... [Steve] Coll said something noteworthy in his closing words on the war in Afghanistan. It may be repeated and quoted here. Keep in mind the context: the summer has been hard. This July is now the deadliest month of the entire 9-year war so far, for the United States at least. 63 soldiers were killed, surpassing last month's record of 60.
Now try taking a step back. "A new phase of the war has already begun," Coll tells us. He's not sure American decision makers always recognize and acknowledge that we're in a transition phase - I certainly know the feeling from Europe. "The exit strategy is already under way," he says. The date is not certain yet, but certain is that it will be some time between 2011 and 2014. That is not far off, mind you. "Every actor in the war knows it's coming." And "everybody" is "hedging for a post-NATO Afghanistan."
Now, here Mr Coll might be a bit too optimistic. There can be little doubt that some actors are preparing for a post-NATO - read: post-counterinsurgency - Afghanistan: yes, the Taliban are patiently preparing; many among the local population are preparing; probably the current regime in Afghanistan is preparing; certainly Pakistani intelligence is hedging its bets in the shadows. But what about Washington? What about London and Berlin? ...
More at Kings of War.
Comments
<EM> Carl said: Intheknow, where does this Pashtuns fighting anyone who in their district stuff come from? From what I've read they are reasonable people who fight when they have grievance and think they might win and don't when they don't. I don't believe they are unthinking insect like creatures that attack anything moving in their area.</EM>
Never meant to imply they were unthinking insect-like creatures. Actually- meant to imply the exact opposite: entirely unpredictable humans ruled by emotion and lacking in any kind of objective rational action- just like all other humans. Unfortunately we base our planning off of the same invalid assumptions economists do when they assume a rational consumer: that people are largely altruistic reasonable folks.
Pashtuns- many- but certainly not all- act just like I expect Francis Marion's followers acted. FM's brothers didn't act necessarily reasonable- but to them it must have seemed reasonable. From the outside it looked to some: unreasonable, irrational, and emotional.
But, my point wasn't to harp on how Pashtuns act- it was to point out that no matter how they acted it most likely wouldn't affect our national security if we weren't there...
These are great comments and perspectives.
Given that I don't have access to all the information, at some point it becomes the "self licking icecream cone" as we go back and forth.
Cut & run, to me, is bad. Preventing further losses IF there's little to gain is good. There are large and pivotal assumptions with either perspective. I'm sure we can all go back and forth about the merits of an expedited withdrawal v. a renewed commitment.
But...
One of my biggest questions though, is this: given the recent raid by Taliban forces on a Pakistani naval air base, are we now compelled to stay in AFG in order to prevent Pakistan & its nuclear weapons from becoming property of the Taliban (or whoever pays the Taliban for that access and control)? Does that make the other arguments moot?
Charles, I think if it looks like cutting and running, it is. And if we do that people will figure we can't stay the course and will base their actions on that. That might not be good.
Intheknow, where does this Pashtuns fighting anyone who in their district stuff come from? From what I've read they are reasonable people who fight when they have grievance and think they might win and don't when they don't. I don't believe they are unthinking insect like creatures that attack anything moving in their area.
Staying in it "to win it" makes me wonder about those that fought for us to stay in Vietnam. Is Vietnam more or less of a threat today to us because we left? If we would have stayed- would they be more or less of a threat today?
I think one could make the argument that us staying longer would have led to longer destabilization and they might be more of a threat (or the 2nd and 3rd order effects of us staying would have made us weaker) today.
Staying until we have stability in Pakistan and India is an end-state that calls for us spending lots of treasure that we don't have and that only makes China stronger and us weaker. That a lot of what happens in Afghanistan and the region has to do with regional politics and China's growing influence makes this even more paradoxical: we are weakening ourselves by staying and China is strengthening themselves- and the one who will become stronger if stability "breaks out" is China too!!
<em> I continue to hear and read comments equating to AFG being a worthless endeavor, not worthy of one more day's effort. That just seems like throwing in the towel.</em>
The people of the U.S. have decided for awhile now that our monetary and blood efforts in Afghanistan aren't balanced by a corresponding increase in our national security. "Throwing in the towel" isn't what it is seen as- as much as "cutting our losses". There aren't too many politicians talking about staying the present course because they know the American people don't believe in it.
<em>If we fold up and go home, then it's back to the same ole mantra: the US will never finish, will never stick around, and the US will always lose the waiting game and we will no doubt be looked at as losers in this, just as the Soviets are viewed as having lost in AFG. That seems to set the conditions for more groups to grow bolder.</em>
That is a possibility- but I don't think there is any proof that the converse won't hurt us more: staying there propping up a sordid government and killing Moslems/Pashtun cousins.
<em>Perhaps I'm too worried about national pride or have a touch of hubris. But, I can't see how any sort of cut & run without a reasonable assurance of victory is going to benefit us in the long run.</em>
Maybe it will benefit us if no-one views it as a "cut and run". If Pashtuns that would have fought anyone in their district anyway stop IED'ing us because we aren't there- why does that hurt our national security? Assuming AQ comes back and is able to hit us a la 9-11 assumes a lot that is invalid.
When I say 'win it' I don't just mean uber kinetic, MCO-esque type of operations. I mean stability, not just in AFG but in Pak and India too (assuming there are real possibilities for the destabilization of India in this mix). Stability for us, of course, is tied to our national security and national interests.
I certainly see the raionale for a focus in NA and the AP. Not sure that will happen. Don't think anyone facing election or re-election soon will take that chance.
I do hope more level-headed individuals are able to steer our future ops and eventual downsizing and subsequent withdrawal - but I continue to hear and read comments equating to AFG being a worthless endeavor, not worthy of one more day's effort. That just seems like throwing in the towel.
I think the raid to kill OBJ has sent shockwaves through AQ, the Taliban, and probably some other groups and HVIs. That's a good thing. But that doesn't mean those groups are going to quit. If we fold up and go home, then it's back to the same ole mantra: the US will never finish, will never stick around, and the US will always lose the waiting game and we will no doubt be looked at as losers in this, just as the Soviets are viewed as having lost in AFG. That seems to set the conditions for more groups to grow bolder.
Perhaps I'm too worried about national pride or have a touch of hubris. But, I can't see how any sort of cut & run without a reasonable assurance of victory is going to benefit us in the long run.
Robert C. Jones:
I understand that you are concerned that our efforts to keep Taliban & Co. out of Afghanistan are destabilizing Pakistan. What I have never been able to understand is why that is so. I just don't get why a stable Afghanistan would cause an unstable Pakistan. If Afghan forces were to launch a campaign to acquire Pak territory that would do it, but we wouldn't let them do that. So why?
Charles, I don't think we will ever see a "simple withdrawal", it will be a phased downsizing. Politics will drive it more than military conditions, but the ultimate win for all of us is the Afghan security forces are capable of and do defeat the insurgency. The intensity of the insurgency may decrease when we downsize our fighting role, but we won't know until do. If you are in it to win (as most are), then set the Afghans up to win. You can't do it for them. We can continue to kill AQ when we find them, but that isn't what the insurgency is about. That is more political, and needs to ultimately be resolved by the Afghans.
I think the key to a successful downsize (not withdrawal) is ensuring we leave robust ROE in place, and maintain the political will to provide fire support to the to the Afghan forces if the Taliban is dumb enough to mass on them. That may facilitate the Afghans enough breathing space to hold their own. Ultimate defeat of the Taliban still requires action in Pakistan by either the Pakistanis or someone else. I think we can continue to prevent Afghanistan's defeat with a much smaller footprint, and only the Afghans can win it, so downsizing after we further attrite TB this summer is probably the right track to pursue. None of us know, we will have to experiment and see how it plays out.
"Reconcile" being the key word.
If we leave without facilitating a true reconciliation there will be hell to pay for those who we convinced to support GIROA in the rural areas (not for GiROA itself, they will take their Millions and run).
However, there is no "winning" for the US in Afghanistan. Is forcing the populace to submit to a GiROA that does not represent their interets a win?
Is building a GiROA security capacity that is almost solely Northern Alliance and nationally controlled, designed for the purpose of suppressing the Afghan popualce a win?
For the US, a win is setting the conditions for a reasonable shot at a future stability that is not dominated by a group of our chosing. A future stability that does not come at the cost of Pakistan instability, as our current apporach dictates.
We stayed in Afghanistan after the first raid to have bases to hunt for bin Laden and to punish AQ. bin Laden is gone, and AQ does not need Pakistan to continue its business. The best way now to get at AQ is to rob them of their base of support by shifting our focus to the many popular uprisings in N. Africa and the AP; and working to help facilitate evolution of government in lieu of the revolution promoted by AQ.
It is time for us to evolve in both our thought and deed.
This does not "abandon" Karzai, it is he who abandoned us long ago.
This does not "abandon" despots such as rule in Yemen and Saudi; they too abandoned us long ago to pursue selfish goals that treat their own populaces with impunity, and Western supporters with disdain.
Bob
A senior commander recently told me that it is getting harder and harder (relatively speaking, of course- it is always "hard") to answer parents he has to talk to after their son has died when they ask, "Did my son die in vain?"
For anyone not convinced we will be out of Afghanistan soon, then I think they are out of touch with the American people. Pro-defense folks from every political stripe are convinced we don't need to be there. The only ones drinking the koolaid of "the long war" and "persistent conflict" are the military.
Clausewitz warned to not divorce military action from its political roots. It would seem our current military leaders have forgotten that axiom- and instead taken it on themselves to attempt to set the political agenda. Mighty dangerous precedent we are setting...
Registan.net was bocked on Camp Eggers. I could reach it off base and I could reach it at HQ ISAF, but just not at eggers.
I'd say western governments are preparing for a post-NATO Afghanistan....because unlike what Rid says, a post-NATO AFG does not equate to a post-COIN AFG. There will still be an insurgency, probably a robust insurgency, in AFG that Kabul will have to deal with. That's the plan. Based on conditions (timelines), NATO will train/build up the ANSF enough to withdraw and let GIRoA seal the deal as it were. We'll still be there doing institutional transition, but as of 2014, they've got the kinetic end of it and GIRoA will have to be inclusive enough without our PRTs and CERP doing everything from governance to service delivery for them...without our blood and treasure. Sure, there's going to be an 'enduring/strategic partnership' involved to continue propping the GIRoA network up but they'll be fighting the insurgency on their own. If they can't do it, I don't think we'll be back there anyway. Decent interval to save face is all we need.
So yes, I'd say we are prepping for a post-NATO AFG. Hopefully our prepping will extend to regional actors as well; PAK, India, China, and Russia. We need to prep for our relationships with them based on our interests and what we've seen and learned in AFG the past 10 yrs.
Yet another blocked one over here in AFG.
I didn't realize KingsOfWar was a hacker site:
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Or maybe they just don't want us learning.
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(My favorite quote on this topic)
"We have nothing to fear from Afghanistan,
and the best thing to do is to leave it as
much as possible to itself. It may not be very
flattering to our 'amour propre', but I feel
sure I am right when I say that the less the
Afghans see of us the less they will dislike us.
Should Russia in future years attempt to
conquer Afghanistan, or invade India
through it, we should have a better chance
of attaching the Afghans to our interest if
we avoid all interference with them in the
meantime."
Lord Frederick "Bobs" Roberts of Kandahar, 1880
(Input to a tremendous debate in London regarding if the UK should return yet
again to avenge this defeat, or leave Afghanistan well enough alone.)
Well at least the British got out, and probably realized at least for a generation or so that it wasnt worth it in the first place to go in.
You see if the British did anything right in their empire years of the second half of the 19th century it was strategy and it was pretty basic. From Afghanistan to Egypt to the Sudan and beyond they knew that if they were going to stay, that if they were going to chunk in a handful more regiments that it would come at a cost; or in other words they knew they would have to raise taxes to pay for it.
So what if smart, contemporary American strategy says that the costs of staying for a long time in Afghanistan just are not worth it anymore? Do we continue to answer that question from the necessity of tactical military success in Coin which by doctrine and practice necessarily will take a generation to succeed? You see war is not just about fulfilling the military's desire to win it for its own sake. Shoot if that was the case we would be a country of militarists.
War is not just about the militaries that fight it and their understandable desire to win with the tactical methods that they have come to believe in. What happens when winning for the military overcomes the strategic and political necessity for leaving Afghanistan, or at least scaling back and significantly altering the current operational framework of coin?
gian
It's a lot harder to disengage from the fighting in Afghanistan than it is to get mixed up in it in the first place.
Remember what happened to the Soviets in the 1980's? (People nowadays refer to that business as the Soviet Vietnam.)
Remember what happened to Sir William Elphinstone's army during the 1842 retreat from Kabul? (Over 16,500 soldiers and civilians died during that SNAFU.)
Do the guys in charge ever learn anything from history?