Comments
Mike,
Great point, and one that should be obvious, but as the old wise ones say, "common sense isn't that common." I read Leities and Wolf's study a few years ago (again), but forgot that particular reference. One of many frustrations today is we only pay lip service today to understanding how the enemy's clandestine organization, shadow government, underground, etc. operates and how it effects the populace. We're focused on guerrilla and IED cells, which of course need to be pursued, but not at the expense of more important revolutionary targets. Of course we stopped studying revolutionary warfare after the Cold War ended. And of course since everything is so much more complex now a days, any wisdom from yesterday is obviously obsolete :-). Gian recently mentioned we need to learn humility. I couldn't agree more, I have over 30 years and I have never seen such a large percentage of unjustified ego in the military as I do today. The petty egos at State, DOD, and elsewhere in the USG are going to be the ruin of our nation. Character matters, hell the indig can sense your character, and they know we have a lot of bull sh**ers out there. Mahalo.
I recommend the Feb 1970 Leites and Wolf Rand study which Abu linked, "Rebellion and Authority," which I think is well worth a read. I think one sentence from the Summary (p.151) distills a particular lesson from Vietnam which retains currency:
"The progress made by each side in the conflict influences the affiliations of most of the population as much as, or more than, it is influenced by those affiliations."
This was certainly true of the Vietnam I knew (MR-III 1971-75), where in even relatively well off communities that were patently benefiting from the new, rural prosperity, behavior of the populace was determined by the combination of proximity to a PAVN base area and a well-embedded VC Infrastructure that was,I would suggest, enabled/empowered by the presence of the PAVN batallion in the nearby sanctuary.
As I read over my post, I want to clarify. We can't want it more than they do. We can't do it for them. We can't do it quickly. We can only make space for them to win hearts and minds. We can't win hearts and minds because, no matter how good we are, everyone knows we're leaving and the insurgent and the COIN government is not. They are the hearts and minds forces. We are the defenders. We can't win hearts and minds, but we can certainly lose them in conjunction with the COIN government. WE can't state-build, but someone must/will.
Bill,
I'm saying what you're saying. The problem is state building. The insurgent is successful in areas where there's no state. We can't "act" to win hearts and minds. If the COIN government (not us, the natives) doesn't state-build in contested areas, there's no hope for us.
We may need to kill to make room for the state-building, but we can't state-act and they can't state-build if we're state-acting. We need to kill and defend and they need to state-build.
Peter,
I agree with all your points, but still tend to think that are lack of persistent development is also a key factor. We're very focused on conducting "activities" that tend to make us feel better than the locals we're hoping to help. For example, we'll conduct a Medical Civic Action Program where we'll ride into the village, set up a few tents (perhaps) and offer medical treatment for a few hours, then ride off into the sunset. Our so called MOE is how many patients we saw, which of course is MOP, not MOE. We may even build a medical clinic, but it won't effectively represent the COIN force or HN government, if the COIN forces (hopefully HN) aren't running it. On the other hand, our foes will set up less capable clinics and stay for the duration. Their association with the insurgents may not even be apparent at first, but they provide aid with a political message that resonates.
While I'm not opposed to the doctrinal meaning of hearts and minds, that isn't what our forces practice in most cases. Instead they try to get the local populace to like through acts of kindness, which only have an effect on attitudes for a duration of a few minutes at best in most cases. We need to challenge the way we're doing business, and look for more effective ways to conduct COIN or assist the host nation in doing so. We can spend ourselves broke building roads, schools, etc. and achieve nothing in the end, because these events are usually not tied into an effective strategy, instead their a "separate" line of effort that is based on hope, not reality.
To clarify I'm not against development that is done intelligently (a slow process that enables locals to "gradually" approve their standard of living in a durable way, best done by NGOs), but I am against the false claim that it suppresses insurgencies. There is no evidence I'm aware of that supports that argument.
The insurgent gains more traction for a number of reasons, especially when compared to the Americans. One is that the insurgent will be there forever, insurgent or not, while we will not. Two, the insurgent is native, or more native than us and lives far closer to the people, so he can target his services much more effectively to those from whom he will gain the most capital. Three, the choice may be take the insurgent's services or have him destroy the services that everyone else tries to provide and maybe slitting your throat to boot. It makes a lot of sense to accept the services and your safety. Finally, the COINers, especially Americans, suffer from a huge expectation-to-reality gap. "You put men on the moon/toppled Saddam in days/are the most powerful country in the world, but you can't get the lights back on? You must not want to do it." Whereas the insurgent gets judged at face value.
I'm shocked to find a pragmatic post/article on the CNAS website.
Abu wrote, ""Hearts and minds is about power and control. And if you actually study the way the U.S. military went about its counterinsurgency operations in Iraq in 2007 and continues to go about them in Afghanistan, it's less about doing good works and more about both killing the enemy and establishing control measures over the population. This kind of counterinsurgency is not as fun to talk about with non-governmental organizations or aid workers (Mike Miklaucic being an exception), but it works better than the softer, kinder alternatives.""
He added,
""I have to add one more thing, which is really important: just because the counterinsurgent does not derive much of a benefit from providing social services does not mean the insurgent does not either.""
I think the last paragraph should be addressed by a study (NPS?). I have found that the insurgent provided social services actually seems to gain traction (even when it is lower quality than ours), while our effort to provide social services tend to fall flat. I have some ideas one why this may be true, one is our effort to provide services is large through civil action programs, where we make an appearance on stage, build a school, pass out a few vitamins, and then disappear, where the insurgent provides long term social services with a political message. This is hunch at best, but definitely worthy of study by some bright young grad students who want to contribute to the study of irregular warfare.