Philippines a Model for Counterinsurgency

<i>"What would happen if the U.S. withdrew from the Philippines?" </i>

Not much. The US is only operating in a small portion of the country, against the smallest and least capable of the insurgent groups in the country... an "insurgent group" that is as much criminal enterprise as insurgency. We are not preventing the collapse of the Philippines: far from it. We should not overestimate our role or our influence.

<i>More specifically, what would be the dangers if insurgent organizations (e.g., MILF, ASG, JI) unified in the absence of a U.S. presence/assistance, and what negative influence could external actors (e.g., Al Qaeda or a rogue state) have if the U.S. chose to withdraw from the Philippines? </i>

Again, minimal danger and slim to no chance of negative influence. The US presence is not preventing unity among these organizations: if anything it encourages it. The reasons for this are probably a bit too extensive to go into here, but it is not a significant threat and we should not in any way assume that our presence is preventing a catastrophic alignment of insurgencies.

It is true that the Philippines has been fighting various insurgencies for many decades, with little prospect of victory. There's also not much prospect for an insurgent victory, or for peace. US involvement has for the most part been pretty minimal, at least as far as the NPA and MILF insurgencies are concerned, and it's not our victory, our defeat, or our stalemate that's at issue.

For RCJ:

<i>Liberty, Injustice, Legitimacy and Respect varies widely by culture, by region and over time. What mechanisms of legal influence on the governmental process are adequate also varies.</i>

Don't forget prosperity, security, and stability, which people also seek. People who don't have them often put them before liberty, justice, etc on the priority list.

Also good to remember that the fight in the southern Philippines is not fundamentally between government and populace, it's between two segments of the populace with irreconcilable expectations and demands. Government has vacillated between supporting one populace against the other and ineffectual attempts to mediate. Neither populace trusts government. It's not just a matter of a populace rebelling against oppression from government.

<i>People feel the way they feel. The best we can hope to do is to not judge those feelings, but rather to help mediate reasonable compromises where invited, or where vital national interests compel us to intervene.</i>

Who defines "reasonable compromise"? What seems reasonable to us may not seem reasonable to contending parties... and for mediation to be effective all the contending parties have to accept the mediator.

<i>Where we need to change the most is in our compulsion to "fix" how the poeple feel, or to assist some ally in suppressing that segment of their populace that dare to complain. We must shift to one where we shine that harsh light on the domestic policies of the Host Nation and how they are implemented, and onto our own foreign policies and how they are implemented as well.</i>

Again, when two different populaces are fighting, and they have irreconcilable demands, change of the status quo to appease one group is likely to enrage the other. We do ourselves no favors by oversimplifying any conflict in any place, and when we assume that any given model is universally valid we often find ourselves trying to promote solutions that seem brilliant to us, but which have little or no possibility of succeeding.

Bill

I think that takes a western perception of the problem and applies a western solution to the same.

What shapes perceptions of Liberty, Injustice, Legitimacy and Respect varies widely by culture, by region and over time. What mechanisms of legal influence on the governmental process are adequate also varies.

People feel the way they feel. The best we can hope to do is to not judge those feelings, but rather to help mediate reasonable compromises where invited, or where vital national interests compel us to intervene.

Where we need to change the most is in our compulsion to "fix" how the poeple feel, or to assist some ally in suppressing that segment of their populace that dare to complain. We must shift to one where we shine that harsh light on the domestic policies of the Host Nation and how they are implemented, and onto our own foreign policies and how they are implemented as well.

For the U.S. the critical realization will be when we are able to take an honest assessment of the control measures we designed and implemented to wage the Cold War. Most are long overdue for a complete overhaul. QDDR is merely a fresh coat of paint.

The question is not "what percentage" does government control/affect one's life. The question is what percentage of that effect is the primary driver of insurgency.

I hold to the minority position that the primary drivers of insurgency radiate outward from government, and manifest as perceived negatively by various segments of the populace. Other things make populaces unhappy, but those reactions are not insurgency. Insurgency is an illegal, often violent, political challenge internal to a country.

Those who hold to the majority position that it is some combination of malign actors from inside and outside the populace, employing some brand of radical ideology to mobilize the populace to wage illegal war against the legitimate government would reasonably see this differently than I do.

The essence of insurgency is illegal political action. IMO it is the higher end factors of humanistic psychology that are most material in such movements. Governments are not apt to recognize such factors as being important as to do so shines the harsh light on the very nature or "goodness" of their governance. Instead the logical position is to point out the lower level factors of humanistic psychology, such as poverty and related hardships, and claim that the malign actors are leveraging these, shifting the focus to the "effectiveness" of governance.

As an example, the US may well confess that our actions were not "effective" in Vietnam; but you'll need a crowbar and a shaped charge to get that same person to admit that they were not "good." Until we can overcome this natural bias we will always be handicapped in the decisions, focus, design, and implementation of such interventions.

After all, it is human nature.

Bill,

Thanks for sharing some very interesting thoughts here.

It's late so I will share some quick thoughts and try and wander back to this thread next weekend.

<i>"I don't know what the equation would look like, or the numbers to put in the equation to determine the cost differential."</i>

Cost accounting methods for quantifying good and bad governance do exist. I am looking for some pointers, but am also working on some thoughts (I am thinking about how to adapt the idea of business ratios) for a later post.

<i>"Part of CA needs to be re-engineered into develop experts."</i>

I agree, part of CA needs to evolve or head back to it's roots depending upon your viewpoint. Targeted recruiting and direct commissioning of specialized ASI holders from the private or governmental sector into Civil Affairs/Military Governance is a proven way to get things done...WWII operations in Germany and Japan are case studies to consider. Sending our CA-Bubba's out to serve atour in USAID would be beneficial as well.

<i>"If King for a day, I would focus more on sharing sustainable methods for governments to get well..."</i>

Noticed that you mentioned 'creative destruction' in another one of your posts the other day. Are you also a Peter Drucker fan? Harvard Business Review has a very interesting article out entitled 'Creating Shared Value' by Michael E. Porter and Mark R. Kramer in the January to February 2011 issue. The Economist offers a critique of the idea in the Schumpter section of the March 12-18th 2011 edition. Sorry about the buzz words but the takeaway concepts from Dr. Porter's article include reconceiving products & markets; redefining productivity in the value chain, and enabling cluster development...I have marked the snot out of my copies but I can scan and send them along to you if you are interested. Dr. Porter uses mini case studies to include ones on cocoa farmers in Cote d'Ivoire as well as Nestle's coffee/nespresso work in Africa and Latin America in order to help to outline the idea of how to create economic and social value via business entities (capitalism) as opposed to government entities. IMO the concept is adaptable to what we do out in the field...

Steve

Steve,

I don't know what the equation would look like, or the numbers to put in the equation to determine the cost differential. Regardless it would have to be some sort of fuzzy logic that anticipates 2d and 3d order effects to be remotely accurate, because it isn't a case of just spending X and then you get Y, you spend X and hopefully it supports a system that facilitates growth. It isn't all about growth, it is also about expectations (fairness is part of that non-mathimatical equation), and the perception that the government either serves it people or it doesn't. Some governments ignore their people while others exploit their people, and then of course you have governments that try to do well by their people. Those are the ones we should provide the most help to.

Civil Affairs isn't the answer, they can only create a short term cosmetic fix, and maybe get the people to like, or at least tolerate, Americans a little more. Part of CA needs to be re-engineered into develop experts.

Killing insurgents can create space for a government to impliment corrective action only if it is "willing" to do so, and it has the means to do so. If it doesn't, then we're only prolonging the misery.

Our current approach of pumping millions of dollars into that government to reinforce and sustain current corrupt and ineffective practices obviously doesn't work, and rightfully it should piss off our tax payers.

If King for a day, I would focus more on sharing sustainable methods for governments to get well (support self help programs) and greatly reduce our automatic response to throw money at the problem (which simply makes the problem worse). However, I'm not sure our government leaders are qualified (the military definitely isn't) to provide this type of self-help advice.

Where does that leave us as we relook our way forward? Go back to the old school (sort of there anyway) where if the leader is a bastard, but he's our bastard we don't care and prop him up with millions of tax dollars and military assistance? Or do we take an approach where we quietly support constructive change by whatever side is willing to impliment it? Obviously each case will be different, but now for the first time we're actually considering the second option. Maybe this is a new doctrine, and of course it brings with it a great deal of uncertainty, but I think it is worth pursuing.

I'm for an engagement strategy that is built more along lines of the way Special Forces deployed prior to 9/11, small elements going to troubled nations that need assistance to provide advice, and in some cases train and equip, while USAID provides their development expertise, and we readjust our intelligence community to provide effective early warning globally (rebuild our global HUMINT capability) to problems that may impact our interests. DOD would rebuild the force to provide a credible military capability, when that option is required. The experiment of transforming our whole force into nation builders was a dangerous expertiment promoted by think tanks like CNAS and needs to be seriously debated. I'm not saying this approach is wrong, but I don't see evidence it is working.

Bill

<i>It (Governance) definitely has an impact, a significant one.</i>

Bill,

I would say that our perspective depends upon our firing position and associated aiming stakes. There is what we 'know' from our experiences at home, and what you and I have seen in our travels. All societies are willing to spend x man-hours on Governance. Our shared western perspective/framework, perhaps, is that 'Good Governance' is analogous to a competent/impartial/armed referee in the realms of security, justice, health, education, infrastructure, etc. and we are comfortable with allocating a certain number of man hours to achieving this.

Please consider the potential long term effects of living in 'company towns', ( with chain-of-command, doctrine, dfac-mess halls, housing, cash-med centers, finance, or just plain old rich western nations) versus that of living outside that type of environment when considering the impact upon importance and type of Governance frameworks.

For example, the practices at construction sites in the Middle East, Central America, Europe, and the US differ markedly. Depending upon location, cost economics in concert with the law of the gun, the law of the bribe, or the rule of law predominate (all exist in some percentage specific to location) with respect to property rights (right of ways, title, etc.), construction materials (ASTM, AWWA, etc.), construction methods (LFRD, ASD, etc.), safety methods (OSHA, etc), contract methods (design-build, etc), and accountability methods (lawsuits, etc). Nonetheless, despite the use of differing regional practices, structures are built everyday in the Middle East, Central America, Europe, and the US.

Frameworks (Good Governance, Bad Governance, Construction, etc.) provide us with some level of certainty which help us to manage risk. All frameworks have costs. Societies have limits on what they are willing to spend on these frameworks. From my travels, I would say that all frameworks are imperfect and METT-TC drives their need and application ;)

I would welcome a cost estimate from you, in terms of hours per week for the average non-governmental worker, for the weekly cost of 'Good Governance' and that of 'Bad Governance'.

Steve

Steve, the government has consider influence.

Sleeping: The government directs studies and broadcasts information on what healthy sleep standards are, they put into law safety standards for mattresses, pillows, smoke alarms, etc., and impose laws to limit noise after 2200hrs so you can sleep.

Working: To some extent the government determines you can hire, imposes hundreds of safety laws and as you know imposes hundreds of other laws that determine your right and left limits at work.

Food and eating, I suspect the FDA has some say over what you eat and drink.

Personal Hygene? Less regulated than the above, the personal hygene products themselves are heavily regulated.

Cleaning? Even cleaning is regulated, what type of soaps you can use, to ensure vacuum cleaners are not a risk to children, etc.

Exactly what isn't regulated by the government in our lives?

In the Philippines the national government lacks the ability to regulate to this level, so you see a lot more governance at the lower levels (also can be translated as corruption). It definitely has an impact, a significant one.

The catch phrase 'Good Governance' is an interesting one.

How much control of an average citizen does the average government really have? How many hours per week of an average person's weekly available hours does the average government monopolize?

Zheng Yumin, China's Communist Party Secretary for Zhejiang's Commerce Department recently estimated that China has 43 million companies, of which 93% are private companies. He further estimates that that 92% of China's workers were employed by these companies. (Source: The Economist, March 12-18, 2011, pg 79, Let a million flowers bloom)

Let's run some numbers for perspective on how many hours in a 7 day/168 hour week the average person (a non-governmental employee who is not incarcerated) of country X spends on non-government activities:

56 hours spent sleeping ( 8 hours per day x 7 days)
40 hours spent working (8 hours per day x 5 days)
14 hours spent preparing food & eating (2 hours per day x 7 days)
7 hours spent on personal hygiene (1 hour per day x 7 days)
7 hours spent on cleaning living area/clothes (1 hour day x 7 days)

124 hours out of a 168 hour week or 74% of the average person's time may be spent on non-governmental activities.

So, how many hours a week does a 'Good Government' ask/take and how many hours a week does a 'Bad Government' ask/take from it's average citizen?

How much control of an average citizen does the average government really have? In the weekly prioritization efforts of the average citizen where does governance fall?

High level diplomatic engagement can't address drivers of insurgency unless we can compel or persuade other governments to change their policies. In many cases we simply haven't the leverage to do that, and if we try we're not likely to get far. Strange but true, foreign governments and foreign populaces really don't like us telling them how to run their countries... and that's quite aside from the lively possibility that we don't fully understand the issues and our prescriptions may not work. We're a long way from omniscient. Even if we could compel the Philippine Government to adopt and implement new policies (which we can't) how do we know that the policies we'd suggest would be effective?

<i>By helping to make their management of the symptoms more effective we enable them to continue to govern in ways that fuel the insurgencies. This is true of our engagement in many Middle Eastern countries as well. When those governments become emboldened by such support and come to act with growing impunity toward their own people, it leads to the conditions we see that are so effectively exploited by organizations like AQ.</i>

Again I think you're vastly overstating our role and our importance to these countries. We do not "enable" the Philippine government. They don't need us. If we back out they'll carry on, sloppily but they will carry on. They would not suddenly have to change their policies and address the root cause of insurgency: they'd just deal with it their way, as they have been for the decades before we arrived. The same is true of the Saudis and the other Gulf States, and many others. They're a whole lot less dependent on us in reality than they are in your portrayal, and our ability to influence their policies is a whole lot less than you make it out to be. We don't enable, we don't embolden, and we're not really in a position to empower anyone. These are not our countries and no amount of "high level diplomacy" will enable us to change their policies. It's not about us. We can pull out if we want, stop dealing with them if we want. Won't be the end of their world and it won't force any policy change. Not likely that it'll change any of the negative perceptions about us either... in fact trying to push into other countries and tell them what policies to adopt is likely to accentuate those negative perceptions. It won't be seen as backing the populace, it never is. It'll be seen as self-interested meddling.

We simply do not have the capacity to persuade or compel the Philippine Government to adopt policies that we want. We can talk about it from now til doomsday, but they still won't do it. We can help them do what they want to do a little better, but we can't change their course. Only they can do that, and they aren't going to do it because we want them to.

I personally think we should be a bit more hesitant about telling other people what they need to do... they don't like it, they never do it anyway, and there's no assurance at all that our ideas are really any better than theirs. Just because we're American doesn't mean we have all the answers or all the solutions.

There's a lot to be said for the idea of not supporting or sustaining bad governments, in cases where we are actually doing that. The idea that it's up to us to go out and proactively force these countries to adopt policies that we like strikes me as having quite extraordinary potential for unintended consequences.

To be clear, when I say we "create a sanctuary" around the governments of these states where we conduct such intervention operations, I mean we create a form of "no fire area" for high-level diplomatic engagement designed to get at identifying and addressing the root drivers of the insurgencies we send our soldiers out to deal with at the local level.

We did this in Vietnam. Years of military victories and tremendous engagement programs across that country were all vainly thrown at the symptoms of the problem of the very creation, nature, and performance of the various governments we help create and then protected with little regard to the will or desires of the Vietnamese populace.

We do this in Afghanistan in a very similar way today. I suspect the centuries of Spanish colonial control over the Philippines shapes the nature of their political culture that is so divisive and poor far more than the much shorter US experience did. Regardless, no matter who is in office they have virtually continuous, multiple insurgencies in that troubled land for centuries. At some point one must break the cycle and focus on the core problem, how the land is governed, rather than continuing the cycle of coups and insurgencies.

Currently we are in many ways an enabler. By helping to make their management of the symptoms more effective we enable them to continue to govern in ways that fuel the insurgencies. This is true of our engagement in many Middle Eastern countries as well. When those governments become emboldened by such support and come to act with growing impunity toward their own people, it leads to the conditions we see that are so effectively exploited by organizations like AQ. So, yes, we are indeed attacked by the populaces of our allies. It is time to take a hard look at the nature of the governmental relationships. More often simply changing OUR END of the equation is enough to take us off of the terrorist target list. Better if we can evolve the relationship to one of helping them to evolve as well in how they interact with and govern their own people. This is the essence of changing from an enabling approach to an empowering approach for the US.

Bob

Bill M...

Yes, the US does focus to a large degree on "the terrorist threat". That makes the current Philippine excursion a bit anomalous, as by the time it took place the supposed "terrorists" had devolved almost entirely into a bandit group with a very nominal Islamist agenda, and their AQ connections were for the most part deep in the past. I'm not at all sure it's accurate to attribute the Philippine approach to the problem to American pressure or American insistence.

One odd thing about the Philippines is that many people, especially politically active people, resent advice from the US even if they agree with the substance of the advice. Form trumps content, and the generalized distaste for interference prevails no matter what advice is given. I'd also say that a large majority of the dominant Christian population opposes any kind of concession to the Muslim minority and would be very resentful indeed of any pressure applied by the US toward forcing such concessions. They're very happy to have US help in suppressing insurgency in the south, but they don't want us pushing for what they consider appeasement.

While the NPA is generally considered a greater security threat than any of the Muslim groups, there is no meaningful support for US assistance against that threat. Against the ASG it's accepted largely because the group is confined to a small and fairly remote section of the country. If the US and the Philippines adopted a similar approach toward the NPA, that would legitimize US-supported operations all over the country, including urban areas. That would not go over well.

I agree that we created a sanctuary around Marcos, to some extent, in the rather spectacularly inaccurate belief that we needed him to suppress the Commies. It could be said that we are doing the same thing in some places today, sustaining and protecting despotic or inept regimes that we believe we need to further the campaign against terrorism. It's not what we're doing here in the Philippines, though. That model fits in some places, but trying to apply it everywhere is a departure from the path of wisdom. Each case is different, and models have to be very flexible. One size isn't ever going to fit all.

I agree with RCJ that bad governance, whether oppressive or simply weak and ineffectual, is a large part of the problem in many of these scenarios. I also think he rather wildly overstates the American ability to change the way other countries are governed, and underestimates the negative unintended consequences of trying to pressure other governments into adopting policies that we believe would address their problems.

Dayuhan,

Generally in agreement, but...

""Again, the "all about us" trap. We are not managing the symptoms. The Filipinos are. We can help them, to some extent, because it's what they want to do.""

I agree 100% sort of :-), but we are also there and everywhere else with our strategy that is myopically focused on the terrorist threat, and of course other countries are there and everywhere with their strategies to acheive their goals. Where I agree with Bob is that our approach/advice to the Filipinos to myopically focus on the terrorists is misguided.

""We haven't the influence to compel or persuade them to do what we want them to do, and any attempt to do that will be bitterly resented and produce an immediate backlash. They don't like it. Not government, not any of the populaces.""

While we both agree the populace isn't one holistic mass, I actually think many in the population would like it if the Philippine government took our advice on some of the issues, especially regarding effective governance. Yes the feudal lords would hate us, but so what?

""We are NOT "creating a sanctuary around the Philippine Government". Not in any way. They are not facing any existential threat, and if we left they'd carry on without us.""

This is true today, but I think we did create a sanctuary of sorts around Marcos. Outside of the Philippines we do support governments that would probably fall if we didn't pump in millions of dollars to prop them up, all in the name of stability and to prevent safe haven? Please this is what causes the problems, we need to get out of the way and forget our stability doctrine. History will not freeze in place to appease our interests.

""

RCJ:

A few points...

First, we were not attacked by the populaces of our allies. We were not attacked by any populace at all. The assumption that AQ represents the will of any populace, anywhere is just that: an assumption, with little to support it.

Re this:

<i>Overseas it is easier to just send dedicated soldiers like Robert Kenjorski on multiple deployments to manage these symptoms of the larger problem down at the tactical level where they manifest among the people, than it is to deal decisively with the strategic causal roots at the top.</i>

Again, the "all about us" trap. We are not managing the symptoms. The Filipinos are. We can help them, to some extent, because it's what they want to do. We can't "deal decisively with the strategic causal roots" because it's not our country. As long as we are in a supporting role we can't dictate the strategy, and we can't help someone to do what they don't want to do.

We are NOT "creating a sanctuary around the Philippine Government". Not in any way. They are not facing any existential threat, and if we left they'd carry on without us. We are providing some assistance in dealing with the least capable of the insurgent groups they face. Let's not blow our role into something more than what it is: we are not their protectors or their saviours, they don't need us, and we can't tell them what to do.

Things to keep in mind:

We cannot dictate policy to the Philippine Government. We haven't the influence to compel or persuade them to do what we want them to do, and any attempt to do that will be bitterly resented and produce an immediate backlash. They don't like it. Not government, not any of the populaces.

Even if we could dictate policy, there's no real reason to believe we'd dictate effective policy. As demonstrated by USIP's backing for the MOA/AD fiasco, Americans often have a terribly incomplete understanding of the situation and are inclined to support simplistic "solutions" that can easily make matters worse.

Even if we could dictate effective policy to the central government it wouldn't help, because the central government couldn't implement those policies. As I've tried to explain, apparently without success, the level of governance at which policy is implemented is locked down by feudal local elites who can and will derail any policy initiative that they do not see as consistent with their interests. Policy not implemented means nothing, and until Manila can reassert control over the level of governance where policy is implemented, there's really not much point in trying to change policies. It sounds good and looks good, but nothing actually happens.

Honestly I get the feeling that this whole idea that all insurgency everywhere stems from central governance and the only way the US can help is to change the way central government works is becoming a bit of a one-siz-fits-all square peg, to be rammed into every multi-shaped hole out there. That's dangerous: no model, no theory, no system applies in all circumstances, unless it's too general to be of any real use.

But no real need to listen to me, if the model sounds better ride with it. I'm just some guy who's been watching Philippine Government/populace relations at ground level for 30+ years, what would I know?

There appears to be more agreement than disagreement in response to this article, so time to shake it up a bit. Only joking, in general I concur with most of the comments, but to add to the discussion:

One of you commented about the fallacy of transposing models, but that is worthwhile to look for principles that can be borrowed. I agree the OEF-P model isn't one that should be transferred to any other location, but there are some worthwhile principles to consider (not necessarily discussed on this post).

When approaching a problem, don't look for the solution before you seek to understand the problem. In short, first seek to understand, then respond appropriately. As one of the best educated militaries in the world we seem to be culturally opposed to critical thinking, and rather blindly apply a doctrinal solution, or someone else's model, to a problem rather than doing the hard intellectual work of determining the true nature of the problem and then developing an appropriate solution. Not a popular opinion, but I suspect this is driven by our officer culture that values conformity over all else, to include winning.

For a reporter to say this a model for the future is one thing, but for soldiers to buy into this argument is another. It is way past time for us to discard the baggage of sloppy thinking.

Posted by Bob,
"" As to my comments on CT and Capacity Building, also critical. Too often we employ CT to attrit the symptoms of the larger problems in governance that we either cannot see (per above) or prefer to ignore. Similarly far too much of our recent Capacity Building, and planned Security Force Assistance concepts are designed to help these same despotic or just flat out incompetent allied governments suppress any resistance coming out of their populace with greater effectiveness. """"

We definitely responded stupidly after 9/11 in general. We interfered (with justification in some cases) with other nations to pursue the limited objective of going after AQ and their associated movement, while ignoring the larger context and confluence of multiple challenges in these countries to provide laser like focus on AQ. It didn't work so well in any country I can think of.

Yes, developing CT forces so we can disrupt or respond to terrorist attacks is critical and value added, but that in itself is a fraction of the whole, it is not a complete solution. I could write a lengthy article on why that is just one small part of the overall challenge, but will simply point out that capacity building is more than train and equip (and we still can't do that effectively due to our bureaucracy). It is building several supporting systems to include a robust legal system, a finance system, helping them develop an economy (not doing it for them, but providing advice) so they can sustain, developing their own CMO and MISO capacity, etc., and it is about effective governance (not democracy in all cases), which a part of is the relationship between the security forces and the citizens of that nation. What the U.S. forces have done so well over the past few years is mentor and demonstrate by example how a professional security force member should act. The Philippine Armed Forces went from being feared and hated in some locations, to be being respected and welcomed. They are a force of the people for the people, very much unlike the local civilian security forces in the villages and towns who are mostly thugs (seems to be opposite from Afghanistan, again every situation is different). I'm not sure how you measure that, but it is just as important as providing weapons and being able to shoot straight.

What we tend to miss since 9/11 is the larger context, which Bob addresses to some extent, and that is how do the Filipinos see the problem? First off, they see the problem with the Muslims separatists as relatively minor compared to the communist insurgency, so naturally there is some friction when we try to focus their efforts on a problem that isn't their priority. In my view we come across as arrogant and stupid when we do this. We could have more of a win win solution if we helped the Philippines deal with security in general, rather than focusing on a handful of Islamist terrorists and Muslim separatist groups (not to be confused with transnational terrorists). In Yemen I suspect our focus was largely on AQ, while we thought we could ignore the larger issues, and now it appears that mission has or is collapsing on us. The list of failures due to laser like focus could go on and on.

Robert made points, so a hat tip to the men and women of JSOTF-P, they're doing remarkable work. Unfortunately, it is hard to appreciate the impact, because the impact happens at a glacial pace, but it is happening, the effects are very real. They are out there everyday in harms way working interfacing with the locals with the AFP, and they're trusted by the people and the military. They didn't try to bully the Philippine Army into doing what they wanted, but rather developed consensus over time and always let their Army ultimately lead their own operations without protest, and they provided support as requested as long as it was within the legal constraints of the mission. If U.S. forces took the lead in combat, they would soon be unwelcome in the Philippines, and it would probably set us back years. Of course the U.S. piece is a minor support role, the heavy lifting must be done the Filipino people, government and security forces in that order. There are signs of positive change, especially with the new President in place. It is their wars to win or lose, not ours, and we skillfully maintained our role as advisors, not the doers. The Philippine people have unlimited potential, which is why our men and women like serving there. We wish them the best, but to realize that potential they have to make certain changes (address corruption for instance), and only they can do that. At least we are not reinforcing corruption with billions of U.S. dollars like we did in Iraq and are doing Afghanistan.

The Philippine model is the right model for the Philippines. There are many lessons others can learn from it, but they must must first seek to understand their problem, and then develop the appropriate solution. Please don't tell us you are using the Philippine model in Africa and South America, instead tell us about your model based on your unique problem.

Ken,

My comments on Galula were critical, pointing out that works like his highlight how colonial "COIN" forces held themselves harmless; and that there perceptions that insurgencies were always caused by some malign actor with a clever cause, rudely attacking local governments that they had set in place to care for the people. That perspective has carried over into US perceptions and doctrine regarding how we view our own role in the world as well.

As to my comments on CT and Capacity Building, also critical. Too often we employ CT to attrit the symptoms of the larger problems in governance that we either cannot see (per above) or prefer to ignore. Similarly far too much of our recent Capacity Building, and planned Security Force Assistance concepts are designed to help these same despotic or just flat out incompetent allied governments suppress any resistance coming out of their populace with greater effectiveness.

The real point is that instead of a militarily led "global war on terror" what we really needed was a policy led global overhaul of our foreign policies and how we implement them in a post-Cold War world; with a supporting, and very fine-tuned effort to go after bin Laden and his handful of cohorts with ruthless, laser precision.

In that regard, while the tactics in the Philippines are far superior to the tactics in Iraq or Afghanistan; all three suffer from the same disaster of a strategic understanding of the problem and operational design to best mitigate the same.

We can do better. This is why I for one am very optimistic about the long-term goodness that will come from the rash of uprising across N. Africa and the Middle East. This will be ugly for a generation, and some will fare better than others, but it is a move in the right direction.

To Ken,

"Good Governance" is not just a catch-all, it is our blind spot. Our tactics in the Philippines are very different from those in Afghanistan, and should be. Our strategy is the same: Attack the symptomes by some tailored, tactical scheme of engagement, ignore the core source of causeation that rests in the domestic policies of the host nation government and how they are implemented among their people.

We prefer to blame "malign actors", "ideology", "poor economy" "warlords" or "feudal local elites" and other fall guys that allow us to avoid any hard consideration of more material factors. Such considerations could lead to uncomfortable converstaions at the senior leadership level that could threaten relationships we fill must be sustained no matter what to serve some perceived set of vital national interests.
(Thank god we had the good sense in the US Civil rights movement to not just blame it on malign actors like King and X; or ideology; poverty or the governors of Alabama and Mississippi; but actually took serious action to identify and fix problems in US civil rights policy and change how it was implemented from top to bottom.) Overseas it is easier to just send dedicated soldiers like Robert Kenjorski on multiple deployments to manage these symptoms of the larger problem down at the tactical level where they manifest among the people, than it is to deal decisively with the strategic causal roots at the top. And for Dayuhan, yes, this is a form of "sanctuary," and yes it is a matter of policy, so it is indeed one that we intentionally and knowingly create around these troubled allied governments.

The mindset described above is captured very well in Galula, where he adamently pointed out that the insurgencies he dealt with were always between the insurgent and the host nation, and never due to the fact that France had colonized the country and designed, emplaced and protected that government that was being challenged by the very people it should have been committed to serving. Until we break from that colonial mindset we will continue to flog at symptoms while allowing the root problems to fester.

We did this in Vietnam with Diem and the two subsequent governments in the South; we do it in the Philippines and Afghanistan; and in fact it is central to the entire operational design to our approach to the war on terrorism. Consider, we are not attacked by the populaces of our enemies, we are attacked by the populaces of our allies (with a few notable exceptions, such as the many Libyan freedom fighters who supported AQ in Iraq). Yet the two governments we actively sought to take down were the Taliban and Saddam. No Afghans were attacking us, and Saddam had zero nexus with AQ. Not much talk about what were were going to do about the Saudi government, though that was where the bulk of the nationalist insurgents who voluteered for the that international terrorist operation on 9/11 came from. The dysfunctional relationship between the Saudis and the US was the crazy uncle locked in the basement that everyone knows is there but no one is willing to talk about.

It is only just recently that, without our support, those populaces are finally feeling empowered to act out to challenge those governments. We've been working to help keep the lid on them for the past 10 years with robust CT and capacity building operations, but they are breaking the chains and seeking liberty in spite of US support, rather than because of US support. As an SF guy, that bothers me. A lot.

Then some supporting fire to Robert K's excellent point about the disrespect within even DoD for operations such as the OEF-P. During QDR I was working with the Army Strategy team on SOF and Army Force Generation procedures, and the senior Colonel for the Army team kept saying "once OIF and OEF are over..." Finally it dawned on me that when she said "OEF" she meant "Afghanistan" so I called her on it. "You realize that OEF is far more than just Afganistan, that it is a global operation with thousands of service members deployed in dozens of locations, and named operations in the Philippines, Horn of Africa, South America, etc,"? "Right?"

She looked at me with a confused look, and then said "Oh, yeah, but around here when we say OEF we just mean Afghanistan."

Considering what she was talking about when she said "around here" I could only think to myself, "we are so F'd..."

Again, I think the word "we" is heavily overused here. We didn't create a sanctuary around the Philippine government: they aren't dependent on us and they aren't going to change their policies because we demand it.

Again, we're not dealing with a despotic government that is oppressing its people and generating insurgency, we're dealing with a weak government that lacks the will and capacity to take on despotic local elites. If there is a sanctuary being created, its the Philippine government creating a sanctuary for lawlessness and violence by refusing to bring its own representatives within the rule of law. The capacity of the US to change that is in the "slim to none" category: the impetus really has to be local. There might be a few things we could do to help if we're very subtle, but subtlety is not our strong suit and if it's not subtle we only make thins worse.

The extent to which we physically protect the Philippine government from the insurgents is overrated. The Estrada administration enjoyed considerable military success against the MILF at the lowest point of Philippine/American relations, with little or no help from us. The government failed to engage the ASG not because they couldn't (MILF is far more potent in both the military and political spheres) but because ASG was bringing in lots of money, and certain people were sharing that money.

Get down to dirt level and violence in Mindanao is more often about money than ideology or oppression.

You will need to direct your questions regarding "how" national level diplomacy will be shaped to persude the governments of the Philippines, Afghanistan, (and a dozen middle eastern countries where they stil cling to their thrones) to Secretary Clinton and President Obama. They too must realize that sending out the CIA, the military, USAID, and thousands of contractors to manage symptoms is mitigation at best.

Or, we can come to the realization that our 1960s definition of "sancutary" is sadly cliche and 2-dimensional. The sanctuaries we have build around allied governments like the ones mentioned above (we don't engage the source of insurgency and seek to get them to make the types of changes necessary to reduce insurgent causation in their respective countries; rather we assist them in managing and mitigating the dangers from the insurgencies that result). We hold governments harmless; when it is governments that are the source of harm. That is what I mean by "sanctuary" that we create for these governments. We also physically protect them as well from the fruits of their sins by helping them defeat the insurgents they create. That too contributes to this sanctuary. "ungoverned spaces"? A cliche that really means nothing. Where the insurgent has some degree of popular support and some degree of cover, he has sanctuary.

We agonize over the FATA and Mindanao, and Yemen, and the Maghreb because we don't understand sanctuary very well. This is where insurgents hide, it is not their sanctuary.

But you are right, this is not the place.

In many ways the national government is more dependent on the local elites than the other way around, especially when the national government has a doubtful mandate, as has so often been the case in the Philippines. The national government has very, very limited ability to control these people, and has very rarely tried to use even that limited ability, for a list of reasons too long to try and list here.

It's true that there are real limits to what local and tactical engagement can accomplish, but when you say this:

<i>One has to go to the source, and that is the national government, and that is a matter of national-level diplomacy</i>

What is it that you expect "national-level diplomacy" to accomplish, and how would you propose to accomplish it? There is very little likelihood that American diplomatic pressure is going to drive significant policy changes in Manila, and there will be very considerable backlash to any attempt to exert pressure: Filipinos don't much care to have Americans interfering in their domestic affairs.

<i>We flay away at the symptoms, but grant sanctuary to the core source of the problem.</i>

The US does not "grant sanctuary" to the Philippine government. We are not in a position to do so: we don't say what that government can or can't do. This one is really not about us.

<i> In both cases it is the nature of the government in the national capitals of the respective countries, and how both systematically discriminate against a broad segment of their own populace.</i>

In the Philippines it's less about the national government then about a core conflict between two segments of the populace, neither of which trusts the government or is fully under government control. The government has vacillated between taking one side and ineffectual attempts to mediate. The ability of the national government to make concessions to the segment of the populace that's traditionally been discriminated against is heavily constrained by heavy popular support for the segment of the populace that opposes any such concessions.

It's more complicated than that, but this isn't the place to try to go into it. Reducing the situation to "government vs populace", though, is not going to produce any kind of viable solution. The US really has very little ability to do anything about it, and attempts such as the MOA/AD fiasco do more harm than good... even if they sound like good ideas to Americans.

And who established those "local elites" and what system protects them? One cannot divorce local problems from their national causation when there are no local solutions due to national protections.

Similarly, no one is promoting a "US solution." What I am promoting is that the strong belief that if the US wants to truly bring enduring stability to the southern Philippines in order to protect us from our own concerns about potential sanctuary for Islamist terrorism that could affect US interests; then the US needs to recognize that no amount of great, local, tactical engagement will produce that effect. One has to go to the source, and that is the national government, and that is a matter of national-level diplomacy, not local-level military operations.

And in that regard, it is very much like Afghanistan. Obviously anyone can point out a thousand ways they are different. We are talking about our approaches to such problems and how to best secure our interests, and on that topic, how they are they same is very important to understand as well. We flay away at the symptoms, but grant sanctuary to the core source of the problem. In both cases it is the nature of the government in the national capitals of the respective countries, and how both systematically discriminate against a broad segment of their own populace.

The face may indeed be friendlier and more professional than it once was, but whether the change is more than skin deep will only be known when US forces are no longer present. I think for the most part people in Mindanao and the surrounding islands will not really be convinced until that happens. There's a fair bit of cynicism out there, and an extended history that's not easily erased. It's not just an issue of human rights abuse, either: the Philippine military has an extended history of corruption, collusion with criminal elements, and money-making ventures in collusion with abusive local elites, among other things.

National government really isn't the problem: Manila's policies and decisions mean squat in Mindanao, and Manila politics mean about as much as a Tagalog-dubbed Mexican telenovela: remote, vaguely entertaining, and with no influence whatsoever on day to day life. The focal point of the problem is the feudal local elites that control local governance, often colluding with criminal and rebel elements and often exerting more influence over military units in their areas than the formal chain of command. It's true that it is Manila's responsibility to bring these people into line, but that has not happened and is most unlikely to happen.

I don't see any real similarity between the Philippines and Afghanistan. The US cannot change Manila and cannot force Manila to address its issues in Mindanao. The Philippine government was not installed by the US and is not dependent on the US. If failing to force changes in Manila means we "betray the trust of our own security/govenrance/development forces that we send forward when we do this; and we betray the trust of the people who we seek to help as well", then we might as well get our people out of the field, because that's not something we have the capacity to do.

I'd also have to point out that our idea of what Manila needs to do may not be all that useful in any event: our efforts to support the now-defunct MOA/AD, the document at the center of the last "peace process" in Mindanao were ill advised, displayed a very poor understanding of the situation, and managed little more than making things worse.

I believe that the assesments of Robert Kenjorski are spot on. Not much glory in this quiet corner, but a tremendous amount of great work going on. The Philippine security forces are the face of the government, and that face is a whole lot friendlier and professional now than it used to be. Dayuhan's assessment is correct as well. The nature of the problems, the nature and intent of the various organizations that challenge the governance in this region is not nearly as clear as it should be. Who advocates for the Muslim populace of the Southern Philippines with the government in Manila? We have helped the Philippine government deal more effectively with the expressions of discontent among their people, but we have not done much in getting the Philippine government (above the local level) to adopt the types of reforms that could remove the thorn from the lion's paw. Instead we treat the paw while largely ignoring and leaving that thron firmly in place.

In that regard the Philippines are exactly like Afghanistan. We treat the symptoms with superhuman efforts, but ignore the primary sources of causation radiating out from the national governments in both cases. We betray the trust of our own security/govenrance/development forces that we send forward when we do this; and we betray the trust of the people who we seek to help as well. This is the legacy of COIN strategy as derived from colonial powers and their experiences.

I think the people we have on the ground there are doing a wonderful job and doing everything they can do. I also think we need to accept that there are real limits to what they can do and what the US can do to achieve any kind of lasting resolution to the problems there.

People in Basilan and Jolo have learned that the Philippine armed forces behave better when Americans are around. Sooner or later those armed forces will have to prove that they are going to keep behaving better even without Americans around. The people in Basilan and Jolo have seen American money funding development projects... but will the Philippine government pick up the slack and reverse the decades of neglect once Americans are no longer in the picture?

Perhaps most important, will the Philippine Government ever find the will to bring its own agents, civilian and military, within the rule of law and finally move seriously against the corruption, cronyism, and abuse that have pervaded the area for so long?

American forces have won a lot of respect and good will, but the insurgencies in Mindanao aren't fighting American forces, and it remains very much an open question whether the Philippine Government, local and national, will be able to - or really has the desire to - carry on the same kind of program in our absence. Sooner or later we are going to have to let them try and see what happens, and I suspect that sooner would be better than later.

We're not doing ourselves or the Philippines any favors by embracing the seriously inaccurate narratives portrayed in the initially referenced article.

Agree that the US is not "doing COIN" in the Philippines, though they couinld be said to be countering insurgency: whether yours or someone else's is not implicit in that phrase.

What bothers me about this article and many like it is simply the factual inaccuracy. I realize that they get the feelgood tour and they write the feelgood article, but can't they do even a little research? Who feeds them this swill anyway?

This:

<i>As more pressure is brought on Abu Sayyaf, it has increasingly turned from an ideological organization to a criminal enterprise based on kidnapping and protection rackets.</i>

is simply wrong. The transition to a criminal enterprise and Khalifa's abandonment of the AQ enterprise happened years before the US deployment. At the time the US went in the Abu Sayyaf was at the pak of its criminal period and had virtually no connection to AQ. In fact, pressure supported by the US military shut down KFR revenues and actually pushed a splinter of ASG back to the jihadi side in 2003/2004, resulting in the Superferry bombing, the worst terrorist incident the Philippines has yet seen.

<i>Perhaps even more critically, the main Muslim separatist group is in talks with the Philippine government, leaving Abu Sayyaf more isolated than ever.</i>

Te MILF has been in off-and-on talks with the Philippine Government since before the US deployment. There's no indication that the current round is in any way a consequence of the US pressure.

The Ramzi Youssef operation in Manila was only remotely connected to ASG. The US did not shut down AQ's attempt to set up a hub in SE Asia; Indonesia was always the primary AQ focus here and AQ's efforts in the Philippines had been largely abandoned before we arrived.

I could go on, and on, and on, but what's the point? There's not even the slightest effort being made here to give an accurate recounting of the story.

My hearty endorsement of Dave Maxwell's comments above.

It was my privilege to serve as the J5 and the J3 at SOCPAC during Dave's tenure as the commander of JSOTF-Philippines. When I came in the J5 position I had been at SOCPAC for two years and operations in the Philippines were always talked of as "COIN." It was in that capacity that at the SOC/GCC level I began to work to change the lexicon and the perspective of our operations by taking the position that we were conducting FID and that it was the Philippine security forces that were conducting COIN.

This may seem like a small nuance, and is counter to the perspective of historic experts on colonial experiences with insurgency, such as captured by Galula, Tranquier, Kitson, etc; but I felt it was important as we were not in the Philippines (currently) as a colonial power and that our role was not that of counterinsurgent, but rather as that of one lending assistance to the counterinsurgent. I felt this was important as there were always those who felt we should engage more aggressively to "defeat" the threats that our J2 personnel at both the SOC and the GCC were briefing the senior leadership on daily, and when one sees themselves as the COIN force it is far too easy to fall into inappropriate roles and to engage in inappropriate operations that in the long run are counterproductive to the resolution of the insurgency, and therefore counterproductive to the interests of both the host nation as well as our own.

Working for me at that time was a very sharp action officer, LTC Brian Petit, who went on to command (exceptionally) an SF BN in both OEF-P and OEF-A. Brian's paper in the Jan/Feb edition of Special Warfare, entitled "OEF-Philippines, Thinking COIN, Practicing FID" captures how he operationalized this thinking during his tour there.

We accepted constraints by subjugating ourselves to the sovereignty of the government of the Philippines; and were equally constrained by the priority of OEF-P for critical enablers. This forced us to work smarter and with greater respect for the people and the government of the Philippines. In other theaters, where no such constraints existed, far different operations developed. I suspect that if operations in the Philippines had been equally unconstrained they would look much like Afghanistan and not be nearly the success they have been. There is an argument in that, that one viable COA for turning the corner in Afghanistan would be for Congress to simply turn off the vast majority of the funding and authorities currently in place there; thereby forcing a transition to a more appropriate form of intervention.

Bob

Semantics perhaps but I would not say this is a model for COIN. It is a model for how to assist a friend, partner, or ally to defend themselves against lawless, subversion, insurgency, and terrorism by building capability and capacity and advising and assisting the host nation security forces and other government agencies in their internal defense and development programs to bring development and good governance to under governed and ungoverned spaces to prevent sanctuary, deny access to resources, deny mobility and separate the population from terrorists and insurgents. It is not about us, it is about our friend, partner, and ally.

And by the way if I can allow my bias and parochialism to show through, this is basic Special Forces operations supported by all the disciplines of Special Operations, the interagency and regular joint military forces. And it is not rocket science!! :-)

My point is that the Filipinos are conducting COIN, we are not. We are providing advice and assistance but it is their fight and their problems to solve. Too often the focus is about us conducting COIN. Again, it may be semantics, but I think it is very important that COIN be conducted by the host nation as the insurgency is a struggle for legitimacy among the host nation, the government, the people, and the insurgents. The interjection of US forces as counterinsurgents can usually be counter-productive, If we were to conduct COIN in the Philippines we would not only violate their sovereignty we would undercut the legitimacy of the Philippine military and government. My point that it is about them and not us goes to the journalist wanting to make this about the US forces. I know it is USAToday so it is only natural but we are not conducting COIN in the Philippines, we are advising and assisting the Filipinos as they conduct COIN. Again, perhaps semantics but I think it is important because when we take charge as we are apt to do, it can be counter-productive. We absolutely have to know COIN of course, but we need to know it to be able to help advise and assist others to conduct it.