Recently, our authors began to shift from problem definition to reframing problem solving. Over the last year, we published some remarkable works effectively describing Iraq, Afghanistan, Mexico, Libya, and others. Simultaneously, we published several series on design and wicked problems.
The challenge we are posing is can someone produce a concise document applying design to an existing problem? If we cannot find practical application or wisdom, then the process becomes a moot effort. Below is my white board attempt to provide an example and discussion for others to follow. This blog post is similar to many of the discussions our authors and readers have daily in the classroom and nightly at the pub or dinner with colleagues. Simply put, I am merely merging the sum of our published thought and discussions.
Three years ago, I was challenged to determine if my experiences in big wars and counterinsurgency could be applied to the macro level. On the tactical level, I found that I simply relearned the lessons of those that had come before me, the countless art of war and warfare. However, when I consider how my thinking had changed, I feel that perhaps there are some lessons that can be applied for us all.
In combat, I finally learned the limits of my own control. This understanding freed me to concentrate focusing on changing the things that I could control. I look at framing problem solving in international relations in a similar manner. It's kind of like the Serenity Prayer for Grand Strategy. So, as a practical exercise, below is an example of how I would use Design, Wicked Problems, and Military Decision Making Process using the example of Mexico.
1. Define what we cannot control. We cannot "fix" Mexico. They are a sovereign nation-state, and they must choose to work on their internal issues. Moreover, our "solution" to their problems may not be a proper fit despite our best intentions. Our intervention efforts in Central and South America over the past sixty years (or more) have had mixed results.
2. Define the problem as it is not as we wish to see it. Are we really in a war on poverty, drugs, education, terrorism, and governance? Are we really at war? Labels are often limiting, but there needs to be some common framework to understanding. Typically, that can be driven by good communication and active listening. We must learn to transcend how "I" see the problem and work towards how the collective group sees the problem accounting for all stakeholders.
3. Define our relationship. How does the US and Mexico see each other? This perception requires a degree of self-introspection and humility. Are we a brother attempting to help our sibling overcome addiction or work through difficult financial times? Are we a parent disciplining a spoiled child? Are we a spouse in a broken marriage? How we see ourselves defines our national interest. If we see ourselves as the parent, then we're self-imposing a conceptual block.
As Martin Luther King wrote while sitting in the Birmingham Jail,
"Moreover, I am cognizant of the interrelatedness of all communities and states. I cannot sit idly by in Atlanta and not be concerned about what happens in Birmingham. Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere. We are caught in an inescapable network of mutuality, tied in a single garment of destiny. Whatever affects one directly, affects all indirectly. Never again can we afford to live with the narrow, provincial "outside agitator" idea. Anyone who lives inside the United States can never be considered an outsider anywhere within its bounds...In any nonviolent campaign there are four basic steps: collection of the facts to determine whether injustices exist; negotiation; self-purification; and direct action."
4. Describe what we are currently doing and how we can adjust these things.
- Impact of NAFTA
- Border Security
- FID efforts in Mexico
- Counter-Drug efforts in Mexico
- Counter-Drug efforts in the United States
- Anti-Gang efforts in the United States
5. Discuss the cost benefits of future intervention efforts and internal reforms
- Comprehensive immigration reform
- Dream Act
- Expanded Counter-Drug efforts
- Expanded FID efforts to better strengthen Mexico's Army and Police internal security forces
- State Department "better" governance efforts (Plan Colombia)- to include judicial and economic issues
- Legalizing drugs in the continental United States (demand side interdiction)
- Comprehensive Prison Reform in the United States
- Treasury Department financial interdiction to narco banking
- Promoting and expanding free press in Mexico through Twitter, Facebook, and new media
6. Describe Area of Influence- Central and South America
- Illegal immigration from Guatemala
- Drug Trafficking from Colombia
7. Ask the hard questions
-What are the key factors driving the problem?
-What is the causality?
-And, if the analysis is from a U.S. perspective, to what degree and in what ways is the problem a problem for the United States?
-what ways do those in power benefit by the status quo?
8. Rethinking the Assumptions
-What are the desired outcomes?
-Is the policy driving the process or is the effort outcome based?
-Are our efforts helping or hurting?
9. Timing of Implementation
- Simultaneous, Sequential, or Cumulative
-Prepare to accept that some items are not decision points; Rather, they are processes that change and morph over time.
Special thanks to those that contributed to the proofreading of this post, and I would like to specifically highlight Dr. Nancy Robert's methodology for teaching any class on problem solving,
A. Creativity
B. Problem Framing
C. Systems thinking
D. Entrepreneurship and Innovation
E. Collaboration in Networks
Now, let the discussion and writing continue...
Comments
Chris Paparone,
Appreciate your response, and I would definitely advocate a case study on Vietnam. It is still very much relevant, yet long enough ago that we can be brutally honest about it. Something we can't do with Afghanistan, and the fact that we can't be honest about Afghanistan due to group think in my view calls into question the value of design in our system. I'm not questioning the value of design to facilitate understanding and challenge the can do attitude, but rather the ability to get key decision makers to shed their biases and actually use the insights that design facilitated to make wiser decisions.
As a favor I request that you and perhaps the Vietnam history expert challenge my post on this blog under "Afghanistan - the sun is raising" propaganda piece. It isn't a popular view, but if it is wrong I would like to see the facts that refute the argument. This is about understanding, and we derived the wrong lessons from Vietnam, then we will continue to make poor decisions based on false truths.
"And the history does not use Vietnam in the core as well..."
I meant "And ILE HISTORY DEPARTMENT does not use Vietnam in the core as well..."
[For the record, I believe we have a world class military history department in Army ILE (led by a very accomplished Vietnam War historian who also served as a MACV adviser during the war. I do not think his department decided on Guadalcanal and Suez as operations case studies and and I believe that dept would support a Vietnam case study if that were requested.]
Bill M
I am a huge fan of studying the Vietnam War in detail. Unfortunately, we choose Guadalcanal 1942 and the Suez Crisis 1956 as cases in the core ILE (in joint /coalition ops). And the history does not use Vietnam in the core as well (it goes through WW I). The year preceding Tet '68 would be infinitely more educational and humbling.
What we can learn from Vietnam (1940s, 1950s, 1960s, 1970s) is about the nature of complexity and how paradigms work (and why we get hung up on them and blinded by them). Remember the post-Vietnam "solution" -- AirLand battle? Many thought the was the be all end all after Desert Storm "victory"...unfortunately that war did not end and we are still "in it" 20 years later.
What complexity theory should do for us is humble us. It should give us some humility to replace the hubris that accompanies the idea of "victory" when fighting limited wars and attempting to occupy (perhaps "occupation operations" would have been a more fitting title of FM 3-24). It should also help to give better advice to political leaders about the feasibility of "victory" in limited wars.
What I hope the doubting Thomas's are not thinking is that design is a replacement science for winning wars. I would be careful in seeing design philosophy as a much more cautious, thoughtful approach to the "can do-ness" that may be part of the issue with our military institutions.
There are limits to what we can do...perhaps a more open, dialogical practice would reveal our own ethnocentricity (military ethnocentricity that is). Sometimes I wonder if one of our issues is that we have a large, extremely expensive solution looking for a problem (i.e. the "tyranny of means" as John Lewis Gaddis called it in his book, We Now Know: Rethinking the Cold War).
Bill-
Planners and students have applied Design to Afghanistan and many have concluded that using Lines of Effort marked by our doctrine (governance, security, development), assuming broad generalizations about the Afghan people and what will defeat the insurgency, and attempting top-down, centralized change from Kabul might not be the way to go.
Unfortunately THAT part of Design isn't the hard part IMO- turning the insights gained into structural change, action and feedback mechanisms is the hard part- and I'd argue our doctrine doesn't address that nor does our insitution believe it is even necessary (questioning our paradigms and structural change).
Chris Paparone,
You could probably put some of us doubting Thomas's more at ease if you took a historical conflict (Vietnam for example), and although artificial to look at it in hindsight, try to apply design based on what was known at the time in let's say 1962. How would it have benefited decision makers? How would design have reframed the problem at that time? I think if we are honest with ourselves, a lot of smart people in the USG (and beyond) understood the complexity of Vietnam, and tried to explain it to policy makers, but the reality is if their input doesn't nest with the political agenda at the time, then it will be ignored. Do you think Bush would have abandoned his goal of invading Iraq, if design pointed out some potential challenges with that option? Complexity isn't new. Design as a concept may or may not be new (I suspect it isn't). We have been in Afghanistan for a decade, I trust your students have applied design to this problem, what insights did they gain? Show us some results, not just promises of a better way.
-What are the key factors driving the problem?
-What is the causality?
Hmmmm...the problem may be the kind of questions we ask.
These questions assume linear causality. In complex (wicked) situations, root cause is impossible to determine. Many things interact to the point you have complexity and indeterminability.
This is where complexity science can help us reframe (note I did not say "solve") and appreciate (note I did not say "estmate").
Collaboration and multidisplinarian approaches are more interesting than unitary ones; however, this may only provide political debate (not "scientific" debate). And maybe that's the answer -- somehow we debate, gain consensus and do something (regardless if the situation is "better" than it was before). (Of course "better" is a political-subjective ideal not an objective reality.)
Also, mutlidisciplinary really means that you have more solutions looking for problems (rather than one solution defining the problem). This is also more interesting.
[i]To close, it is my observation that humanity as whole blends a variety of methodologies and belief systems in order to accomplish things and enjoy experiences every single day. In short, I completely reject the binary notion of some academics that life consists solely of either a liberal arts approach or science & engineering approach.[/i]
Very good to hear! Having spent (perhaps too much) time around academics, it is occasionally disheartening to hear them talk about multidisciplinary studies in terms of "we'll get a different sort of engineer and make it multidisciplinary."
I've seen the sort of collaboration you talk about on Federal projects to be sure, and those teams can turn out some really great projects and results. It's a shame that the broad composition of those teams isn't always understood or appreciated...
And now we'll let Mike's discussion return to the proper topic....;-)
<i>When talking about multidisciplinary groups, it's also vital to make sure that the group really IS multidisciplinary. I've seen cases in academia where multidisciplinary means adding a chemical engineer to a mechanical engineering project, or bringing in someone from business marketing. It seems rare (at least from where I'm sitting) that actual liberal arts folks are brought into the picture (aside from the token sociologist or political scientist...</i>
I often contrast a couple of decades spent in science & engineering land with a lifetime spent in and around the military. Out in science & engineering land the multidisciplinary approach is a way of life. Failure to follow that approach is penalized both legally and financially.
With respect to the employment of liberal arts degree holders in science & engineering land (public and private) US regulatory frameworks such as the National Historic Preservation Act, Clean Air Act, Safe Water Drinking Act, and Endangered Species Act mandate that Anthropologists, Architects, Biologists, Chemists, Geographers, Historians, and Lawyers are just as equally involved in projects as are Engineers and Physicists. The demands of Capitalism drives projects to incorporate financial accountability and technical innovation. This means Accountants, Business, and Marketing people have equal voices regarding the feasibility and status of projects. All of these folks need a support network which is staffed by many liberal arts trained folks.
http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/
The US Military is not homogenous, and IMO the Navy has a better understanding of the multidisciplinary approach than does the Army. Across all of the services, however, it is my experience that civil service employees have more completely institutionalized the multidisciplinary approach than have the average soldier/sailor/marine/airman/coastguardman...although GWOT has greatly helped things along, it would probably be advantageous to allocate more internships and more TWI-training with industry slots/rotations as another way to transfer the multidisciplinary approach into the military proper. Even with increased active effort this transfer will take time however, and political (and in some cases institutional) will power does not presently appear to be something that can counted on. Perhaps the generational turnover will be enough to get it done. We will see.
To close, it is my observation that humanity as whole blends a variety of methodologies and belief systems in order to accomplish things and enjoy experiences every single day. In short, I completely reject the binary notion of some academics that life consists solely of either a liberal arts approach or science & engineering approach.
When talking about multidisciplinary groups, it's also vital to make sure that the group really IS multidisciplinary. I've seen cases in academia where multidisciplinary means adding a chemical engineer to a mechanical engineering project, or bringing in someone from business marketing. It seems rare (at least from where I'm sitting) that actual liberal arts folks are brought into the picture (aside from the token sociologist or political scientist...and I would contend that they don't look at things through the same sort of lens used by a historian or area studies type). Someone looking at market segmentation, for example, might not look at HOW those groups came to be where they are simply because he or she was never trained to think of things in that way. Looking back over the long term is an important skill, and not all disciplines are trained to do this (and some, in fact, are discouraged from doing so).
Just my $.02.
Hey Steve,
<i>Like it or not, we have "history" along that border...a history with multiple narratives, points of view, and filters.</i>
Well stated...the Spaniards started colonizing the Indians in Mexico around 1519, and it wasn't until the the Indian Nonintercourse Act (of 1790, 1793, 1796, 1799, 1802, and 1834), the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848, and the Gadsden Purchase in 1854, that there was some legal clarity regarding the US-Mexico border.
It's important to think about market segmentation/demographics when discussing agreement frameworks, legal and otherwise (google 'absolut map of the united states and mexico' for some other demographic viewpoints)
The border is very much a vibrant moving picture that continually changes.
<i>I think it's something of an Americanism to try to approach a problem from a mechanical (or scientific) POV without grasping that the events we're looking at happened or were created within a context and not as a self-contained experiment.</i>
;) True.
Multidisciplinary teams/workgroups are a way to try and balance viewpoints and find a pathway to the truth....the digital salon that is SWJ is an example of this process at it's finest.
Steve
Steve,
Your answer to Mike touches on some of the things I mentioned. Like it or not, we have "history" along that border...a history with multiple narratives, points of view, and filters. I think it's something of an Americanism to try to approach a problem from a mechanical (or scientific) POV without grasping that the events we're looking at happened or were created within a context and not as a self-contained experiment. With Mexico you have to look at their history with us, with Texas (which isn't always seen in the same light), and their own internal history and narrative. Initiatives that to us seem benign and helpful might play out through their lens as yet another Anglo attempt to govern them from a distance, steal their land, or dictate to them. And that may play back to us as just another example of Mexican pig-headedness (or worse, depending on the climate in decision-making circles). We may also not grasp their concept of time or ways of making decisions, which do vary from ours (and that's a totally neutral statement - neither way is "better" or "worse", they're just different).
I think sometimes we forget that we really can't see the future (no matter how hard we squint), but we are capable of seeing at least a portion of the past. It's foolish of us to ignore that view.
Mike, Michael, Bill, Steve, Slapout9,
A way:
1. Given
2. Find
3. Solution
Given -
Facts bearing upon the problem
1. Army Style: METT-TC, ASCOPE, PMESII, DIME, etc.
2. Biology Style: Ecosystem Maps
3. Business Style: Stakeholder Maps, VRINE, PESTEL, etc.
4. Diplomacy Style: Broad Contact Base, etc.
5. Engineering Style: Site Conditions, Design Criteria, etc.
Find -
Phrasing the question to be answered so that it balances realism and idealism...cost, benefits, and schedule should be addressed.
Solution -
1. Army Style: TLP, MDMP, etc.
2. Business Style: Business Model, Business Plan, Strategy Diamond, Five Forces Model, Scenario Planning, Industry Life Cycle Strategies, Balanced Scorecard, etc.
3. Engineering Style: Work Breakdown Structure, Statement of Work, Cost Estimate, Project Schedule, Engineering Design (Architectural, Civil, Electrical, Environmental, Mechanical, etc - each discipline has a 'layer' of calculation techniques, drawings, models, etc.)
4. Philosophy Style: Problem Situation->Tentative Theories-> Error Elimination->back to Problem Situation
MikeF,
An analysis of Mexico requires more than a security or American POV to describe the myriad forces at work there (Statics and Dynamics approach) or the demography of the inhabitants (Edge Effect from Biology or a Marketing Analysis). Think about how the porous and transient 'border' affected the social, political, economic, security, and historical geography of Baqubah, Muqtadiyah, Khalis, and Khanaqin; or of how it impacted Tehran and Baghdad's effects upon Diyala.
Learning the language, studying the culture, and spending some time living there is a way to catch some valuable insights that would be missed by analysts/operators who have not taken that approach.
The Ken White question, probably covers everything we have discussed here plus... ;)
Steve
Good comments all. As stated above, this was a white board exercise. I'd like to touch on two points Bill M made that seem particularly relevant.
Bill M caught two important corrections. First, the use of FID. This term can mean anything to anyone just like SFA. I should have clarified the entire range from educating officers at US schools, training in rear areas, partnering/advising on patrols, and leading direct action raids.
Also, defining our national interests. I've read many of the National Security Strategies, and I'm starting to consider that perhaps the intentional goal setting (i.e. spread democracy and capitalism) is too lofty and broad. In some ways, perhaps the NSS is more of hope than a method. It's like the Lines of Operation in Iraq and Afghanistan- you need to build governance, economics, and security. Ok, I got that, but what do you want me to do???
Slap's point about our physical boundaries is another important consideration.
Please continue to discuss. I imagine in the end it should be a proper 12 step program to recovery :). As a placeholder, the final 12th step will be to ask "what would Ken White do?"
Thanks,
Mike
I think it's important to consider the historical in point 3. When defining the relationship it's vital to ask "how have we seen each other before." All too often the U.S. seems to make decisions and plans based on the present without looking at the past. All relationships are based on a shared reality, and we need to take both sides of that reality into account before we can see the "real" picture. Many of our neighbors to the south don't trust us (in some cases for valid reasons, in other cases because they 'need' a 'bad' U.S. just justify their own political decisions), and our own vision of those nations to the south is often blurred or flawed for any number of reasons. If we don't stop to grasp that historical reality, any decisions reached or frameworks created will be flawed at best and unworkable at worst.
Mike,
I agree with your comment on the relevance of design, and I think most people do it intuatively anyway. Of course for those of us in the Army, we know that we apparently need a FM so we can define the correct way of doing intuative acts :-). Design is the antithesis to what military planning needs to be, and that is cutting through the complexity to arrive a clear mission/intent. Complexity is always there, it is not a new condition that we recently identified. Complexity can paralyze, so while we always have recognize it, in the end we have a mission to do, and the clarity of the mission is what allows us to function despite the complexity. The mission gives us focus, embraces complexity does not. There is a need for recognizing the impact of complexity and wicked problems at various levels, so we don't blindly fight a plan that is no longer working, but we can overdue this if we divert from getting the job done to discussing the merits and impacts of various philosphers on our thinking.
Getting to your example, I think you missed the key question, which is what problem does the situation in Mexico present to our national interests? Then put that in the overall context you identified and try to get a holistic understanding of it, before we solve it. I also would avoid terms like FID to describe what we're doing. FID is too broad, instead focus on what we're doing (providing training and weapons to X, providing intell support on X to Y, etc.), so we can identify what is and what isn't being done at this point.