KABUL, Afghanistan, Aug. 25, 2010 -- Intelligence reports indicate some pockets of low insurgent morale, with some insurgent fighters reluctant to keep fighting and some refusing to assume district commands when commanders are captured or killed, International Security Assistance Force officials in Afghanistan said today.
In a written statement, officials said the low morale among enemy fighters and insurgent leaders can be linked to successful security operations by Afghan and ISAF forces.
Coalition and Afghan forces conducted more than 2,800 counterterrorist operations over the past 90 days, the statement said, killing or capturing more than 365 insurgent leaders and 2,386 fighters. These counter-insurgency successes have also led to a growing sense of distrust among insurgent fighters, heightened fear of spies in their midst and increased suspicion among rival tribes, officials said.
"While the coalition strength and capability of the [Afghan forces] are on the rise, we are seeing evidence of low insurgent morale, which is affecting their capability across the country," said German Brig. Gen. Josef Blotz, an ISAF spokesman. "The coalition will continue to neutralize insurgents and eliminate their safe havens, expanding areas that are secure enough for improved governance and development."
The ISAF statement cited the Taliban commander in Helmand province's Marja district as an example, noting that he openly acknowledged to his fellow insurgents that the Taliban are losing Marja and that their chances of winning are poor.
ISAF officials said intelligence reports indicate the Taliban commander based his assessment on battlefield losses -- insurgents killed or captured by the coalition forces -- and increasing resentment of the insurgent methods by average Afghans.
"The increases in troop strength and continued growth in capability allowed coalition forces to conduct 83 percent more kinetic operations in July 2010 than we initiated in July 2009," Blotz said. "We are intensifying our campaign in areas previously held by the insurgents, including the central Helmand River valley, in and around Kandahar City, and in the vicinity of Baghlan in northern Afghanistan."
The troop increases to ISAF are nearly complete, with about 90 percent of the 40,000 additional ISAF servicemembers already in theater. The Afghan army already has achieved the October 2010 strength goal of 134,000 soldiers, and recruiting totals for the national police are ahead of schedule, with more than 104,000 police officers serving in uniform, officials said.
The security ring in Kandahar City continues to strengthen, and operations have begun in the Arghandab district of northwestern Kandahar, a traditional Taliban stronghold and source of insurgent strength in the region, the ISAF statement said. The clear-and-hold operation known as Amaaliat Motahed Kardan Arghandab -- "Unity Arghandab" -- supports the ongoing Hamkari operation in Kandahar by denying the insurgents safe haven in the province, officials added.
Another operation designed to deny insurgent freedom of maneuver was Task Force Helmand's recent air assault into the last remaining insurgent stronghold in Nad-e Ali in Helmand province. Also in Helmand, elements of the 215th Afghan National Army Corps planned and conducted independent counterinsurgency missions in Nar-e Saraj targeting insurgent safe havens relying on only mentoring assistance from ISAF.
In northern Afghanistan, ISAF has increased its capability with the addition of 4,000 U.S. forces and increased Afghan forces, bringing the total number of coalition forces in the region to about 30,000. These additional forces have allowed Afghan and ISAF units to conduct clearing operations in Baghlan focused along key commercial routes to Mazar-e Sharif.
"As [Afghan] and ISAF units continue to achieve success against insurgent networks and sanctuaries, the Afghan people will continue to feel empowered to reject the insurgents within their communities," Blotz said. "As this happens, the insurgency will continue to weaken, and low-level fighters will abandon their losing cause.
"Combining these security successes with anti-corruption programs, reintegration efforts, and long-term development projects will lead to the further weakening of the insurgent cause and greater security for the Afghan people," he added.
Comments
Kind of reminds me of a serious Iraq intelligence report I happen to review in 2006 indicating that the US was only facing a combined insurgent force of 5,000 using one method of analysis and maybe 7,500 using another.
By 2009, many were accepting the figures 20-40,000.
ISAF must wonder then why so many people simply question their reporting.
For those that are reporting on the low morale---check the video being carried by CNAS which was done via a Norwegian reporter who was embedded in a Taliban group.
Did not appear to be in a low state of morale.
Also if morale is so low just why in the heck is the Taliban northern campaign being effective effort to warrant a large input of US troops?
As a VN vet I do not know how many times I have heard "light at the end of the tunnel".
"The Taliban is not traditionally popular in Afghanistan and the Afghans as a whole - and especially in the north and west are not, traditionally, going to support them and their un-Afghan religious intolerance..." paraphrasing A. Rashid.
If this is still true, then
1) We should continue going after them hard in Afghanistan and Pakistan and look for every opportunity to separate them from the local population, who may wish them gone even more than they wish us gone
2) Why is the Taliban able to operate now in the north?
This is reported from ISAF, while Spencer Acherman relays morale problems (albeit from collected anecdotal sources) on ISAF itself, on his blog post over at Danger Room:
<a href=http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2010/08/troops-wonder-wtf-are-we-doing-… Wonder: WTF are we doing in Afghanistan, again?</a>
Morale is low?
1. Religion. Ramadan does not affect insurgent's operational tempo due to the fact, that "holy warriors" are excluded from fasting...
2. Culture. Atrition of 2000-3000 insurgents in 90 days is impresive. What about around estimated 30000 Taliban insurgents in AFG mountains indicated by same ISAF sources earlier and last nine years in a row? Families and tribes of 2,386 killed fighters will be obliged to take weapons to conduct revenge (Badal in Pashtunwali code). There are some 6 million Pashtun males potentially created to conduct badal.
3. Tactics. Maybe insurgents just choose to lie low and wait until the middle of 2011. Westerners have watches, the Taliban have time.
Conclusion: We need to push more.
Ramadan should be used as an opportunity to continue operations. Cultural sensitivity aside, why does it seem that we never use this potentially critical time when our enemies may be weakened? This will have to be used carefully and intelligently but if a proportion of our enemies are not eating during the day, why not step up operations?
Am I the only one disturbed by comments like:
"In northern Afghanistan, ISAF has increased its capability with the addition of 4,000 U.S. forces and increased Afghan forces, bringing the total number of coalition forces in the region to about 30,000. These additional forces have allowed Afghan and ISAF units to conduct clearing operations in Baghlan focused along key commercial routes to Mazar-e Sharif."
How is this a measure of our success? RC-North is NOT a traditional area of Taliban strength, nor was it a major security concern, until recently. That fact that we now have 30,000 C.F. troops there seems like conditions are worsening, not getting better. What exactly is there to be hopeful about?
1. Ramadan
2. Suspect there is some command confusion between the various groups and their leaders as to direction of effort
3. They are seeing some backlash from the population so they are slowing down to guage the next step
4. I really though think they are in a recently released study "splitter group" phase and when in that phase there will be a natural slowdown and then a reconsolidation amongst the remaining elements with a tendency to join an exisiting stronger group that has not been under the same pressure
5. Would also throw in the potential of the effect of the flooding in Pakistan on the supply efforts
Was just wondering if morale could be low due to the fact that they are participating in Ramadan? I understand that not all Insurgents will participate. As a former ETT, a majority of our operations ceased due to the fasting. The OPTEMPO, ANA morale, and insurgent activity increased once Ramadan was over.
Is it really the morale decreasing or is it because of their participation in Ramadan?
<i>So color me "very skeptical".</i>
Done and noted. But it may be true and I do believe that P4 would not be putting this out if there was not a strong indication of Taliban weakness here and now. We need to get beyond debating windows of opportunity by replacing that debate with best practices concerning how to exploit our adversarys gaps and weaknesses.