As one might expect, Conway strongly defended the requirement for a two-brigade amphibious assault capability. He termed it a U.S. "asymmetric advantage" and a necessary hedge against the likelihood that the United States will not have overseas bases convenient to all future military crises.
And in order to keep the amphibious assault option credible, Conway voiced his support for the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle, a program he termed "beleaguered" and which he acknowledged was absorbing a large fraction of the Marine Corps' acquisition budget. Conway explained that if the new-and-improved set of EFV prototypes fails its trials or if this version of the EFV is otherwise killed, the Marine Corps is still going to need some method of moving infantry through the ocean at 25 knots to a hostile shore from over the horizon (at least 12-14 miles out).
Later, Conway dug in deeper. He flatly rejected the idea of the Marine Corps relinquishing any of its roles and missions. Conway defended the Marine Corps' continued need to be ready for "small wars," combined arms mechanized operations, and the full range of amphibious missions.
Where will the money come from? Conway explained what he is —to give up:
I think in time, after Afghanistan, that 202,000 Marines in a peacetime Marine Corps is probably too many. People are expensive. I don't know that we could keep 202,000 Marines constructively occupied ... So we need something out there in the out years, but in no way would we accept that we're going to build a less capable Marine Corps ... I don't see that we're going to eliminate, in a vertical slice, any of our capabilities ... There will be less Marines eligible to deploy when we have a smaller Marine Corps in peacetime than there are today. That's the only place that I would say that we would be less capable of responding to the call from the secretary.
It is refreshing to see Conway protecting the Marine Corps from Parkinson's Law -- rather than having what he would see as a bloated peacetime headcount diverted to increasingly wasteful purposes, Conway would rather build a smaller, higher quality force, and one with the proper equipment for future challenges. At an average annual personnel cost of nearly $95,000 per head, cutting the 27,000 Marines added since 2001 would free up $2.5 billion per year for a variety of other uses.
Whether the next generation of Marine Corps leaders shares Conway's views on peacetime end-strength remains to be seen. And if the Marine Corps shows a willingness to save money on headcount, might that cause the Navy and Air Force to cast a hungry gaze at a future peacetime Army?
Comments
Ken White: your bottom line is a correct one; a correct one for any service.
This may already be on the retiring CMC's mind as he has mentioned in a previous article eleswhere, of a smaller Corps built around the backbone of an older enlisted base (the Corps' current base the youngest), and he may have already advanced this to his replacement for consideration and implementation?
Toujours Fidele
Robert Haddick wrote:<blockquote>"Whether the next generation of Marine Corps leaders shares Conways views on peacetime end-strength remains to be seen. And if the Marine Corps shows a willingness to save money on headcount, might that cause the Navy and Air Force to cast a hungry gaze at a future peacetime Army?"</blockquote>History imputes probably 'yes' to the first question and almost certainly 'yes' to the second. Those answers followed by results in the affirmative would be wise courses for the nation in the near future.
We do pretty well at rapid buildup <i>when pushed</i>, we do quite poorly at peacetime bureaucractic military stuff with minimal external pressures. We have been and would be in a far better position emphasizing personnel quality over quantity...