"... much remains to be done by whoever replaces Gates later this year. His successor's overarching objective will be to maximize U.S. national security in an era of increased budget constraints and decreased certainty about the shape of future conflict. In other words, he or she will need to spend less money to prepare for a wider range of threats. The most serious of these threats will be asymmetric in nature - that is, they will target American weaknesses to circumvent its conventional superiority."
Comments
The Nixon Doctrine by any other name is still the Nixon Doctrine. Nagl may not be able to verbalize it, but when these guys speak of building "partner capacity", does one really think that just means "partner capacity for COIN" ??? Here is the real deal - For where ever you have failed states and broken societies, you have a power vacuum. Even the most troglodyte offensive realist will recognize the need for the US to support hard-balancing at the regional level with good security assistance investments. Right now, we are "invested" in Iraq, and to redeem that investment involves a security relationship that ought to involve a lot more than training policemen and intelligence agents. You have every reason to stay connected with these guys, not just in the more mundane forms of security assistance - and if you incentivize the conventional ground force personnel systems to reward such assignments, you will get a better class of trainer - not really by throwing in A-teams hither and yon...but by combined training exercises and periodic REFOIRAQ drills. Show that you can come back and you will come back if needed. Now, to get that kind of partner capacity building in play, you need partners who will play ball. Just do it. Then you can make the label your own...
Robert C. Jones:
What does it mean? Here's what I think it may mean:
I. The Forces of Integration:
a. We are not working today to "maintain the favorable status quo that emerged from the Cold War." This, we believe, is fairly well in hand.
b. Rather, we are actively engaged today in a different project, one in which our goal is to EXPAND UPON that which we have achieved in the last century(ies).
c. In this light, and assisted/spurred-on by such things as globalization, we see ourselves as embarked on a great mission to transform and incorporate the less-integrated world.
d. Herein, we intend to move aggressively -- as per the opportunities presented to us (insurgencies, natural disasters, humanitarian crises, other state/societal difficulties) -- to achieve this goal.
e. Consistent with this "Change the World" mission, we have attempted to follow the maxim: "If the goal is to achieve political (and/or other) change, then all military (and other) action must be considered as secondary and subordinate to this aim; a means to an end."
II. The Forces of Disintegration:
a. Anything and anyone who -- by their nature/make-up, by their beliefs, or by their actions -- would tend to hinder or stand in our way re: this "Unseat the Status Quo; Transform and Incorporate the Less-Integrated World" project.
b. This, specifically to include those who (in defense) would wish to suggest, propose and/or move towards forming some alternative (not like us and part of our system) political, economic or social order.
Thus, the Clinton's "integration/disintegration" construct and, likewise, the Neo-Reaganites' "re-engineering the world/accelerate the grown of freedom/speed the pace of history" concept; both which would seem to suggest that the United States was/is embarked -- not on a defensive mission, per se, -- but offensive one. One which advocates the use of power to bring about favorable state and societal change (in the less-integrated world).
One might also make the argument that the use of power (hard, soft, smart, etc.) to transform outlier states and societies -- and to incorporate them within our system -- was/is necessary to "maintain the favorable status quo that emerged after the Cold War (re: all great powers at peace and generally on the same sheet of music). But I am not sure that this distinction (need rather than ambition) would make much of a difference to those in the less-integrated world who had no desire to experience such a change in their status quo.
Bill,
I had to scratch my head a bit, thinking "wtf?" upon reading this quote you pulled up: "a great battle, a race, between the forces of integration and disintegration"
I mean, seriously, what does that even mean?? I suspect it means "the forces dedicated to maintaining this favorable Status Quo that emerged from the Cold war against the efforts of those state and non-state actors who believe that their interests are best served by challenging the same."
On an Earth possessed of finite resources of every type, the gain by one party is almost always to the detriment of another. It is a competition. Those on the outside are pretty much forced to wage a little "disintegration" of the systems of protections that exist for the purpose of keeping the insiders in and the outsiders out, if they hope to better their lot. Doesn't make them evil, though there is plenty of that to go around.
We've gotten into a moralistic mentality that has gotten us into situations that have made us less, not more competitive in the matter of the interests that matter most. Idealistic posturing in the name for or against moralistic issues like "communisim," "democracy," or "Islamism" all distract from the real politics that must be the foundation for great nations and how they engage the world.
I think the US would be well served by becoming less tied to sustaining the the unsustainable; less dedicated to perceptions of enduring friends and foes; and more committed to defining realistic, durable national interests, and more flexible in working with those who share those interests when and where they align, and guarding against those who challenge those interests when and where they diverge. A friend on one issue may be a foe on another. After all, at the end of the day, we are all competitors, and the winners write the rules the game is played by.
Just to be sure that I have given proper and equal time and credit:
"As it evolved in the 1990s, the neo-Reaganism of the conservative idealists diverged from the original. Most obviously, it took an expansive view of the ability of the United States to re-engineer the world." (Page 6)
"The new generation of conservative idealists turned this on its head (the idea that the use of the US military was essentially for defensive purposes), seeing military power as the spear tip of American Grand Strategy. Military power, they thought, could allow the United States to acellerate the growth of freedom. Like Lenin, they believed they could speed the pace of history." (Items in parenthsis are mine) (Page 7)
http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/attachment.php?attachmentid=251&d=1…
Thus, should we step back and say that -- not asymmetrical threats, per se -- but something else, for example: the idea, seeming to be held by both parties (or influencial elements therein) that the US military could and should (1) be used for offensive purposes, specifically, (2) so as to "re-engineer the world?"
For most people, I'd say no. It does not justify them. Obviously, the two Clintons and many of the Western political class worldwide as well as some Academics -- mostly Baby Boomers -- believe that it does.
I believe the facts and actual history of such interventions contradict that belief.
It may or may not be germane that few of those persons actually have much personal stake in the conduct or outcome of such interventions other than a generation of wealth on the part of some or 'success' of their ideology on the part of many.
Ken White:
So I'm guessing the post-Cold War world-view of "a great battle, a race, between the forces of integration and disintegration" (introduced pre-9/11 by then-Pres. Clinton in 1999 and reconfirmed recently by Sec. of State Clinton in May 2010 in her introduction to the Obama National Security Strategy); this explanation also does not justify these proposed "interventions" (thanks much for this definition, information and guidance)?
I agree those warranted the use of the GPF. However, neither was an intervention. The first was a conventional operation in support of a friendly power which had been attacked.
The second, if by (Part 1) you mean Desert Shield / Desert Storm in 1991, was similarly a conventional operation in support of an attacked friendly power.
If you meant the 2003 attack on Iraq, that was a deliberate conventional attack on another nation and its armed forces in furtherance of national policy. The failure of the attacking force to conduct occupation operations led to an 'insurgency' (among other things) that the erstwhile opponent had deliberately initiated. It was a case where the GPF was already committed and thus not an intervention.
All three were conventional operations, not aimed at correcting dysfunctional states or engaging in "Global COIN." The 'intervention' to which I was referring was of the type that many advocate, one that is defined as:<blockquote>
"...
2. (Government, Politics & Diplomacy) any interference in the affairs of others, esp by one state in the affairs of another...
a. To involve oneself in a situation so as to alter or hinder an action or development.
b. To interfere, usually through force or threat of force, in the affairs of another nation."</blockquote>specifically to bring about the results you cite, "<i>in order to provide for and sustain the international community noted above</i>."
Grenada and Panama were interventions of a sort but both were very short operations in both time and troops committed plus no COIN effort was entailed and there was no effort at bringing about such results.
Given that, the only operations post WW II where we intervened for that purpose or even close to it and the GPF was involved in any numbers at all are Viet Nam, the Dominican Republic and Afghanistan.
None of which, in my view required GPF commitment -- in all cases, that commitment was far more a result of US domestic politics than a pressing need for us or the international community. Nor were any an effort in real terms to cure a dysfunctional state. There is no question that US domestic politics must be catered to -- there is also no question that it is NOT a good basis for foreign policy, especially if the commitment of troops to a war of sorts is involved.
<b>Bill C.:</b>
You are possibly correct in saying that is the 'model' being used. My question was and is "How has that worked out for us?"
That does not make it either the correct model or mildly sensible...
The specific question I asked of you, with respect to the US, was:<blockquote>"There are rare occasions when intervention using the GPF is warranted and there are no other decent options.
If you can think of just one that's occurred since World War II, could you tell me where and when it was?"</blockquote>
The overall model being used, I believe, is:
a. One of an "international community" which has "functional" (more like us) and "dysfunctional" (less like us) parts. (Someone else on this site originated this "functional and dysfunction" analogy but I cannot remember who to give credit to).
b. Due to the need to adequately provide for the rapidly expanding security and other needs of this now vastly enlarged "international community" (China, Russia and India et al. now coming over to the more-functional side), the "dysfunctional" parts of the community -- as in the case of expanding communities everywhere -- will have to be "cleaned up" and "fixed" (transformed and incorporated); sooner rather than later.
c. "Global COIN" (preemptive when possibly but per event if the need and/or the opportunity presents itself) is suggested as what will be required to get this done.
d. And, when viewed within the scope and context noted above, it is thought that such is beyond the capability of USSF+.
e. Thus, as per an argument re: other rapidly expanding and encompassing communities, the job to "clean-up" and "fix" the dysfunctional, limiting and dangerous parts of said community would no longer seem to be an optional -- nor could it be deferred to later generations.
f. Accordingly, an "appetite suppressor" would not seem to be an adequate "cure" for such a large meal that, based on the circumstances noted above (rapidly expanding and encompassing community) must be eaten now.
g. Thus, this job is considered to be what "war" in the first half of the 21st Century will look like -- in order to provide for and sustain the international community noted above.
Bill C.
Your comments (some reduced) are in quotation marks. This is an attempt to kill or at least exorcise the devil from the USG's "new" view of foreign affairs by providing another perspective.
""the requirement to intervene re: insurgencies et al. is not a matter that is within our control""
You're implying that we have no choice of when to intervene, which means others outside our country will control and direct "our" foreign policy. We have clearly have a choice on whether or not to intervene. Have we intervened in a meaningful way in either Burma or Sudan despite cries from the media to ride to the rescue? Did we intervene in Rwanda? We intervene when we believe the cause both emotionally and rationally is in our national interest period. As many leaders have stated, our great threat to "our" security is our national debt, so we cannot afford to intervene in every little piss ant conflict around the world just because we think AQ may be involved somehow or someway.
""(in that they are caused by "unstoppable forces" such as "globalization," "the end of history," etc.).""
Please break out some history books, a subject they longer teach our new crop of officers because it apparently distracts them from getting degrees in business management and complexity theory. You'll find there were several periods in world history of instability marked by insurgencies/revolutions around the world. If you didn't put it in the proper context, it would look like the sky is falling. Remember the post WWI and II periods when nationalist movements throughout the developing world revolted to throw out their colonial masters, and then subsequently the communist sponsored insurgencies attempted (or accomplished it) to overthrow the current form of government (usually dictatorships). Despite the continuing spread of globalization (it has only been going on for centuries), there is more peace and stability in the world now than ever before. We need to put things back into context, the sky isn't falling, we don't need to start the draft and deploy DOD forces around the world to solve everyone else's problems.
""these factors, which are beyond our control, will require our intervention""
If these factors are "beyond our control" then why the heck would we intervene? Didn't we discover that these factors remained beyond our control in Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia and elsewhere? So you think we should develop and execute a national strategy based on control?
""And, accordingly, we really do not have the option of "opting out" of these jobs (consequences of other action, non-action or "opportunity lost" being considered to be more-dire and/or more-costly than if intervention had been undertaken post-haste.)""
I think those who think this way are way out in left field and have little to substantiate these claims. These self generated fears, largely for political purposes, have resulted in years of stupid policies, policies that politicians can't back away from without being labeled weak on terror. I guess it is O.K. to be stupid on terror, but don't appear to be weak. I have no issue with increasing our covert capabilities to kill terrorists whereever they're at, but that doesn't require getting involved in that location's politics. There are select times, times and places that we can select intervention, and more importantly we need the wisdom to know when not to intervene.
""Thus, this (intervention, early and/or late) must become the bread and butter of DoD, DoS, etc., for the early 21st Century. (Job being considered to be too big for USSF alone?)""
It isn't too big for SF and select individuals from the services if we take a needed appetite suppressent. The bread and butter of DOD must remain warfighting, and admittedly what that looks like tomorrow will be different than yesterday, but it won't be global COIN. COIN/Stability operations will be just a small part of what we do (as it always has been). And the beauty of COIN from one perspective is it really doesn't matter if the country we're supporting loses, it is their fight. This means we don't do the fight for them, because we then make our fight to lose, and we will lose it if come across as an occupying power. It sure as hell matters if our GPF can't win a war.
""So (the thinking goes) we must adapt our instruments of power so as to meet this new reality;""
I have yet to see a new reality? What are we doing different now that is significantly different than what we have been doing since the end of WWII?
<b>Bill C.:</b>
If that is indeed the thinking -- and it probably is -- then it's fallacious. There a few to no "unstoppable forces," "globalization " has been ongoing for over 5,000 years so anyone who is surprised by or has trouble coping with it has major problems. "The end of history" didn't merit comment when published and it looks even more foolish today.
You are correct in one thing:<blockquote>"...(intervention, early and/or late) must become the bread and butter of DoD, DoS, etc., for the early 21st Century."</blockquote>It is indeed -- there's more to that than you realize. It does keep budgets nicely high. Bread indeed...<blockquote>...(Job being considered to be too big for USSF alone?)"</blockquote>Hardly -- and I did say State and US Aid need to be involved as does the CIA. THe issue for the rest of DoD is that the Green Beanie wearers cannot be allowed to get too much money or clout. Stupid parochialism but there you are...
Intervention requiring the commitment of the GPF should be avoided -- but then, the GPF would wither away, un- or under- funded. That's a mechanical problem that can be fixed by simply changing the way we do the budget.
There are rare occasions when intervention using the GPF is warranted and there are no other decent options.
If you can think of just one that's occurred since World War II, could you tell me where and when it was?
In my role as the devil's advocate:
The thinking is, I believe, that the requirement to intervene re: insurgencies et al. is not a matter that is within our control (in that they are caused by "unstoppable forces" such as "globalization," "the end of history," etc.).
Thus, these factors, which are beyond our control, will require our intervention (preemptively if possible but during-event if necessary) -- in a very specific manner -- whether we would like to interevene or not.
And, accordingly, we really do not have the option of "opting out" of these jobs (consequences of other action, non-action or "opportunity lost" being considered to be more-dire and/or more-costly than if intervention had been undertaken post-haste.)
Thus, this (intervention, early and/or late) must become the bread and butter of DoD, DoS, etc., for the early 21st Century. (Job being considered to be too big for USSF alone?)
So (the thinking goes) we must adapt our instruments of power so as to meet this new reality; much as the United States has had to modify and adapt its instruments of power to meet the challenges, requirements and realities of past centuries.
<b>Bill M.</b> accurately states two important points that bear repetition. First:<blockquote>"the article claims SFA/BPC isn't part of our DNA? This isn't true, <b>it isn't part of the normal conventional combat arms unit's DNA, nor should it be</b>. DOD and the State Department have been doing this for years. However, we don't do it effectively due to a confluence of various policies, laws and regulations that prohibit the development and execution of a holistic SFA plan that would be cost effective and actually result in a return on our investment. The services can't fix this, but Congress can, so I agree the next SECDEF and SECSTATE will again have to take this message to Congress and "continue" to push for change."(emphasis added /kw)</blockquote>The very flawed idea of 'Advisers' to do SFA other than SF should be buried before someone else gets hurt unnecessarily. Bill also wrote:<blockquote>"It is hubris to assume other nation's interests are aligned with ours, and that their security forces will "ensure" the security of the U.S(Pakistan as a case in point)...<b>We don't need to convert large conventional units into trainers</b>, we need to select trainers from their ranks and properly train them and ensure they're fully supported when deployed."(emphasis added / kw)</blockquote>I don't like to play parrot but those are important points and to ignore them -- as we have for the last 35 years -- is to invite another fiasco. I use that term advisedly (pun intended). John Nagl wrote:<blockquote>"The asymmetric attacks of Sept. 11, followed in short order by virulent insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan..."</blockquote>True as far as it goes. The asymmetry of the attacks was due to the lack of HumInt and imagination on the part of Capital area urban and suburbanites; the insurgencies we arguably brought upon ourselves by a lack of strategic thought, marginally trained Troops for post attack missions and political bungling.
He further wrote:<blockquote>"The next secretary of defense will have to fight hard to institutionalize advising foreign forces and ensure that the many lessons learned about countering insurgencies and terrorists are not once again forgotten."</blockquote>Hopefully, the next SecDef will not listen to that dangerous statement. I'm not at all sure we've learned that much in the last ten years about countering insurgencies or terrorists. We learned a good deal more some years ago and deliberately buried it -- or tried to do so. Advising foreign forces is institutionalized -- in USSF -- and the element with the required skills and knowledges is just being misused. That's easily rectified and trying to use the GPF as surrogates is misguided at best.
Let's learn some new lessons from the fortunately minor fiascos we made of Afghanistan and Iraq.
What if we learned that the time to 'intervene' is <i><u>before</u></i> the Nation we wish to assist reaches critical mass. That can be done with better HumInt, better Diplomacy and early low key intervention by USSF and State / US Aid efforts. That way we avoid trying to make 'Advisers' out of persons not tempermentally (the Personnel system will insure that..) or culturally (Ditto plus the vagaries of what pops up. Not to mention Viet Namese speakers assigned to advise Montagnards or Pashto speakers sent to Iraq...) equipped for the job or to use the GPF for missions for which it is quite ill suited and will <u>never</u> perform well if it is properly trained for its principal missions...
We used to intervene a lot -- we also used to ride to work on horses...
It seems John is setting himself up for effective counter arguments when he argues that building partner capacity (BPC) and security force assistance (SFA) is affordable and effective. Based on what?
First, as the article implied, if we don't have the means/strategy to effectively challenge irregular and assymetric challenges, then who the heck are we to advise others on how to do it? A non-bias assessment of historical examples, may indicate that our BPC assistance has more often then not made the situation worse. For one non-CENTCOM example, Columbia started making "some" progress when they rejected our advise and started treating their security problems like a war.
Second, the article claims SFA/BPC isn't part of our DNA? This isn't true, it isn't part of the normal conventional combat arms unit's DNA, nor should it be. DOD and the State Department have been doing this for years. However, we don't do it effectively due to a confluence of various policies, laws and regulations that prohibit the development and execution of a holistic SFA plan that would be cost effective and actually result in a return on our investment. The services can't fix this, but Congress can, so I agree the next SECDEF and SECSTATE will again have to take this message to Congress and "continue" to push for change.
Third, becoming an effective trainer/advisor requires unique education, training and personality traits. We don't need mass numbers of advisors, we need effective advisors. Mass production of security forces in Iraq and Afghanistan by soldiers not prepared to execute this mission hasn't panned out well, and arguably was a waste of billions of dollars.
SECDEF and John stated,
"" Building our allies' capacity to fight is an effective, affordable but often overlooked way to ensure the future security of the United States.""
Agreed to a point (especially if we could fix the laws and policies that govern our efforts), but this argument also has many weaknesses. It is hubris to assume other nation's interests are aligned with ours, and that their security forces will "ensure" the security of the U.S(Pakistan as a case in point). There are few cases that I am aware of outside of some select small security forces the U.S. trained with Special Forces, Dept of Justice, State Department Contractors and CIA that have contributed to our national security. We don't need to convert large conventional units into trainers, we need to select trainers from their ranks and properly train them and ensure they're fully supported when deployed.
SFA/BPC is very important, but it is one of many issues that need to be addressed. I also think we need to move past the false belief that nations will act in our interests, and ensure we have the right capabilities based on current and projected threats to act unilaterally when they won't.
Nothing particularly insightful concerning future threats. UAV's, cyber warfare and missile defense systems seem to be a chief concern already. Heavy use of the cumbersome "asymmetric" term make this a very difficult to read one page article. Additionally, I'm confused how missiles and cyber warfare are "asymmetric" when they are tools in our arsenal as well.