Killed
Osama bin Laden, Saudi. Al-Qaida founder. Killed by U.S. forces in a raid on a compound in the Pakistani city of Abbottabad on May 2, 2011.
Abu Laith al-Libi, Libyan. Al-Qaida operative. Killed in a U.S. missile strike in northwest Pakistan on January 29, 2008.
Omar al-Farouq, Kuwaiti. Al-Qaida operations chief for Southeast Asia. Killed by British troops in Basra, Iraq on September 25, 2006 after he escaped from a maximum security prison in Afghanistan in 2005.
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, Jordanian. Al-Qaida in Iraq leader. Killed in a U.S. air strike north of Baghdad on June 7, 2006.
Captured
Ramzi bin al-Shibh, Yemeni. 9/11 planner. Captured in Pakistan on September 11, 2002. Held at U.S. prison at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
Abu Faraj al-Libbi, Libyan. Senior al-Qaida operative. Captured near the northwestern Pakistani city of Mardan on May 4, 2005. Suspected of involvement in assassination attempts on Pakistan's then-military president General Pervez Musharraf. Held at U.S. prison at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Kuwaiti. Suspected 9/11 mastermind. Captured by Pakistani and U.S. operatives in the Pakistani city of Rawalpindi on March 1, 2003. Held at U.S. prison at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, Saudi. Al-Qaida operations chief in the Gulf region. Captured in the United Arab Emirates in October 2002. Suspected of planning the October 12, 2000 bombing of the USS Cole that killed 17 U.S. sailors off the coast of Yemen. Held at U.S. prison at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
Abu Zubaydah, Palestinian. One of Osama bin Laden's top lieutenants. Captured in Pakistan on March 28, 2002. Held at U.S. prison at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
At Large
Ayman al-Zawahiri, Egyptian. Age - 59. Bin Laden's deputy. Suspected of playing a major role in the September 11th, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States. Went into hiding with bin Laden when U.S.-led forces invaded Afghanistan weeks later, ousting the country's Taliban militant rulers, who had sheltered the terror network. Survived a U.S. air strike that targeted him in a Pakistani tribal region in January 2006 and remains at large. FBI has a $25 million reward for information leading to his arrest or conviction.
Abdullah Ahmed Abdullah, Egyptian. Age - late 40s. Wanted by the FBI for the 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. U.S. investigators say he fled Nairobi, Kenya in August 1998 and went to Karachi, Pakistan. FBI has offered a $5 million reward for information leading to his arrest or conviction.
Saif al-Adel, Egyptian. Age about 50. Suspected high-ranking al-Qaida member wanted by the FBI in connection with 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. FBI has offered a $5 million reward for information leading to his arrest or conviction.
Anwar al-Awlaki, US/Yemeni citizen. 40 years old. Radical Islamic preacher. Suspected leader of al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula. Accused of inspiring a series of attacks on the United States in recent years. Identified by the U.S. Treasury Department as a "Specially Designated National" whose U.S. assets are blocked. Not on the FBI's most wanted terrorist list.
Adam Yahiye Gadahn. American convert to Islam. Age 32. Known as al-Qaida's "American spokesman." Charged in a U.S. court with treason and providing material support to al-Qaida. FBI has offered a $1 million reward for information leading to his arrest.
Sulaiman Abu Ghaith, Kuwaiti. Al-Qaida spokesman and radical preacher. Stripped of Kuwaiti citizenship in 2001 for alleged involvement in 9/11. Fled to Iran, where the government said it detained him in 2003. Kuwaiti media said Iran allowed him to leave the country in 2010.
Ali Saed Bin Ali El-Hoorie, Saudi. Age 45. Suspected member of Saudi Hizballah terrorist group. Charged in a U.S. court with involvement in the June 25, 1996 bombing of the Khobar Towers military housing complex in Saudi Arabia that killed 19 U.S. personnel.
Anas al-Liby (also known as Nazih Abdul-Hamed al-Raghie), Libyan. Age late 40s. Charged in a U.S. court with involvement in the 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. FBI has offered a $5 million reward for information leading to his arrest or conviction.
Fazul Abdullah Mohammed, Comoros Islands national. Age late 30s. Al-Qaida leader in East Africa suspected of links to Somali Islamists. Wanted by the FBI in connection with the 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. FBI has offered a $5 million reward for information leading to his arrest or conviction.
Fahd Mohammed Ahmed al-Quso, Yemeni. Age 36. Charged in a U.S. court with involvement in the October 12, 2000, bombing of the USS Cole that killed 17 U.S. sailors off the coast of Yemen. FBI has offered a $5 million reward for information leading to his arrest or conviction.
Comments
Those who feel threatened by such an unwanted change and who, otherwise, have no wish to see their state and society -- via transformation and incorporation -- be brought under even greater control of the United States and its allies.
No, retard, IT CAN'T BE DONE.
Shariah law forbids proselytizing the poor and the ignorant. Freedom of speech legalizes proselytizing the poor and the ignorant.
Therefore freedom of speech and Islam are incompatible.
This is why COIN and the Bush Doctrine could never work in MENA.
In majority muslim nations when people are DEMOCRATICALLY empowered to vote, they vote for shariah.
Seems kinda obvious, right?
One way to look at causation and decapitation of leaders within this context:
a. The ambition of the most powerful nation in the world, the United States, is the most important thing to look to when considering "causation."
b. The United States has, for a very long time, wished to transform the less-integrated world in such a way as that might be better integrated into our system.
c. United States instruments of power are frequently directed toward this end.
d. Various elements in the less-integrated world have no wish to see their state and society become changed and incorporated in this manner.
e. When threatened, these more-conservative elements react; sometimes by becoming radicalized and by moving aggressively in the exact opposite direction than that which the United States desires.
f. Its SOP and has been for a long time.
g. Thus, the conflict paradigm internationally -- and also within these less-integrated states and societies -- caused by the United States and its ambition. This conflict being between:
(1) Those who would welcome and embrace such change as the United States offers, supports and works actively to try to bring about and
(2) Those who feel threatened by such an unwanted change and who, otherwise, have no wish to see their state and society -- via transformation and incorporation -- be brought under even greater control of the United States and its allies.
h. Decapitation of leaders in the context? Herein, I would agree with COL Jones. As long as the mission continues to exist [see "d" above], other leaders can be expected to fill the void left by those that we eliminate.
i. Conclusion: We may need to come to better understand "causation" within the context suggested above.
Chasing leadership, while important and measureable, is always an iffy thing in terms of how effective it actually is.
Consider how many senior leaders have retired out of the US Military and an entire administration change over the same period. So long as the organization exists members will step up to lead, so long as the mission exists individuals will join up to become members. Scraping the tip of the iceberg is a slow way to make it disappear or even change its shape or course very much.
Best to keep these operations in context. They are important and we have developed a tremendous capacity and capability for them as well. They provide the immediate feedback and countable metrics that people love; but they are the long, slow back road to actually getting at causation; and when we are too ham-fisted in our pursuit of these guys we often make the underlying problems worse.
For example, bin Laden's greatest beef has always been with the Saudi Royal family, and how they have drifted from their role as expected of them by the Saudi people. This is what has kept a steady stream of Saudi insurgents flowing to fight with AQ directly or to travel to camps supported by AQ in places like Yemen and Somalia to prepare for operations back home. The Saudi Royals have been scrambling lately in response to growing pressure from the populace to challenge their authority.
Has this operation to take down Saudi enemy number one enabled the Saudis to relax and slow down on needed reforms, or has it allowed them to move more aggressively on reforms as they no longer look like they are responding to bin Laden's pressure? More importantly, what is the US diplomatic follow-up to nailing bin Laden in engaging with the Saudis? Are we still sitting around giving each other high fives for kicking this door open, or are we rushing through to exploit the opportunity it presents in government to government engagement in Riyadh, Kabul, Islamabad and other key capitals??
Breach is great. Exploitation is essential.
You do realize you are probably leaving the most important guy on this list not named Osama or Ayman--Mustafa Setmariam Nasar a.k.a. Abu Musab al-Suri. That guy was the definitive tactician, laid out the fundamentals for 4GW+, and was the man behind the Madrid bombings. He deserves to be prominently featured on the list and is supposedly in a Syrian prison somewhere.