It is Friday. You're almost done with your boss's checklist. You can almost leave work for the weekend, one filled with adventures to Home Depot and Bed, Bath, and Beyond to satisfy your wife's desires. While you are there in one of our magical shopping centers, imagine that you observe four men conduct a raid to rob the store. In this case, the police are in the parking lot, but they refuse to intervene.
Do you still feel secure?
I imagine that over the next year, many folks will scramble to separate themselves from Iraq and Afghanistan regardless of the various pitch and chord they recorded over the last couple of years composing enlightened remedies of a better war. I heart their woes and empathize with their attempts to overcome human nature, an endeavor that intense thought and new ideas can transcend the natural order of things.
Unfortunately, there is no combination or bumper sticker approach that can overcome this specific law of human nature. In the fringe areas of modernity, perhaps it is time to reconsider more a Machiavellian or Hobbesian approach to those newly introduced to the democratic, capitalist approach found in our National Security Strategy.
Andrew Exum comes to mind. In his 2009 Op-Ed "On CT vs COIN," he proclaimed, "the distinction between COIN and CT, however, is poorly understood. For one, there is no hard and fast dichotomy between the two." During the same time period, while Andrew was conducting anonymous raids, I was having lunch with Iraqis near Abu Gharaib to ask Iraqis what they thought about life, the war, and their future.
Carl Prine, Crispin Burke, and I take issue with Exum's thoughts in "Evolving the COIN Field Manual: A Case for Reform." See point five.
"The dichotomy between "counter-terrorism" and "counter-insurgency" is a false distinction designed to force political choices. Too many scholars now have their reputations and careers staked on the efficacy and durability or failure of FM 3-24 and how it relates to the competing narratives about its use on the battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan. While we embrace these debates because they are intellectually vital for a nation at war, ultimately we must move on and find new means of analyzing irregular conflicts America is likely to face. "COIN" is not the "graduate school of war" because all forms of modern war-making are complex and are guided by intellectual responses to complicated events and ideas."
Bing West summarized this folly in the simplest form, "the new religion of benevolent counterinsurgency has been defined by the best writers. Especially in Big Army, attracting attention and prominence is helped enormously by an advanced degree and by the publication of theoretical papers on macro topics at the high level of warfare."
For an historical accord, the Romans phrased it "Facta non Verba," Deeds not Words.
Many moons ago, in the siege of Masada, deeds triumphed words. The Roman Empire forced a strategy of pacification to the outliers of its provinces, those who rejected control of the then supposed modernity. To quell the rebellion, Lucius Flavius Silva, governing the outlier states, dispatched thousands of the Legion to surround the mountaintop stronghold of Masada.
Deeds mean things.
For the Romans, they showed that they could project force any where in the world.
For the fundamentalist Jews, they showed that they would rather die than succumb to perceived tyranny.
What actions are we showing today and what do they mean?
UPDATE. Andrew Exum concurs with our critique. Now, I am confused considering that we contradicted him. I must consult the MISO for guidance.
UPDATE TWO. I've asked Dr. Exum to reply multiple times. He refused responding only, "What? Don't confuse to me linking to an article with agreeing with everything it says." So, with the tone of this post, measure his deeds. In 2009, he was a self-described counter-insurgency expert.
UPDATE THREE Andrew Exum states, "My primary criticism of the doctrine as it is currently written is the doctrine's weakness with respect to waging counterinsurgency as a third party, something both Charlie "Erin" Simpson and Steve Biddle have written a lot about." So, with the tone of this post, please explain why you, Erin Simpson, and Steve Biddle are experts in COIN..
Comments
MikeF:
You are welcome.
The major section headings of Dr. Bacevich's 1999 article are:
- The Clinton Doctrine
- The Strategy of Globalization
- The Rule Maker
- Enforcing the Rules
- Full Spectrum Dominance
If he were to simply add to this list today a new major section heading entitled:
- Population-Centric Counterinsurgency
Would everything, thus, be made more clear (for example: the relationship between [a] the requirement to achieve international "openness" and [b] the requirement to do COIN via nation-building)?
Does this worldview/context/basis -- which was clearly conceived before and which transcends 9/11 -- is this still in force today? The answer is Yes.
Evidence:
a. In Dr. Bacevich's 1999 article linked above, President Clinton is noted as having characterized the context (in the section entitled "Enforcing the Rules") as: "The great battle between the forces of integration and disintegration; the forces of globalism versus tribalism; of oppression against empowerment."
b. In Secretary Clinton's statement introducing President Obama's 2010 National Security Strategy, Ms. Clinton said: "We are in a race between the forces of integration and disintegration, and we see this every day."
What has changed per the Great Recession, etc? Not the perceived context or the characterization of the conflict (forces of integration v. forces of disintegration) but, rather, how we are able to proceed now (to wit: only via "Smart Power").
While I recognize that Counterinsurgency (big C, with apologies to Dr. Kilcullen) has become synonymous with building state institutions in other people's states, it seems that counterinsurgency (or counterterrorism for that matter) will not be a worthless term or concept as long as there are insurgents to counter.
Both counterinsurgency and counterterrorism will be valid intellectual concepts as long as there are insurgents and terrorists to counter. Colonialist COIN made sense in its context just as what's being done by the Marines makes sense in Sangin. While in Sangin it is highly kinetic, it wouldn't really be called CT. Its commanders looking at the insurgents and coming up with methods of countering them. The distinction between the two would seem to be more at the strategic and political level.
Col. Gentile, I'm curious why you focus on COIN vs. CT in the operational context rather than the strategic context in Afghanistan/Iraq. My (admittedly amateurish) observation, on Afghanistan in particular, is that the greatest problem with our current operations is not the operations themselves but the lack of a coherent strategic framework in which those operations sit. Colonialist COIN is predicated at the strategic level on a cooperative government (among other things) and the operations and tactics of it flow from that. The failure is not that connecting people to their government is inherently bad (although whether its a US responsibility is a separate debate) but that in the Afghan case the government is corrupt and ineffective.
-Ian
Mike:
That is very kind of you for having me in mind but i am hardly qualified to write the new manual, Bob Jones yes, but certainly not Gentile.
My days with Coin are numbered as i work this year to finish up a book i am writing on four modern wars of counterinsurgency with the aim to debunk the coin narrative that has used each case.
After i finish this book i plan to get back to doing "just" history and get out of the "coin criticism business."
gian
I would offer that COL (ret.) Andrew Bacevich, as early as 1999, captured the overall context that we are looking for in this article of the "National Interest" published in the fall of that year:
http://www.comw.org/pda/14dec/fulltext/99bacevich.html
At this very early date we can see:
a. Not only (as Dr. Bacevich notes), the foundation for such things as "Full Spectrum Operations" (objective: to achieve and to maintain international "openness").
b. But also, I believe, the contextual reasoning/thinking/objective which likewise may explain why institution-building/nation-building came to be seen as the way that we must do counterinsurgency. (To wit: At the end of the day, we are required to produce a state and society that has been made more-open and better ordered, organized and designed so as to our needs and those of the global economy.)
Does the above help in "answering the mail" re: context.
Gian,
As a side note, I'd ask the military to include both you and Bob on any serious rewrite.
Bob, as with many Green Berets, seeks to transcend the propaganda of the deed by keeping the third party actor out of the execution. Instead, you are their to influence and advice NOT do the work.
There's much to be learned from that approach, but it first involves understanding one's limit of control in the conflict.
Mike
Gian,
"I am talking about an operational method of countering insurgencies that can be employed by strategy and have alternatives to a one way only approach. Your post above with "lessons" on what worked and did not work in certain places seems to be offering up more a batch of TTPs from the current campaigns."
I'm not sure how one would overcome that risk.
"I am actually with Bob Jones in his above post about being careful with lessons learned, and starting off with getting the context right first."
Concur, and perhaps that is the best way to go about it.
Mike: I am talking about an operational method of countering insurgencies that can be employed by strategy and have alternatives to a one way only approach. Your post above with "lessons" on what worked and did not work in certain places seems to be offering up more a batch of TTPs from the current campaigns.
I am actually with Bob Jones in his above post about being careful with lessons learned, and starting off with getting the context right first.
My point again is that any new manual must not be trapped by what Bob rightly calls the "colonial" context of our current doctrine, which again is the theory and practics of pop centric coin, or the counter maoist way.
gian
The problems with FM 3-24 are primarily contextual and what is missing, rather than what is already present.
Any new effort must seriously step back and recognize the Colonial context and the Containment context that shaped the vast majority of Western "COIN" (neither is COIN in fact) knowledge. We must also purge the OIF context as well, as it is a mix of both of the above lawyered onto a GWOT driven punitive crusade into the Middle East grown frustrated at the elusive nature of a non-state foe, so then focusing on the most convenient State foe in the region.
We must also step back from the "COIN and Insurgency are complex forms of warfare" context that the manual begins with. Certainly there can be a warfare component to these types of illegal political challenges to existing governnace; but warfare often does not exist at all, and even when it does it is a tactical choice applied to a problem, and does not define the problem itself.
Much of the current debate, on this tread and in general, is about how an intervening foreign power best addresses that warfare component of this much larger insurgency dynamic in someone elses country.
That is kind of like debating what is the best way for me to come to your home and discipline your children who have been bothering me of late. Should I spank your children? Should I bribe them? Should I put them in "time-out"? There is no right answer to this, because no matter how smart my approach to disciplining your children is it will always be wrong, as I have no right, and therefore no right way, to do so.
Let's get the context right first, then we can discuss what is the best mix of approaches to apply within that context.
Bob
Gian,
"Until we allow for equal treatment at the operational level of CT and Coin we will forever remain trapped in the same straightjacket that we have been in for the last three years ever since the rise of the savior coin generals."
I think that statement is catastraphasizing. A rewrite focused on lessons learned over the last ten years does not necessarily imply a straightjacket. Instead, it can show what worked in different places and what didn't.
Mike
ADTS, this may also be my most frivolous blog post. I was trying to publish it in to compliment our rewrite article. Rushing it limited what I wanted to say. But, "Old School" can be relevant to many of life's discussions :).
Michael C,
Does it matter what the label is or is the deed more important than the words? In this case, if the populace witnesses crimes or violent actions without response, then they do not feel secure. We take this security for granted in the US.
Mike
I am not talking about "gotcha attempts" but intellectual accountability and honesty. But so be it, perhaps one must wait 20 to 30 years for history to do its job.
Lastly to Mike F's point when he referenced General P's statement that you cant chose between CT and Coin. Come on, of course you can, and strategy must have that option to do so, or if need be combine the two. Here is why. When Petraeus says you cant chose between the two he is basically saying any coin campaign must at its heart be a population centric one with its doctrinal goals of institution building in foreign lands as its object, within this kind of campaign therefore CT is always important but absolutely subordinate to the higher operational goals of state building.
Until we allow for equal treatment at the operational level of CT and Coin we will forever remain trapped in the same straightjacket that we have been in for the last three years ever since the rise of the savior coin generals. Moreover, all of these excellent statements by folks like Mike F, Carl, and SB on rewriting coin will only lead to a reproduction of 3-24 with some polishing around the edges yet with no fundamental change.
Absolute acceptance of theories of statebuilding by force must be decoupled from any revised FM 3-24.
gian
Carl:
To be sure I take their words seriously and agreed with Doug's recent essay on the Surge. Moreover as you state in many of their cases their past scholarship stands on its own: Biddle's work, Exum on Hiz etc are all first rate.
But these are the very people who have pushed us down this road to a dysfunctional operational method in Afghanistan that doesnt work. They were a part of the construction of the Surge Triumph narrative, the hagiography of Petraeus, the templating of the Surge and Petraeus onto Afghanistan. At what point are folks accountable for the path we are on now? Are we to wait twenty to thirty years for history to provide this accountability as it most certainly will?
gian
I guess I'm more forgiving of these souls, Gian.
Earlier this week, I defended the historiography of Benny Morris, who has shifted politically but not in his scholarship about key matters in Israeli-Palestinian relations.
So I'm not opposed to doing this. But I have to have something to defend.
With Exum, Ollivant and Biddle, I take their daily political selves a bit differently than I do their professional, scholarly lives.
People get on me when I express respect for Exum and they mention the television appearances. But there I see a young man who in a sense is coming of age professionally on screen. That's not easy and so I'm probably a bit more clement on the subject than others think I should be.
Why wouldn't we want people to change their minds when new evidence presented itself? Or lessons became learned? It doesn't mean that we don't hold them accountable for previous, political positions, but I've never thought it profitable to castigate people for adapting to facts.
That and I draw a distinction between the scholar Exum and the blogger/TV personality Exum. But I do the same thing with you! The historian Gian Gentile is different from the provocative bete noire of COIN agitprop.
The thing about Ollivant is that we really don't have much from him about the so-called "Surge," except that which was sieved through Ricks, Robinson and other ideological journalists.
Nir Rosen referred to him in "Aftermath" with a mere sentence or two. So there's much less to work with. His first major statement on his perspective came with his recent publication, so I begin with that.
Ollivant's edited book on 20th century politicized Catholic thought (which I confess that I read), unlike your work on population-centric strategic air bombing strategies, doesn't lend itself to the subject at hand. And his PhD was about Jefferson, if I recall, so I didn't bother to check it out.
To what shall I compare him? Linda Robinson's gushing portrait of him? Do you really want me to trust any description of any person in Ricks' books?
I'll pay Ollivant the highest compliment I can and take seriously the words to which he has put his name now.
Like so many of the Coin experts that emerged as an exploding meteor in 2007 Exum is conflicted. He wants to criticize but at the same time wont acknowledge his full and previous embrace with the theory, doctrine, and practice that he now criticizes. Many others are in the same boat (Doug Ollivant was previously in the Coin crowd but recently he has "flipped").
I still remember watching Dr Exum on the Rachel Maddow show in spring of 2009 commenting on the relief of General McKiernan and the new commanding General, Stanley McChrystal. Exum seemed giddy at the prospect of this new, savior general riding onto the scene to save Afghanistan as Petraeus had supposedly saved Iraq. Dr Exum referred to McChrystal as a "rare bird" in the Army.
Now all of that promise and hope seems to be crumbing in front of their eyes with the reality of the situation on the ground in Afghanistan and the reality of the politics of the war in the United States.
Still, they want the best of both possible worlds: they want to maintain their ties and links to Coin since it was Coin and their early embrace of it that produced their rise, but many of them also now want to be seen as some of its harshest critics.
Of course intellectualism is perfectly comfortable with intellectuals changing their views on things. But in this case of the Coin experts since their views seem to have changed so quickly and in some instances radically at least we might hear from them some explanation on a personal level with the change. Was it something they read that changed their views, recent experience on the ground, what?
I asked Carl Prine on his blog last month about this issue of intellectual change with regard to Ollivant and his substantial "flip" from being a coindinista to a critic of the doctrine and the Surge Triumph Narrative. Carl in response took a fair, reasonable but still to me unsatisfying position by saying he didnt want to put Doug on the "couch" for psycho analysis and was content to accept the text of his current views and treat it as such. I understand Carls point on one level. But on a different level, like I said, it doesnt satisfy.
Let me explain by way of using historiographical change on Eisenhowers presidency as an analogy. In the 60s and 70s and into the early 80s the consensus of historians was quite critical of Eisenhower as an ineffective president. Shoot, I remember my undergrad text book with a picture of Ike playing golf. But then by the early 90s there was significant "flipping" among historians with a revisionist view of Ike seeing him as one of the more effective presidents in the 20th century. But this "flipping" was based on many years of reflection and research and writing.
So again I wonder, what has brought about the current change with many of the coin experts?
Maybe it is simply time for them to acknowledge that they were seduced by a doctrine that was broken from the beginning, that they didnt really see it at the time, that it all seemed so righteous, so progressive, so deeply intellectual, that their rise to stardom along with certain savior generals kept them from seeing this reality, and that perhaps now it is becoming somewhat clear to them in the face of the reality of the current situation in Iraq and Afghanistan.
gian
Jason,
I shouldnt have picked on Andrew (or Erin) too hard in this post. His name came up while I was researching the COIN vs. CT debate. As we stated yesterday, that debate is limiting and tiresome. GEN Petraeus, in the NYTs, recently said, "Counterinsurgency includes counterterrorist operations. You cannot choose between them." Hopefully that will end the debate.
To the larger issue, I was attempting to flush out "Propaganda of the Deed." Carl Prine brought it to my attention as a tool insurgents have used over the past two hundred years, and I think that we have lost sight of how powerful actions are for messaging.
Sometimes, it feels like we put too much effort into psychological warfare campaigns pushing bumper sticker slogans rather than allowing our actions speak for our words.
Masada is a good study to this end from both sides of the conflict.
I suppose the lesson here is that our actions speak much louder than our words.
Mike
Mike,
I'm not sure where you're going with this, but I don't think Ex (I can't speak for him of course) disagrees with your point on CT vs COIN. And didn't in 2009.
"Success, then, means getting past the COIN versus CT paradigm and thinking about which best practices can be imported from each discipline - and how the two mentalities can be fused with the realities on the ground in Afghanistan to offer policy-makers solutions beyond the usual models."
That quote is from the same op-ed you cite here and sounds very similar to what you three wrote on the topic.