Edited by Colonel Gary Montgomery and CWO-4 Timothy McWilliams, USMCR.
Published by the Marine Corps University Press, Quantico, VA in two volumes, 2009.
Reviewed by Commander Youssef Aboul-Enein, MSC, USN
Marine Corps Field Historians Colonel Montgomery and Warrant Officer McWilliams have done a great service in documenting Al-Qaida's abuses in Iraq that led to the revolt of Iraqi Sunni Tribes from the insanity of al-Qaida. It is not enough to say that al-Qaida has hijacked Islam, but to demonstrate the tangible violations of Islam, tribal customs, and societal structures against Iraqi Sunni Muslim leaders. In many ways, al-Qaida in Iraq's actions were among the catalysts that led to their violently expulsion from Iraqi Sunni region of al-Anbar. This study is invaluable on many levels, for it brings the words of tribal leaders in Iraq to life, and is recommended for anyone deploying to Iraq and wanting a deeper understanding of its society. The focus of this review will be on volume two, which immerses readers in the Iraqi perspective of the Anbar Awakening, whereas volume one offers the American Perspective. Both are excellent reads for the serious student of counter-insurgency.
Tribal Sheikhs (leaders) and their authority are based on the ability to bring patronage and security to members of his tribe. The book discusses how the late Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein registered all tribal leaders, and mixed them with tribal leaders who did not have the right pedigree to lead a specific tribe. This was meant to get tribes to compete for rank within and access to the Iraqi government as well as to test loyalty of the tribe versus loyalty to the state, which in this case the state was the person of Saddam Hussein.
The book discusses the observation of Miriam (not her real name) who observed that al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI) ordered all police to go to the mosque and repent. This was the first attempt at societal control and intimidation using the village mosque, and she says that "the terrorists used the word jihad to cover up evil acts." Among the outrages carried out by AQI to intimidate the town of Ramadi were killings during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan, a month designed to commune with God and forgive neighbors. AQI utilized this tactic in order to intimidate other Muslims to accept its victimization. Females, under the guise of being seamstresses, were drafted to reconnoiter houses for AQI and report on the presence of Iraqi policemen in hiding. Miriam is a woman, mother, and wife trying to survive. She describes how AQI reduced killing for killing's sake and tells of a moving story of female Marines bringing normalcy amidst the chaos through gestures of humanitarian aid.
The Authors received interesting insights when they interviewed Sheikh Abdullah al-Faraji, head of the Sunni (religious) Endowment for al-Anbar, the sector of Iraq bordering Jordan and home of Iraq's Sunni tribes. He wishes to see an exchange of ideas between Iraq and the United States and implores America to leave a legacy like the British did after World War I, citing the infrastructure, bridges, roads, and buildings that were built by the British and an actual Bridge built in al-Anbar is referred to by the locals as the "British" Bridge. He also recounts that AQI could no longer discern who the enemy was as it included Shiite Muslims, Kurds, Sunni backsliders, women and children, in the end everyone except them. Al-Faraji, much like Miriam, explains how AQI killed to kill, and not for any specific reason except to control the village and oppress the people. Sheikh Ahmed al-Rishawi, one of the leaders of the Albu Risha Tribe, discusses how the September 14, 2006 eleven point Communiqué was the start of the Anbar Awakening Movement that began to unify Sunni tribes to expel al-Qaida. Among the points was to bring the army back into Anbar, bring tribal sons into Iraq's army and police, declare war on al-Qaida thugs, and not to cooperate or negotiate with al-Qaida.
In another interview, Sheikh Jassim al-Suwadawi of the Albu Soda Tribe describes the tactics used to fight against AQI. It includes fighting from rooftops, indentifying foreign fighters for targeting, and the setup of checkpoints. He talks of how twelve tribes in East Ramadi had to be enticed into joining the alliance against AQI. These talks among these Sunni tribal leaders included a discussion of how AQI did not allow Iraqi Sunnis to live like normal people, and he highlights the importance of disinformation of battlefield success in fighting al-Qaida and tricking them into surrendering. Iraq's Sunni tribes developed a sophisticated organization for their fight and linked it with the Iraqi government, one cell gathered intelligence, and another cell conducted the raid. The concept of fight, hold and secure was divided between the tribe and Iraq's central government. Each volume has about twenty interviews and is an excellent study.
Commander Aboul-Enein is author of "Militant Islamist Ideology: Understanding the Global Threat," published by Naval Institute Press. He is Adjunct Islamic Studies Chair at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. Commander Aboul-Enein wishes to thank his Teaching Assistant Mr. Michael Barry for his edits that enhanced this review.
Comments
The "Awakening" was indeed strategic to the onset of some form of sustained peace in Iraq..and the beginning of the end..perhaps.
But, was it not the payment of million..perhaps hundreds of million of US dollars to former military members of the Iraqi Army that was substantial to the "Awakening" movement and the highly aclaimed "success" of COIN in Anbar Province.
The real and strategic issues was the disbandment of the Iraqi Army...in total. This led to thousands of un-employed and well trained Iraqi military to use their knowledge and motivation to kill American troops.
Yet few really have taken on the issue of the disbandment of the Iraqi Army or the entire Iraqi civilian infrastructure. Have people forgotten or do they (or we) really know who made that horrific decision to disband the two functioning organizations that made Iraq work...day to day.
History has yet to point the finger of the person or persons who made that decision...no doubt it was in the Rumsfelt corner..with Doug Feith as the messenger.
What if we had screened the Iraqi Army instead of totally disbanding it...what had we endured to retain the civilian infrastruce rather than terminating thousands....absolutely, the war, the cost in lives and the billions spent may of been much less.
Yet, people like Bush, Cheney, Rumsfelt and Feith remain on the American scene in the historical limelight of "success" in Iraq....for most of us who served there....it was a waste..and history will validate this fact....