Thinking Critically about COIN and Creatively about Strategy and War

Ken,

While I agree with most of your comments, I think the key take away from Melton's article was to understand the type of war you're engaging in (defensive/offensive) at the strategic level and plan at the strategic level accordingly, so subordinates at the operational level understand the objectives they are to achieve. Unlike our recent two experiences where our overall goal other than fighting terrorists and stopping the proliferation of WMD where very vague and constantly changing. It sounds overly simple, but I think the implications he makes are profound on many levels.

I never associated the problems with the National Defense Act of 1947, but it makes sense and is worthy of more study.

We seem to have this annoying habit of embracing ideas that have never worked, failed to work repeatedly, while ignoring tried and tested theories.

Certainly we need to be aware of the potential emergence of new weapons and tactics. It happens, though less often than some suppose, and it can be significant.

We also need to be aware that there are lots of people who will wrap old ideas in new terminology and hype them up as part of a self-promotion campaign. This also happens, rather more often.

Our antagonists adapt to our tactics and develop tactics of their own that exploit their capacities and our vulnerabilities. Disparate groups set aside differences to fight a common enemy. Not exactly a shock, and we don't need arcane theories to predict that these things would happen: it's a bit like predicting sunrise in the east.

Slapping terms like "quantum" and "open source" on long-established patterns may sound kind of geeky-cool (like ya saw it on the innernet), and is certainly a useful marketing aid, but it doesn't really advance understanding and often distracts attention from the actual substance of what is being discussed.

I do wish the various anonymous posters would at least choose consistent pseudonyms, if they'll be posting regularly. There is something vaguely amusing about a duel of the anonymi, but some sort of identification would make it easier to keep things in order.

The last anon,

I like the quote you cited from McArthur, and tend to agree like many others that we're embracing pop-centric COIN doctrine based on misinterpretations of old wars, and while not throwing the baby out with the bath water, I don't think it will get us to where we want to be. More importantly, I like Dayuhan don't see any substance in the previous Anon's post. What exactly is new? I once again looked up quantum and while a fairly creative guy I can't find a useful correlation to quantum with what is happening in the conflict, so please help me out. Personally I like the use of open source warfare, not because it is new (it isn't), but because it is an easier way to explain what is happening. Easier to envision to what is happening regionally and globally.

When you talk about new weapons and other technologies, my biggest concern is we'll be surprised by emerging nations because we're overly focused as a force on irregular warfare. Folks from my background make their living and always have in the IW realm, but we also assumed that GPF would retain focus on the larger issues (high end fights) and constantly evolve their technology to ensure they we're on top of the predator food chain. Not convinced that is happening now, so we may be surprised when our next state on state war competitor knocks downs our satellites, renders our communications equipment obsolete, and applies their smart weapons against our platforms, and who knows what else (failure of our imagination).

I admire those like COL Gentile who challenge dogma's and ask their readers/students to actually think about what is "really" happening or has happened. However, while I agree with many comments in this article, I think he tends to throw the baby out with the bathwater with his unbalanced counter view.

While he is correct that good tactics will not save a bad strategy, it is also true that bad tactics can fail a good strategy (assuming we had one). I'm also under the impression the focus of a FM is really at the operational/tactical level. The how to book on how to go about executing the given strategy.

I find it disappointing that senior leadership implied the early failures in Iraq and or troubles in Afghanistan were due to poorly trained Soldiers. The Soldiers will adapt quickly if allowed to do so by their officers, what I saw was a very poorly conceived strategy and then when it turned into a bag of crap it was quickly handed over to the tactical units to deal with. Here you go, you guys figure this out.

On the other hand, where I disagree with COL G is his refusal to recognize that General Petreus was the right man at the right time when he took over in Iraq, and it was his change in strategy (not just tactics) that bought us enough space to exit with our heads at least held level.

COL G in my opinion accurately identifies the myths with the focus on winning hearts, when the effort needs to be on controlling the designated populace, which is exactly what the Brits did in Malaya, while simultaneously aggressively pursuing the criminals. Any attempts that focus solely, or even mostly, on winning hearts is generally a short lived effect in a very localized area, it is not a strategy.

Actually better than the article was Grant's excellent post above. He identifies the real underlying flaw with our "new" approach to war, and it is the prevailing view of political correctness. We focus on the imaginary myth that everyone wants to be like us and ignore the reality immediately in front of our face. There are none so blind as those who refuse to see. I hope Churchill was right and that we'll eventually pursue the correct course of action after we exhausted all the wrong ones.

Good comments by both Grant and Bill; a lot of good in the article as well. Good tactics can indeed temporarily overcome poor policy and bad strategy; but those results typically prove to be fleeting.

As Bill points out, the Brits employed some good tactics on the Malayan Peninsula. (Arguably the easiest terrain feature to conduct COIN on, so long as one does not allow a sovereign border on one end to become a barrier to the COIN force that provides legal sanctuary to the insurgent). Separate and Pursue were critical supporting tactics that put the current crop of insurgents on the ropes; but it was the political changes of Great Britain relinquishing control of the government; granting full political participation to the Malayans of Chinese descent (the popular base of the insurgency) that allowed those tactics to "stick" and produce long-term results. One without the other is folly.

We tend to see what we want to see. The tactics proposed by Galula are sound as well. The French lost Algeria and Indochina because they were not willing to relinquish political/economic control of those nations.

There is a lesson for the US in this. While US control measures are less overt, we tend to see them as benign and nothing like the outrages of colonialism. If it were our opinion that mattered, if it were our perception that counted, then Europe would still have colonial control over half the globe, and the US would not be in a war on terrorism.

It is the perception and opinion of the populace that counts, that matters. Merely telling someone you are not standing on their neck is not enough, telling people that a boot on their neck is good for them is not enough, putting someone else in power to put their boot on the neck for you is not enough. Giving someone vast development projects is not enough. One must actually remove the boot. It's a matter of respect.

"Effective governance" is nice, but expensive and does not guard against insurgency. "Respective governance" is essential, and it does not have to be all that effective to work.

Cheers,

Bob

Slap,

Thanks, and agree with COL G's point. There are indeed many ways up the mountain.

I just point out that there are some constants in mountain climbing that it is worthwhile taking note of and respecting. Gravity is a constant. One must ultimately go up to get to the top. Unpredictable factors, like weather, get a vote and can defeat the best of efforts. The closer one gets to the top, the going may get harder, but one's vision of the bigger picture improves and the mountain looks far different from the top looking down, than from the bottom looking up.

It's not just ok to recognize constants, it is essential; and in COIN as in mountain climbing one of the constants is the variables, and that the mountain/populace always gets a vote.

Bob and Slap, I find myself in the odd position of agreeing with both of your well thought out comments and insights above. I don't know if it due to the holiday season or we have finally found common ground to build upon?

I want to believe that I have finally swayed you to come sit by my campfire, but I know better. :-)

Bill

I am not sure that "strategy" is possible in the complexity of human social systems, at least in the way the military has espoused "strategy" as essentially a large-scale version of rational decision making.

WE are the ones who scientifically categorize war, operations, and tactics. We see situations as "ill-structured" when these categorizations do not seem to be working. It is too convenient to criticize activities that aren't working to be void of "strategy" (which is, in my view, more of a Shaman rain dance).

I believe we have made a cultural mythology of "strategy" usually vested in our skewed interpretations of history (the old "hindsight is 20-20" issue). I think strategy began as a physical matter -- where the general stood on higher ground to better see and affect the way the battle goes. Tactics were literally his orders, not some lower form of activity that feed his larger scale strategy. As political-military hierarchies grew, we had to find some way to rationalize this process -- of breaking the situation down into manageable parts, issuing orders at each level that are derivatives of higher orders.

We took that physical meaning and have embellished it into what has become a dead metaphor. Now such "generalship" is mostly invested (from what is taught at our war colleges) in rational, hierarchical decision processes that give the appearance of understanding causality (as would our engineering sciences).

Based on the premise that "strategy" is no more than a dead metaphor, I would further argue that Colonel Gentile's comments are philosophically empty (representing a monistic paradigm that is not much help when it comes to acting in complex situations, but serves as a convenient criticism rather than a sound argument). We will search endlessly for that "strategy" or "strategist" when we may be ignoring the truth that our view of what strategy is is the problem.

"Strategy" has evolved into a catch phrase -- a culturally invented linguistic container in which we place blame for things that are not working the way we'd like them.

I agree with you about the canard of counterinsurgency as the "graduate school of warfare," Gian.

But at the same time, one might say something about the strategic difference between the First Day of the Somme or Cold Harbor and pop-centric COIN: The indirect approach, with its obligatory nod to the good captain who survived the trenches of WWI and took from the slaughter that particular insight.

The thing about America's current notion of COIN as a population-centric event, best sussed out through Hearts & Minds, is that it depends indirectly on other actors for "success" (however defined).

Most typically, the COINdinistas trot out the "population" or the "host nation government," and I don't think it's wrong to assume that if not more complex it certainly is more nettlesome to put one's strategic eggs into the Karzai kleptocracy's basket.

There are all sorts of reasons for this, but one might suggest the highly profitable continuation of the war becomes its own end for the HN oligarchy, just as using the US forces as a crutch becomes its own debilitating condition for them and us.

Perhaps our problems with properly executing an indirect approach to "victory" (however defined) have their roots not in complexity but rather in our military (and broader) culture. But it also likely has to do with the strategic paradoxes of a war and a pursuit of "victory" that are in tension with each other, problems that include, but aren't limited to:

1. Defeating the Taliban requires that the HN "out govern" them. Our proxies, the Karzai government in Kabul, however, prove inherently destabilizing. The spread of that government is what helps to drive the rebellion against it. So we try to push the government into the Afghan provinces fighting to avoid it, and they fight because we push the government;

2. The Taliban rally supporters by decrying a foreign occupation. In order to defeat them, we "surge" more foreign occupiers, which proves their point;

3. We must win hearts & minds through control (stick) and suasion (carrot). The carrot, however, is self-defeating. The more money we sluice to the "people" to buy support for the Kabul government, the wealthier they become and the more they send to the enemies. The more projects we begin, the more they are pickpocketed by the Taliban. The more supplies we send to support our troops and the growing (albeit often AWOL or unreliable) Afghan security forces, the more tolls are paid to the trolls (Taliban, Pakistani enablers) and the stronger the enemies become.

4. We posit a pop-centric effort as the best means to "win" in Afghanistan. But the COG really is in Pakistan, where ISI plays a cynical game of hunting with both the fox and the hound. And the various Taliban directed westward have a great deal of Pakistani Pathan support, which we can't apply much stick or carrot to retard for all the obvious reasons.

It's often suggested that you offer criticism but no solution. While I disagree with that tepid point, it should be asked how you would re-orient US strategy to achieve our foreign policy goals.

How would you navigate the shoals my strategic lighthouse has illuminated without making the situation for the region and ourselves worse?

Gian,

I know you are not suggesting that the degree of violence equates to the degree of complexity of an operation. After all, killing and dying are easy, and as well executed by the stupid and the lucky as by the brilliant and prepared.

But nothing makes headlines and history books like a good box score.

This is where Sun Tzu had it all over Clausewitz. CvC wrote of warfare, TZ valued victory without warfare as the pinacle of the art.

Not that any of that applies to COIN. COIN is simply governance, and Insurgency illegal politics creating a civil emergency that, at times, can resemble war in its violence, but is very different in its nature.

Cheers!

Bob

I am like you -- not a fan of those who think things are more complex today. I speculate here, but think that is a result of our modern communications -- we can appreciate the complexity quicker and with more information things become more ambiguous.

I also believe we have created a rationality -- the levels of war for example. We believe in the inalienable correctness of policy; otherwise, what good is strategy without the right policy? Policy is ephemeral and largely a "sausage-making" process of political haggling. If it is wrong, doesn't that make strategy wrong?

Col. Gentile

There is far too much post-modern nonsense being used to explain and analyse Iraq and Afghanistan.

I also support your comments:

It is as if Galulas text offers the secret to success of counterinsurgency if only its practitioners would "get it". Again, remember, that the French ultimately lost in Algeria regardless of the better tactics of counterinsurgency practiced by David Galula.

The idea that hearts and minds have been won by foreign occupying powers in modern counterinsurgency war is just simply hokum.

Ralph Peters hit the nail on the head in his 2006 New York Post article when he observed it is hard enough to bear the timidity of our civilian leaders - anxious to start wars but without the guts to finish them - but now military leaders have fallen prey to political correctness. Unwilling to accept that war is, by its nature, a savage act and that defeat is immoral, influential officers are arguing for a kinder, gentler approach to our enemies. Much of this is not due to the military commanders but an omnipresent media and well meaning civilian advisors with a Western democratic mind-set.

Historian Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., astutely pointed out in his 1977 biography of Robert Kennedy, the notion that reforms can be carried out in a wartime situation by a beleaguered regime is ―the fatal fallacy in the liberal theory of counterinsurgency, with the United States so often obliged to work through repressive local leadership, the reform component dwindled into ineffectual exhortation.

As a civilian I want my Armed forces and our most important ally, the US, to first and foremost be trained to fight first to win and to respond and defend against any external force.

If that force is threatening our freedoms from afar then I want my armed forces to take the required action to neutralise this threat - first and foremost. As a taxpayer Im not interested in my armed forces then staying to rebuild every nation from which that threat was planned. As with any corporate strategy - it needs to be focused on clear objectives.

One of the reasons I admire you constructive challenge to COIN is that those at your level of influence are in the position to ensure we do not fall into the trap where after Iraq and Afghanistan we think there is some off-the-shelf model of COIN that can be dusted off for the next fight.

Galula points out that French military history contains excellent examples where the construction of doctrine has been so rigidly retained as articles of faith. In 1940 they duplicated a recipe proved during World War I and fought a 1918-type of war against the German panzer divisions. The result in both cases was disastrous.

p.s. I am not expressing the views of a postmodernist as presumed. I think postpositivist is a better characterization.

My point on strategy comes from the science of cognitive linguistics, neither Foucault nor Habermas.

I like Galula's book better than 3-24 and I use it in my lessons. I think he is a pragmatist and he learned through immersion.

I subscribe to Simons' idea of the "Lawrence Paradox" (see http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=998) where we cannot reduce our experience to principles. Every situation is unique (why Lansdale was successful in the Philippines in the early 50s and when he tried the same ideas a year or two later in S Vietnam, he failed.

I believe our best hope is to immerse key people for long periods of time and adapt as we go (similar to John Paul Vann). I like design philosophy but do not subscribe to the Army's or JFCOM's (Joint Warfighting Center) versions -- they misinterpret design literature, are overly prescriptive, and treat design as another instrumental-like (tool kit) methodology.

I think "design science" (with a focus more on artistry) is a more useful and more open philosophy than rational decision processes (which dominate DOD schools & colleges when it comes to tactics, campaigns and strategies). The underlying rational decision model (RDM) underpins ALL of our thinking (at least insitutionally). The rational model is what I was referring to as a monistic paradigm (that excludes other ontological views and associated knowledge structures).

One of the related key assumptions in our system of military training and education is that knowledge is progressive (like the hard sciences, we get better and better at understanding what we have to do). I think this assumption is flawed and this has served to create a crisis in the profession of arms.

An alternative philosophy, suggested by Donald Schön in his books, The Reflective Practitioner and Educating the Reflective Practitioner, is to reorient professional practitioners on artistry (associated with reflection-in and on- action) and less on technical rationality (associated with RDM, expertise and skill). Studying past wars are not so much about discovering a science of warfare, but more so to conclude that such a science is implausible.

Once we accept that conclusion, our view of military professionalism should shift from technical rationality (oriented on RDM, expertise and skill) and more to reflective practice (oriented on uniqueness of each situation, the importance of immersion into it, and the ability to question one's own and the institution's assumptions/reframing).

Design is an attitude, not a methodology. You seem oriented on criticizing design as a method and rationalistic way of finding causality (using the monistic paradigm to evaluate another). I would not equate 40 years of design science culminating in the IDFs issues...you seem to indicate the IDF should have used RDM/progressive assumptions about knowledge and they would have been better served.

Have written too much here, my apologies. My bottom line is RDM and progressivism have failed us when face with wicked situations. These may serve us well in moderately complex operations (like force-on-force, "Desert Storm"- type activities), but are inadequate for complex social milieu.

"Life is really simple, but we insist on making it complicated." Confucius

Grant,

I totally agree with you that ISAF forces, especially in Kabul (where I posit the real COG exists, not with the population) pay lip-service to COMISAF's new COIN guidance. On paper it makes sense; in practice, you're given an LOR or UCMJ investigation if you try and follow it. Literally.

I'd just like to clarify what you brought up in your second post about following up the 'clearing' stage of the campaign plan. This is precisely why we lost Marjah, why we're losing Op Hamkari, and why we're losing the east and the north - we can't be responsible to hold and build but nobody seems to have told GIRoA. Governance and Development are host-nation responsibilities and our host has shown sorely lacking capability to fill critical civil servant positions in southern districts, have all but given up on other districts that might not be KTDs, and don't even get me started on the anti-corruption efforts. Corruption, sanctioned organized crime, and GIRoA malfeasance regarding rule of law and the economy will cause us to lose this war. Holding and Building get lip service (much like COMISAF's COIN guidance) from ISAF and IJC planners because we still don't understand how diametrically opposed GIRoA priorities are to our own.

MAJ K
GIRoA embed
Kabul, AFG

The views expressed above are the author's own and do not constitute a position of ISAF, the US Army, or DoD.

Grant,

Agree wholeheartedly. Two things I'd clarify though:

1. "<i> one of the main reasons for [NATO] being in Afghanistan was to prove the feasibility/worth of NATO- and many in Europe look at Afghanistan in that light.</i>"

This is, beyond a doubt, the <i>only</i> reason NATO is here shohna-ba-shohna with the US. The sad fact of the matter is we strongarmed them into it, it's not in their national interests, and NATO is a dinosaur in need of major refocus in the least or disbandment at the most. It's a Cold War fossil in search of relevance in the 21st century.

2. <i>"I would argue that at the strategic and operational level COIN in that environment is very different than what is described in 3-24...</i>

At least in this version of nation-building, there is no such thing as "strategic" COIN. It's a tactic misapplied to handle the President's stated policy. The problem is there's no commensurate COA at the strategic level to fill the void. Just like terrorism itself is a tactic that we decided to wage war on, so is COIN a tactic we use to deal with the true strategic threat (not terrorism, by the way). And this tactic isn't going to win us any wars with no strategy to match.

The views above are the author's own and do not reflect the position of ISAF, the US Army, or DoD.

Perhaps "strategic" FID/COIN/FSA is vested in a kind of inverted campaign, where small changes in local areas may (unpredictably) create an amplified effect. This would perhaps cause us to reflect on strategy as strictly a top-down process (good for Desert Storm events) rather than a bottom-up (better for wicked wars, like Vietnam),

As Grant commented in his complexity article a few weeks ago, the problem is we have no way to model complexity and chaos to present a planning sort of argument.

As complexity science and chaos theory suggest, we have to be patient and act in order to adapt effectively (which requires learning and unlearning -- a more radical [ephemeral] view of knowledge construction).

Also requires a huge amount of patience on the part of friendly parties -- the amplified effects may not become apparent for a generation.

BTW, I think your comments on motivations for NATO are hugely insightful and I appreciate the discussion!! Fantastic.

I think the only thing that is "vested" by FID or COIN is the willing host nation we would support. But since that's lacking in many areas with GIRoA, can we execute a political and governance campaign to any effect? If and when GIRoA fails due to a plethora of non-military issues, the best tactical COIN force in the world won't matter one bit.

None of our tactical prowess on the battlefield matters. What does matter is the popular view of the illegitimacy of any strong central government, the ANA/ANP drug addiction rate, the rate at which GIRoA cannot bring governance to District-and-below levels, incapacity to deliver rule of law, massive corruption in mid- to high-level government, and an APRP process that is wildly contentious among the host populace. Again, our military doesn't matter one bit in this effort because these, the most debilitating issues in Afghanistan, aren't military issues we're dealing with. It's an internal Afghan political fight with a vicious organized crime element gnawing at the periphery. The US Army isn't going to "win" let alone solve any of it.

The views expressed above are the author's own and do not constitute a position of ISAF, the US Army, or DoD.

The "ecosystems" metaphor reminds me of a theory of analogous reasoning that may have led to decisions during the Vietnam conflict (see, for example, Yuen F.Khong, Analogies at War, 1992).

Our dominant metaphors today seem to be drawn from open systems theory (based strongly in the theory of evolution).

How's that working out (sarcasm)?

So we attrit the system? Sounds familiar...Westy?

Carpet bombing (rolling thunder)?

Not trying to be a wise guy...just that the arguments bring images to mind. Hence, historic analogy...

Define "hasn't done anything to you yet."

It is a well accepted tenet of Deterrence that if one party develops a capacity that so exceeds that of a competitor, that the competitor is likely to launch a pre-emptive strike to destroy that capability before it can destroy him. Risking war in order to restore the balance of power to a degree of equity that either allows deterrence to work once again or survival if it goes to war.

This is a concept that NATO should consider as we press an ever-expanding NATO into Russia's sphere of influence. We may not feel that we are threatening them. Can one write similar guarantees that they will not feel threatened?

President Bush made a comment recently on how the US was attacked on 9/11 when we "had never done anything to anyone." (Or words to that effect). It is the perception of the aggrieved or threatened party that matters, not that of the one being attacked.