Pop-COIN and ‘The Death of American Strategy’
by A.E. Stahl
Defenceiq
Gentile states that “American armed nation building at the barrel of a gun simply does not work and strategy should discern this basic truth.” Again, Gentile is correct. The idea that one can simultaneously engage in warfare and nation building is comparable to mixing oil and water. They do not and cannot blend. As the article clearly states, Gentile, Peters, Long, Biden, and others are not against assisting a nation in reconstruction efforts if that is what the U.S. government decides is best for its national interests. However, as should be clear given our historical treasure chest of over 3,000 years of the history of warfare, the wars first need to be won — again, hardly an original notion. That is, if a country has chosen to engage in warfare, the focus of one’s efforts and the means at one’s disposal must be on the physical attrition of the enemy to the point that the enemy’s will to continue violently resisting has been broken. Once will is broken and once one’s political condition has been imposed, post-war reconstruction projects can then commence at will, but only if that is what the policy calls for.
The COIN war: B.H. Liddell Hart and T.E. Lawrence Edition
by Gulliver
Ink Spots
In 1928, T. E. Lawrence wrote to his friend Basil Liddell Hart on the subject of the latter man's advocacy for what he called the Indirect Approach, a concept that emphasized dislocation of the enemy through rapid, unexpected strategic and operational maneuver and held out the hope of bloodless, battle-free victory.
A surfeit of the "hit" school brings on an attack of the "run" method; and then the pendulum swings back. You, at present, are trying (with very little help from those whose business it is to think upon their profession) to put the balance straight after the orgy of the late war. When you succeed (about 1945) your sheep will pass your bounds of discretion, and have to be chivied back by some later strategist. Back and forward we go.Lawrence was highlighting the cyclical tendencies of the never-ending debate about strategy. First come the proponents of maneuever and wars of position – Frederick, Vauban, Bulow, and even Jomini, to a certain extent – then the purported advocates of mass, destruction of the main force, decisive battle – Napoleon, Clausewitz, Moltke, Mahan, Foch – before returning to indirect approaches in reaction – Douhet, Liddell Hart, De Gaulle, Guderian, etc.
Comments
Bill,
I have to confess, your posts always leave me a bit baffled. In my opinion, efforts to make other sovereign states more like the US makes us less safe, not more safe. No one, and and no state, likes to be judged by some pompous bible thumper swinging a baseball bat. That is how we come across.
Domestic policy is a totally different matter. Afghanistan does not need to become more like us, they need to find a solution that works for them. Not just the Northern Alliance, and not just the Taliban, and not just any similiar cluster of ethnicities or tribes or families to the equal exclusion of others. They attempt now (with our help to preserve a government that we want)to enforce the rule of law. One side suppress the other. Like it or lump it. It won't work. What will work? NOT OURS TO SAY. Perhaps Karzai will wise up and open up governmance and economic opportunity to the entire populace, but I doubt it. It is against their culture to "expand the circle" to all. This is a winner take all society. making inner circles that are largely atonomous is the typical Afghan approach (We call the warlords) and likely to work. Just stop pushing the heavy dose of Western centralized control; but the current Constitution is a big obstacle to that. That leaves creating a new state. Split the baby. Create Pashtunistan. That probably gets to making everybody happy faster than any other course. Pakistan would have their zone of influence and Taliban based patronage would come back to replace Northern Alliance-based patronage in that region.
As to sanctuary for AQ? We've long made far too big a deal of this. AQ has never needed this land or this populace to conduct their business, it was just convenient. Sanctuary has always been a function of the support of the Taliban and their base populace and not any particular real estate. So long as we cut a deal with the Taliban I suspect we could get them to send AQ packing. (If we'd been more patient and had a better understanding of Omar's duties to a guest under Pashtunwali, we probably could have gotten him to give up AQ 10 years ago.)
It needs to be their solution though. Drawing convenient lines through the lands of others is long obsolete and creates more problems than it solves.
But all this stuff about making every country a democracy, and modern US values somehow being a model of "enduring" proper values is lunacy. Thinking our going around preaching or bullying others to toe our line will make us safer is dangerous, provocative lunacy.
Cheers!
Bob
"America's ultimate goal is to have a stable environment in which to pursue the vital interests of our nation."
Many believe that such a "stable environment" is not reasonably possible in a world in which every Tom, Dick and Harriet state and society can -- via "self-determination" -- be on a substantially different sheet of music from one another and from ourselves. Such an environment, one might suggest, is perfectly "designed" -- not just for "instability" generally, but, rather, specifically for world-wide chaos, disaster and conflict.
Likewise, many believe that a stable environment, in which Americans can pursue their vital interests, can only be achieved when all states and socieites are, generally speaking, on the same sheet of music -- our sheet of music.
With this as our starting point (in order to achieve the required "stable environment" for America to pursue its vital national interests, everyone needs to be on the same sheet of music -- our sheet of music), then, certainly, differing "Ways" (ex: other than out-of-the-barrel-of-a-gun nation-building COIN, etc.), to achieve these desired "Ends," need greater discussion.
Possibly another way of stating things:
a. In the days of the American Indians and the Confederate States of America (19th Century), the United States could more readily pursue and achieve its vital national interests through "internal" governance alone (ex: via "sub-circles" re: the American Indians and via "enforcing the rule of law" re: the Confederate States).
b. Today, however, should the United States desire to continue to pursue and achieve its vital national interests, it must (quite obviously?) expand these and/or other governing/shaping concepts to include the external environment.
Bill,
America's ultimate goal is to have a stable environment in which to pursue the vital interests of our nation. This means the government is exercising its primary sovereign duty vested in them by the populace of protecting us from all manner of physical, economic, social, etc "threats" to our collective pursuit of "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness"; and doing so in a way that does not overly disrupt the sovereignty and similar pursuits of others. Period.
The idea that we have some duty to "transform" other states, or that if we somehow make others to be more like us it will make us safer is a well-intended concept woven into the strategic policies of our nation over the course of the post-Cold War era. Smart proponents, such as Dr. Peter Feaver of Duke, continue to work to weave such thinkng into our National Security Strategy and other such documents. But this is a Course of Action, a "Ways" selected to achieve the "Ends" I describe above. I think it is a bad one, and that is based on thinking that overly focuses on the symptoms of instability rather than on the root causes of the same. I think it is a very dangerous concept that places our nation at greater risk, not less; that it takes us farther from our desired Ends, not closer.
We see this same thinking in political positions that attack the amount of taxes paid by the few who are rich as the cause of a shrinking middle class, rather than the vast amount of handouts funded by the middle class for a new class of poor (not all poor, but a growing class within the poor) who feel increasingly entitled to benefit from society without contributing to society. I appreciate the compassionate intentions, but some things can't be given, they have to be earned. Be it self-determination of governance at a national level, or programs that ensure the opportunity to work and contribute to the best of ones capacity on the individual level.
We have no duty to "transform" any more than we have a "Responsibility to Protect." Our duty is, I believe, as I have laid out in the first paragrapah. That is hard enough in of itself. Better we tried to conquer the world than "fix" it; Neither effort is "acceptable, suitable or feasible" and either effort would break us in the end; but at least the former would provide some short-term benefits. No, we need to focus on keeping our own house in order, and there is little need to "transform" or fix others in that pursuit.
At the state level, Self-determination is a collective endeavor. Certainly the state has the right and duty WITHIN its borders to pursue some ends of governance. The four approaches I describe are ways to go about doing that. We created sub-circles and pushed those native americans not anihilated by our invasion into those circles to isoate those who were not willing or able to asimilate. We enforced the rule of law on a Confederate south who reasonably disagreed with Andrew Jackon's asertion that states no longer had the right to withdraw from the Union. They made their argument and they lost to a stronger argument led by Mr. Lincoln. But outside our sovereign borders?? So long as it does not directly affect our own sovereign pursuits (and "what ifs" or "it mights" don't count) that is the business of other people and their governments to self determine on their own. They do not need, want or appreciate our help.
Bob
If our ultimate goal in these cases -- as in the cases of China and the former USSR before -- is to transform these states and societies such that they might come to cause the modern world fewer problems and offer the modern world greater utility/usefulness instead.
(Herein, our rational being that these lesser and included entities -- much as with the great powers and great societies which proceeded them -- need to become better organized, ordered, oriented and designed so as to adequately provide for [1] the wants, needs and desires of their own populations and [2] the requirements of the modern world.)
And if we believe that these requirements can only be achieved by the adoption by these lesser and included states and societies of political, economic and social structures/systems which are similar to our own. (Other approaches, we believe, have been more than adequately tried and have consistently failed/proved to be counterproductive.)
Then:
a. How does "self-determination" fit into this picture (can it be perceived as a "help" or a "hinderance" to the requirement noted above, to wit: state and societal "westernization") and
b. Which option suggested above is most likely to bring about -- sooner rather than later -- the state and societal changes that we have deemed necessary?
(Herein, we should expect that the United States will [1] embrace and work with those ideas and entities [states, governments, populations, individuals and/or groups] that we feel are moving in the right direction and [2] work against and in opposition to those concepts and entities that we feel would tend to hinder the transformation/westernization process that we believe is necessary.)
P.S. Tell me if I have this right: In the past, many a state, government, population, individual and/or group (within the United States and/or world-wide) -- via "self-determination" -- chose an alternative political, economic and social structure (ex: American Indians, Confederate States of America, fascists; communists) but (1) we did not see this as a positive development/productive path, nor did we (2) seek to compromise with/accommodate these entities.
I like Approach 3 & 4. Let's call it Balkhanisation from the Persian word for fortunate.
We get the self-determination right this time and only famous native sons can be elected leader of their homeland through legitimate UN supervised popular vote.
Omar gets the South, Haqqani the Central East, Hekmatyar - Kunar & Jalalabad, Khan and the Naibzadah bros split the West, Dostrom the North, one of Massoud's brothers gets Pansjhir and Bagram and the Nuristanis will stay as they are. Even though Balkhanised leadership is supposed to be native son only the Kandahari Karsai gets Kabul Central because no one else want's to be in the middle of that lot.
The 90 percent illiteracy and most people earning a living growing heroin for the mafia should round things off nicely.
Cheers,
RC
I think Duck's comment about the population being the center of gravity and Gian's response has further convinced me that we're still lost when it comes to Afghanistan and the broader war against Al Qaeda. We have exaggerated the impact of our COIN efforts against the Taliban on its impact on Al Qaeda. As Bing West has stated, we’re fighting the wrong war, but unfortunately it is a little late to identify that. We are fighting this war, so we need to come up with achievable goals, and that will require a lot more thought than we have given to the problem to date.
Doctrine describes a COG as the source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act. It is always tied to an objective. Most importantly the doctrine goes on to explain that the process for determining a COG cannot be taken lightly, since a faulty conclusion resulting from a analysis can have very serious consequences, such as the inability to achieve strategic and operational objectives at an acceptable cost. This is the point Gian seems to be making that Duck and many others are missing. We need to put the intellectual rigor into studying the problem before we simply spout off the population is the COG, and there may not be tangible COG. In those cases when the population is the COG, then it must have a so what factor behind it. Simply winning hearts and minds will not defeat an insurgency, or take the wind out of its sails, especially when it has foreign sponsors. What is the value of harping the population is the COG and naively conducting civil affairs, nation building, etc. while the insurgency still rages on?
At the strategic level, Bob’s four proposed approaches are the first relevant strategic approaches that I have seen regarding the population and COIN. Everything has been tactical and operational at best and only results in transitory success that is quickly eroded by time and events. I think the government could apply more than one of Bob’s approaches simultaneously, for example they could enforce the rule of law with one group, expand the circle of trust for another, and even consider partial or full autonomy for another.
Back to the center of gravity debate Duck surfaced. I find the COG concept to be an intellectual straight jacket in most cases, but since we use it doctrinally it is worth discussing. Even FM 3-24 doesn’t state the population is the COG, but it does state that their ability to generate support from the population is “normally” the COG. If you think about it there is a considerable between the insurgent’s ability to generate support from the population (whether through popular support or coercion) being the COG and the population being the COG. I think the ability to generate popular support loses importance if the insurgents have foreign safe haven and receive foreign funding. They will always have the ability to generate coercive support just as criminals do in the U.S.
Going under the assumption that the generating support from the population is the COG in for the counter insurgent in Afghanistan, the foreign counter insurgent’s objective/COG shouldn’t be their ability to generate support from the population, but rather for the government in power to generate support from the people. If the foreigner does it, then it subverts the government. If the government can’t or won’t generate this support, then it is an inappropriate strategy/COG, and one must pursue another path to victory or step out of the way and let the population change the government.
Taking this COG a step further, we start looking at the associated critical capabilities, requirements and vulnerabilities. What enables the Taliban to generate support? Some capabilities are a common ethnicity, common goals with the people to oust the occupiers, common goals with the people to oust an unpopular government, or at least protect them from it, the ability to coerce people, etc. These are enabled by a safe haven in Pakistan, external funding, our behavior, Karzai’s behavior, etc. Simply calling the people the COG and then engaging various population groups with CMO, embedding corrupt police forces will do little to pull the population towards the government and away from the Taliban. Our ability to effectively engage the people in this case is limited and misguided if it undermines our effort to strengthen the government we elected to support. The Taliban on the other hand will still have their ability to garner support from the population. At the tactical and operational level this is a holding action at best. Once we tire and move on there is no reason that the Taliban can’t mass and potentially defeat the ANA in a war of movement regardless of the people’s desires with Pakistan’s support, thus the COG at this point is no longer the people if it ever was. However if the holding action buys time to pursue one of Bob’s four approaches for strategically influencing the population groups then maybe we get somewhere. To date we have been doing this for year with little to show for it, as a famous dead Italian philosopher once said, “there are none so blind as those who refuse to see.”
AQ’s has a multi prong strategy, but one of their efforts has been clear. They want to provoke us to react in a large way and get stuck in quagmires to undermine our economy and political will. They consider our economic power a critical enabler to our COG which is our political will. For the most part AQ has been losing ground, but on the other hand we have fallen into their trap when it comes to go big, spend big, and then get stuck in quagmires because we failed to develop an appropriate strategy based on the real COGs, which we still haven’t determined. Somewhat reflexively our self-appointed COIN experts and Nation builders led our national leadership astray by identifying poor governance as the COG that enables AQ to operate and pursue its objectives, and then talked our leaders into pursuing a non-sustainable strategy to reform/transform governments around the world in hope that we can deny AQ safe haven, freedom of movement and eventually undermine their ability to recruit. While the idea that poor governance was critical has merit, our approach to addressing this issue was off the mark. That strategy as implemented in Afghanistan and Iraq has backfired because we decided what legitimate government was, not the people, and now those governments we helped install serve as a source of motivation for AQ and their likeminded jihadists. We also expended considerable wealth and political capital pursuing this dream. It is more challenging to remain a leader when you lead people in circles.
As for the safe haven argument, it is worth reminding people that much of the 9/11 planning was conducted in Germany, Malaysia and the U.S., so while lawless areas are undesirable and allow militant groups to train and gain combat experience, the idea that eradicating these areas will eliminate the ability for terrorists to train and recruit is misguided. Furthermore, if AQ decides to set up training camps in these lawless areas that is to our advantage if we retain the political will to strike them. We literally get more bang for the buck.
The Arab Spring scenarios are provide interesting examples for COG analysis, but of course mostly in hindsight. It is clear that the COG in Egypt afterwards was the Army, if Mubarak lost control of this major coercive arm he has in effect lost control of the nation, and he realized that. If he retained control of the Army, then the protesters would have add to pursue an alternative strategy based on another COG. They would need strategic flexibility, a trait we haven’t demonstrated much of since 9/11. In Syria the government has identified the protesters as the COG, but instead of positively influencing them they’re using coercive power to control/contain the problem. They have effectively crushed these movements in the past with brutal responses and may do so again, but as Bob wrote the problem will persist. For this approach to work it depends on Syria retaining control of its coercive instruments and having the freedom to employ them outside accepted international standards. So far they’re good on both accounts, but it appears that elements of their Army Is breaking away and they may be feeling some pressure from the Arab League. Taking it back to Afghanistan we need to think a lot harder about what the COGs are in Afghanistan, or even if they’re in Afghanistan.
Yes, and we have never disagreed on this point. All four of these options require decisions by the ruling elite to implement with an understanding of and in concert with the affected critical populace. This must be internal, and all but approach one require a MAJOR compromise on the part of that same ruling elite. If designed, directed and/or implemented by foreign parties any of these are presumptively illegitimate to a degree that is, in most cases, impossible to overcome (unless the ruling elite was also the foreign party, as in the case of the British in Malaya).
Ruling elites do not make such compromises willingly, even when they see the logic of making such a compromise in regards to attaining a better, more durable stability.
Mr. Karzai is not a stupid man, he knows what ISAF is doing can never create a stability based on addressing the grievances of those members of the populace outside the Northern Alliance cirlce of trust. He, and his fellow Northern Alliance powerbrokers are quite happy to ride the status quo for as long as possible.
Likewise the ruling elite in the Philippines (and viturally every other country colonized by the Spanish) are not oblivious to the fact that some are favored and that many are excluded. That is just how it is and they will not surrender their favored status willingly. To have low-level insurgency in many places, with the occasional flare up that demands a heavier effort put down is good enough.
For the US the problem is that we have convinced ourelves that we have "vital interests" in these places (and others like them), and that those interests are best served by establishing a relationship with some government (even if that means we have to rip out the old one that refused to play and replace it with one that will), and then working to protect and preserve that government in power so long as they are willing to help us with those "vital" interests. This is a tried and true process that has worked reasonably well for powerful nations and the elites they adopt in various lands for as long as history has been recorded.
But the information technology of today and the effects of that technology are unprecedented in history. Perhaps these old approaches are still viable, but I do not believe they are. I believe they create the motivation and the intent of suppressed and oppressed members of other nation's populaces to conduct acts of transnational terrorism against us. We focus on the organizers of such activities, such as AQ. Better we focus on how we energize this entire dynamic. For those who like to study COGs, consider "US Foreign Policy" as a top contender for the COG of transnational terrorism directed against the US.
Cheers!
Bob
The option categories here are reasonable. The problem, as always, is figuring out who is going to do the enforcing, expanding, and building in the environments where we operate. If we do it the outcome is by definition illegitimate. If local government carries out these functions we have to accept that they will be performed primarily to serve the interests of the ruling elite. These are governance functions. We don't want to (and probably can't) govern other countries, and if they were in a position to govern themselves we wouldn't be involved.
There's nothing inherently wrong with looking at these situations and discussing what might be done to create stability, but if we come up with answers we haven't the ability to implement we haven't made much progress.
Dave,
to continue this a bit, I currently see 4 broad options of approach a government can make when dealing with a "critical populace" that perceives itself to be "outside the circle of trust" (a circle formed by perceptions of that populace in regards to how well the government addresses the criteria of sovereignty, legitimacy, respect, justice and trust that I have laid out in various papers and posts - but that I continue to refine).
Approach 1: "Enforce the rule of law." The state is the legal actor, and an insurgent populace is by definition the illegal actor. Simply apply security forces as necessary until this segment of the populace ceases to act out against the government. Examples: The Sepoy revolt in India in the mid-1800s. The American Revolution. The defeat of the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka. Current efforts by Assad in Syria. Etc, etc, etc. Requires no compromise on the part of government, one side or the other will "win" by force of arms, and things will likely not get any better for the people as a whole.
Approach 2: "Expand the Circle of Trust." Make important, but typically small changes in how governance is extended to this critical populace. Best example is the passing of three landmark civil rights acts and associated Supreme Court decisions in the 50s and 60s that combined to extend the same rights of US citizenship enjoyed by White, male Americans to Black Americans and women in general. Also the Malaya Emergency where Great Britain backed off from complete colonial control of Malaya, brought them into the Commonwealth as a sovereign partner and ensured that good governance extended to the ethnic Indian and Chinese populaces who were outside the circle of trust under the colonial rule Britain attempted to reinstate post WWII.
Approach 3: "Build a circle within a circle." When there is no way a simple extension of rights and inclusion will satisfy a populace, but full separation is not workable either, create a region with a lesser included form of sovereignty for that critical populace. The Kurdish zone of Iraq is a modern example. Also Indian Reservations in the US. Perhaps a Pashtunistan extending across the Durand line in the future???
Approach 4: "Make more circles." Sometimes new states must form. Yugoslavia becoming what is, I believe, now 7 separate, sovereign states today is a modern example. Perhaps the Sudan, but I am not sure if that is an internal solution or one forced by well-intended outsiders. When outsiders draw lines, as in Korea and Vietnam in the Cold War; and many other places in Colonial times, it is not an example of this approach. It must be self-determined to count.
Currently we remain too fixated on approach one, but I would argue that is the least viable approach in almost every case.
Bob
Bob,
Good points. Agreed - political homogenization of national identity formation is a fundamental aspect of nation-state identity. Heather Rae has done some interesting work in this area. Absolutely the case with the 13 American colonies who were greatly at odds during and after our revolution and not an organic part of our colonial and early American beginnings - the American identity formation iteratively preceded our nation's growth and maturity.
Also, I made a mistake in my earlier post: I meant to qualify on the idea of nation-state definitions/viability. SOME places do not seem to be nation-states and are rather areas of exception between other nation-states. My wording was a blanket that implied obsolescence when what I'd meant to imply was that in some cases we seem not to have nation-states and perhaps little potential, although I would not be surprised to see subdivisions, e.g. the Balkans, Eritrea-Ethopia, N-S Yemen, W Europe a bit further back.
S/F/Dave
Nation-states come in many forms. We need not be so obsessed with the inherent goodness of badness of any particular form as judged by how closely it mirrors our own.
As to "the populace" perhaps is it easy to start with Clausewitz's very simple construct of "the people" as one of three elements (the others being "the army" and "the government"). But "the people” are indeed no monolith, but is made up of many interrelated and interconnected "populaces."
So what is the best way to think of "populaces"? I am currently doing this through the lens of "identity." Consider, each person identifies with hundreds or thousands of things, big and small, and if tasked good generally prioritize the identities. You may be of some nation, and some tribe, and some religion, and some region, and be a father, a son, and like blue shirts, and Honda motorcycles, and sugar in your coffee, etc. With each of these "identities" one is a de facto member of a global populace of people with that shared identity. If tasked, you could prioritize these identities in a rough order, but to simplify, simply list those and prioritize those you would be willing to kill for. Now, draw line through those to divide those you would be willing to die for. These are the "critical populaces" for purposes of stability. When one believes that their identity with some state facilitates their ability to preserve their other critical identities, there is stability. When one believes that their state, or some external state that affects governance within their state, is a danger to other critical identities, there is instability.
The "simple" task of government is to expand the perception that identifying with the state is the best option for preserving all or most of one's critical identities. What brings stability to "the people" and in extension to "the nation-state" are when one forms and nurtures trust and faith in a national identity/populace across "the people."
In Afghanistan there has never been an effort to create such a populace; but then, in the traditional, decentralized, largely self-governing approach there was no need for such an identity. Today we attempt to force a centralized control without the development first of a national identity/populace. One cannot order or mandate beliefs; but must nurture them over time and create structures people who have no trust in each other can trust in if there is any hope of developing such a national identity. But when instead the government is dedicated to the idea that one segment of the populace will have dominion over others, no amount of military and police effort, or development or any other band-aid approaches will develop such an identity.
In the United States it took generations to build such a national identity. The Constitution, dedicated to this task, was a big help, but consider Robert E. Lee's famous decision as to if he prioritized his identity as an American and US soldier, causes he had devoted his life to, over his identity as a Virginian. One cannot mandate these things, but must set proper conditions and then work ceaselessly to nurture them. Governments being made up of politicians, being made up of humans, often forget or never fully appreciate this. They simply expect "the people" to support the rule of law. As the American Declaration of Independence proclaims so eloquently, governments can only expect that presumption to take them so far. The people hold the ultimate power, and if pushed, the people will push back.
Cheers!
Bob
You are insufferable Duck, in fact I have often stated my position on Afghanistan, i guess you must have missed it or just been too angry at me to see it but here goes.
I think American Strategy in Afghanistan is broken because it applies a maximalist operational method of coin(aka armed nation building) to achieve a core policy objective that is actually quite minimalist ("disrupt, disable, defeat AQ". There has always been alternatives (as Columbia University scholar Austin Long has cogently argued) but because the American Army and some of its senior generals have been entranced by the promise of making American coin work in Afghanistan we have been unable to see and apply alternatives.
Now if good strategy in war said that the operational method of armed nation building was needed to achieve policy ends then I can see the population being the center of gravity. Again Clausewitz says it is something to be discovered. And if good strategy did decide to pursue such an operational general it should have Colonel Bob Jones G2 because he knows more about the nature of insurgencies than most others.
hope this clarifies my position.
No, Vitesse et Puissance, I don't think you understand Colonel Gentile's position. He is not, has not, and will not suggest what exactly he thinks the enemy's COG in A-Stan is. He is merely pointing out that it might not (or probably not depending on his mood) be the civilian population.
Your question (if not the civilian population then who or what) is at least facially a logical and sensible one.
But we are dealing with Colonel Gentile. He does not answer or analyze such questions. He only derides the analysis of others.
He tells us that "strategy should discern the true COG."
But has Colonel Gentile used his obvious talents to apply "strategy" to discern for us what the true COG is in A-Stan? If so, i've somehow missed it.
No, Colonel Gentile's analysis rarely gets beyond tbe 'we shouldn't be there' stage, which strongly implies that we shouldn't have gone in the first place. This is, of course, a perfectly valid position--for someone like Ron Paul or Dennis Kucinich, and in Colonel Gentile's private political life that is a perfectly valid position as well.
So while Colonel Gentile is his usual brilliant self when pointing out flaws in "pop centric coin" this brilliance somehow is never put to use in figuring out what, exactly, is the best course to take in A-Stan. Afterall, there still is a mission to accomplish, one that President Obama has yet to relinquish, despite Colonel Gentile's wise protestations to do so.
No, Vitesse et Puissance, you are barking up the wrong tree my friend.
Mr. Jones - thank you so much for that! I have been monitoring the COIN debate for the last months now, attempting to get my mind around the various points, counterpoints, and trying to see the forest for the trees.
Your brief comment about perspective seems to me to point to the basic underlying issue about the different positions in this debate. The arguments about COIN in both terms of its execution and nature seem really to be a debate over what the US is doing, should be doing, and how it is doing it, in the world. The fundamental aspects of disagreement seems to be one of the perspective you mention. Restated, the entire debate appears centered on these two issues…
1. What are USG foreign policy objectives, stated or inferred, legitimate or not, coherent or incoherent?
2. What is the proper use of force in pursuit of those objectives?
In answering those questions, I have perceived three general perspectives…
1. Realist. The world is an amoral, anarchic place where the veneer of world organizations and systems of government do not fundamentally change the basic relationships between states and between non-state actors as they pursue resources, power, and wealth, only the guises in which they do so. Foreign policy objectives should be driven by realpolitik. The determination of means should be made in the same manner. Third Party COIN, in whatever form, is merely a means to an end – the population’s importance or lack of importance reflected similarly. Decisions regarding the use of force and proportionality are made amorally based on the requirements to fulfill policy.
2. Idealist. The world system is increasingly organized, democratic, and moral. The pursuit of resources, power, and wealth, are becoming subordinated to peaceful means of conflict resolution under the auspices of fair and just world organizations. Relationships between state and between non-state actors reflect this shift. Foreign policy objectives should be driven by democratic processes that determine a right and a wrong and seek the betterment of all concerned. The determination of means is made in the same manner with errors being made in favor of acting to solve the problem which stands in the way of progress and good order. Third Party COIN is conducted for the good of the population and seeks, above all, to better their condition. Decisions regarding use of force and proportionality are made within a moral framework with a strong reliance on the ability to tailor force and its application in a very precise manner. Warfare is merely violent conflict which can be minimized and made kinder and gentler.
3. Hybrid. While the world is getting better and better, relationships between states and between non-state actors remain contentious. Because world organizations and systems of government remain imperfect, states and non-state actors retain crucial roles as arbiters of right and wrong. Democratic states make foreign policy decisions based on their best interests but modified by a moral awareness of right and wrong. The determination of means is made in the same manner with errors being made in favor of inaction when faced with doubt. Third Party COIN dictates that both foreign policy objectives AND the betterment of the population can and should occur simultaneously. Decisions regarding use of force and proportionally are made within a moral framework with an understanding that force is an imprecise tool and that despite the best intentions, there will be unfortunate instances of unintended damage, destruction, and harm.
These generalities are of course complicated by the relativism associated with terms such as good, right, and wrong – which takes me back to why I think your point was so important. The debate about what COIN should look like is really a debate about whether it should even be occurring. The answer to that, lies in perspective.
I won’t pretend to any academic accuracy in the above terminology – but I think it is a good first attempt at putting everything I’ve been reading into a framework for understanding the issues at hand. Thanks again…
Galula wrote some great stuff, but he was blinded by his own background. A frenchman who was born and raised in French colonies of Morocco and Algeria, and who spent much of his adult life dedicated to the idea that there was nothing fundamentally bad about that French dominion over others and that the French government was simply helping their less capable "partner" govrenments resolve differences between those populaces and those governments when they conducted COIN with them. He wore rose coloroed colonial glasses.
US COIN doctrine is written (and read and implemented) by Americans who similarly grew up within a benign system of US influence and have also spent much of their adult lives working to help those "partners" to resolve differences between those populacs and their government.
What is benign is in the eyes of the beholder. So too what is "legitimate." We need to take off our own rose colored glasses. They may be a lighter shade of rose than those worn by Galula, but they are tinted, or perhaps tainted, by our perspective all the same.
There was a similar discussion over at the SWC awhile back where I pointed out that Galula Never!!! called the people a COG,but many experts still keep saying he said that,he didn't do that. What he clearly writes in his book is that the people are the Objective!!!! they are the target! They are being attacked and or affected by another force and that other force is or should be IMO opinion the COG. In LE it's like saying the victim is the COG, the victim is the target and the criminal is the COG (source of all power) don't understand why that is so hard to understand,also that used to Green Beret stuff 101.
Perhaps a slight change of POV might help the article and the comments thusfar make some headway. Nation Building and Warfare are spoken of as distinct activities. Now, if you replace the peculiar phrase "nation building" with "governance" then a hierarchy becomes possible.......governance on favorable terms is what you are always seeking, and warfare is what you engage in to further governance. Here I speak only in terms of occupation. T.E. Lawrence was aiding the rebels, so his POV is fundamentally opposed as he sought to disrupt governance and engaged in warfare to make it happen.
This requires estbalishing a framework for your campaign. A framework MUST be established before even starting the discussion (what am I about to do? 'go to war' is the wrong answer). Governance is not always relevant. For example, if Iran blocks Hormuz and we send the 5th Fleet to secure that terrain. But in Occupation, which is after all what we are talking about 90% of the time on this site, governance IS the terrain. If the 5th Fleet receives marching orders then they will read "secure the strait IOT ensure free passage". Limited and achievable objective. When the POTUS set out on OEF/OIF the orders should have read "secure local governance IOT permit US-friendly regime". Limited and achievable objective, if a hell of a lot more resource intensive. The analogous failures to articulate frameworks in both OEF and OIF were the core strategic failures.
COIN in this regard, especially pop-COIN, misses the point of war completely. Getting the population on your side is a technique to the end, not the goal. If our goal was to cripple AQ in Afghanistan in 2001 then the local population was relevant only to the extent of its value to our intelligence gathering and operations (essentially the CT view). When we decided that we were going to install an enduring US-friendly regime from scratch we took on governance...and SURPRISE, all the problems of governance...security, economy, education, international relations, etc. At this point, COIN is in the right direction...yes, we need more than CT...but it is painfully inadequate and will continue to be until we define our framework and realize that what we committed to is governance first and foremost.
PS as an aside, is anyone else utterly confused by the term Nation Building? I can't define it no matter how hard I try without reducing it to a term of art and just making it mean whatever the hell sounds convenient.
I think this short paragraph from Gian is critically important and something that we should keep in the forefront of our minds:
"Now if good strategy determines that the most cost effective operational method to achieve policy aims is pop centric coin, then sure the people can be the center of gravity. But because the operational method of pop coin has eclipsed strategic thinking, we know can only imagine that in any coin operation it must be so."
In my mind this illustrates a significant strategic weakness the US has of late and that is that we search for the silver bullet of technology and the holy grail of theory of doctrine. We want to have the template that we can apply to all situations - one that we can pull off the shelf or extract a checklist from a book - in case of emergency break glass and apply this formula.
But we spend more time trying to name a conflict rather than understand it. We spend more time trying to name a strategy than trying to develop the right one and executing it.
But Gian is absolutely right - the center of gravity of to be discovered based on analysis of the all the conditions of the conflict and environment in which we find ourselves. And I hope no one misses his subtle point - if our analysis and strategy determines that the people are the center of gravity and that the strategy must be focused on the population then so be it - Gian is not throwing the baby out with the bath water. It seems to me he is only asking that we execute thorough analysis and apply critical strategic thought that leads to a strategy and campaign plan and if that calls for the execution of counterinsurgency with the population as the center of gravity then we have determined what the best strategy is for a given situation vice pulling a strategy off the shelf and just applying it because that is what someone's interpretation of a manual drives us to do
Bob,
http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/this-week-at-war-playing-risk
Robert Haddick's "Playing Risk" article/post provides another example of where are policy objectives are conflicted, or in simple terms we want to have our cake and eat it too.
He wrote, "According to the conference participants, the Arab Spring has created collateral damage to U.S. relations with key Gulf countries. Leaders in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere were not pleased with the Obama administration's abandonment of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. U.S. policymakers seem to make a clear distinction between external threats to the Sunni Arab countries, to which the United States has pledged to respond, and internal threats, which the United States sees as each country's responsibility. The Sunni monarchies, fearing Iran's covert and irregular-warfare capabilities, do not so neatly see the distinction between Iranian-sponsored external and internal threats. The conference reported that some GCC leaders, having lost some confidence in U.S. reliability, are now looking east to India and China to diversify their security relationships."
While we potentially see the Arab Spring as a positive movement towards longer term stability and more respect towards human rights, our active and tacit support of the various movements threatens States that we call partners. In turn they distrust and we have thus damaged our ability to build a regional coalition to counter-balance Iran.
It now turns to a policy debate, do we make policy based on our principles or do we pursue a policy that more closely reflects our current national security interests? If we chose the later and were asked to support the remaining States stay in power by conducting FID to help them oppress their dissidents, then we would have to come up with a strategy to achieve that objective. We have lots of historic examples where we supported the State against its people for various strategic reasons, or in some cases strategic misunderstanding.
Again while I'm in general agreement with you, we are still sometimes asked to pursue policies that are contrary to your model. Your model still informs understanding, and may provide some indirect methods to address the madness if the State we're supporting is willing to make some concessions, but if not, then force is a viable option as it has been throughout history. I agree it will be another long and bloody century.
For consideration by all on this point and from a previous thread:
"In fact, in Occidentialism: The West in the Eyes of its Enemies, Ian Burama and Avishia Maljhit argue at length that the kind of "modernization" that we equate with "good governance" is, and is perceived as, "westernization," and is actually the root of the Islamo-Fascism that underlies the global Jihad."
Great comments and insights overall, but some points are still not clear.
I do think people are mobilized by a leader or a particular event, but normally a combination of the two. For example, do you think uninformed American college kids protesting our support to the government of El Salvador in the mid-1980s were driven by internal beliefs that the government was wrong? While that would be logical, when questioned they couldn’t identify what continent El Salvador was in, what the conflict was over, or why we were providing support, yet they were mobilized. What mobilized them exactly? Poor governance or a whacky professor and the power of group think? Why do you assume that others in the world can’t be manipulated to think there is a problem when one may not exist? You see it now in our own political process today. The human race has a long history of cults that have nothing to do with poor governance. I'm not dismissing your ideas, actually I think in most cases you're right, but your views do not apply in all cases.
I also agree that in some cases people do attack us because of perceived or real injuries we have done to them, but then the question ultimately becomes so what? We can’t rewrite history and undo the wrongs, and we’re still obligated to protect our citizens from attack. How to respond to these issues is always the million dollar question, but in the meantime we need to take actions to protect our people. I’m certainly not advocating occupying countries to build schools and impose democracy as "the long term fix", but rather taking the needed actions to protect our nation in the short run, and in in the longer run seek out and implement a strategy that addresses the underlying problems long term.
We continue to disagree on AQ, the Muslim Brotherhood Creed is “Allah is our objective, the messenger is our leader; Quran is our law; jihad is our way; dying in the way of Allah is our highest goal.” UBL ideology hails largely from the MB, and he was definitely frustrated that his government allowed U.S. troops on Saudi soil, but I haven't read anything that states he wanted more freedom for his people. He has also stated he feels justified to conduct mass murder of civilians to achieve his ends, and has clearly stated he would use weapons of mass destruction if he had them. You see a rational actor where I don’t. I see AQ as a real threat and one that requires a lethal response, albeit a much more low visibility response than what we’re doing now. Fighting Iraqis and Afghans who choose not to be occupied is not fighting AQ, and we have foolishly conflated the two. The war against AQ is happening elsewhere, occasionally we hear about drone strikes and the recent direct action mission that resulted in killing UBL. Those actions I support.
You wrote,
“not with a handful of ridiculous assumptions rooted in why this problem is the fault of any or everything other than their own actions; and instead begin the same way any addict begins their path to true healing. "Hello, my name is government X, and I have a problem."”
Agree, but why would design start with assumptions to begin with? First you study/learn, then make and test assumptions. Of course the government may be the primary driver of the conflict, no one is refuting that, and while that may be understood we may still choose to support that government (Iraq and Afghanistan for example).
You wrote, “Sure, there are small numbers from all communities who respond to Islamic-based messages being used, but where large bases of Muslim popular support rest is where these political issues remain unresolved.”
I’ll buy that, but again if it is our policy to protect those governments because we’re opposed to or scared of what the change may mean to our interests, what do you propose?
You make a great point when you wrote,
“Iran had self-determination and got stuck with more bad governance. But that populace no longer blames the US for their problems, so they do not attack us. It is primarily the populaces of our allies and partners in the region who attack us.”
This illustrates both our points, the people were victorious and now the State of Iran is a threat to our interests. This can be used by those who embrace the old school approach to foreign policy as example of why we should continue to endeavor to prop up illegitimate regimes that support our interests.
Your predictions about the Arab Spring are pretty bold. I hope you’re right, but it is too way too early to tell. Chaos tends to demand order, and those who can provide that order may not be what the people really want, so in the longer run no issues may have been resolved, and instead they might just be passing the crown to another dictator.
With the exception of our views on AQ, our ideas don’t diverge significantly, but I think they appear to diverge because you are focused on fixing policy, and I’m focused on the best way to use the military to achieve stated policy objectives regardless of whether the policy is good or bad.
"Islamist extremists, since our ideas are opposed to one another and incompatible. Extremism isn't caused by poverty, and it isn't due to our actions, it is due to a particular set of beliefs."
And in that quote lies the essence of our point of disagreement.
You subscribe to the position that people attack us, not because of injuries we have done to them over time and how they feel about those injuries; but rather because they are suffering from a form of mental illness rooted in their religious beliefs and enflamed by some evil genius and his "radical" messages.
I, on the other hand, see insurgency (and on the transnational scale, organizations with regional agendas which recruit from insurgent populaces of a wide range of states) as being primarily Political in purpose. I see the primary drivers as being true grievances between some or various segments of some populace and some government that affects their lives in ways they don't like and that they blame on that government.
Governments always shun responsibility for their actions and place blame on factors beyond their control. They blame the economy. They blame the people who dare to complain as being ungrateful or disloyal, or crazy. They blame poverty. They blame foreign states. They blame differences of race or religion. They blame the messages employed to rally and motivate aggrieved populaces to action. We see this in our own current Presidential election process. Insurgency is merely illegal politics where effective legal options do not exist.
The United States in regards to transnational terrorism; and every national government faced with insurgency; needs to begin their "design" process not with a handful of ridiculous assumptions rooted in why this problem is the fault of any or everything other than their own actions; and instead begin the same way any addict begins their path to true healing. "Hello, my name is government X, and I have a problem."
You know as well as I, that the largest, most populous Muslim nations in the world are largely immune to AQ message. Why do you think that is? Because Arab Muslims are more susceptible to brain washing than other Muslims are?? No. Because Arab Muslims share a common political grievance rooted in Western Colonialism and Containment activities that have manipulated the governance of their region since the fall of the Ottomans. Muslims elsewhere, in places like India, Indonesia, Malaysia, etc have already addressed those political grievances. Sure, there are small numbers from all communities who respond to Islamic-based messages being used, but where large bases of Muslim popular support rest is where these political issues remain unresolved.
This is why Arab Spring, perhaps the true ending of the Cold War as Western containment structures begin to be pushed back in the Middle East much as Soviet controlling structures were pushed back by the populaces of Eastern Europe 25 years ago; is far more productive in moving us out of this era of transnational terrorism than anything we have done in Iraq or Afghanistan, or even the Philippines. Our actions seek to sustain or expand our status quo of controlling influence over that region and those populaces. Their own actions seek to provide themselves the same opportunity at self-determination as enjoyed by others where we do not feel we have such vital interests to protect. What they will get is yet to be seen. Iran had self-determination and got stuck with more bad governance. But that populace no longer blames the US for their problems, so they do not attack us. It is primarily the populaces of our allies and partners in the region who attack us. We should as "why is that" in this design process you mention. But ask that question free of the bias of "it is the fault of ideology and region, not the political actions of us and our allies" that you describe above.
Ideology does not cause insurgency. Bad political situations do. Ideology is a tool, like a rifle or IED. A smart insurgent with a smart message will jam it into the crack of poor governace and pry. You can attack that man and his tools, but he will not go away. Others will step forward, and if one tool breaks they will get a new one. The role of governments is getting harder. Domestic and Foreign policies need to get a whole lot smarter and more equitable, or it is going to be a long century...
Bob,
Mostly in agreement, but using your first example to make my point. If several men on an operation are heat exhaustion victims the doctor will assume they all have heat exhaustion and beging the standard treatment protocol only to find one of the men with similiar signs and symptoms having a diabetic shock event, looks similiar, but it is very different and so is the treatment.
I don't know where you perceive I get uptight about dropping the colonial COIN baggage, I'm not a fan of the impact that FM 3-24 has had on our force. On the other hand being 100% opposed to all the ideas in the doctrine would be equally bias as accepting them all. I'm actually for understanding our policy goals, then understanding the situation, and then determining the correct strategy period. I can't make it any clearer than that.
Generally in agreement with your last paragraph, but I think it is a fool's errand to try to address the underlying causes of Islamist extremists, since our ideas are opposed to one another and incompatible. Extremism isn't caused by poverty, and it isn't due to our actions, it is due to a particular set of beliefs. While it may be possible to meet certain groups like the IRA, NPA, MILF, and even the Taliban half way and reach acceptable political compromises, there is no appeasing groups like Al Qaeda who want to forceably impose their views on the world. There are simply some situations where outlier groups need to be eliminated. Has little to do with COIN, just as our occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan had little to do with COIN. They were part of the negative ways and means we pursued in my opinion.
Bill,
You want your doctor to begin his examination of you with a fundamental understanding of medicine and human anatomy.
You want your mechanic to being his examination of your car with a fundamental understanding of internal combustion.
You want your child's school teacher to begin his approach to teaching with a fundamental understanding of principles of education and knowledge of the topics to be taught.
Yet you get very tight when anyone suggests that we should drop the archaic body of colonial / containment /pre-modern information age, self-serving practices in our COIN doctrine, and develop a similar fundamental foundation to begin from??
I understand what your position is, but I find it odd. It was once standard practice to think disease was caused by sin and not germs. We moved on. Time to drop equally ridiculous notions about insurgency and move on as well. Concepts such as "sanctuary as ungoverned space", or the role of "effective" government as curing insurgency; or how "separating the insurgent from the populace" are all as crazy as blaming infection on impure thoughts.
It is time for powerful states to adjust to the fact that controlling (or attempting to control) outcomes for others is a far more dangerous and difficult business than it once was, with much more immediate and powerful implications back in their own homelands. If we want to get serious about reducing the threat of transnational terrorism we need to move beyond attacking the symptoms and begin to think more completely about how we reduce the aspects of causation and motivation that are tied to our own actions and policies abroad. Our ends are largely fine, but our Ways and Means are long overdue for a serious overhaul. Forming a clearer understanding of how insurgencies form and grow is a critical aspect of that.
Bob
Let me get this straight, we should start design with a framework of fundamental understanding? So instead of studying the environment as it really is and determining what changes we would like to see (doesn't mean any of these desired changes are remotely possible), and then determine what needs to be done to achieve those changes, we should start design with preconceived bias?
Forget winning and losing in irregular warfare, but we are obligated to achieve the objectives that support policy goals. If that can be achieved by working with the people then so be it, if it can't then we need to take another approach. You're arguing it is immoral to conduct actions that will negatively affect a particular segment of the population. I'm not arguing about the morality of our policy since that is separate debate, but about the actions the USG needs to take (that is what we control) to achieve the specific policy objectives. If it is our policy to maintain U.S. bases in country X, and the X Gov/dictator suppports our bases, but the majority of the population does not, it may very well be our policy to support the dictator against an insurgent element. We'll probably be in agreement that doesn't reflect U.S. values, but once the decision is made it really doesn't matter. What are the actions we should take? We don't start off with Bob's model and then act anymore than we should start off with our clear, hold and build approach. We should start off with developing an understanding of that particular environment/situation without preconceived biases (as much as humanly possible), then determine what actions we should recommend. I suspect if we enable the X to stay in power, then as you stated things will stay as messed up as they were before or get worse, but since our objective in this case limited to keeping our friend X in power to support larger strategic objectives that doesn't matter.
Fortunately we rarely if ever take that approach anymore, so the purpose of this example was simply to point out our actions depend on a lot of factors.
Bill, you appear to be building assumptions around your personal biases. No one says anything about "the majority of the populace" except for you. No one is saying "one size fits all" yet you argue against that unmade position.
Now, as to what I did say and believe that "winning" in insurgency is not simply keeping the government one created or adopted in power. Maybe 150 years ago, but such thinking today does little more that motivate the segment of that populace NOT represented by your little social experiment to rush to the nearest transnational terrorist recruiting station to volunteer for overseas duty. Nor is losing necessarily the result of the insurgent prevailing. Sometime neither side wins, but due to the conflict changes in governance are made that makes things better for more of the people than before.
So a win can be a loss or a win; a loss can be a loss or a win; and a tie also can be either. Or neither. ADM Mullen got this right, whether he understands why he got it right or not. (I did not share his three principals for a new American Way of War, and I really felt he missed the mark there).
Historically winning is indeed measured in the expansion of the percentage of the populace that feels they are being well-served by a government they recognize as their own. You need examples?
The American Revolution. Total freaking disaster for the populace following the defeat of Britain, but with a new constitution and a few generations of growing into the concept of a single nation under that governance and the populace as a whole ultimately got the win sought by the few who decided for the rest to throw of Britain.
Malaya. The form of Colonial government and total control over governance Britain had at the start of the conflict was completely dissolved by the end of the conflict. We focus on what the soldiers did in the field, but it was the changes of governance designed to address the very real grievances of the ethnic Chinese and Indian populaces and the relinquishment of British Control that gave the true win to a much larger segment of the populace than was "winning" under the original construct.
American Civil Rights movement. By passing and enforcing new laws that expanded the goodness of American governance to a much broader segment of American populace America as a nation won. Johnson on the other hand stepped down and retired from politics having lost the support of both parties in his efforts.
It goes on and on. Even more examples of where the government "won" or the insurgent "won" and things either stayed as messed up as they were before or got worse. The Philippines is a poster nation for this, Algeria as well. More modernly we'll see what the government in Sri Lanka does with their "win" and what the Egyptian populace does with theirs as well in due time. Very likely the populace will not win in either case.
A framework of fundamental understanding is the start point for design when one is faced with an insurgency to intervene in. Otherwise one is just guessing and applying very biased lessons learned captured from other efforts where one Western nation or another engaged to promote their objectives in some region with little regard to the impact of the affected populaces of that same region.
This is the same type of illogical thinking that Dave Maxwell warns about in his post. The COG theory is flawed to begin with, but to assume you can determine the COG based on a model or theory is deeply flawed. You're prescribing an approach/strategy, before you even understand our policy objectives and the context of the conflict we're about to engage in.
The people may or may not be the prize or COG. ADM Mullen was out in left field with the comment you reference. That isn't a way of war or COIN, and sure as heck isn't right if the people's success has little or nothing to do with our objectives. One can argue that the people's success in Libya may have in our interest, but even that is overly simplistic. There are Libyans who benefited from numbnut's rule, and people who didn't, so even the choosing the "people's success" in this case means we picked a side. Our objectives were not neutral. There have been and will continue to be cases when the people's success is not feasible nor our objective.
You can argue until you're blue in the face it is their fight (your comments below), but we also have objectives and we're fighting to achieve them, so accept the fact there are numerous warring parties in Afghanistan, Iraq and other places, and we are one warring party among many with our own objectives.
The one size fits all thinking that FM 3-24 has promoted has seriously degraded our ability to think critically. The FM argues that people are the COG (false argument, because winning majority support in itself still doesn't "defeat" an insurgency), so counter arguments are either it is or it isn't, and if we think about it we know the correct answer isn't binary, it is more complicated than that.
Obviously no need to engage in design thinking we already understand the environment and what we need to do, as you said numerous times it isn't complex. However, that assessment is wrong and what you're proposing is equally dangerous to the narrow thinking that FM 3-24 promotes.
Bob:
Nicely put and I agree with you. In my short post I was simply stating that if strategy said use pop centric coin to achieve policy aims--and when i say pop centric coin i am refering to FM 3-24, current American style coin--and in that operatioal construct, yes we actually have become quite dogmatic about what the cog is.
In fact i would take it a step further and say that if strategy committed to another endeavor of long term, armed nation building to defeat an insurgency and in a wild hypothetical if i was made the overall officer in charge i would want Bob Jones's understanding and explanations of what an insurgency is, how to operate in one, etc.
Gian,
While I am comfortable with a statement such as "the populace is the prize," and while I can make an argument for the populace as the center of gravity as well, I don't think one necessarily implies the other. I also think you have to be able to step back from the reality that in war, a center of gravity is something one must DEFEAT to succeed; whereas in Insurgency it is something one must secure the support of. At least in revolutionary insurgency. Knowing what kind of war one is in remains that most essential of tasks. If one determines they are in an insurgency, to then understand what type (or often types) of insurgency they are in is equally critical.
But where most go wrong, and where Pop-Centric COIN goes wrong in particular, is that it somehow translates an awareness of the populace as the prize into a task to fix, bribe, or somehow cajole the populace into supporting the current government. This is 180 degrees out. The populace is merely measuring device on how well the government is performing. Every state is made up of many such "measuring devices." When one of these devices begins to indicate there is a problem by drifting away from the government, or supporting groups (from their midst or from elsewhere) who seek to modify or change the government through illegal means, this is an indicator that the GOVERNMENT is broken in some way, not the populace.
Most COIN sets out with the mindset that "winning" is the preservation of the current regime; but in almost every case it is some aspect of the current regime (how they came to power, how they exercise power, etc) that is the root of the problem.
Currently there is high-level discussion about what "The American Way of War is" and how it might need to evolve in the future from historic approaches described by historians such as Dr. Weigley (We all have a copy of that big pink book propping something up, or holding something down somewhere...). In looking for current thoughts I ran across a speech ADM Mullen gave 3 March 2010 at Kansas State. I think he missed the mark on his offered three principles (more a take on the application of the US military, rather than on how we wage war), but he did make one comment I agree with completely and that needs to be explored, and that comment was in regard to "winning": "In this type of war, when the objective is not the enemy's defeat, but rather the people's success, less really is more."
Both threat centric and pop centric COIN lose sight of this most critical of insights. Preserving the government as is, or defeating the insurgent are neither one going to ensure the "people's success." Most likely it is some minority of the populace, ranging from 10-40%, which feels they are outside "the circle of trust" and are acting out against the government. To simply drag or bribe this segment to come back inside the circle is not likely to produce more than a temporary effect. Government must either expand the circle (the true success of Malaya, also the American Civil rights movement); or make more circles (the Balkans breaking down into multiple new states of satisfied populaces, or the creation of the semi-autonomous Kurdish region within the Iraqi state). Whatever the approach, there is always a role for security forces, and there will be a need for security efforts as a supporting effort. But history offers no examples where nation building, development, or simply expanding governmental effectiveness helps resolve an insurgency; any more than simply killing insurgents does. It ultimately comes down to how the disaffected segment of the populace FEELS about the governance they receive, and some aspects are much more important than others. In my research and analysis it is feelings of how the state exercises its sovereign duty of protecting populace (thus the irony of sending out state security forces to attack this same segment of the populace when they act out); whether they believe this government has a right to govern them (legitimacy); whether they believe they receive justice under the rule of law; whether they feel they receive a respect equal to other similarly situated segments of the populace; and whether they believe trusted, certain and legal means to affect and shape government are available to them.
So, yes, I believe the populace is indeed "the prize;" but more often than not, they are not also the problem.
Cheers!
Bob
Strategy should determine a center of gravity. Clausewitz says that a center of gravity is something to be discovered; the rules of population centric coin that the "people are the prize" have done the discovering for us.
When I was a student at the Coin Academy in December 2005 at Taji one of the instructors said just that: that the "people are the center of gravity." When i raised my hand and asked why the people are the center of gravity I got an answer that mumbled something about Galula combined with a stare that i didnt know what the heck i was talking about by asking such a question.
Now if good strategy determines that the most cost effective operational method to achieve policy aims is pop centric coin, then sure the people can be the center of gravity. But because the operational method of pop coin has eclipsed strategic thinking, we know can only imagine that in any coin operation it must be so.
The rub in "'we don't care who is in charge, or what form of government is adopted, so long as both are self-determined by the people of the region in a manner consistent with their culture; and so long as those people retain legal means of self-determination equally consistent with their culture. We will work with you, because we have interests here, and your success is our success'" is that there are no "people" or "culture" in any monolithic/holistic sense.
Invariably, wherever we look, there is cultural pluralism at work. We, indeed, may not "begin to move the trend of growing transnational terrorism and the presence of violent extremist groups in the opposite direction" because in this turbulence of incomplete agreement to hostile animosity probability probably supports the proposition that most often we will misread or misapply the varying degrees of influence that might resolve into some dynamic stability for the nation-state in question.
(And the applicability of the nation-state idea is itself perhaps a obsolete context, e.g. aren't Afghanistan, Somalia, Yemen, a few others, maybe someday soon Pakistan or Mexico [the latter in particular for its sketchy history with central rule] more defacto nation-states that are defined more by the borders and contexts of surrounding, more solid nation-states? A digression/topic for another day...)
Getting to the point where who does the self-determining in which way and at levels of workable buy-in is the conundrum. And in our American tendency to mirror, the myriad non-American forms (and could we start-up a USA today? I say no) of governance put us where Mike suggests, as our own biggest problem. Does this mean stay out, don't get involved, which is unsatisfactory and most likely unrealistic, at least in a comprehensive, never again sense? Dunno. I know that's not a good answer either.
Typically the heart of the problem is the government. Governments don't like to hear that, even though more often than not it is small, low-cost, but important changes that make all the difference. Treat the entire populace as well as you treat your base of support. No need for massive development efforts to bribe, or massive security efforts to suppress.
For intervening governments the heart of the problem is typically that they come to confuse their relationship with some govenrment as being their relationship with the nation-state as a whole. (See Bill Moore's comments above). The GOVERNMENTS of the GCC are concerned about recent US support shifting from being all about keeping their manicured, purfumed butts in power to one of being more focused on the improving of governance across the entire nation-state. In 1945 it made sense for FDR to commit to Ibn Saud to keep him and his family in power in exchange for an exclusive relationship built around the development of the Saudi oil industry. Today Saudi Arabia is still important, but the nature of the relationship is long overdue for a major overhaul. The US should become as committed to the success of the Arabian nation-state as we have been to the Success of the Saudi monarchy. That may seem a subtle nuance to many, but it is clearly not a subtle nuance to the Saudi Family. It is equally clearly not a subtle nuance to the thousands of young men who have fled Saudi Arabia to take sanctuary in places like Yemen or Pakistan to train for the day they can return and seek through illegal means the political changes they are currently denied any legal means to address. Yes, these men are very susceptible to the AQ message that to have success at home they must first help AQ break the excessive US support to sustaining particular regimes in power in the region. "You help us, and we will help you." Is a simple, but effective message.
In Afghanistan what is "winning" for the US? The preservation of GIRoA or an expansion of good governance to a broader segment of the Afghan populace than the half that were inside the Taliban circle of trust, or the half that for the past 10 years have been within the GIRoA circle of trust? How do we expand the circle? We rationalize that we are committed to better governance for all, but we make OUR condition precedent that we will achieve that by making the government we elevated to power and helped shape be the vehicle that is achieved through.
When we can say "we don't care who is in charge, or what form of government is adopted, so long as both are self-determined by the people of the region in a manner consistent with their culture; and so long as those people retain legal means of self-determination equally consistent with their culture. We will work with you, because we have interests here, and your success is our success." Then we begin to move the trend of growing transnational terrorism and the presence of violent extremist groups in the opposite direction. Attacking these groups and propping up specific regimes only makes the problem worse.
Let's just get down to business here. If in fact the population is NOT the center of gravity in counterinsurgency warfare, then - what is ? Body counts ? Control of the ground ? Multiple "lines of operations" ? I'm being deliberately and rhetorically aggressive here, because if one is to have a discussion about COIN strategy, it does not good at all to just say, "Stay clear of these situations", or some other obfuscatory mechanism that avoids the theoretical issues altogether. (We've had)Enough of that. I concede that post-conflict reconstruction implies that the conflict is actually over. But if in fact, it is not the rebuilding effort that is the focus of the enemy's actions, but in fact one's own combat forces, then it is reasonable to ask what role those forces play in securing anything, much less the population. Likewise, if what is taking place amounts to a civil war, and one takes sides (or even does not take sides, from time to time), then under what circumstances does the control and security of the population make conceptual sense at all ? Are there in fact circumstances where the people become the enemy, and how does one act if such is the case ? And once you have subdued these people (as I assume the COINTRA position demands), how do your past actions affect how you deal with the self-same people afterwards ?