Comments
Posted by Wilson,
""The failed or fractured state creates a power vacuum that with eventually be filled with the strongest and most organized group that is prepared to seize control; that power may or may not pose a threat to the United States. The problem that this country faces is that it is not always clear who that group ascending to power is what their agenda consists of.""
While the above argument may be true, it appears you are using it to justify U.S. led international interventions to ensure that the best organized parties are pro U.S. interests wherever fragile states are threatened or parties are battling for control of failed States? Not only does this logic propose we deny the right of self determination to other nations, but that we are well within the intent of the constitution to take liberty on the part of our nation to commit our sons and treasure to causes without end that have questionable benefit to the U.S. beyond a few special interests groups. Worse it is doubtful we can influence the outcome anyway. We're not going to deny safehaven, and we're not going to control the world directly or through others, but we can effectively engage the world without trying to control it, which will save us billions of $$$ over time to reinvest in our nation where it is needed, to include invested in DOD to ensure were ready for real threats against our nation-state.
The myth of threats to our national security radiating out of failed States really gained ground after the 9/11 attacks, but first off Afghanistan wasn't a failed state when AQ launched the 9/11 attacks; it was ruled by the Taliban. The Base (AQ) wasn't formed due to a failed state. It was formed in response to another State undertaking the same policy you are advocating. In this case it was the USSR invading Afghanistan, "then" the Muslim backlash, part of that cadre formed AQ. The terrorists who conducted 9/11 may have fought in Afghanistan against the Soviets, but they found safehaven in Germany, Malaysia and the U.S. prior to their attack on 9/11. To top it off UBL was found in controlled portion of Pakistan, not the so called wild lands of the FATA. The only true failed State that I can think of that is generating a real terrorist threat against U.S. interests is Somalia, and as you may remember we played a role in the early 90s shaping Somalia into the mess it is today by pursuing the policy you appear to be advocating.
The argument that failed states and dark places are where most threats to the U.S. come from is completely unfounded. This belief has become the new Fulda Gap, but unlike the Fulda Gap scenario, it isn't supported by facts or history, and changing DOD to adapt to this imaginary threat leaves us vulnerable elsewhere to much greater threats. While I agree it is never black and white, unfortunately many of our policy makers and those influencing policy continue to believe global reform is more important and more practical than it is.
Of course the more blood and treasure we invest in these ventures the harder it is extract ourselves, because we want the loss and investment to mean something, so we refuse to admit it was foolishness that got us into this and other quagmires. By all means we should employ our military to counter threats, pre-empt threats, and pursue other national interests (real interests), but attempting to remake the world in our image doesn't fall into that category. We can deploy USAID to gradually help these underdeveloped nations develop without making it a military problem.
Stewart Patrick presents a well-written and thoughtful argument in his article "Failed States Irrelevant to U.S. National Security." It is short-sighted to propose that the United States government disregard failed or fractured states in order to invest its assets in dealing with stronger developing countries. The answer is not one or the other, rather it is both.
Failed or fractured states pose a much broader threat to the US national security beyond what Patrick cites. The failed or fractured state creates a power vacuum that with eventually be filled with the strongest and most organized group that is prepared to seize control; that power may or may not pose a threat to the United States. The problem that this country faces is that it is not always clear who that group ascending to power is what their agenda consists of. Change in power inside of failed states may not present the greatest threat to US national security, rather the inherent instability in the region surrounding the failed state will.
Addressing the volatile issues within a failed or fractured state requires all aspects of national power: diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME). The problems are ambiguous and can present themselves suddenly without warning. The United States national security is threatened continuously. Established nations can be just as dangerous, but there is more predictability about what they may or may not do.
The United States must actively engage the international community and do so with balance. The situation will dictate where the focus will lie. Shifting our strategic eye away from fractured and failing states is not the right answer. This focus needs to be maintained as does our nations ability to react.
Maj Wilson Hopkins, USMC
US Army CGSC
Ken,
Now I know who George Washington's speech writer was for that famous farewell... :-)
But I actually like and agree with that speech and believe it is still very valid. But I don't want State to evolve to meddle more, but rather to evolve so that they understand better what is going on so that they do not feel so compelled to meddle.
More and more effective communication rather than more assumption and fear driven interventions. I have to believe it will lead to better foreign policy.
Ken,
Now I know who George Washington's speech writer was for that famous farewell... :-)
But I actually like and agree with that speech and believe it is still very valid. But I don't want State to evolve to meddle more, but rather to evolve so that they understand better what is going on so that they do not feel so compelled to meddle.
More and more effective communication rather than more assumption and fear driven interventions. I have to believe it will lead to better foreign policy.
<b>Bill C.:</b>
I think you have a lot of company:<blockquote>"I really cannot figure out what is going on and why.
So I try to observe, hypothosize and hope to learn.'</blockquote>As do we all...
I think your perceptions are very good and your statements accurately mirror the thinking of many in Washington. However, like Robert C. Jones, I'm pretty well convinced that thinking is flawed and has done us no favors. Unlike Bob, I would not replace old style meddling with new style -- I'd just stop meddling.
Nature may abhor vacuums but there are plenty around and many more places are not that at all but do not need to be trifled with to no good end -- witness Afghanistan. It can be changed but it won't happen in my lifetime and probably not in that of my kids...
We have become since WW II intemperate meddlers in the affairs of others and we need to break the habit.
What do I think:
I really cannot figure out what is going on and why.
So I try to observe, hypothosize and hope to learn.
In the back of my mind I wonder: Does this (failed states, etc), in some roundabout way, have something to do with the threat from China and/or Russia -- something like not leaving the ground open and unattended -- something like using this opportunity to get our ideas and connections into place before others do -- something like "threats" from the "security vacuum" point-of-view -- something like we are doing in Afghanistan(?), but on a grand scale(?).
I simply wish that our "State" Department would retire the idea of having a Counter Terrorism Division and instead evolve to more of a Foreign Office that retains a robust state diplomacy capability, but that adds a robust "non-state" division. A group of professionals trained, organized and equipped to interact with all manner of C2 structures that do not fit our vision of a successful state model. This could be from a BP spilling oil in the Gulf, to Hezbollah, and everything in between.
We fear what we do not understand, and State does not do well with systems and structures that do not match their idea of what "right" looks like.
<b>Bill C.</b>
Bill, I'm old and thus confuse easily. Your use of the Socratic method leaves me wondering what <i>you</i> think. I believe I know what I think. Sort of, anyway...
To provide some riposte to a couple of specific questions:<Blockquote>"...it would seem that it is the overarching "post-Cold War/International System in Flux/Globalization=Integration and Disintegration paradign/context...which seems to drive our national security and foreign policy trains...Accordingly, is it within this larger, more complete and more enduring context... that "failed," "fragile," "outlier," etc., states should be viewed?
To wit: Not from the single standpoint of "threat" alone; but also from the standpoint of "responsibility" and "opportunity?""</blockquote>Two points. Threats must -- or certainly should be -- accurately identified and then contained or eliminated. Thus they <i>require</i> action which can range the gamut from mere from watchfulness to major existential combat.
The other two items you suggest generally will not impose such a necessity.
"Responsibility" (as here couched and in relation to affairs of state) is a variable and is acted upon most often according to the views and values at the time of the nominally responsible party. Thus it may or may not require action and the desirability of acceptance of responsibility and action thereunto can vary. The point is that in affairs of state it is generally an optional construct -- it is rarely mandatory and should <u>never</u> be viewed as automatic or requiring action.
The same parameters apply to "Opportunity" -- it is optionally acted upon.
In those latter two categories, it is important to diffrentiate between the necessary and the desirable -- and to further separate the truly desirable from the merely 'nice to have.' This entails an assessment of the cost:benefit ratio and an imperative to never place the last category above the necessary. We have not done that at all well in the past. We have a penchant for adopting the cause of the moment to the detriment of our long term viability and to often decide to virtually ignore the necessary to temporarily satiate almost random sensitivities of the merely nice to have. IMO, that's dumb -- and incredibly dangerous.
All that is the preface to your Addendum:<blockquote>"Thus, is it with this understanding in mind ...that we might better undertstand our actions in the less-integrated world -- and our approaches, methods, tactics, techniques, etc., used therein?"</blockquote>The answer is that's true. With respect to the past.
The real and important question the Article asks is should it be true in the future...
Addendum:
Thus, is it with this understanding in mind (not just about "threat," per se, but also about such things as "responsibility" and "opportunity") that we might better undertstand our actions in the less-integrated world -- and our approaches, methods, tactics, techniques, etc., used therein?
To conclude:
The author seems to have made a credible argument that -- from the stand point of such transnational threats as terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, international crime and disease, etc., -- failed states should not be considered our greatest national security fear.
But has he missed the point?
In that, it would seem that it is the overarching "post-Cold War/International System in Flux/Globalization=Integration and Disintegration paradign/context (introduced by then-Pres Clinton in Apr 1999 and reconfirmed as recently as May 2010 by now-Sec of State Clinton) which seems to drive our national security and foreign policy trains (thus, both preceding and transcending such things as 9/11).
Accordingly, is it within this larger, more complete and more enduring context (see paragraph immediately above) that "failed," "fragile," "outlier," etc., states should be viewed?
To wit: Not from the single standpoint of "threat" alone; but also from the standpoint of "responsibility" and "opportunity?"
For the entire text of the speech made by former President Clinton in April 1999, see the following. (Look for MR. PRESIDENT about 1/3 the way down after the MRS CLINTON and MR WEISEL parts):
http://www.pbs.org/eliewiesel/resources/millennium.html
You may wish to look at his closing paragraph that begins with "To succeed ..." Herein, he (former Pres. Clinton) invokes the mission of former Pres. Lincoln, and the ideas of former Pres. F.D. Roosevelt, to suggest the path that the United States would take in the 21st Century, and why.
This all stems from the "end of history" argument. Here, I don't mean Fukuyama's argument, but the long intellectual legacy that he wrote about reaching at least to the Enlightenment, if not closer to St. Augustine. This is the idea that history is marching toward a single correct path. Some define this by reference to religion, math, Laws of Nature, universal reason, whatever. Even many who poo-poo Fukuyama and the "end of history" idea still subscribe to this: democratic peace theory, proponents of democratization, the "golden arches" theory, the world is flat, neo-conservatives, Marxists, and on and on. If there's one right path, the way to a peaceful world is to ensure everyone is on that path. Once you've browbeaten everyone onto that path, everything will be great. Like a utopia even. The idea has been around for a long time. Kant wrote about it. Hegel thought Napoleon was bringing it to Jena, where he taught. Doesn't seem to have worked yet. I'd argue that our obsession with pushing everyone onto this path is pushing us toward an environment like that of the wars of religion. Some have actual religion, some have secular religion, but all of the talking heads pushing for "solutions" are true believers and crusaders. These true believers are the same who like to overblow the threats that come from failed and failing states. There are threats, yes. Are they existential as some would argue? No. Are we doing ourselves greater strategic harm chasing ghosts than they could do to us if we chose a different way? Yes.
What I think Ken White is saying is that we're very guilty of drinking our own bathwater, or of believing our own mythology. And to be a little provocative, I'd like any of the active duty officers who read this enlighten everyone here as to just how good they are and where they should rank in the military stud hall of fame.
I rarely disagree with Ken White; this will not be one of those occasions. The unfortunate reality seems to be that our nation has chosen to be Rome. And we all know how that turned out.
Why is it all of you who believe that we somehow have the credibility and/or ability to rebuild a failed state and somehow make ourselves safer fail to look inward? There is only one failed state with which we should be concerned and it's not Afghanistan. I don't know how anyone can take their oath to the Constitution seriously and ignore what's happening here at home.
<b>Bill C.:</b><blockquote>"Then, with this incredible perception of "transformation/incorporation success" at our backs, we now have, in our minds quite logically, moved on to complete the job by attempting to transform/incorporate/integrate 'the rest of the world.""</blockquote>That is indeed an incredible perception. Absolutely incredible. It is also terribly wrong. We did not defeat Germany and Japan in World War II, we merely aided and heavily bankrolled the effort. We did not 'defeat' the USSR and Communist China (Type 1). Russia is still around as is Communist China (Type 2).
I acknowledge there are those who believe what you stated but I'm convinced they are dangerous. Belief in myths is the first step to thinking one can creat another myth. To wit:<blockquote>"...we seem to believe that we need only modify, adapt and transform our "instruments of power" (DoD, DoS, etc) so as to accomplish this task (transforming/integrating/incorporating) re: the lesser/weaker states."</blockquote>Some seem to believe that and that creates two problems. Our sclerotic Bureaucracy and governmental system will prevent such modification in any remotely effective way. That in turn will preclude any potential for effective action in such modifications to other States by insuring that the military option is paramount. Thus, the worst option will be the first applied and that will be as a result of those egos in charge having accepted the earlier cited myths and believing that this time, it will be different and will work because, this time, <i>they</i> are in charge...
Thus we will again discover that belief in myths is a poor basis for policy. It is an even more abysmally poor basis for any military action. Note that Malaya, Viet Nam and Iraq were or are only qualified successes at best and even that small measure is true only because in all three cases (and most others...) the original goals were significantly defined downwards as much time passed to simply getting out without being embarrassed too badly... :(
So no, IMO, your accurate comment doesn't answer the mail of what should be done. It does, however, provide the foundation upon which some predicate their answers to a perceived problem -- be that problem keeping the Departmental or Agency budget topped up, a party in power or allowing a decision maker to foolishly believe that he or she is doing God's work and will against all precedent and odds succeed the next time in 'remediating' a State that neither needs nor wants the remedy that is applied.
What should be done is to vote those well intentioned but foolish people out of office so they take their hangers-on with them and in their place, elect some hard headed realists who will heed their oaths and devote themselves to the Nation's business instead of their reelection and who will change the system slightly to preclude future flawed myths from developing.
Ken White:
"It is indeed helpful in explaining why some seemingly intelligent persons hold onto a very flawed concept. It does not touch on the reasons the concept is flawed and why those persons insist on pursuing a course proved to be incredibly failure prone."
Let me take a stab at the last part of this:
Bottom Line: We believe that our current world-view and the course-of-action we have undertaken regarding it is neither flawed nor failure prone because we tend to look at these in the context of our recent history and our perceived "successes" achieved therein, to wit:
a. Having defeated/helped defeat such "outlier" great powers as Germany and Japan in World War II,
b. And believing that we, likewise, defeated/helped defeat the great powers of the USSR and pre-capitalist China in the Cold War,
c. Likewise believing that we played a crucial and critical role in causing all four of these great powers to successfully transform and become substantially integrated into our system,
d. Then, with this incredible perception of "transformation/incorporation success" at our backs, we now have, in our minds quite logically, moved on to complete the job by attempting to transform/incorporate/integrate "the rest of the world."
e. This, (1) so as to preclude "disintegration" (Yugoslavia) caused by the defeat of the USSR and (2) so as to better provide for the new world order that we, through our successful efforts, have created (all great powers at peace, somewhat on the same sheet of music and very needy).
In this regard, we seem to believe that we need only modify, adapt and transform our "instruments of power" (DoD, DoS, etc) so as to accomplish this task (transforming/integrating/incorporating) re: the lesser/weaker states.
Herein, (quite irrationally in the view of COL Gentile I believe) we may look to certain beliefs regarding our or others "successes" in such places as Malaysia, Vietnam and Iraq.
Ken: Does this, in some way and/or some small measure, help "answer the mail?"
I realize I do not discuss 9/11 here. But that is because I believe the overall world-view and course-of action based on it precedes 9/11 -- as per Pres. Clinton's 1999 articulation of the "the great battle between the forces of integration and disintegration," and our initiatives in Kosovo et al, seems to confirm.
Thus, an overall concept, and a course-of-action based on it that, as shown at my comment above (see Sec. Hillary Clinton and her introduction of the 2010 NSS) continues to dominate even unto today.
<b>Bill C.:</b><blockquote>"Thus, the overall problem, framed in this manner, would seem to suggest that it was our job -- our duty -- to transform outlier states and societies, so as to incorporate them into our system; this, so as to promote and achieve "integration" and preclude/arrest/reverse "disintegration.""</blockquote>Your suggestion is accurate I believe -- if applied to those whose arrogance and egos lead them to believe their 'solutions' must be applied to better mankind -- while said mankind continues to get along adequately without all that 'help'...<blockquote>Is this information and explanation helpful in our discussion of "failed," "fragile" or "outlier" states" and how such terms -- and ideas and emphasis associated with them -- may have come into being and still remain in vogue today?"</blockquote>It is indeed helpful in explaining why some seemingly intelligent persons hold on to a very flawed concept. It does not touch on the reasons the concept is flawed or why those persons insist on pursuing a course proved to be incredibly failure prone.
You cite instances going back 10 years or so. Regrettably, we've been engaging -- mostly futilely -- in the charade of helping "failed States" for a far longer period. It has NEVER worked yet still we persist. :<
Perhaps we should look at this from a somewhat different perspective:
a. Cir. Apr 1999, during the Kosovo Crisis, then-President William Clinton stated: "We are engaged in a great battle between the forces of integration and disintegration, of globalism versus tribalism, of oppression against empowerment."
b. Cir. May 2010, when helping to introduce the new National Security Strategy of the United States, present-day Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated: "We are in a race between the forces of integration and disintegration and we see this every day."
Could we say that it is this long-running (over 10 years now) and still seemingly dominant and consistent view of the world that drives our considerations and actions re: -- not "failed" or "fragile" states -- but, rather, "outlier" states (so as to be more consistent with the integration v. disintegration argument and construct noted above).
Thus, the overall problem, framed in this manner, would seem to suggest that it was our job -- our duty -- to transform outlier states and societies, so as to incorporate them into our system; this, so as to promote and achieve "integration" and preclude/arrest/reverse "disintegration."
Is this information and explanation helpful in our discussion of "failed," "fragile" or "outlier" states" and how such terms -- and ideas and emphasis associated with them -- may have come into being and still remain in vogue today?
There are some key distinctions regarding "failed" versus "fragile" states.
See Rolf Schwarz's article, "Preventing state failure: a proposed agenda for NATO" in Forum Paper #14, Complex Operations: NATO at war and on the margins of war" at: http://www.ndc.nato.int/research/series.php?icode=2