Southern Sudan - the Four Theses

Even if Sudan manages to avoid a general war in 2011, the border environment is hardly conducive to peace. First, neither the Government of Sudan (GoS) nor the Government of South Sudan (GoSS) has sufficient capacity to police the 2,000km line-of-contact between them. Second, given Khartoum's long history of intervention in Chad, the GoSS' role in insurgencies elsewhere in Sudan, the easily-exploited local tensions on the border as well as within either of the two Sudans, the tendency of armed groups in both north and south Sudan to act independently, and the potential "pay off" that one side could gain if the other is destabilized in the coming months, the situation has all the essential triggers for proxy war. What about "hot pursuit?" Reprisal in the event that one side discovers the other "dabbling" in its affairs (e.g., bribery of key officials; logistical support for armed groups)?

Northern elites have much to lose from southern secession. Three-quarters of Sudans oil is pumped in the South. According to former Special Envoy to Sudan Andrew S. Natsios, oil is central to governmental operations: "[It] allows the party to buy off opponents at home, guarantees a national growth rate of 12-14 percent a year, helps maintain prosperity in the Arab triangle, and supports a massive internal security apparatus." [1] Currently, the NCP enjoys significant leverage. All oil is refined in, and shipped from, the North. Revenues are also managed in the capital -- by an NCP-dominated civil service that has not yet been replicated in the South. About 98% of the GoSS budget is derived from its share of drilling in the Upper Nile and Unity states. The SPLM is already working to reduce its vulnerability by building a refinery in Warrap and encouraging pipeline construction in Kenya. [2] The North has three options: (1) acquiesce to the referendum; (2) attempt a limited invasion of the oil blocks that straddle the mutual border; (3) pursue long-term destabilization of South Sudan by instigating conflict between the various groups therein.

Acquiescence to the referendum would be a hard pill for the NCP (and thus, by default, the GoS), which, as LTC Talley points out, has appeared to engage in something very like denial. Before it attempted a limited invasion, the GoS might hope to extract concessions from the South -- shared control of the oil fields, say. (Perhaps they could drive a hard bargain by threatening war and threatening an embargo, hoping to bleed the South before they themselves succumb.) This would mean that the South would not one day gain primary control over its own oil wealth. Whether or not the GoSS could accept this outcome depends upon their confidence in achieving battlefield victory.

Flush with wealth, the SPLA has expanded "in ... both size and scope." [3] Juba has received limited defense assistance from the United States, and may expect to receive more. [4] Like the MPLA and the GoS before it, the GoSS may also require oil companies to provide off-sets that help expand its military capability. These could range from all-weather roads to private security that can free up garrison troops for operations at the front. Not too long ago, Jane's reported that private firms were stripping the Military of Kenya of specialist troops for service in Iraq -- as a prelude to potential employment in a Third Sudanese Civil War. [*] With a new complement of about 100 T-72 main battle tanks, it is also possible that South Sudan could fight an essentially defensive war using an offensive strategy, perhaps including an armored thrust at not-too-distant Khartoum, as one member of the Making Sense of Sudan blog community has pointed out. This will depend in part on the SPLA's judgment of the Sudanese Armed Forces' ground-attack capabilities, which may be somewhat defrayed if they can convince the JEM and other Darfur rebel movements to coordinate operations, thereby dividing SAF attention.

That said, the military balance of forces still clearly favors Khartoum. The Military Balance (International Institute of Strategic Studies) indicates that the government purchased many heavy weapons since 2002, including 130 main battle tanks, and 45 light tanks, as well as an assortment of armored fighting vehicles and artillery pieces. The Air Force deploys 63 fixed-wing combatants, including A-5 Fantan jets capable of ground attack. According to the Small Arms Survey, Sudan has also acquired 44 "combat helicopters" (Mi-17 and Mi-24). [5] The SAF is also known to employ private companies to provide logistics services using old Russian freightliners -- a major factor in quickly resupplying far-flung fighting forces. In Darfur, we know that the SAF can quickly turn local allies into heavily-armed auxiliaries. Khartoum strengthened allied tribes into "a full paramilitary fighting force after 2003, with communications equipment as well as plentiful new arms, some artillery, and military advisers." [6] The SAF could employ its helicopters to add valuable strategic mobility on the battlefield -- a tactic reportedly suggested by Russia in 2002. [7] Probably, the fighting would involve more conventional battles than in years past, along main roads and around the key oil sites. However, one could expect both sides to arm tribal militias, and for the SAF to press transports into use as bombers. Again, much will depend on whether the SPLA has been able to expand its anti-aircraft capability.

There are some limiting factors on Northern action, however. During the most recent fighting prior to the CPA, neither side could consistently defend its oil infrastructure. In mid-2001, the SPLA won a string of major victories contrary to the expectation of most observers. Khartoum was unable to improve battlefield performance with injections of new equipment -- a strategy that it has repeated for most of a decade. The fighting indicated that its forces were ill-trained, badly-motivated, and poorly-led. The North is also likely to have a problem finding fresh troops, especially with new buildups for fighting in Darfur, where it deployed three divisions in 2007. However, the South will have problems of its own: fighting between the Nuer and other southern tribes may distract the SPLA even without GoS tampering, and the military assistance of former allies in eastern and western Sudan is no longer assured: they may believe that, as the South goes its own way, so they, too, must negotiate with the center, or risk future isolation.

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[1] Andrew S. Natsios, "Beyond Darfur," Foreign Affairs, 87:3 (May/June 2008): 77-93, [electronic; no pagination].

[2] James Gatdet Dak, "South Sudan to build its first refinery in Warrap state," Sudan Tribune [online], 4 October 2009, http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article32667; "Kenya, China mull massive corridor for Sudan oil: FT," AFP, 15 October 2009, http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5gmyjd6bbuGSa5HQgpy3T….

[3] Heba Aly, "Arms race, uneasy peace in Sudan," The Christian Science Monitor, 12 November 2008, http://www.csmonitor.com/2008/1112/p06s02-woaf.html; Small Arms Survey, "Sudan Issue Brief," Human Security Baseline Assessment, Number 15 (December 2009), p. 4, incl. Table 2: Selected transfers to the SPLA, 2005-09.

[4] Natsios, "Beyond Darfur," n.p.; David Axe, "U.S. Trains South Sudan Air Experts?" War is Boring [blog], 28 July 2009, http://www.warisboring.com/2009/07/28/us-trains-south-sudan-air-experts/ (accessed: 27 October 2010).

[*] Simon Nicol, "Contractors recruiting Kenyan troops for eventual operations in South Sudan," Janes Defense Weekly, 26 March 2009. [Note: The date on this is tied to an electronic version, not a print version. Because the Making Sense of Darfur website is currently down, I cannot provide a date for the print copy.]

[5] Small Arms Survey, "Sudan Issue Brief," Number 15, p. p. 4, incl. Table 2.

[6] Julie Flint and Alex de Waal, Darfur: A Short History of a Long War (London: Zed Books, 2008), p. 103.

[7] The Military Balance, 2002, 102:1 (London, UK: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 2002), p. 193.

From Jan-May 2009 China's oil imports came out to 3,585,000 bpd. Biggest suppliers were Saudi Arabia, with 740,000 bpd, Iran with 544,000 bpd, Angola with 451,000. Sudan accounted for 217,000 bpd, or about 6% of the total.

China has invested heavily in oil production in the Sudan, and they will do what they can to keep it running... up to a point. I very much doubt that they would go as far as military intervention in the event of a collapse that threatened their investments there. It just wouldn't be worth the cost. They could fill in the missing 6% from other sources for less money than it would cost them to try and force the issue in Sudan. "Dependent" is too strong a word: China likes the Sudanese oil, but they will not collapse or even be seriously strained if they lose it.

Of course it's possible that they'll repeat our mistakes, likely with the same result... we will see.

In 2000, Sudan oil was officially representing 5% of China oil imports. At that time, China was importing 120 000b/day. The oil production form Muglad in Sudan was of 144 000 b/d with 60 000 b/d belonging to Chinese oil companies. A quick calculation shows then that China was in fact importing 50% of its daily imports from Sudan.
The production and investments from China in Sudan were to be tripled at that time.
It is very difficult to know the exact volume of oil produced in Sudan and the volume of oil first sold by China from its Sudanese investments and secondly really imported for domestic consumption.

M-A:

I'm not sure it's accurate to say that China is dependent on Sudan's oil. Sudan's share of China's energy imports is significant but not overwhelming; the Chinese have effectively (and intelligently) diversified their suppliers to avoid excessive dependence on single sources. It's not likely that they'd let themselves fall into dependence on such an unstable supplier.

Certainly the Chinese will try to keep their supply from the Sudan moving, but within limits. I doubt very much whether direct intervention would be contemplated. If the cost of keeping supply from Sudan is higher than the cost of simply buying it elsewhere, they will simply buy it elsewhere. There's plenty around and they can easily bid higher than other customers.

An excellent and interresting article, just as the comments above.
The focus on the rationalities of Khartoum regime and the need for the US to understand them is a needed excercise.

North needs war but South does need war as badly as North. Most of the comments on the ethnical management of power in North are also true in South. The question is not so much on CPA, which is the main tool for US to achieve their goal, but rather on the US capacity to create a pole of influence in Africa and its battle against China to access oil out of Middle East.
Also, and this is no consideration for the US strategic interrest but does have an impact on the course of events, GoSS needs a war. Not to overthrown Khartoum but, just as Khartoum, to gain monopoly of control over its populations and specially the armed groups more or less integrated into SPLA (As in CPA).

The idea that Khartoum is not helping is just right. But the idea that Khartoum has interrest in a new war with South is wrong. Khartoum has to secure the minimum oil revenues they need to not colapse and Bashir regime to fall. But so does US. Bashir regime is the best protection against hardcore Islamist regimes which will be a threat for Egypt and Ethiopia.

The idea that South will do what US will say and that South is not looking for another external big brother to protect them is most probably the biggest misunderstanding of South Sudan and Sudan politic.
China is in South, does US like it or not. For a power as China, Sudan, North and South, is too valuable to let it fall into anyone else hands. China dependancy over Sudan oil is too important. A war from Khartoum over South would be a disaster for China. The attacks over the oil pipe in Nuba Mountains would start again and disrupt their oil imports.
At contrario, a war launch by South, would give China a very good opportunity to support Khartoum. And as it was rightfuly mentioned, SPLA is actually no match for the SAF.

For the neighbooring countries, the situation is quite different. If Kenya expects a lot on the Lamu port (China funded), but Kenya will also benefit from Ugandan oil what ever happens in Sudan.
For Uganda, the situation is quite different. South Sudan is a friend but also an unreliable friend. Uganda is scared to death of an independant South which will colapse in less than 5 years after its independance.
For both Kenya and Uganda the threat is not in oil but is stability of South Sudan. None of them can afford (and even less is willing) to be confronted to another Somalia inland.

For all those reasons, I do tend to believe that North does not need war but is rather pushing South to the fault. So do the Arab countries as they see the gigantic Chinese oil market potentially falling into their hands.

The ultimate question is rather how would USA benefit from a peaceful partition?

PS: LRA is a problem but not a threat to the referendum in South nowadays. To achieve peace in Darfur? Most probably!