by Tripp McCullar
Download the Full Article: The Rising Dominance of the Information Revolution within RMA Thought
Although scholars continue to debate the definitive terms and significance of so-called Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), history will eventually suggest that the still-in-progress Information Revolution most radically redefined the western way of war. In War Made New, Max Boot masterfully addresses the phenomenon of RMA's and how various military scholars define what constitutes an RMA. Although Boot's piece allocates an entire section for the Information Revolution, it falls significantly short of giving due credit to the impact the Information Revolution will ultimately have on the western way of war. The purpose of this piece is to argue that the Information Revolution will ultimately eclipse most of history's widely-accepted RMAs due to its ability to "empower the weak" by (1) widely propagating strategic weapons technology, (2) rendering traditional military organization near-obsolete, (3) providing open access to mass social mobilization platforms, and (4) bypassing the development of industrialized mobility to achieve strategic effects.
Download the Full Article: The Rising Dominance of the Information Revolution within RMA Thought
MAJ Tripp McCullar is a U.S. Army Special Forces officer and recent graduate of the Naval Postgaduate School Defense Analysis program. He is currently assigned to DIA.
Editor's Note: Tripp's article presents a critique of SWJ friend Max Boot's War Made New. This critique falls within the writings of John Arquilla, NPS DA faculty and former RAND associate. These views are continued in the recent SWJ publications by friends Crispin "Starburk" Burke and Adam Elkus in their article "WikiLeaks, Media, and Policy: A Question of Super-Empowerment." SWJ takes no stance on any of the presented views. We welcome the discussion, and we will publish any rebuttals that meet our journal editoral policy.
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I am in complete agreement with MAJ McCullar about the need for greatly increased attention to communications and a narrative. The real challenge, however, is in design and implementation of a counter-narrative. Unfortunately, the author devotes only two sentences to that issue -- to the issue of what we should be *doing*. It is easy to say we should deglorify the Taliban, but how should we do this and -- in some ways more important -- *who should do it*? I addressed these issues at length in my "Humanizing 'The Man': Strengthening Psychological and Information Operations in Afghanistan", posted on October 10.
The challenge of how to deglorify comes from the central problem of tribal societies' antagonism to outsiders. In fashioning a counter-narrative, how do we overcome the fact that both we and the government are outsiders? I address this problem at length in the article. The key, I believe, is empowering people. I also argue that the most powerful counter-narrative may be influenced by the Japanese martial art of Aikido, which would suggest a narrative focusing on empowerment rather than on direct confrontation with the Talliban narrative. Empowering people will help mobilize them to organize for objectives that are important to them, and security will certainly be one of those objectives, if not the first among them.
I would also suggest studying how Hernando de Soto and his Instituto Libertad y Democracia, in Peru, in the early 1990s put out of business the violent Maoist terrorist group, Sendero Luminoso, by giving peasants property rights, thus giving them a stake in the system. De Soto gave people a stake in *private* space, while my organization, EGG (see my article) gives people a stake in *public* space -- but the effect is the same.
I find myself agreeing with Wilf...however perhaps with some repolishing, the bottom line of this paper may be that the West needs to get to grips with the environment in which its adversaries are using so well against it, namely the information environment...at the moment we seem like the fledgling RFC struggling to gets its head around this air warfare things and hoping just once to even get near a marauding Zeppelin...
The article raises some interesting ideas, however I agree with the previous posters. Information as a resource may not be adequately used by Western democracies / the USA, but that does not mean conventional arsenals will become obsolete or non-state actors and decentralized networks will come to dominate the international landscape or seriously challenge Western states. I also doubt that past inventions, be they technological or organizational in nature, should be considered "revolutions". They're just processes of adaptation to changing external cricumstances. Finally I think the sentence about enemies being the real visionaries is somewhat overdone, mostly it's just people and groupings who are lacking alternatives and so cling to improvisation and any conceivable means they can use to counter rational, linear-designed Western strategy; necessity spawns invention.
I think the author missed one important point -- the great flexibility the current opponents and their ilk have when compared to the massive western bureaucracies.
That accounts for much of the disparity in approaches and he offers no solution for that salient point.
The final paragraph contains this:<blockquote>"As the US continues to long for the era of clean linear wars and backslides towards its comfort zone, our enemies appear to be the real visionaries, who truly view the past as prologue of things to come, and leverage the Information Age most creatively. These are the new rules for the global way of war, the fight already being waged by our enemies, and the paradigm that the modern strategic environment will continue to demand."</blockquote>I believe the longing for "clean linear wars" while certainly present for some is largely incorrect. It's also notable that 'longing for' and actually appreciating current realities are two different things. Most of us often wish things could be less complex but realize they are not and we just get on with what needs to be done. We are able to adapt rapidly, a small group can react almost as quickly, a nation far less rapidly and a group of nations in concert only agonizingly slowly...
That paragraph could be construed to express longing for a situation that does not really exist. We are likely as or more visionary as our opponents; what we are not is adequately flexible and unconstrained by social and political fetters. Both those shortfalls are due to the absence of an existential threat. Given such a threat, things would likely be quite different.
While there is much merit in the article, some of the assertions are seemingly a bit hyperbolic and all seem totally immersed in the here and now. As Nils Bohr said, "Prediction is very difficult, especially about the future." Warfare does change very slowly as William F. Owen noted. Each war is different, some amazingly so...
Maybe I've just seen too many of these 'revolutions' but to say the West in general has not adapted well to the information operational aspects of today's war is absolutely correct; to say that such will be the future is possible but far from ordained, to call it a revolution is simply incorrect.
(1) widely propagating strategic weapons technology, (2) rendering traditional military organization near-obsolete, (3) providing open access to mass social mobilization platforms, and (4) bypassing the development of industrialized mobility to achieve strategic effects.
OK - nothing in the article presents any evidence that 1-4 are in anyway correct or supported by evidence. War does not change. Warfare changes very slowly.
I am still trying to get over the statement that "gun powder" was somehow an "RMA" - and why after all the writing showing that the RMA is a very silly concept are we still talking about RMA's?
Previous Posters:
Regardless of whether or not RMAs are "silly" or if warfare itself doesn't change and will continue to require conventional arsenals, the author's argument remains important in forcing modern military professionals to look past historical examples as the key to future events. The larger point, I think, is that certain events in history like the invention of gunpowder did change war very rapidly. The first battle hardened warrior to show up unprepared for the first battle with gunpowder would surely agree. Therefore, the importance of capturing the changes of war due to the author's points 1-4 cannot be ignored. To maintain relevance in this information age will surely require the "visionary" characteristics demonstrated by our current enemies. If these ideas help us better prepare for the next conflict rather than the last one, the RMA concept cannot be ignored and warrants further thought and consideration.