Counterinsurgency and its Discontents

libertariansoldier: The training program for ANP has been, as long as I have been around, an 8 week basic program. That was condensed from a program that was weeks longer at one time. Officer training is longer, but is not four years. I recently met with German ANP trainers from the academy about melding COIN into their curriculum. The Germans established the academy, but my point is that the main failure, to this day, has been in failing to do what we have done to improve the ANA; mentoring on the ground. At least consistently. Only a third of ANP have had mentors, and some who have only had it for a brief time. The ANA has had mentors for years, and we see the results.

The heavily caveated Germans were never able to mentor those who were trained. As a result, no one did until 2007... and then only a few teams were fielded. The ANP were sent out to fend for themselves, and the results are manifest.

There are some other inaccuracies in your statement. The AUP (Afghan Uniformed Police) is the term used to describe all Afghan Police who wear uniforms. This includes the ANP (the guys you see in the grey uniforms in the villages and districts), the ABP (Afghan Border Police), and ANCOP (Afghan National Civil Order Police). All fall under MoI.

Galula pointed out that the Army is a transitory presence. It moves around the nation as directed to "hot spots" where the insurgency is very active. Once the local indicators have calmed, the Army will then move to another "hot spot." In Afghanistan, there are areas that are fairly consistent hot spots, like Kunar, Helmand or Kandahar. The Army maintains a presence, but it moves its weight from district to district as required. Galula pointed out that this is like a foot stepping in a puddle. It displaces the insurgency, at least in part, and the activity is increased elsewhere. We see this in surrounding provinces as a result of the main effort in Helmand, for instance.

Galula pointed out that there must be some stay-behind force that is able to maintain local security conditions after the Army leaves. In that role, the ANP would be the rightful guarantors of local security... if we put emphasis on their development and professionalization, which we do not. Even though they are involved in fatal combat three times more often than the Army, <i>our</i> Army has little or no interest in them due to their title. The international community (EUPOL) is entirely unhelpful in their insistence that the ANP be used strictly for law enforcement, bringing their own personal interpretation of the reason for police and remaining ignorant of the precepts of COIN.

My point is that the ANP need mentoring, and that military mentoring is the only kind that will result in long term development and professionalization, just as it has for the ANA. No one can argue that the ANA is light years from where it was in 2004. That is not just due to spending money. It is due to the efforts of thousands of Soldiers and Marines who have spent their tours embedded with them, operating and living with them.

DynCorp and MPRI cannot do the operational mentoring. They are not allowed to patrol with the ANP, and are caveated in respects to where they can go and even where they can live with coalition forces. They are civilians. The Gendarmes sent by various countries to "mentor" police also cannot patrol with them. They work only at the HQ, and do not operationally mentor.

MP's have the perfect skill set for mentoring ANP, but MP's tend to be horrible counterinsurgents because of their branch propensity for disregarding ranks in other branches, a basic lack of training and education in COIN, and an inability to play well with others. They have always been outsiders militarily whose mantra has been, "Sir, don't confuse your rank with my authority." Great skill set, poor attitude for COIN. In COIN, attitude means a lot. Teamwork means a lot. Education in COIN means a lot... and you have to believe in it.

I know all of this because I was a PMT who was pulled from an ETT mission, and I got around a bit. I worked with MP's and saw their weaknesses as mentors and counterinsurgents firsthand.

The entire ANP is Gendarmerie. They are all primary counterinsurgents. It will be years before ANP are writing speeding tickets. In the meantime, the technique that benefits a largely illiterate combat force to the greatest degree, mentoring, is not consistently done with the ANP, even in our main effort areas like Helmand (where I have spent a fair amount of time this year).

Old Blue: "The German model for national police may be appropriate in Afghanistan. The German-led police training is good. The German inability to mentor in the field led to years of wasted effort and widespread inefficiency and corruption in the ANP. "
I disagree. The "German model" was based on recruiting from a literate population and the police being able to go through a four year training program before they went out on the beat. The Germans were unable to resource their model and the situation on the ground precluded waiting four years until there were ANP available to perform policing functions. Which is why the US took over and put in a USD1.3B contract with DynCorp. And when that wasn't accomplishing everything, DOD put in an additional multimillion dollar contract with MPRI. And the ANP is still broke, aside from some tiny units such as the new MCTF, unable to perform LE functions. In fact, the ANP writ large (but especially the ANCOP/Gendarmerie and AUP/Community Police) is a poorly trained and lightly equipped COIN auxillary force.

Two significant things:

The German model for national police may be appropriate in Afghanistan. The German-led police training is good. The German inability to mentor in the field led to years of wasted effort and widespread inefficiency and corruption in the ANP.

To this day we are failing the ANP continuously. This is a grave error. Very poor counterinsurgency; a COIN-killer.

Secondly, no external power can lend legitimacy to such things as justice. No external power can provide justice, only disarming locals or deterring violence. There are other things that external forces can do... and are accepted for doing... that do support legitimacy. Deciding on justice issues is not one of them. At least not in Afghanistan.

Dennis M: Excellent points. Right on target.

As for your first point, it depends on the popularity and legitimacy of the regime toppled. The Taliban regime was never fully accepted and ruled, for the most part, by fear. It did, however, have benefits. The streets were orderly. On the other hand, nearly every other aspect of life suffered. Most Afghans, and particularly the millions of refugees, were more than happy to see the Taliban go.

As far as our efforts at, basically, creating a government... with the help and acquiescence of not some key leaders and a good portion of the people... is that we had no earthly idea of how to go about doing what we were doing. Especially not in a Joint and Combined environment. It has been a learning process. Just as we somehow expected good governance to magically spring from the ground, we had no idea as nations how to set about this project. Look at how the work was divvied up.

The US said, "We do great armed forces. We'll do the armed forces." "Excellent! Yes, you do the best armed forces in the world. You do the armed forces," said the participants.

"We do great national police," said the Germans. "Indeed," said the international community, "your national police are a model of efficiency. You do the police."

"We do great courts," said the Italians. "Hmmm," thought the world, "we don't want to do the courts, especially Islamic courts." "Yes," acceded the international community, fingers crossed behind its back, "you have excellent courts. A model of efficiency. You may do the courts."

The Italians set to work.

"We have a criminal code from 1973 that worked really well for us before The Troubles," said the Afghans. "No, no," said the Italians, "you need a whole new criminal code that none of your lawyers... either the ones remaining or the ones who return... will understand. It will be no problem to train judges, prosecutors and lawyers. You'll see. Trust the Italian justice model!" The results are manifestly spectacular.

I jest... in part.

We didn't fully appreciate what we were doing. And 2/3 of our national instruments of power pretty much benched themselves. Three years ago, the State Department may as well have been tossing bricks with money tied to them over the embassy wall with a note that said, "Please go and build X at Y location." There was almost no oversight and little direct involvement. USAID was nowhere to be found. Now they are here, learning and working. I've met some really impressive folks with both State and USAID since I've been here this time.

It seems that many of them were busy in Iraq during my previous engagement here.

As far as Afghan dispute resolution, other than (half) jesting about the Italian efforts, the GIRoA courts aren't the only ones who have been taking it on the chin from insurgent justice. (Great example of Maoist strategy, by the way.) There are three types of law in Afghanistan; Constitutional law, traditional law and Sharia law. Much of Afghanistan always worked local disputes through traditional dispute resolution mechanisms using a combination of tradition, Pashtunwali (or Afghanyat for the non-Pashtuns), and Sharia. Of course, if you are religious fundamentalist, that simply wouldn't do. Especially because if there was a conflict between tradition and Sharia, tradition often won. Many traditional law experts were run off or killed off. Chains of mentoring hundreds of years old were broken. Traditional law suffers from a struggle for legitimacy when those who make the decisions are viewed as uneducated in its application.

Thanks, Mr. Taliban!

What we have realized... and now are trying to leverage... is that the traditional dispute resolution mechanisms need to be restored even as the Constitutional justice system needed to be reconstituted. We can do this in many ways. One way is to empower and encourage the ANP to assist in enforcing traditional dispute resolution (Jirga) decisions. They can be the Arbakai. This provides a cross-legitimization between the GIRoA and strengthening the traditional resiliencies of communities. I've seen this done. Sort of like how in some towns in the US we have Mayor's Courts and the local Police enforce the judgments... but in an Afghan context.

That's just the tip of the iceberg, but hopefully that helps.

The thing is to avoid laying blame on particular individuals for the mistakes made by learning. If someone deserves blame now, it is for having the information available and willfully ignoring it and particularly for advocating against its application. Doing the same thing over and over and expecting a different result is a symptom of insanity... especially when there is another way that others are trying to lead to. Where we see people applying these solutions in local communities, it is working. Meanwhile, we can get some breathing room to work to minimize (we still have it in the US) corruption via a number of programs. That is a huge challenge in itself.

Mr. Jones, if I may;

Dennis M.:

The first question that I saw was about public works being used as metrics in COIN when they may not be useful. Any project or operation, whether military, governance or economic, must be undertaken with prior consideration to the "so what." American and British doctrine both refer to these as "second and third order effects." If the first order physical effect is that you have dug a well, then what are the second and third order effects? Do they support the counterinsurgent aim of developing legitimacy for the government? What are the follow-on effects that have nothing to do with the provision of water? If you dig the well and the insurgent destroys it, have you not demonstrated to the populace that the government cannot protect infrastructure?

Commanders have had a propensity to measure only the first order physical effects, the immdediate results, or their actions. It has been common to see commanders basing their evaluation of their own effectiveness on how much CERP (Commander's Emergency Relief Program) money they have spent without providing any context, any appreciation of the second and third order effects of that spend.

The third-order effect, although there may be more than that, of course, is the enduring perception left in the minds of the populace. If that projected end result does not support the government's legitimacy, you may want to re-think your proposed project. An exception may be simply humanitarian in nature, but that is a commander's decision on assumption of risk. At least he should know what and why he is doing it.

For your second question: If warfare is the continuation of politics by other means, then insurgency is warfare. It is the point on the scale where political violence is no longer an individual criminal act performed by a social deviant, and numbers of people acting in cooperation are willing to break the social contract due to vehement disagreement with the political course of events combined with an inability to utilize the political process to attain satisfaction or at least consent. It's not about being willing to die for a cause; it's about being willing to kill for it. A good juxtaposition would be our Timothy McVey vs. the founding fathers of our own country in the earliest parts of what grew from insurgency to open rebellion.

Legitimacy is based on a number of things in the minds of the governed. We consider representation to be an important element of legitimacy. Some may not. Legitimacy in the mind of the counterinsurgent must be based on an understanding of that construct locally. Other factors include relevance, effectiveness, and fairness, but may include others. If a government is not relevant in the daily lives of the people, then there is no legitimacy. If it cannot enforce its edicts, there is no legitimacy. If an individual cannot count on a fair result in a dispute based on an impartial and incorruptible decision-maker, there is no legitimacy. Weakness in any of these areas would be one of the first candidates for shadow governance to usurp authority and, through relevance, legitimacy.

Again, there may/will be other factors locally. In my observation, the three facets of relevance, effectiveness and fairness are pretty standard. In some places it could include such things as birth right... although we don't see that one much anymore.

Just my two cents. Mr. Jones?

There are some great comments on this thread. One of our greatest challenges is that no one, to certainly include myself, has a corner on understanding the challenges we face today; and similarly, no single line of operation or approach to a line of operation will provide the best solution.

Most are on board that "Terrorism" is a tactic, and therefore "counterterrorism" is a tactic as well; but because we originally defined the entire problem in those terms, and then created whole new organizations and crafted DoD campaign plans based on those narrow tactical concepts, we got vectored into an equally narrow set of perspectives and approaches.

When FM 3-24 came along, we needed to do something to get out of that canalized, tactical CT mindset; so shifting to "COIN" did help in terms of opening the aperture, but it still boxed in our thinking in a couple of ways I believe are incredibly significant:

1. First, all populace-based violence is not what I would characterize as "insurgency." I do not believe that an organization outside of a populace-governance dynamic can conduct either insurgency or COIN; but rather what is more effectively thought of as UW and FID. In that regard, AQ cannot conduct "insurgency" but rather conducts UW to foment, incite, facilitate, and shape a wide range of nationalist movements to support their broader agenda, as well as achieving the more narrow nationalist goals of each movement the engage with.

2. Chapter 1, Page 1, Sentence 1, FM 3-24 states unequivocally that COIN is warfare. That locks one into military-led, violence oriented perspective from the very start. I do believe that most active Insurgency is "warfare" against the state, but that even that can employ either non-violent or violent tactics and irregular or regular approaches as deemed to be most likely to succeed by the insurgent. For the state, however, I believe that it is rarely "warfare" and is typically best seen as a civil emergency to avoid slipping into approaches and perspectives that are likely to do as much harm as good in their application (As Bill M. will likely attest, one of the most significant successes in the Southern Philippines is changes that we have facilitated through our capacity building with the Philippine security forces in changing HOW they engage and treat the populaces and the rise in respectful professionalism of their operations. As they are the element of Philippine governance that the people actually see, they are the stratcom that is affecting how the people perceive the "goodness" of the government. A more effective security force is great, but one that builds perceptions of respect and true justice in the conduct of their operations is one that is really moving the populace toward stability.)

3. The final problem I have with FM3-24 is that is appears to be based on a study of COIN and then heavily seasoned by our early experience in Iraq. I would recommend these three issues be given high priority in a re-write:
A. Base it in an understanding of Insurgency itself to begin with, and then build out to look at approaches to dealing with insurgency. This is "zombie COIN" currently; it looks and acts about right, but lacks the "soul" that comes from this critical foundation in insurgency.

B. Look at COIN not narrowly as "warfare", but rather look at "insurgency" as a condition, a perspective, a mental state, within a populace that can manifest itself differently over time and among various unique groups all served by this same governance. That it is only illegal responses that are a problem (the rest are politics), but can manifest itself in illegal ways that are non-violent or violent, irregular or regular as the conditions merit and the leadership decides. Be more flexible in how we look at it, and put some real teeth in the concept of civilian led COIN.

C. Purge out the heavy coloring of Iraq. While Iraq makes a fascinating case study is one wanted to teach a class on insurgency and COIN (you can find so many varieties there of insurgency, and dos and do nots of COIN), it limits the effectiveness of a product that must be applicable everywhere.

As to campaign design, I think we shape the context much more clearly if we think of it as "counter UW"; with a family of LOOs of CT, COIN, Diplomacy, Policy, etc all bundled under that umbrella of taking AQ out of the picture, and outcompeting them for influence with the populaces they target. Insurgencies are waged in the countryside, but those that are truly won, are won in the capital. We need to shift our ME to new and appropriate approaches for engaging those capitals; and that has very little to do with the military indeed.

COL Gentile: I have read much of what you have written over the course of the past several years in regards to COIN as a doctrine. Numerous times and in some prestigious venues, you have likened it to Active Defense and present a nebulous concept of a better approach; as AirLand was to Active Defense. However, there is no recommended replacement stemming from this critical thinking. You have described FM 3-24 as prescriptive, and yet I fail to see where it is prescriptive. The only prescriptions being made are in terms of a common operational framework insofar as how to examine social aspects of an Operational Environment, in a similar manner as we all use operational graphics that look the same. We all use sector sketches that look the same. These are standard methodologies that work for us in tactical, operational and strategic applications. Other than the common operational language/framework, it is up to each local commander/leader to make decisions that have the proper long-term effects in their Area of Responsibility.

One of the key points is that the Army DOES NOT possess a COIN mindset. It is moving in that direction more than it was two and three years ago. Three years ago, the Army possessed no better than a buzzword knowledge of the doctrine best suited for the environment in which it was engaged. A few "got it," most didn't. Now, I would describe the Army's overall knowledge of COIN as being a pop-culture understanding. We've moved beyond using buzzwords inappropriately, but not to the level of "mindset."

Thank you for describing my observations as clever machinations to shoehorn Afghanistan into a nice, neat box so that FM 3-24 will apply. That's a nice way to dismiss not completely uneducated observations of my current operational environment. I can recognize the strategy and its application when I see it. The insurgents here even use Maoist doctrinal terminology in their communications to each other.

It's easy to glibly dismiss a statement made by an individual on the ground. Personally, I disagree that the only type of insurgency against which the concepts detailed in FM 3-24, FM 3-24.2 and JP 3-24 is strictly Maoist. But, even assuming that for some reason you are correct on that point, if this is not a Maoist (minus, of course, the Communist ideology)insurgency, then can you tell me what it is and into what construct it falls?

When an insurgent commander tells a sub-commander not to attempt transition to the Strategic Offensive, to stay in the Strategic Defensive phase, do you think that he pulled that out of the ether? Using Maoist doctrinal terminology clarifies the operational and tactical behaviors of the insurgents in Afghanistan. Its hard to argue against the insurgent political behaviors having been drawn from the lessons of Mao, and tactically the insurgents use Al-Muqrins adaptations as well. It is actually ridiculously plain to see.

There are some really cool things coming that will help units preparing to deploy to properly prepare for this environment. The SECDEF memo of 24MAY10 is being worked diligently. The results will come sooner rather than later, and it will make a quantum change in behaviors of units on the ground down to the Soldier level. Britain is already moving in the same direction, and the rest of NATO will copy our model. Then, perhaps, a mindset change will occur that changes the overall tactical approach being taken in each discrete area, instead of the two steps forward - one and a half back that we have done here for years.

With 30 plus years in Special Forces I understand the importance of FID and COIN as a means for achieving our national policy objectives, but as the author stated we have not done a good job of logically explaining how this will defeat AQ, nor have we have done a good job of evaluating the risks an overly COIN/FID centric military exposes our nation to. Im not so sure the military back lash identified is anti- COIN or FID, because both are appropriate means for achieving certain ends, but the new wave of coindistas have perverted COIN and FID from a means to a end for certain situations to a cure all snake oil.

The debate should not be pro-COIN or anti-COIN, since defining the debate this way polarizing people into two camps around two rather simple ideas, rather than exploring the full realm of how we can best employ our military force to assist in achieving our policy objectives.

In 2003 I was embarrassed to hear senior military officers say they were surprised by the IW threats in Iraq as the character of the war changed from conventional to irregular, and worse, they didnt know what to do as the character of the conflict became largely irregular. In my view it was clear that DOD needed a push (a strong push) to study IW and institutionalize its study throughout DOD, but where are we now? COIN in some circles is the new Fulda Gap mentality. A lot of us want to see the snake oil salesman taken off the street, because we believe their zealous pursuit of unproven doctrine and touchy feely ideas is putting our nation at risk.

Since the success of FID and COIN depends on numerous variables (not simply good government, and based on historical examples good government isnt even required), but generally the host nations willingness and capability to fight skillfully (without alienating its populace) is one key, and if were working with governments around the world that dont share our vision, or refuse to step up to plate then the COIN/FID effort will probably fail (many have in the past). Yet we cling to the doctrine with unfounded faith that if we just keep trying well get over that hill. Meanwhile Al Qaeda seems to be reconstituting while were distracted with nation building.

Again FID and COIN have a critical role to play in our national security toolbox, but they are not the answer to defeating AQ. Our strategy in many peoples view is based on the false assumption that extending government control will deny safe haven for terrorists to operate. Where has this ever worked? Terrorist cells function in Europe and the U.S. and they have plenty (some would argue too much) of government.

It is time to move the discussion beyond pro-COIN and anti-COIN to a complete review of the strategy.

Old Blue:
My post was not about progress made or not made in Afghanistan but the currency of counterinsurgency as an idea within the broader strategic-studies community. I am sorry that I did not make that clearer in the post.

Now, the 'currency of counterinsurgency as an idea' may appear a trifling matter to those, like yourself, deployed to conduct such operations in the field. I can understand that. Still, I chose to take this angle 1) because other people are more qualified to comment on the state of affairs in Afghanistan; and 2) I think the 'domestic' treatment of counterinsurgency is still important, as it will determine whether the hard-earned lessons learned in the field are squandered or institutionalised. But, yeah, my post really had very little to do with Afghanistan.

Gian: thanks for your comments. You are right: 'critics' would have been better, but I was going for a Stiglitz-type title).

Currently 14 months in Afghanistan with a couple of more left to go, working directly with COIN and many units who are tasked with executing a COIN mission. I travel extensively and have seen the operational behaviors of units from various NATO partners from RC East to Helmand.

The Afghan insurgency is not narcotics-driven, although there are apolitical actors, including narcotics traffickers. The insurgency is not homogeneous. It is dispersed and in ways fragmented. It is indeed a conglomeration of local insurgencies, but that's what insurgencies really are. All politics is local, therefore all insurgency is local, therefore all counterinsurgency is local. This is indeed a Maoist insurgency insofar as the systemic behavior of the insurgencies themselves. If we define Maoist insurgents by the strategies that they use in order to disable legitimacy, usurp authority and provide actual government via "shadow governance," beginning with disfunctional areas and working towards disabling what was, if anything, working.

All but one Afghan province has a shadow governor. Some can exert little influence, and others are more influential and relevant in the daily lives of the local populace than the GIRoA governor. Many of the 364 districts have shadow subgovernors. The same situation exists in the districts. This behavior follows the tenets of Maoist insurgent doctrine, which they execute with more fidelity than we execute our own.

As for the author's assertions that COIN is met with snickers, perhaps it is within the halls of KCL, but the Queen's Army is grasping it with both hands in Helmand, and the results are showing. Look at Nad e Ali, and you will see a great deal of progress in an area that, in January 2009, was almost totally under insurgent control. Commander, Task Force Helmand has mandated use of "Human Terrain Packs" which include ASCOPE/PMESII crosswalks as a way to understand the societal aspects of the terrain on which TFH units operate. The information that this provides company-level officers, such as overlays showing land ownership, influence areas of local elders, and the actual naming conventions used for local areas in the speech of local inhabitants, has made operations in these areas much more effective. Where the Brits were pinned inside compounds, GIRoA and ANSF influence is spreading out from areas where progress has shown people what can be if they assist. One village, seeing the progress being made and the benefits to villagers only a few kilometers away, cleared their own village by edict in one night.

While the instant village clearance is an extreme case, those villagers knew that the ANSF and 1 Duke of Lancasters had their backs. The next day, 215th ANA Corps and 1 Lancs elements were there, helping to secure the gains made by the elders. That was a direct result of the British Army buying into this "failed doctrine."

While this article may have made COL Gentile clap his hands happily together, the declarations of the nature of this insurgency and the state of COIN in Afghanistan is not only premature but entirely misinformed. One thing I can assure anyone of is that nowhere is the fog of war thicker than in an insurgency... it's more like muddy water. Many can stand on the ground and not really understand what they are looking at, especially when the observer refuses to put on the mask that permits a point of view that will help make sense of it. That point has been illustrated quite well.

In this war, the words of those on the ground are glibly tossed aside in favor of an opinion with which one agrees. So, do with this as you may; but it is what I see. While the good Doctor hears more voices, on the ground we see more leaders who have progressed beyond the buzzword knowledge displayed three years ago. What those who claim to be the voice of reason do is provide lightning rods to those who wish to find a reason not to learn. This is quite diversionary. The divisions in actual progress on the ground made by units who are actually doing their best to do COIN is manifest and in stark contrast to units that have trained for counter-guerrilla operations and have had to be removed from operational areas that they have completely bolixed-up.

The article, and some of the comments, do not reflect the current reality on the ground.

<em>"... the link between the stated strategic goal (to 'disrupt, dismantle and defeat al-Qaeda) and the operational tenets of counterinsurgency is difficult to discern..."</em>

Reading that passage alone made the entry worth my time.

RamadiNights,

I'll disagree with your assertion that Afghanistan is not a political insurgency but a narco-insurgency. It is much more complex than drugs - at least my experience there said as much to me.

I hung out in the opium fields and talked with farmers, field owners, and men in the markets and to me, Afghanistan is a land of 1,000 insurgencies for a 1,000 villages, all rooted in traditional Pathan antipathy towards foreigners. The "Taliban" certainly exists, but more as a movement and less as an organization. Insurgents in our AO knew that neither ISAF nor GIRoA would do anything against their narcotics crops but continued the resistence.

Abu Nasr, definately dig what you're saying - tacking doctrinal success to the forces of history is something that should be investigated.