Pakistan deliberately scuttled Afghan peace talks

Kiling's 'Great Game' continues.

Mr. Jones,

Quit agonizing over Pakistan? That is easier said than done when Pakistan's behavior directly correlates (positively or negatively) with our "current" objectives in Afghanistan. Fortunately or unfortunately we don't make policy, yet your advice always seem to cross the line, or border on, making a significant policy change versus how to achieve our stated objectives. That isn't a criticism, but I think you need to be upfront about what your proposing is a policy change, not how to achieve our current policy objectives.

You implied (my interpretation) that we should let the Taliban have Afghanistan, because Pakistan won't back off, and besides the Taliban won't as extreme as they were formally (I agree with that assessment, the Taliban as a politically body have matured. Also like your analogy to the Christians in Mass, but that sir is a policy change and not what our men and women have been asked to do.

COL Jones,

I do not blame Pakistan for pursuing what it believes to be its interests, nor do I expect it to alter its policies simply because the U.S. asks it to. That is neither here nor there, however. What I cannot understand is U.S. policy. The U.S. is investing enormous resources in an attempt to stabilize Afghanistan, while simultaneously subsidizing and supporting Pakistan, which appears to be actively seeking to destabilize Afghanistan. U.S. policy seems to be enabling both sides in this conflict. That strikes me as irrational.

The relationship between Pakistan and the Taliban may be a point of weakness, but I have a hard time seeing how the U.S. could influence that any more than it can Pakistan. You have often pointed out the Karzai governments lack of legitimacy, which makes it a weak tool at best to try to peel the Taliban away from Pakistan. What else does the U.S. have with which to influence the Taliban? You say that the Taliban would be better off realizing that their best interest lies in reconciling with the Karzai government, but as long as they have Pakistani support and Karzai is weak, does not seeking outright victory seem the more rational policy choice? And even should the Taliban manage to slip the Pakistani leash and negotiate a peace, whats to stop the Pakistanis from recruiting and supporting another disaffected Pashtun faction? There are plenty to choose from.

Given, as you point out, that the U.S. is unlikely to be able to alter Pakistans behavior, and the Pakistanis are unlikely to change their policies anytime soon, what exactly is the rationale behind pursuing COIN operations in Afghanistan? The current approach seems destined to squander resources and perpetuate open-ended conflict.

And what, exactly, does any of this have to do with defeating al Qaeda?

It is irrational to expect Pakistan to adjust what is arguably its number one national interest simply because the U.S. asks them to, or even when when they have agreed and accepted handsome bribes to do so.

Looking at this like a military problem, I would see that issue as a strong point, that I am not likely to be able to take, and to be avoided if at all possible. I would look for the point of weakness in this system to focus my energy on.

My assessment is that the point of weakness is the relationship between Pakistan and the Taliban. Does the Taliban really want to be Pakistan's little Bi@%# once this is over? I don't think so, but they know they will be. Better to cut those ties and to work reconciliation with Karzai for a place in an independent Afghanistan. They know the Americans will get bored and go home, Pakistan, however, isn't going anywhere.

As to US concerns, the type of extreme Islam practiced in Afghanistan by the Taliban when no one cared about Afghanistan is highly unlikely to re-emerge. Just as the extreme Christianity practiced in Massachusetts had to evolve once exposed to the public eye, so must the Taliban. They will probably be looked back at nostalgically some day, just as we do the Pilgrims. There is a time and place for religious, oppressive zealots in black, but it is not an enduring condition. BL, our fears for reconciliation are irrational. The fears of the Hazzara and Tajik populaces in N. Afghanistan, however are real, so we need to focus on those, not ours, as we monitor the reconciliation process.

(And quit agonizing over Pakistan. They know what they are doing, we would do the same, and they are not going to change simply because they are asked, and as they are a nuke power, we cannot force them to comply either - which, of course, is why Iran wants nukes, but that is for another thread...)

Yadernye, your thought about large, unstated geopolitical considerations is a good one. Of course, no one who matters is going to share those on an open forum, but its possible that some such nonsense does underlie this apparent paradoxical policy. On the other hand, it may just be bureaucratic inertia, stupidity, arrogance and ignorance mixed together...

What exactly is the strategic rationale behind waging a large, expensive COIN operation in Afghanistan if the U.S.s erstwhile ally and ward, Pakistan, is supporting and guiding the primary insurgent group? Either American national security decision-making has been completely sublimated to domestic political concerns, or there are some large, unstated geopolitical considerations influencing policy-making.

Either way, it appears clear that the key to ending the war is to convince or compel Pakistan to end its support of the Afghan Taliban. Without Pakistans backing, it would seem that the Taliban would likely seek a peace deal with the Karzai government.

Madhu:

<em><blockquote>Some of us that live between worlds learn to say one thing to one audience, and another thing to another audience. We do it all the time. It's called survival.</em></blockquote>

A soldier approaches a villager on the outskirts of a highland settlement.

Soldier (points to sky): "Say, is that the sun or the moon up there?"

Villager (suspicious): "I don't know...I'm not from around here."

1. The public opinion canard is a canard. One would give that some credence if the most dedicated army apologists in Pakistan were not the same people who stir up the most anti-American feeling. But they are, so the notion that public opinion holds the army back is laughable. The army fashions public opinion much more than public opinion does anything to the army.
2. "national interest" is another load of BS. Pakistan's "national interest", in the sense of the best interest of most of the people in that country, is NOT to indulge in some endless zero-sum game with India or play regional power in Afghanistan. A relatively small section of the elite does indeed perceive that to be in THEIR interest and they pursue that interest relentlessly. But the twist is this: they can be made to change their minds, but their AMERICAN paymasters with Stockholm syndrome/lack of vision/arrogant-ignorance are enabling their illusions. The only irreconcilable group is the true-blue Jihadis and they are NOT a majority of the general staff. They use the general staff's stupid notions of national interest to promote their own dangerous cause. And the general staff, trained to think "strategically" by generations of American advisors, may not know any better.
3. It may well be that the US really does not have the ability to do imperialism in that region and should pull out as soon as possible. And they should not make things worse with further incompetent and blinkered meddling as they leave. Let China sort it out. There are probably some people in the PLA who think too much like the Pakistani generals and who will try to get Pakistan to go after India, but I increasingly suspect that the Chinese will be less foolish than the Americans. There may be a few desperate moments in the coming years, but without a multi-billion dollar American subsidy, many insane notions will start to look less attractive...

The U.S. is indeed but one of many nations that perceive that it has essential national interests that are shaped in Afghanistan; and while none of those interests match up, those other nations have opted to service their interests discreetly, from the sidelines, without overly exposing themselves to the inherent risks of direct, official engagement. Like the U.S. did when we countered the Soviet invasion. The U.S. did not want to get into a direct war with the Soviets over Afghanistan so we used discretion then. These many countries (Russia, Pakistan, Iran, Uzbekistan, China to name but a few) don't want to get into a direct war with the U.S., so they apply discretion now.

It appears it is still a"Great Game," to borrow a retired phrase for such intrigue in this region between Russia and Great Britain.

This is what states do. While it is frustrating to be the one caught in an exposed, overcommitted position, we have done it to others in the past, and will again in the future. The key is simply to recognize it for what it is, and act accordingly. We, at least in the public eye, appear to be acting like the US position is the only position that any honest state could possibly support and that other positions are either wrong or non-existent.

I guess perhaps this is another area where we need to get pragmatic...

Oh, and every Pakistani official I have met impressed me as knowing EXACTLY what the situation was and what they were doing to shape it to their ends. They'll take the money and stuff we give them to help support what we see as our interests in this region; but we would be very naive indeed to expect that they would subjugate their own interests as well. No, the fiction that the executive of Pakistan somehow does not know or control what his intelligence service or military do is, I believe, a fiction created largely by us to ward off public uproar over the massive support we lend to Pakistan when it so clearly, (and reasonably) has interests that are quite counter to ours on this matter. The Great Game indeed...

We may want to consider how much more effective we were when we took a position that aligned with Pakistan, were those not the glory days and the poster child for effective, low cost, low exposure intervention?

The U.S. has acted increasingly without discretion since the end of the Cold War. It may be time to reacquire that one aspect of our Cold War engagement.

Dayuhan,

We went into Afghanistan based largely on emotion, then attempted to apply a rational approach later. Unfortunately our rational approach, or strategy, seems to be simply a doctrinal approach combined with hope instead of an appropriate approach to pursue our interests. This article simply reinforces that achieving our national interests in Afghanistan has little to do with good governance in Afghanistan (it is a problem we should assist with over time using diplomacy and economic development, but whether we achieve it or not will have little impact on Al Qaeda). Assuming our primary strategic aims remain defeating AQ and its "transnational" affiliates; and denying a future safe haven for them in the region (a pipe dream), then even a costly victory in Afghanistan wont achieve that, so what are we doing?

In my opinion these boasting ISI officers may have presented an opportunity for us to shift the effort where it needs to be shifted. We present an ultimatum to the Pakistan Government to put these ISI terrorists away, or we reserve the right to target them unilaterally just as we would target AQ. I know that doesnt fly well with those in our government that are Pakistans lap dogs. Theyll of course call for more patience while our coalition continues to bleed out in more ways than one, which simply reinforces the bravado of these ISI officers. These pleas are based on hope; not fact. We just had the ISI tell us who the real enemy is, and what we do with that information will define our future in the region.

Why were still blindly pursuing a Cold War COIN approach under the false assumption that were simply dealing with an insurgency instead of something larger still baffles me. Agree with Gian or not, he makes many good points and too many key people are drinking the COIN tea without really thinking it through. Even if we achieved a forced stability, or better yet good governance in Afghanistan, we still wouldnt have accomplished much in way of defeating AQ or denying AQ safe haven. On the other hand if we lose in Afghanistan well give AQ an undeserved psychological victory that will give the global movement more momentum. This is the bed we made for ourselves due to our lack of strategy and blindly pursuing COIN doctrine.

Whether we like it our not, we have been drawn into the Central Asia Great Game, where the Taliban is simply one proxy being used by Pakistan, Iran and perhaps others. We may think this war is about defeating AQ (it is getting harder to see the correlation anymore), but we dont even get half the vote. Pakistan, Iran, China, Russia, India and others in the region have different views of what this conflict means to their interests (not to mention the non-state actors), and will engage in ways that is in line with their interests. Our strategists have been too focused on the Taliban and COIN doctrine to see the larger picture, and were paying a price for it. As our President said, you have to deal with the world the way it is, not the way you want it to be.

It is time for a new approach that aligns with the reality there and our interests. Idealism is not a strategy.

Yes, they will look for someone to blame, and probably end up blaming us.

There are of course any number of options, and in every case it's difficult to assess what the outcome of any given action would be. There is abundant potential for unintended consequence with almost any decision, which is a good reason to be a bit cautious when making decisions.

My point is simply that statements such as "Pakistan supports the Taliban" impose a monolithic unity of policy that simply doesn't exist in the real world. If that leads us to respond by penalizing the few allies we have there for actions they didn't initiate and can't control, we haven't advanced our cause. It is not a situation in which we have the capacity to simply impose our will.

That assumes - and again we have to recall the fragmentation within these institutions - that the people getting our money are the same ones that want to kill us. If that's the case, all well and good. If it's not the case, all we're doing is undercutting that factions that don't want to kill us at the expense of those who do.

Of course we may not know who in the picture wants to kill us; just trying to illustrate that it's not so simple as one might think if one assumes that any given "they" represents a monolithic entity.

<i>
I think we should seriously consider taking the gloves off. What other actions would work in a reasonable amount of time? </i>

What specific action would you suggest, and with what anticipated outcome?

We need to consider the possibility that there is no action that will "work" - meaning that will achieve our objectives - reliably and in a reasonable amount of time.

We knew when we went into this that large parts of Pakistan, including parts of the populace, the army, and the ISI, support the Taliban. We knew when we started that the Pakistani government does not have the capacity to control these parts, even to the limited extent to which they're willing to try. These are things we should have factored into our goals from the start, rather than adding another problem we can't solve to the existing problem we can't solve.

First we must assume that the article may not be entirely accurate, but I think most of us who follow this sad situation believe there is more truth than fiction in this article.

If we're at war with the Taliban, because they're associated with AQ, and Pakistan is providing the Taliban aid and comfort, and we're providing Pakistan billions of dollars for their COIN effort (and now the humanitarian crisis), then our tax payers have every right to call on "their" government and ask for an explanation of why their hard earned tax dollars are funding the Taliban who are in turn killing our children.

We don't have a strategy in Afghanistan, and all efforts to reform the government (even if successful) will do nothing to stop this fight. In some cases a stronger military response is appropriate.

You can interpret these actions in a lot of ways, but on one extreme the ISI just declared they were waging war against us through their proxy (and it is implied they do it with our aid money). What is our answer? I personally don't care if it is rational behavior for the government of Pakistan. All groups believe their actions are rational based on their beliefs/goals. This simply reinforces that good governance in Afghanistan will not stop the Taliban. I think we should seriously consider taking the gloves off. What other actions would work in a reasonable amount of time?

One thing we often forget when we speak of "Pakistan", "the Pak Army", or "ISI", is that while we are conditioned to see governments, armies, and intelligence agencies as hierarchical entities with a clear chain of command, in many countries, including Pakistan, this is simply not the case. "The Army" does not necessarily act coherently at the behest of government according to Government's perception of national interest. Neither does ISI. All or part of these entities may at any given time be acting on its own accord, following its own perception of national interest, or sometimes of self interest. These perceptions may vary among different parts of these entities.

Trying to persuade the Pakistani government to change its policies may be of limited value even if the effort is successful, because the government may lack the power to compel or persuade its constituent parts - especially those parts that are armed - to follow whatever policy it adopts.

It is not clear from this story whether the individuals quoted were acting (or speaking) on behalf of government, or whether they were acting on an independent agenda, trying to disrupt US-Pakistani relations. Plots within plots are, under the circumstances, to be assumed.

There is really just one key point that needs to be understood to see why there is nothing particularly suprising about Pakistan's actions describe here. That one key point is:

Pakistan national interests are not the same as US national interests. Period.

Pakistan has acted rationally based on their interests, though in recent years this has grown more complicated. They have always had the interest of defending against India and also the interest of maintaining good relations with the US. It was easy to do both without conflict for years. An unstable Afghanistan that they can influence helps them against India. When the US was working with them to create instability there during the Soviet era, there was no conflict. When the US didn't care what was going on there during the period between the fall of the Soviets and the attacks of 9/11, there was no conflict. But once the US decided that it needed to take out the Taliban as part of its actions against AQ and also wanted Pakistan's help in that endeavor, it created a HUGE conflict of interest for Pakistan. They have tried to work both sides of this conflict, and the cost has been a tremendous growth of instability in their country. If push comes to shove on this issue, they really only have one choice. Indian fears trump U.S. friendship. We need to act accordingly. It is irrational to assume they will compromise what is best for them in favor for what we believe is best for us; and unfair of us to expect them to do so.

There's another flaw in that this is working with old information. There have been a number of high impact events since then, the most obvious being the floods. Pakistan asks "why won't you help us more?" well, this is why. Keep feeding the monsters and we will not want to feed you. When a nation invests in hate it reaps sorrow.

To be fair to Pakistan, things have changed there since the information the NYT's article is based on had more temporal currency. The ISI has trouble today that it did not have then as well, the status quo of muddling & manipulation everyone relied on collapsed in the floods as well. The peace talks went nowhere, and instead the Taliban have responded with yet more brutality and butchery. One of the things that has been revealed since is that the Taliban intentions of turning Pakistan into a client state have been more open. The ISI's opinions have changed along with that.