Gates also made clear that he won't be around to drag the Army in the direction he described. That will be up to his successor and the next generation of Army leaders. If Gates's message wasn't ominous enough, these leaders face an even bigger challenge left unsaid by Gates but perhaps implied, namely how will Big Army - its general purpose forces - remain relevant in the period ahead. With threats rapidly compounding in the air, naval, space, and cyber dimensions, and defense spending heading in the other direction, the Army's general purpose forces would appear to be the easiest target to get the books balanced.
Gates asserted that, "any future defense secretary who advises the president to again send a big American land army into Asia or into the Middle East or Africa should 'have his head examined.'" Gates is presumably exempting the current defense secretary from such a cranial critique. It was Gates himself who implemented the surge strategy in Iraq and (according to Bob Woodward's Obama's Wars) was the most determined advocate for the "big American land army" in Afghanistan. During his time as defense secretary, the U.S. headcount in Afghanistan grew from under 24,000 to nearly 100,000.
When Gates councils against another large, open-ended campaign by general purpose forces, he seems to be assuming that the U.S. government will find some effective tactic, technique or procedure other than a large stabilization campaign to deal with Eurasian security problems that are certain to arise. The second half of Gates's speech implied as much. He sees a new generation of young Army leaders who now have extensive on-the-job training and experience in security force assistance and building partnership capacity. He wants to retain that generation so that they can use these skills to both prevent future security problems that would otherwise require a large messy intervention, or to prepare indigenous or proxy forces to fight these conflicts so U.S. general purpose forces won't have to. It is an unproven model. But for Gates, it is politically imperative that the Army provide such an option to future policymakers.
In order for that happen, the Army needs a personnel system more optimized for breeding T.E. Lawrence and Russell Volckmann rather than Omar Bradley or Bedell Smith. The Army's officer promotion system has been designed to train and select officers who are the best at leading larger and larger general purpose units. Any time in one's career spent away from command, staff, and school billets not in support of that track is a grave career risk. Gates explicitly called for Army officers to get off that track in ways that would improve their skills at security force assistance with foreign military partners. And he called on the Army's personnel system to support this new primary track.
With Gates sharply downgrading the probability of either Big Army COIN stabilization campaigns or "another head-on clash of large mechanized land armies," the primary tasks of Gates's future army would seem to be security force assistance, strategic raiding, counter-terror direct action, brigade-level rapid reaction, and disaster response. With Cold War-era general purpose missions downgraded, much of the Army's mechanized forces could be headed to the reserve component, which would revert to a strategic reserve.
Gates's speech was a warning that the Army is about to get smaller, more intellectually challenging, and with promotions harder to come by. The result, Gates hopes, will be an Army that can make security force assistance into a highly effective and widely used tool. It is an unproven theory. But it's a plan that has to work -- because Gates's successors will certainly strive to take his advice about those big land wars in Asia.
Comments
It often appears that the underlying message in some of these statements from our national leaders is that our strategic shortfalls in the war on terrorism are due to the military failing to transform. Apparently Afghanistan is a "military" failure instead of a political failure, yet I'm not aware of any true military failures in Afghanistan. All military missions were and will continue to be accomplished, but to what end? We have decided not to defeat the enemy in Afghanistan and the region, and instead to pursue transformation of a society in hopes that our enemies would embrace our ideas.
I'm a critic by nature, so I of course agree the military can be better. There is much room for improvement in numerous areas to include leadership, but the basis of our national failure is not a poorly trained or equipped military, but rather the underlying idealistic policies and strategies that we were deployed to pursue.
While it is true that the military needs to relearn how to do SFA more effectively, but it is also true that without reform in the various laws that govern our SFA processes, then simply learning to do it better will accomplish little. There is also the fact that people will not fight well for causes they don't believe in. People who believe in what they're fighting for with our training and equipment will win almost every encounter. If they don't believe, and their enemy has passion for their cause, well the outcome will often be less desirable. We continue to be naive when we believe others are simply going to embrace and fight for our ideals when we ask them to. The world doesn't work that way; never has.
If we had a functional strategy producing body in our government perhaps we would have identified the realm of the possible and designed an appropriate strategy to achieve it. Instead we pursued idealistic goals,too often promoted by private think tanks, while failing to understand ourselves, our enemy and the people we were trying to partner with. Sun Tzu would fire us all.
"Gates's speech made clear that he is concerned that in spite of the experiences of the past decade, the Army has not completed the cultural transformation from the Cold War-era Army to an Army optimized for an era of persistent irregular conflict."
Should we consider that "the experiences of the past decade" do not so much offer lessons indicating a need for a "cultural change" re: the US Army; as they do offer lessons indicating a need for a cultural change re: the ideas and thinking of our national leaders?
If our national leaders were to properly acknowledge and embrace these lessons -- and, accordingly, undergo the appropriate "cultural change" -- would such terms and ideas as "an era of persistent irregular conflict" -- and the need for the US Army to transform to deal with it -- still hold water?
Without debating the importance of SFA capacity and capability, it is important to address joint land force capability and capacity writ large in light of both military history and the unpredictable future joint operating environment.
As a guy named PLATO said, "Only the dead have seen the end of war."
This year's West Point graduating class will have no better luck predicting all the fun places they will deploy to during the course of their careers than ours did. And no more of a vote.
The notion that a Defense Secretary would have to 'have his head examined' if he advised a POTUS to send land forces into Asia, the Middle East or Africa assumes our national interests will not ever again compel us to do whatever is necessary in those regions to impose our will on the enemy strategic and operational centers of gravity to the degree and for the duration necessary to accomplish national objectives. It also assumes that air and naval power can somehow be decisively relevant to the enemy strategic and operational centers of gravity. Or that "by, with, and through" can/will be enough to be decisive. These are dubious assumptions - - especially given the uncertain future in the middle east.
Not that my opinion counts relative to a SECDEF but to play on words below. . ."in my opinion, any future defense secretary who advises the president NOT to send a large enough land army into Asia or into the Middle East or Africa if our vital or survival national interests are threatened, the enemy centers of gravity are in the land domain, and we cannot be decisive without capacity and presence in the land domain is naive and places the nation at risk. Any future defense secretary who does not ensure we have at least enough capacity and capability to at least give the POTUS decisive options when important national interests are at stake has let him and the Nation down.
Many of the problems we had to overcome in the current fights arose from a failure to send in sufficient forces to do full spectrum operations - - the capacity and presence on the ground to stabilize and secure as we fought. In Iraq, the challenges prior to the successful surge was due in part to a misplaced trust in EBO. .the dominoes would all fall just so after a little "shock and awe". Shinseki was right. . .
We already lost 8 of 18 active divisions in the 90s. If I recall correctly the joint force lost approximately 780,000 in end strength during that period. The day we do no longer have the capacity and capability to impose our will on the enemy/situation - - whenever/wherever required (not just where it is convenient and less messy)- - while at the same time at least being compelling staring down/deterring/containing another potential adversary in another part of the world is the day we are no longer a superpower.
"In order for that happen, the Army needs a personnel system more optimized for breeding T.E. Lawrence and Russell Volckmann rather than Omar Bradley or Bedell Smith."
While I understand the use of historical figures to qualify traits and attributes, I'd suggest that all these names were good at identifying problems that faced them and devising solutions - which I think is really what we are after given the SECDEF acknowledges the character of the next war is undeterminable.
In order to get there though we first have to define the requirement - what do you want a given person at a given rank in a specific role to be capable of doing and then work the requirements backwards through all their training, education and development opportunities - all the way back to their selection/assessment/acquisition.
Only after having defined the Requirements can the HR system (processes, infrastructure, technology & organization) that exist to manage the Army HR Life Cycle functions be assessed in a way that allows you to change what needs to be changed and emplace some the metrics that tell you if you are doing the right things and doing them right.
Our culture resists this - while everyone raise their hands for measuring someone else's effectiveness and performance, few will raise them for being measured. Our is a culture that never has enough time to do things right, but always seems to have enough time to do them again.
Hopefully with the new CSA coming from the Generating Force (but still having strong experience in the Operating Force) the Army will have a champion with a good enough understanding of the current state to shepherd a Transformation of the how the Army manages its human capital and individual talent. He's up against a strong bureaucracy however, and it is one that does not believe that the current system does not deliver because they measure success in terms of structure and end strength not capability requirements fully met.
To initiate any changes, the first order is to define the requirement for specific talent in a way that cannot be ignored and that gains support from the people who employ those capabilities. Some of it can be anecdotal, however it also requires specific measures of skills, attributes, experience, education and other elements of individual capability that get us beyond metrics that don't tell the whole story.
Dave:
<i>That is why the assessment of the host nation' s willingness to work to do what is necessary to solve their own problem is critical to determining whether it is feasible to even assist them.</i>
Agree on this, and we also have to determine whether the host nation's assessment of "what is necessary" is consistent with ours.
In the past we've all too often allowed ourselves to be levered into supporting goals that weren't ours (like keeping a despot in power) because we mistakenly believed that this was consistent with our goals (fighting communism, or whatever else). We need to be a lot more cynical in our assessments than we sometimes have been, and to put a good deal more effort into not being worked. We're also a bit too eager at times to assume that there is something we can do, and that we must do it. Staying out is often a quite viable option, and often the best option.
I agree with Dave on this one, and have been harping on it elsewhere throughout SWJ. Getting better at SFA and irregular warfare will accomplish little without a coherent strategy with achieveable goals. SFA is a tool or means, it is not an end to itself.
SFA simply won't work in some situations, because the government is deeply flawed, or the indigenous personnel do not have the will for fighting for any number of reasons. I think it is haphazard to think we can achieve all our objectives through, by and with others as though the rest of the world will simply march to our music. We owe our nation, especially the conventional Army, the ability to win major battles unilaterally. We can hope it won't come to that, but simply trying to wish away future wars, to include ground wars, is to substitute strategy with hope.
SOF, CIA, DOJ and even the State Department (through contracting) could, if given the authority to do so, provide the bulk of SFA type skills needed to build appropriate security force capacity for partners to effectively counter low level persistant irregular warfare. The Army should stay focused on their wartime mission. Yes to fewer promotions and higher standards, but why commit the conventional Army to SFA?
We can make another argument, and that is since we don't have the authorities to conduct SFA effectively and responsively to assist partners in countering irregular threats due to insufficient authorities and rice bowl fights, then SFA isn't even a viable means to pursue a strategy. The biggest challenge with SFA isn't our lack of capacity or capability to conduct it, but insufficient, or in most cases the complete absence of, proper authorities to do it right.
If Congress doesn't tackle this critical shortfall, we'll simply continue to talk about SFA and our inability to do it until the next major conflict that we couldn't prevent, because we couldn't assist certain partners develop an adequate security force capability. We are simply watching the next wars form on the near horizon right in front of us because we're paralyzed by our bureaucracy. In some cases a modest investment in SFA could prevent disaster, but we sit on the side lines watching....waiting...
Dayuhan: I probably was not clear enough but I do not mean that we bring good governance and development but that the host nation has to do it possibly with out help. We have to get out of the business of doing it for them. That is why the assessment of the host nation' s willingness to work to do what is necessary to solve their own problem is critical to determining whether it is feasible to even assist them. The operative term is aiding then in their internal defense and development programs and not us doing it for them. If they have the will but not the capacity or capability then we might want to assist them if deemed in our interest. But if they lack the will then our assistance is not going to achieve success for them or protect our interests.
I agree that a specific strategy based on specific goals is essential. I think we also need to look beyond US strategic objectives and assess the objectives and means of out nominal allies and our prospective antagonists. In any given case, is our ally defending itself against "lawlessness, subversion, insurgency, and terrorism", or is it trying to suppress domestic dissent... or a bit of both? Is the nominal agenda of our ally's central government shared by the military force we'd be working with and the various regional authorities? We tend to assume that governments govern, and represent some sort of consensus; the assumption is not necessarily valid.
I confess that I cringe when I hear talk of bringing good governance and development to anyone, anywhere. Sounds a lovely idea, yes, but if doing it were anywhere near as easy as saying it there would be a lot less bad governance and underdevelopment out there. Good governance and development are not gifts to be bestowed or accessories to be installed: we may be able to help people along that road, with a light hand and a lot of craft (things we are not notorious for displaying), but if we try to deliver them in a package we are usually going to make a mess.
Keeping the goals defined, specific, limited and achievable makes it much easier to determine whether we really want to be in a situation or not, and if we do want to be there, what sort of presence we want or need to apply. If we're defining our goals with terms like "good governance" and "development", somebody somewhere needs to do a lot more work on getting the focus narrowed down.
Let's try focusing on a strategy. Why don't we decide that where it is in the US interest let us make the deliberate strategic decision to provide a friend, partner, or ally assistance with its internal defense and development programs to defend itself against lawlessness, subversion, insurgency, and terrorism and bring good governance and development to ungoverned or under-governed spaces? We can provide advice and assistance with a range of options and capabilities that are based on a thorough assessment of the situation and the ability of the friend, partner, or ally to take the necessary actions for it to be successful in defending its against lawless, subversion, insurgency, or terrorism. Of course that sounds like a Foreign Internal Defense mission but instead of trying to fit every situation into a FID or SFA scenario (or make SFA work); let us do the thorough analysis and assessment, devise a strategy and develop and execute a campaign plan that achieves US strategic objectives. Let's worry less about names and doctrinal concepts and theory and focus on strategy and campaign plans.
Good article, Robert -- though I quibble with a few details...
With respect to the revamp of the Army not being complete, a number of us have been saying -- screaming -- that for years. It falls on deaf ears. So Gates is not a harbinger, he's merely the latest in a long line to note and state such change is required.
You say:<blockquote>"It was Gates himself who implemented the surge strategy in Iraq and ... for the "big American land army" in Afghanistan..."</blockquote>What Gates said is important -- "...any future defense secretary who advises the president..." He's not the decider...
The fact he recommended more troops may well have been his second choice to 'just get out' and that simply has not been mentioned to avoid undercutting the President.
Should he be the person to give such advice? Gates is good -- but he's an Intel Analyst by trade. The person who should give military advice is nominally the CJCS -- but what happens if an Air Force person with significant fighter experience is to provide advice on a land war? The system is dysfunctional. Good SecDefs do the best they can within that.
Creating an Army of T.E Lawrences or Russell Volckmanns may not be a good idea. Both did good things but so did Walter Kreuger and Bruce Palmer. Those latter two could deal with the full spectrum of warfare. It's <u>people</u> that make the difference -- no education or training process can make Greats out of poor material -- you can and we do make barely acceptable that improves bit with the right experience out of it but that is not optimum or even necessary, it's just the way we've always done it.
Improvement starts with selection for entry -- and frankly we do not select, we beg. That worked in days of yore but it is today emphatically the wrong answer.
You say:<blockquote>"Gates explicitly called for Army officers to get off that track in ways that would improve their skills at security force assistance with foreign military partners. And he called on the Armys personnel system to support this new primary track."</blockquote>Perhaps. I didn't get that sensing with the degree of assurance you seem to have. Regardless, I suggest what's needed is a realization that the old 'generalist' model of producing Officers and the very, very flawed 'large staff' approach to building a personnel cushion and preparing for mobilization are two ideas that are long past their sell-by dates.
You say:<blockquote>"The result, Gates hopes, will be an Army that can make security force assistance into a highly effective and widely used tool. It is an unproven theory. But its a plan that has to work - because Gatess successors will certainly strive to take his advice about those big land wars in Asia."</blockquote>I'm quite unsure of the accuracy in that. I do not know that is what he hopes but I suppose the issue is the definition of "widely used."
Security force assistance is not at all unproven. It is proven and it generally works quite well. What does not work is trying to employ the GPF to do that job and we have proven that in three wars. That is a CIA / SF mission and they are adequately sized to do that -- <i>provided</i> they are not misused in other missions.
I do agree he probably hopes to avoid a land war in Asia or far more likely and less desirable places he included that you inexplicably omitted; the Middle East or Africa. Hopefully, "Gatess successors will certainly strive to take his advice about those big land wars..."