Thinking Critically about COIN and Creatively about Strategy and War

slapout9;

We have no motive that I can see as we simply do not understand the driving ecosystyem ---and you are right but the beachhead is about now the size of a toe and getting smaller by the month.

Backwards Observer;

You are entirely correct---when all commenters who are now starting to really question COIN theories hear the phase "open source warfare" they run for cover using comments like "cussed, discussed, and found of no interest", but then you see the big guns JIEDDO/MITRE/University of Maryland start pouring consulting funding into the quantum research that has in fact validated the theory-then what does make the group of commenters and their fluff off comments?

The issue is serious and it appears that we as a society seem to run lately from responsibility---what ever happened to the old fashion concept of if it is broken then fix it---guess that got in the way of defense contracting greed which in fact would be seriously theatened by a group of University researchers and a former AF SOF/software geek. While Rome burns military personnel/civilians are getting killed because we cannot fix it.

If the theories concerning tank warfare in the 30s had not been published and Patton had not read them and tied them to history we would not have had a Patton if he had followed the concept of "cussed, discussed, and found of no interest".

Just my pointless opinion.

A few points to consider: Gian Gentile makes several good points about ends-ways-means being out of balance; commitment of resources is heavy and objectives very limited.
One historical point: winning breeds arrogance while losing typically generates learned lessons, hence the validity of Galula's framework in a comparable environment. [a bit shallow intellectually to consider a plan invalid just because one team couldn't execute it effectively] Similarly, while his critical analysis of British performance in Malaya captures the historic/chronological points acutely, he doesn't fairly highlight that the purpose of controlling the population enabled 1) isolating the insurgents from the population; and, 2) mobilizing the population, which IS the purpose of "winning hearts and minds".
Population centric focus of current doctrine gets at the point that populations ultimately decide who rules; ultimately, one of the points lost in current doctrine is the aspect of capitulation. The Civil War, WWI and WWII were fought until one side capitulated--the lost the will to fight--a decision was reached.
Causality discussions aside, it is important to note that good commanders capitalize on opportunity, whether they create the opportunity or stumble upon it [remember Napoleons interest in lucky Field Marshalls?].
Two three points: GIans comment that an Army should be organized and optimized around the principles of firepower, protection and mobility come very close to stating that an Army should be optimized to provide superior Relative Combat Power as defined in FM 100-5, circa 1983. The missing element--the critical element which enable adaptability--is Leadership.
Many valuable lessons can be gleaned from Robert Tabor's War of the Flea. Insurgency/Counterinsurgency is a contest of Time, Space, and Will. This applies broadly, but especially in COIN. The critical issue tactically is whether our troops operate without alienating a population; operationally, whether we eliminate insurgent sanctuary and malign support across Afghanistan's borders; and strategically, does US national security require widespread democracy [Rand's use of the term 'anocracy'--imposed democracy is of interest here], or can we hold accountable governments which allow terrorism from within their borders without invading, occupying and instilling democracy?

Anonymous:
slapout9;

We have no motive that I can see as we simply do not understand the driving ecosystyem ---and you are right but the beachhead is about now the size of a toe and getting smaller by the month.

We had a motive at one tiem and that was to Kill Bill Laden and his AQ gang but then we fell off "Mission Creep" mountain.

BLUF: The interview reveals nothing new. It is the same thing we have heard repeatedly from COL Gentile for the past three years. There are no revelations, no new alternatives that make one scratch one's chin in appreciation, and finally in comments he reveals admiration for the laughable strategy of a politician. The current doctrine could perhaps benefit from a thorough and critical review, but this is not it.

First, while COIN may dominate the discussion in professional journals, since the job at the moment is to fight an insurgency and we are struggling in that task, I must challenge the Colonel's assertion that we are focused on it. I just returned from 15 months teaching COIN in Afghanistan. Fully 15% of the Army field grade officers who arrived in country had actually read FM 3-24. Seriously. I saw a pretty broad representational slice of them. MAJ Martin correctly points out that actually following COMISAF's Tactical Directive is likely to result in UCMJ action. Units have not been arriving in theater with staff processes optimized for operating in a COIN environment. As late as early last summer,training exercises at the NTC were a bizarre hybrid of Afghan and Iraqi components, but kinetic contact was made in every single exercise. COIN is making its way into NCOES at the rate of a frozen snail. This is not an Army consisting of professional practitioners of COIN doctrine who have lost their way in maneuver warfare.

I don't know about the combined arms part, but the proficiency with COIN just isn't there. Maybe we're not good at any of it anymore. So, no Sir; it has not taken over the Army.

I also tend to agree with the "tepid" assertions that COL Gentile offers no real alternative, nor does he adequately describe viable alternatives to other items of criticism, such as an alternative COG. This is the same oft-repeated narrative he has carried since 2007. Nothing new, no real alternatives. If you've read one, you've read them all. I have awaited some description of an alternative master strategy for years, and now he pronounces the "Biden Plan" as fitting his mind's requirement as a solution to the issue of "strategy." I expected something worthy of delicious discussion, and that... well, it disappoints in the extreme.

Sun Tzu, Clausewitz and Biden... I'm thinking, "Not so much."

We can get lost in semantics and the discussion of the roots of the semantics, which is delightful and stimulating, but we are faced with real problems. The two Kabul-based Majors above are clearly nearly defeated by the complexity of the challenges they face in their positions in Afghanistan. Perhaps they are completely defeated and simply marking time through their tours. They are the only ones who know for sure. Six months into the tour I just completed, I felt the same way. Over the course of the coming months, I reached a certain level of optimism born of seeing lots of good people doing some good things and achieving some results. Slowly. To you, almost undetectably.

To me, the stated policy is weak sauce. True, it does not seem to match the (Presidentially approved) military strategy in Afghanistan. Why did the President approve a strategy that does not match his stated objectives? The policy itself is confusing, and invites such ridiculous "solutions" as the "Biden Plan," designed not to win but to pick away at and pin down AQ and relies upon violating Pakistan's borders with SOF.

Implementing the "Biden Plan" would make Pakistan even less likely to permit such incursions, not more likely. It would convince Pakistan of our lack of commitment and encourage those elements in Pakistan bent on gaining influence in Afghanistan via actors such as QST and Haqqani. It is not a strategy designed to succeed at anything and relies on mythical powers that our SOF simply do not possess. It is a token, an effort to show that we are doing SOMETHING, but we cannot attrit such an organization into submission. It simply isn't going to happen.

I agree that the current strategy requires efforts that are not strictly military, but requires unity of effort amongst several different agencies of the US government. That unity of effort has improved in discrete areas and the results have been good, but limited successes can come undone quickly as units rotate and are replaced by units such as last year's 5-2 Stryker.

Training strategies such as the 9 COIN Qualification Standards tasks will help orient deploying units on the types of tasks and information flows they will need to arrive at potentially successful local strategies. Meanwhile, a renewed effort to provide civilian mentoring to go with the money and more aid directed straight to the local level would be helpful. Get the Italians out of the Justice business and get some help with building a real court system while leveraging traditional justice systems; take the justice issue away from the Taliban.

The solutions don't have to be perfect, but this lazy, FORCEPRO COIN is sure as hell not going to work. The good Colonel insists that our Army has focused on COIN, but actions in the field (read the two Majors above) don't support that. A better argument would be that it is undoable because we simply can't even do it adequately, much less well. I've seen tremendous gains made where it is done adequately and have seen backsliding occur when RIPs brought in lesser performing units.

A force that was professionally focused on a particular doctrine would at least read the FM, much less Galula. Graduate level? Hell, our highly educated field grades are showing up for the final exam without having cracked the book. Failed doctrine? COL Gentile wins by default. You simply cannot succeed with a doctrine that you don't even bother to read.

<i>COL Gentile wins by default</i> - Bingo.

Martin,
There are good alternative plans to what we are currently doing.

Get rid of the premise that reforming the people of the middle east is the solution to the world's problems. If you can accept that there are better ways to deal with people then try to force them into the behaviors we want from them, then that is a start to a better plan.

What are these better ways? Most people like to be treated with respect and we should keep that in mind when dealing with people. Telling people they can not grow this, or do that, is not respecting them. Supporting a government that seeks control over people is not respecting them. Occupying areas without clear invitation of the surrounding people is not respecting them.

So instead we work with whom we can. People who share some common interests or better yet even some common principles. We make a real relationship with these people that actually generates real trust and friendship.

In doing this it also means that we have to accept that there are many who we can not work with, or they will not work with us. We leave them alone, as long as they leave us alone. If they attack us or our allies, they are going to have a real problem.

We stick to our business, i.e. capturing/killing those who attacked us. This is an action people can understand and relate to. We do it very carefully, more like a police action, then a war. We clearly identify the individuals who wronged us. Our congress votes on approval to do this specific action, with clear guide lines.

We stop using the soldiers of the United States in a nation building or world policing capacity. It does not fall directly under the domain of protecting the United States. It may protect the people of Afghanistan, and that may be a very noble ideal to help others, but that is not the intended purpose of our soldiers, it is not what we swore our oath for. I know there are many who believe what we are doing does protect the United States indirectly, but it is becoming a very gray area, and personally I am very unhappy that we have strayed so far into it.

So where does that leave us?

In Afghanistan, we can still work with the Afghans, but we work with them like we did with the tribes of the Northern Alliance. To promote a common interest, not our interest. We accept that we can not fix the country of Afghanistan, but we can give some aid, in return for intelligence, from the groups we can work with.

We can go back to preparing our soldiers for real war. Projecting force on a large potential enemy. I think more the potential of strong action, good preparation, rather than what we say, keeps rouge nations from doing crazy stuff (e.g. Iraq invading Kuwait).

We spend less on soldiers, and more on anti terrorism personnel. Securing borders. Tracking terror plots. Tracking potential weapons of mass destruction.

I think that is a much better recipe for keeping our country safe, and promoting peace in the world.

Carl P: Yeah, that's worked really well for us so far. Not.

COL Gentile likes to talk about strategy, and he likes to talk about Clausewitzian principles. He loves to say that the center of gravity is to be discovered. A Clausewitzian outlook is to attack the strategy of your opponent. The strategy of our opponent, or part of it, is to prevent the success of the constitutional regime in Kabul and replace it with one of their liking. So where is their true COG? Possibly not Afghanistan... but where are they putting their schwerpunkt? Where is their main effort? Does this not help in determining the COG and the strategy of your opponent?

If Clausewitz is to be believed, then they know that Afghanistan's success or failure is important. They are sinking many resources into an insurgency. It's not an outright rebellion, it is an insurgency, and insurgencies are political; they are a contest for political control. So we are stuck with fighting an insurgency.

If the Colonel has a better methodology for fighting an insurgency, he does not further it except with a straw man approach like the Biden Plan. A victory in Afghanistan for the devotees of the Global Caliphate of bin Laden's dreams would be disastrous for us. Ignominious acceptance of defeat either through precipitous withdrawal or through a degradation to half-assed "strategies" such as the Biden Plan would bring extremely negative consequences for us. The thing is that these consequences may take years to develop.

So if precipitous withdrawal is not an option we choose to pursue, then what? If we are to fight a counterinsurgency, then what operational approach should we take?

COL Gentile likes to decry the current doctrine, to the point of selecting alternative interpretations of historical examples, but still does not further a viable alternative. In the meantime, the rest of the force has not applied the existing doctrine to any reasonable extent that would give an indication of its viability as a counterinsurgency technique or approach. A good plan, executed poorly, looks like a bad plan. I submit that COL Gentile's arguments have not progressed in three years. I would further submit that he is a poor judge of success or failure to begin with, given that his personal example in JFQ earlier this year of the COIN activity of his Cavalry squadron in 2006 Baghdad was a measure of activity but not of any effect whatsoever. This is a common mistake made by those who don't know how to measure effects in COIN.

The Colonel appears to be an example of those who refuse to, in his terms, "get it," and not someone who has truly applied the doctrine, found it lacking, and submitted a masterful alternative. Lauding these criticisms is like telling a man who is wearing no pants that his jacket is exquisite.

I intend no disrespect, and I'm sure that the Colonel physically wears pants. I just question the validity of the Colonel's criticisms, express disappointment that we find nothing new here, and insist that the GPF have not been taken over by COIN practitioners.

And no, Carl P, it is not better for a corps of officers to lack the professionalism to arrive in theater having read the book describing what the combatant commander says he wants for them to do. A flawed doctrine may fail, but willful ignorance of a doctrine will assure its failure. To laud such a disregard for the directives of a combatant commander is not what I would expect of a military thinker, regardless of how right he believes himself or someone else he would rather listen to. I'm sure that COL Gentile does not advocate such subtle insubordination, but I do believe that he has that effect without having the further positive effect of providing a true alternative.

Carl P:
"I just returned from 15 months teaching COIN in Afghanistan. Fully 15% of the Army field grade officers who arrived in country had actually read FM 3-24. Seriously."

The Army would be better off if none had read the blasted thing.

What is interesting is that with just about every major active Division BCT having at least four rotations in Iraq or Afghanistan and or a combination of both countries one would think that the officers and men of these units could sleepwalk COIN.

There has been absolutely no retention of institutional knowledge and learning that I can see at virtually any level---DOES anyone have an explanation as I do not.

The common attitude from both Officers, NCOs, enlisted personnel is "been there, done it, and definitely have the T-shirt to prove it" so what are you going to show me I do not already know.

Direct result is now CTC observers are no longer observer controllers (OCs), but rather observers trainers (OTs).

Everyone shouts about how great the lessons learned are being collected, recorded, and disseminated---that said it is definitely not making it back to the troops in any way that I can I can see. The insurgency seems to retain and learn from their mistakes at a far faster rate than we do---maybe it is all about survival of the fittest and the BCTs are not in the survival mode mindset.

Anyone else see the same things?

Morgan, I meant my above comments for you. Not sure where I got Martin from.

I can not speak to Col Gentile or the Biden plan (does anyone really know what it is?), but I think you are locked into the idea that Afghanistan is more important than it really is. I think it is the thought of the day, without strong substance behind it. People continue to say things like "failure in Afghanistan is going to be disastrous". Enough intelligent people say it, it becomes the truth.

So you say Biden plan is a half-ass strategy. What do you mean by that?

I think our current strategy (however you define it) is not smart for many reasons. We are hell bent to make it work regardless of the costs, partly because people like you and others keep saying "failure in Afghanistan is going to be disastrous". It seems like we continue down this path because we are afraid to change. Nobody wants to be the guy that rocks the boat and gets blamed if Afghanistan does go to shambles. So we just continue down the same path, tweak our strategy until we get a certain?, but costly result.

I would rather do a smart conservative strategy (call it half ass if you want), that could achieve good results, than some costly strategy that achieves the mediocre results.

I want a strategy that puts faith and confidence in people, then one that puts restraints on them. Without taking off the restraints, and seeing what people can do, how do you really know what they can achieve?

I want a plan that has patience and gives time for success. That can be maintained long term, with gradual results, and not some surge that tries to force results in a short period.

I want a plan that makes small, but certain changes, that is not disruptive to the people.

I want a plan that is simple to maintain and operate.

I want a plan that is quiet. That does not have to be a headline to rally people to its cause.

I want a plan that takes the balance of our country's resources and soldiers lives in to consideration.

All of these are very achievable with a different mind set.

Quote: "...The two Kabul-based Majors above are clearly nearly defeated by the complexity of the challenges they face in their positions in Afghanistan. Perhaps they are completely defeated and simply marking time through their tours. They are the only ones who know for sure. Six months into the tour I just completed, I felt the same way..."

I'm not sure I'd say "defeated". Frustrated? Yes.

I will offer these comments: When I first arrived in-country almost a year ago, I thought two things:

1- that we (NATO) were finally going to shoot for a clear, obtainable, and sensible objective in Afghanistan and resource the effort to get there.

and, 2- that the U.S. Army put too much faith in solving the ANSF's problems through "leadership" and not through systemic solutions.

The reason I thought the 2nd point was that I didn't see much leadership displayed on the NATO side and thought we were making progress only because our institutional systems were so strong. I have now come to believe that we actually are not making much progress beyond what would come normally through a short-term concentration of manpower, money, and propaganda- and that that lack of further progress is tied directly to a lack of leadership.

Thus, my conclusion is that we SHOULD focus on leadership improvement- but, that has to be reflected on the NATO as well as the ANSF side.

When I say "leadership"- I am not saying that there is a lack of leadership in any one individual, unit or commander/set of commanders. I personally think it is more of a systemic and institutional problem. What I have observed, admittedly limited, are a great number of personnel that are not mission-focused, do not communicate to the troops the logic behind what they do, do not push authority down to the lowest levels possible, do not trust their subordinates, do not question anything, refuse to take any risk, and manage their units through inflexible policies and punative measures. Obviously I am trying to be as generic as possible and not identify any specific units. But, these observations were not limited to any one level/unit/country.

To illustrate this: I saw something extraordinary with the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) recently. For months we tried to focus on "fixing" them. We put a large team on them, led them by the nose in pre-deployment training, attempted to partner with them, paid them more, and attempted to get some predictability in their deployment-rest cycles. I would argue it wasn't until recently, when GIRoA brought in a sharp ANA officer to command them, that I had any hope they would improve. That, along with a changeout of contractor-mentors (from bad to good) and the addition of two P4 BNRs, the unit seems like night and day to me in just a few months (the two P4 BNRs actually follow the spirit of 3-24 at the tactical/operational level better than I've seen almost anywhere- but they are the exception, not the rule).

That lesson, to me, is the key. We can empty out almost all of our headquarters personnel in my opinion, send almost every last person who spends the majority of his/her day on ppt/email home and keep the guys who are actually with their ANSF counterpart the majority of the day/week in-country (just make sure they are the right people and that they are good enough to be empowered), and if all we have in addition to that are some sharp ANSF leaders in the right places- I think we'll be successful. Instead, we are heading the opposite way from what I am witnessing (bringing in more headquarters types, more field grades and general officers, and more bureaucracy).

Now, my definition of "successful" is that the ANSF is a viable organization, able to complete the missions of their political leadership (GIRoA). As to the strategy here- I still think COL Gentile is right: we have to tie means/ways to ends. If a comptetent ANSF still won't get us our objectives because GIRoA doesn't agree with those objectives, then I'm afraid we've got some bigger problems than us not getting COIN right.

And that brings me back to my #1 thought upon arrival. I'm afraid either some of the things we are shooting for here are so complicated/complex- that no-one is able or willing to articulate them publicly, or this place is just too complex for NATO to show any progress in (and thus everything is just confusing/frustrating to everyone, we just don't want to admit it).

Some here have offered that we're really here now for long-term NATO viability. Others have suggested the only way to be successful is to improve enough to get European forces more involved. I've even heard that this is a strategic message to other parts of the world. Whatever it is- let's at least admit it to ourselves, articulate it better- and try to head towards THOSE objectives vice pretending to head towards others.

As far as being "defeated"- those of my peers who were mission-focused and lucky enough to have some latitude found things they thought were important and concentrated on those things. Others stayed at their desks, attended meetings, prepared their power point slides, and answered their emails. They didn't push the envelope trying for mission accomplishment along COIN principles, they followed the most strict interpretations of the movement/FORCEPRO policies, and didn't get out and build any relationships (or, if they did- only did what was absolutely required- the bare minimum). What kills me is that the first group risked their careers to accomplish a mission and the second group covered their asses- but both groups will be treated the same by our systems: same awards and same evaluations.

So, long answer (sorry): I personally don't feel defeated, but I do have some serious issues with the way our institution is running itself during this time of "persistent conflict" and what we are concentrating on/how we are doing business.

Grant Martin
MAJ, US Army
NTM-A/CSTC-A

The above comments are the author's own and do not constitute the position of NTM-A/CSTC-A, ISAF, the US Army, or DoD.

Chris-

I'll have to wait to give you a longer and more detailed answer in a non-public forum, but the short answers are that "the institution" in my mind is the U.S. Army: all soldiers in aggregate.

Serious issues revolve around burning our guys out in the way we deploy them/work them/manage them/reward them/trust them and the lack of mission command.

In my opinion we have to figure out a way to reward people based on mission accomplishment, and unit and long-term progress, make it acceptable to punish people without ruining their careers the first time they run afoul of a commander, value unconventional paths to general officer level, and encourage commanders to contribute to long-term Army and in-theater progress as opposed to concentrating on one-year, short-term "in theater" progress only- to the detriment of the organization as a whole in the long-run (although hard to measure and identify).

I'd say my diagnosis is a lack of "grand strategy", vision, and leadership. I discounted leadership as recently as this year- but once you've seen an environment in a combat zone without leadership, you quickly realize the importance of it. I think it is easy to discount it in academic environments- but on the ground in a complex environment where people are dying I'd argue it is THE imperative. There are a lot of "sheeple" in the world! I am currently reading A Question of Command: Counterinsurgency from the Civil War to Iraq by Mark Moyar, as I believe it to be prescient. Bottom line to me: lots of policy writers and rule followers in our Army today. I haven't read anywhere where those things won us a conflict in the past.

Recommended treatment? We'd have to totally restructure the U.S. Army, if not the entire DoD. We have become our own worst enemy: a monolithic bureaucracy that self-generates problems unconscously that inevitably lead to more of "our solution", which begets more problems- that only "we" can solve, and so on. Maybe we don't have to restructure the entire force- but at least those involved in COIN, stability ops, "persistent conflict", etc. We are (or were) on top of our conventional ops game. I don't think we've shown much flexibility, creativity, adjustability, or effectiveness when dealing with unconventional environments. Maybe we're the wrong answer to be the lead in these environments anyway (although we arguably just filled the vacuum in an otherwise leaderless environment)- but if we are going to be, surely we've got to do better than we have and offer our political leaders/people better options.

Maybe we've done so badly that they won't ask us to do anymore COIN after 2014- and that will be just fine for the conventional warriors and most of our populace. But someone will surely be involved in some manner with COIN afterwards- even if its just SOF- and surely we can't look back at 2001-2014 and use that as the template...

- Grant

The views above are the author's own and do not represent the position of NTM-A/CSTC-A, ISAF, the US Army, or DoD

<b>Robert C. Jones:</b>

It's not dangerous Bob, it's just reality and it can be worked out -- though your idea of just ignoring that reality in hopes it will go away is not going to do much good...

The issue is not that we "...<i>have no 'head' of grand strategy</i>..." We do have one and, by design, he or she is the President of the US aided by the Cabinet. That has been corrupted to an extent but not devastatingly so by misuse of the National Security Council (not subject to Senate confirmation) and by the failure of Congress to exercise its responsibilities to oversee the design <i>and funding</i> of strategies.

We have a 'head of strategy', the issue is that ability of the 'head' to design strategy is at the whim of a political process that is inimical to consistency and which will try to deter such design for domestic political reasons.

As I've tried to tell you for several years, that's a large problem (and you remember that...) but I've also told you it <b>can</b> be worked around -- you just need to change your approach to account for that.

You always seem to forget that rather important last part...

<b>Robert C. Jones:</b>

Whoops. Sorry for misunderstanding, Bob.

However, just wanted to insure all realized the Head of Strategery cannot get to that pinnacle because of all the conflicts caused by the numerous persons who shouldn't even be involved but who wish to craft and implement strategy -- which is why we lack a grand strategy. Or something like that...

And I've been drug to worse places. ;)

I read the article and several reviews of Melton's book. What strikes me as it seems to be just a modified version of the USMC Small Wars Manual. The Small Wars Manual has a very big section on the establishment of Military Government. To include the fact that we should be charging the Host country for administering such an undertaking.

Yet another who agrees with me that the creation of DoD and Goldwater-Nichols both created far more problems than they solved.

I could quibble around the edges but he's pretty much on the mark. My biggest complaint is that he apparently replaces the excessive latitude Goldwater-Nichols provided to geographic 'combatant' commanders with excessive centralization in the Pentagon -- there's a happier, middle way...

Doctrine is infinitely changeable due to the METT-TC factors and the often huge differences between wars but the basics of strategic operational and tactical planning are constants and if they are not performed competently, the failures of the last 60 years can and will be repeated. We can do better.

He indirectly touches on another of my pet rocks; expecting people who are in place for a two to four year stretch -- sometimes less -- to properly orchestrate long term strategic efforts. Whether at the national and political level or on the CentCom staff, that musical chair rotation is totally inimical to coherent planning -- and execution.

Ponder a 'strategic planner' who occupies three quite different chairs in three Commands in four years. The fallacy that all like jobs can accept such rapid turnover is a terrible flaw. An eighteen month tour does not provide truly competent, consistent and effective command to a Bn or BCT -- it provides exposure to command for the designee. Somewhat limited exposure at that.

We must be able to provide effective command and leadership and that means somewhere in the mix, we must provide consistency and only longer tours can do that. The terribly flawed 'up or out' and 'any appropriate level person can do any job' mentalities do us no favors. As has been said, one can place a round peg in a square hole -- but it will be smaller than optimum...

In addition to selecting the best and not the next available or scheduled person for a job, we must be able to better trust subordinates. That means improved training at all levels.

While Melton's prescriptions have merit, they will not provide the improvement he and we seek and need. We must improve training and the personnel processes in order to provide reliable and coherent plans and capabilities to the political and electoral cycle influenced strategic decision makers. One cannot -- and should not -- 'lick' them; they will not let one join them nor should one wish to do that.

Therefor, one must out-think them and outlast them in order to provide effective strategic advice, operational command and tactical prowess. We can do that.

Just another example of open source warfare at work as the theory predicts will happen in an insurgency ecosystem. AND actually some of the terms used in this article come darn close to Robb's own OSW defintions---what a dance that we do in order to not admit that it is open source warfare.

WASHINGTON -- Rival militant organizations on both sides of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border have increasingly been teaming up in deadly raids, in what military and intelligence officials say is the insurgents latest attempt to regain the initiative after months of withering attacks from American and allied forces.

New intelligence assessments from the region assert that insurgent factions now are setting aside their historic rivalries to behave like "a syndicate," joining forces in ways not seen before. After one recent attack on a remote base in eastern Afghanistan, a check of the enemy dead found evidence that the fighters were from three different factions, military officials said.

In the past, these insurgent groups have been seen as sharing ideology and inspiration, but less often ideas and plans.

Now the intelligence assessments offer evidence of a worrisome new trend in which extremist commanders and their insurgent organizations are coordinating attacks and even combining their foot soldiers into patchwork patrols sent to carry out specific raids.

The change reveals the resilience and flexibility of the militant groups. But at the same time, officials say, the unusual and expanding alliances suggest that the factions are feeling new military pressure. American and NATO officials say these decisions by insurgent leaders are the result of operations from American, Afghan and allied forces on one side of the border, and from the Pakistani military -- and American drone strikes -- on the other.

American commanders recently have been seeking even more latitude to operate freely along the porous border, including inside Pakistan, and have consistently warned that whatever gains they have made in the past few months are fragile. One official said it was "a wake-up call" to find evidence, after the attack on the forward operating base, that the fighters were partisans from three factions with long histories of feuding: the Quetta Shura Taliban of Mullah Omar; the network commanded by the Haqqani family; and fighters loyal to the Hekmatyar clan.

These extremist groups have begun granting one another safe passage through their areas of control in Afghanistan and Pakistan, sharing new recruits and coordinating their propaganda responses to American and allied actions on the ground, officials said.

American military officials sought to cast these recent developments as a reaction to changes in the American and allied strategies in the past year, including aggressive military offensives against the enemy coupled with attempts to provide visible and reliable protection to the local Afghan population.

"They have been forced to cooperate due to the effect our collective efforts have had on them," said Lt. Col. Patrick R. Seiber, spokesman for American and coalition forces in eastern Afghanistan.

Colonel Seiber said insurgent commanders recognized that as the number of American forces increased this year in Afghanistan, "they would need to surge as well." Veteran militant leaders, many with a long history of open warfare against each other, have "put aside differences when they see a common threat," Colonel Seiber said.

Over the past 90 days, signs of this new and advanced syndication among insurgent groups have been especially evident in two provinces of eastern Afghanistan, Kunar and Paktika.

Increased cooperation among insurgent factions also is being reported inside Pakistan, where many of the extremist organizations are based or where their leaders have found haven.

American and NATO officials said they had seen evidence of loose cooperation among other insurgent groups, including Lashkar-e-Taiba and Tehrik-i-Taliban.

Lashkar is a Punjabi group, and is considered one of the most serious long-term threats inside Pakistan. The Punjabi groups, many of which were created by Pakistani intelligence to fight Indias interests in Kashmir, now appear to be teaming up with Pashtun groups like the Afghan and Pakistan Taliban to fight their creators, the Pakistani intelligence and security services.

Pentagon and military officials who routinely engage with Pakistani counterparts said officials in Islamabad agree with the new American and NATO assessments.

"This is actually a syndicate of related and associated militant groups and networks," said one American officer, summarizing the emerging view of Pakistani officials. "Trying to parse them, as if they have firewalls in between them, is really kind of silly. They cooperate with each other. They franchise work with each other."

The role of senor leaders of Al Qaeda, who are believed to be hiding in tribal areas of Pakistan, remains important as well, officials said.

"They are part of this very complex collusion that occurs between all of these extremist groups," one American official said. "Each group provides certain value to the syndicate. Al Qaeda senior leadership provides ideological inspiration and a brand name -- which is not all that tangible, frankly, but its still pretty important."

Officials said the loose federation of extremist groups was not managed by a traditional military command-and-control system, but was more akin to a social network of relationships that rise and fade as the groups decide on ways to attack Afghan, Pakistani, American and NATO interests.

While these expanding relationships among insurgent groups are foremost a response to increased American and allied attacks, another motivation is eliminating the need for each group to guard its physical territory and money-generating interests from the other extremist organizations.

"They do not want to have to defend that against each other," one NATO officer said.

The official cited information gathered on the ground confirming that insurgent groups now allow rivals free passage through roads in their areas of control in exchange for that right across the other groups turf. There also is a body of intelligence pointing to threads of financing that run from senior Qaeda leaders and then pass among several of the insurgent organizations.

Commanders also warn of another response to the increase of American troop levels in Afghanistan: Larger numbers of insurgent foot soldiers are expected to be ordered to remain in Afghanistan this winter to fight on, rather than retreat to havens in Pakistan awaiting the spring thaw and a return to combat.

"What our intelligence is telling us, were probably going to see about a 15 to 20 percent increase in the amount of attacks compared to the same time frame of 2009," said Maj. Gen. John F. Campbell, commander of American and allied forces in eastern Afghanistan. "We think many are going to stay and try to fight."

Anon,

Beyond consistently demonstrating your lack of historical knowledge on these types of conflicts you are clearly in violation of copy right laws when you cut and paste an entire article into this blog space.

Many of us are tiring of seeing your posts stating the exact same thing on numerous blogs, even where it isn't relevant. This is unprofessional and in the short and long run undermining your effort to make a valid point.

There are places where this topic is appropriate, no one is ignoring its importance, but few think it is new. Find the correct forum for your post and post away. Do not cut and paste entire articles. Copy the link to the article and post one or two paragraphs from it. If folks are interested they'll read it.

Finally, take some time to actually read all the comments and educate yourself on the old as well as the new and you'll be able to make your point more effectively. Right now many of us wondering why you are harping on the obvious and why you think folks disagree with you. Of course it is open source warfare, and that has existed for decades. What is the so what of it?

Bill M;

Reference quantum physics research into the math of insurgencies---interesting note is that JIEDDO is in fact looking at two recent studies (and actually engaging them as consultants)one which I often refer here as models for CIED. Math at that level tends to allow one to look at data in a far different perspective than the typical military intelligence analysis process does. Surprsingly math sees patterns which have not be seen when using standard intelligence analysis for whatever reason. Maybe math is far more unbiased than the egos of analysts. Maybe math tends to not get tied up in the history of the past but for whatever reason the two studies are extremely close in their results and in fact validate open source warfare which cannot be said for a number of theories floating round in the blogs.

So even if one calls OSW an old or new theory it defintiely does in fact explain what is going on inside insurgencies in a far more lucid manner than do other theories and if we had just deepened or actually did research into Kilcullen's conflict ecosystem one would have had then the analysis tool to use in OSW.

Which in turn is exactly the problem that Anon 2 mentions here;

"One of my answers to that would be, if you let those espousing the status quo and "we always did it that way...in 1930" have the bully pulpit, then progress and new TTP and ideas are never explored or advertised to those in power to use them (or are killed as programs due to naysaying) because "the force is strong" in inertia, IMHO."

Bill M;

Reference quantum physics research into the math of insurgencies---interesting note is that JIEDDO is in fact looking at two recent studies (and actually engaging them as consultants)one which I often refer here as models for CIED. Math at that level tends to allow one to look at data in a far different perspective than the typical military intelligence analysis process does. Surprsingly math sees patterns which have not be seen when using standard intelligence analysis for whatever reason. Maybe math is far more unbiased than the egos of analysts. Maybe math tends to not get tied up in the history of the past but for whatever reason the two studies are extremely close in their results and in fact validate open source warfare which cannot be said for a number of theories floating round in the blogs.

So even if one calls OSW an old or new theory it defintiely does in fact explain what is going on inside insurgencies in a far more lucid manner than do other theories and if we had just deepened or actually did research into Kilcullen's conflict ecosystem one would have had then the analysis tool to use in OSW.

Which in turn is exactly the problem that Anon 2 mentions here;

"One of my answers to that would be, if you let those espousing the status quo and "we always did it that way...in 1930" have the bully pulpit, then progress and new TTP and ideas are never explored or advertised to those in power to use them (or are killed as programs due to naysaying) because "the force is strong" in inertia, IMHO."

Bill M;

Reference quantum physics research into the math of insurgencies---interesting note is that JIEDDO is in fact looking at two recent studies (and actually engaging them as consultants)one which I often refer here as models for CIED. Math at that level tends to allow one to look at data in a far different perspective than the typical military intelligence analysis process does. Surprsingly math sees patterns which have not be seen when using standard intelligence analysis for whatever reason. Maybe math is far more unbiased than the egos of analysts. Maybe math tends to not get tied up in the history of the past but for whatever reason the two studies are extremely close in their results and in fact validate open source warfare which cannot be said for a number of theories floating round in the blogs.

So even if one calls OSW an old or new theory it defintiely does in fact explain what is going on inside insurgencies in a far more lucid manner than do other theories and if we had just deepened or actually did research into Kilcullen's conflict ecosystem one would have had then the analysis tool to use in OSW.

Which in turn is exactly the problem that Anon 2 mentions here;

"One of my answers to that would be, if you let those espousing the status quo and "we always did it that way...in 1930" have the bully pulpit, then progress and new TTP and ideas are never explored or advertised to those in power to use them (or are killed as programs due to naysaying) because "the force is strong" in inertia, IMHO."