by Dan Green
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Commander Gen. David H. Petraeus often talks about getting the "inputs" right in Afghanistan, which means having the right mix of military forces, civilian assets and Afghan government participation to conduct a population-centric counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign. In many respects, the process of getting the inputs right only really began in 2009, but with the beginning of the U.S. drawdown later this year, it is useful to investigate whether we have the inputs right as well as whether the "outputs" are correct. The following 10 problems with the Afghan campaign reflect the challenges of resourcing the conflict correctly but also have to do with implementation strategy in general, as well as how civilian interagency and Afghan partners are doing in support of the COIN strategy. These observations are gleaned from my service in Afghanistan with the State Department in 2005-2006 when I worked as the political officer at the Tarin Kowt Provincial Reconstruction Team, military service with the Navy in 2009-2010 where I worked as the liaison officer between ISAF Joint Command and the U.S. Embassy's Office of Interagency Provincial Affairs, as well as a trip last fall for the U.S. government where I participated in an independent study of the conflict. I also served with the Navy in Fallujah, Iraq, in 2007, which provided a useful contrasting experience.
Much more over at AFJ
Comments
No matter how much better "we" could do it, isn't the question really getting them to do it? If it takes that much of a civilian surge to build their government, will they actually be able to govern once the civilians leave? One year assignment, ten year assignments, will it really matter unless we plan to stay there in perpetuity if they aren't the ones doing it? Furthermore, who is it that is going to be expected to give up even more of their life to help these people? Isn't one year enough of a prison sentence?
And probably the best phrase ever to grace AFJ: "to fat, frail, and/or flaky..."
Proving yet again that 'A' does in fact lead to 'B.'<blockquote>"are fraught with continuity problems because of frequent personnel rotations, and are hampered by friction, miscommunication, lack of teamwork and poor planning."</blockquote>We're not going to get better until we fix personnel and training...
However, we could <i>do</i> better with some strategic planning that recognizes that the US system of one year tours is inimical to competent and effective combat operations that last longer then six months or so.
Think about it...
I found the following section particularly apt (particularly paragraph 2):
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U.S. civil-military efforts in Kabul are still poorly coordinated and integrated even with all of these changes. They have a bias toward the central government versus the field, are fraught with continuity problems because of frequent personnel rotations, and are hampered by friction, miscommunication, lack of teamwork and poor planning.
In many respects, when it comes to the collective good governance and development efforts of the U.S. and the international community, the U.N. has the mandate but not the manpower; State has the responsibility but not the resources; and the military has the manpower but not the mission.
While much has been done to improve U.S. and coalition state-building efforts, a new approach is needed that is better resourced, fully integrates civilian and military efforts, connects the field to the capital, and is sustainable for the long term, especially as districts and provinces transition to civilian control.
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