James Reed's short article posted today touches on Clausewitz's still relevant conceptions of fog and friction and their impact on the conduct of warfare. I am posting this article as much for its content as for the prospect of debate in the comments section over the U.S. military's preparedness to deal with fog and friction on today's battlefield. While some suggest that modern technology offers the promise of information dominance, I think most readers will find that both information overload and information starvation can lead to fog, friction, and paralysis. How do we train and educate leaders to overcome the paralysis caused by the combination of an expectation of information dominance and the choking influence of risk-averse climates? In an environment of data overload, how do we educate commanders to step back from the numbers and matrices and see the whole picture and the details that can only be sensed, not quantified? In an operating environment where adversaries may be able to jam or otherwise compromise our communications and information systems, how do we ensure that our troops and leaders can continue the fight "unplugged" as we become more and more reliant on our technological advantages? These are questions I hope you are thinking about and I look forward to your comments.
Comments
It's easy to feel like you…
It's easy to feel like you're not in control of anything when it feels like the world is constantly changing around you. But, https://www.superiorpapers.com/programming-assignment-help.php are ways for students to cope with uncertainty that can help them feel more prepared for what life throws their way.
don't you think it's a little too much? it's tough out there nowadays but come on, the country doesn't even have overland enemies. the world is afraid of you more than you are afraid of it.
__________
<a href="http://freemkvtoaviconverter.com/">mkv to avi freeware</a>
Pete,
Good topics! Information overload and paralysis are definitely topics to research and also incorporate into the education of junior and senior staff officers. Working with some of the unmanned aerial vehicle programs, I have seen times when data is taken as information and vice versa. This can severely slow the Assessment loop of the decision making cycle.
While technology has created new platforms and paths, I wonder if service culture may also play into some of the paralysis. Many seem to criticize the Navy and their infancy in the development of doctrine, but it seems that a dogmatic approach to the ISR process does leave one at a disadvantage when one of those technology paths/systems is lost.
I'd also like to add the zero defect mentality that senior officers are subjected to today may also add to that friction when tasked to make that critical decision.
Would add more, but gotta run.
Vr
GG