Attrition warfare in Afghanistan, financial warfare in Washington

Few observers would compare the war in Afghanistan to the World War I Battle of Verdun. But it appears as if both Gen. David Petraeus and Mullah Mohammad Omar are explicitly using classic attrition warfare to compel a change in their adversary's behavior. Similar to the Verdun "mincing machine," each commander is hoping that unsustainable casualties, demoralization, or bankruptcy will force the other side into a settlement or withdrawal. For Omar, there is a direct line between his strategy and the budget crisis in Washington; he is counting on another financial crisis to help him win the war. A budget deal in Washington might do as much as air strikes and raids to convince the Taliban that their strategy won't work.

Two stories from today's New York Times illustrate the focus the two commanders are placing on attrition tactics. In a holiday fund-raising message aimed at international supporters, Omar described his attrition strategy against NATO forces, by which he hopes to do to the United States what in the 1980s the mujahedeen were thought to have done to the Soviet Union. On the other side, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and other administration officials defended Petraeus's use of nighttime special forces raids against the Taliban chain of command and support network. As reported in the New York Times, such raiding, "in turn, puts pressure on senior Taliban leaders operating in the safe havens of Pakistan, according to a strategy outlined by General Petraeus, who hopes they may be forced to the bargaining table."

Which side will crack first? Congressman Buck McKeon, the incoming chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, vows it will not be the United States. In remarks delivered yesterday to the Foreign Policy Initiative, McKeon gave a stark and uncompromising defense of the Afghan campaign, U.S. defense modernization, and the overall Pentagon budget. McKeon declared that Defense Secretary Robert Gates's offer to increase defense spending by one percentage point faster than inflation was insufficient. Indeed, any thought of outright cuts to Pentagon spending would for McKeon cross a "red line." To McKeon, anything less than full support for the Afghan campaign, defense modernization, and required force structure would jeopardize American foreign policy and risk geopolitical instability.

McKeon admitted that defending the defense budget in the period ahead will be "a battle." Most sober observers across the political spectrum would agree with Joint Chiefs Chairman Admiral Michael Mullen when he asserted that the federal government's financial problems are the greatest threat to national security. Omar is hoping a financial crisis, exacerbated by his attrition strategy, will bring down the United States just as a financial crisis brought down the Soviet Union.

Defenders of defense spending rightly point out that a European or even Costa Rican level of U.S. defense spending will not fix the government's finances while Medicare and Medicaid inflate like the Hindenburg. And taking risks with national security means risking another national security crisis which would most likely be more expensive than the insurance that might prevent it.

But writing the government's budget is a political exercise, not a procedure in logical optimization. That means that McKeon will have to join the budget negotiations, giving in order to get. Omar is hoping for political failure in Washington, with harsh punishment ensuing from the global bond market, upon which the U.S. Treasury depends for cash. He is counting on a collapse in the U.S. Treasury's credit, leading to another financial crisis which would then result in a U.S. pullout from Afghanistan. No one knows how soon or distant such a crisis may be. But it may be Omar's confidence in the scenario that keeps him from considering a settlement.

From this perspective, perhaps the best way to reinforce Petraeus's efforts on the battlefield would be to reach a meaningful budget deal in Washington. Such a deal might remove a key pillar in Omar's strategy, cause him to reexamine his assumptions, and give Petraeus a major advantage in the war of attrition. A budget deal won't be easy. But knowing how much Omar is counting on political failure in Washington might make reaching an agreement a bit easier.