A-10s Saved the Day in Botched Afghanistan Raid by David Axe, War is Boring
On June 9, five U.S. Special Operations Forces commandos died when a U.S. Air Force B-1 bomber mistakenly attacked their position in southern Afghanistan—presumably dropping JDAM satellite-guided bombs on the commandos from high altitude.
The accidental bombing comes as the Air Force is trying—with some success—to convince Congress to allow the flying branch to retire all 230 of its remaining A-10 Warthog attack jets, which specialize in low, slow attacks in close proximity to friendly troops.
The Air Force insists the high-flying B-1 and other warplanes can adequately replace the A-10. But the June 9 incident undermines the Air Force’s case. Likewise, a similar incident seven years ago involving a B-1—“Bone” to the ground troops—and A-10s highlights the yawning differences between the two plane types and their pilots…
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Interesting document:AIR COMBAT COMMAND STRATEGIC PlAN 2014
http://www.acc.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-140617-019.pdf
ACC is the Core Function Lead for the following five Service Core Functions:
Command and Control (C2)
Global Integrated Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance(GIISR)
Air Superiority (AS)
Global Precision Attack (GPA)
Personnel Recovery(PR)
Where is CAS???
CAS may be transfered to The United States Coast Guard(With C-27J).
US Army Welcome to the Real World!!!
With Love from General Mark Anthony Welsh III,Chief of Staff USAF
Keep in mind that the following argument is just my speculation about the USAF Reaper to answer the groupthink notion of non-permissive A2/AD environments and claimed over-investment in "non-stealthy" UAS. Wouldn’t we all agree that only Russia and China present the sole “high” air defense threats? Iran, Syria, and North Korea might be the sole “medium” threats in terms of both air defenses and fighter aircraft. I argue that it would take a relatively brief time for manned stealth aircraft to reduce medium air defense and fighter threats to acceptable levels for non-stealthy remotely piloted aircraft and manned helicopter operations.
You might counter that if stealth aircraft reduce the air defense threat to acceptable levels, the A-10C then can fly. The problem is that in 1999, NATO allies began Operation Allied Force on March 24/25th. Over a month later on May 2, an F-16 was shot down by a radar SA-3 missile and an A-10 was damaged by an older shoulder-fired MANPAD. The old SA-3 is also what was thought to have downed the F-117 in the first few days of the 78-day air war.
These are very old air defense systems that pale in comparison to what Russia, China, and medium threats possess today. The SA-6 that shot down Scott O’Gray’s F-16 in 1995 is circa the 1973 Yom Kipper war and it gave Israeli F-4s fits. Keep in mind also that during the Cold War, systems like the old SA-6 had the USAF believing that very high attrition rates would result to A-10s. That was 30+ years ago. Today’s air defenses are far, far more advanced and more affordable to adversaries than the manned fighter aircraft they would need to counter our stealth fighters. Even stealth aircraft are challenged by them according to General Hostage in the Breaking Defense articles.
The Allied Force example suggests that cautious air defenders even with very old equipment can make their systems survive longer than a month by limiting how often they turn on radars and when/who they choose to engage. If you are flying a “low” flying non-stealthy 4th generation manned aircraft such as the A-10 or F-16 a month into any conflict you still face substantial potential risks. That probably is not the case for an F-35 or F-22 flying at medium and high altitudes. If you are operating a non-stealthy remotely piloted aircraft at medium altitude, the risks are limited except to radar missiles <strong>and </strong> no pilot is at risk so does it really matter?
Then examine a semi-recent incident off Iran where a single F-22 pilot showed up to ruin the plans of a pair of Iranian F-4s that appeared to be threatening a USAF Predator over international waters. They didn’t know the Raptor was there underneath them checking out their weapons load until he suddenly revealed himself on their left wing according to a story told by General Mark Welsh who said the USAF reservist told the Iranian pair that “you really ought to go home.”
Lesson? We can fly non-stealthy UAS to include Reapers, Global Hawks and Tritons off the 12-mile limit of any country and along international borders whenever we desire provided standby air support protects them and we retaliate in some manner if threats attack them with their aircraft or air defenses. True, we can’t fly non-stealthy RPAs over the top of China, Russia, or any medium threat country. However, neither could we fly stealthy RPAs over medium to high threat territory very often in peacetime without them eventually being shot down visually by adversary fighters.
We can fly Reapers high over most other low threat troubled areas to include current Iraq, particularly at night, without much concern of losing an aircraft. Even if a Reaper/Predator/Gray Eagle is lost they are relatively cheap and have no stealth technology able to be compromised/copied by adversaries.
All,
The A-10 is an outstanding platform for CAS. That being said it does have limitations. But nothing we in the inventory can fill it's role. No it isn't a sleek fighter. But we don't need it in the interceptor role. In the ground support role we do. It can be covered by other fighter aircraft if needed. It could be improved, and updated. It can handle ground fire and if MANPADS are the issue, why? We still fly helos... This mythical idea that with just enough technology we can avoid losses and casualties. Or that technology will ever completely clear up the fog of war. It's armour and handling abilities at low altitude and speed make it the heat for CAS. Based on our policy of complete air superiority before the ground guys move, we don't need it to fly as high as an SR 72 or or carry as much as a B-1. It can do more than GS as well.
As for the fratricide issue, training and more training are what is needed. Don't get me wrong because I love them, but why are we using junior enlisted JTAC and FO's to call for any type of CAS? Because they went to a school house? Why not send more senior NCOs, with years of experience in land nav, tactics and just plain getting themselves out of a pickle to the courses and have them do it? Even with this we will never completely get rid of fratricide.
Let us not forget we had to retrofit F-4 in Vietnam with guns in order to take on NV migs. The A-10 still has a place and for the foreseeable future in my opinion.
As a matter of fact I have wonder alot about the using prop driven aircraft in places like Iraq and Afghanistan, for CAS. It would seem to me that a fleet of consisting of much less expensive prop driven aircraft (probably a couple types) could provide CAS in locations were we have complete and total air supremacy. The argument that the A-10 isn't fast enough is AF brass BS. They just like shiny new toys. And are in love with the idea that technology can make everything better... Which it cannot. The best way to insert a nail into a piece of wood is a $30 hammer... A hammer with a zillion dollar paint job isn't going to do it any better and maybe worse because you won't want to scratch or hurt the hammer.
One more thing, as a ground guy nothing makes me as happy as when a wart shows up.
1st Its big difference between service ceiling: 50,000 ft (but without weapons and most fuel) and operational altitude.
2nd People size target need “soda straw" field of view AND 10-15 000 AGL altitude.
CAS requires great situation awareness.You need see smoke,cloud dust,movement.Doing fast evasion maneuver-without 2seconds satellite delay.Solution eyeballs Mk.1 and stabilisation binos.
Kosovo war air operation restricted above 15 000AGL except A-10 Hog airborne FAC only 5000AGL.
3rd “permissive” environment is USAF terms
2.2.1(U) Threat Environment Classifications. The threat environment relates primarily to the enemy's ability to detect and lethally engage rescue aircraft.
2.2.1.1(U) No Threat/Permissive: Environment permits operations with virtually no probability of combat or enemy detection leading to engagement.
2.2.1.2(U) Low: Environment contains threats; however, dispersal, concentration, and warfare capabilities of the enemy permit operations to proceed with passive measures taken to avoid detection. Detection of rescue forces by the enemy is likely to be without consequence; if the enemy engages, weapons encountered will typically be small arms, man portable (MANPAD) surface-to-air missiles (SAM), rocket-propelled grenades, and light optically aimed anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) up to .50 caliber/14.5mm.
2.2.1.3(U) Medium: Environment contains significant threats. Dispersal, concentration, mobility, and warfare capabilities of the enemy permit operations to proceed with active measures taken to avoid detection and threats. Detection of rescue forces by the enemy is likely to result in engagement. Weapon systems typically include low-threat systems plus early generation SAM, radar-controlled AAA, and aircraft lacking effective look-down/shoot-down and/or all-weather capability. Aircrews can expect to employ extensive mission planning, threat evasive maneuvers, avoidance tactics, onboard electronic countermeasures systems, and/or defensive threat suppression measures to accomplish the mission. The medium-threat environment may require attack deliveries from force protection packages such as Rescue Escort (RESCORT)/ Force Protection or other Close Air Support aircraft. The environment may restrict the flexibility of attack tactics in the objective area.
2.2.1.4(U) High: A high-threat environment is created by a hostile force which includes widely dispersed, densely concentrated, integrated air defense systems; advanced or late generation SAMs; aircraft with all-aspect and look-down/shoot-down capabilities; modern ground-based radars or passive detection systems; significant quantities of highly trained and mobile ground forces; and electronic warfare capabilities which would seriously diminish the ability of rescue operations to proceed without large-scale combat protection packages. Some of the ground-based systems may be hardened or be unusually difficult to destroy/render inoperable. Rescue- specific assets should be employed in environments with integrated defense systems only when those systems can be adequately suppressed by other CAF assets. CSAR forces are not currently capable of prosecuting rescue missions in a high-threat environment without significant threat degradation and force protection from enemy air- and ground-based weapons.
4th Airplane without aircraft survivability equipment(ASE)aren't survivable manned or unmanned .RPV is slow circling target with big radar cross section.
MQ-1/9 without ASE is expensive,low ability,dumb training target.
Tomahawk is steahl design and low level flying(terrain masking tactics)
5th RPV value without survivability in air defense is NIL.
6th Remember Iran Trophy was RQ-170 not manned jets.
I'm sorry for horrible pingin English.
Love your name.;)
<blockquote>1st Operational level MQ-1/9 is ONLY 10-15 000MSL-inside MANPADS and flak envelope</blockquote>
Please refer to the manufacturer's specs. The Predator B is the Reaper.
http://www.ga-asi.com/products/aircraft/predator_b.php
Note all are capable of altitudes higher than 20,000'. Just because "operational level" aircraft in these wars have flown lower does not mean it is required. Flak is a WWII term, correct?
<blockquote>2nd RPV have Very Narrow field of view.It is through a “soda straw”</blockquote> Field of view is variable. Operators can be cued. The battlefield has many sources of cueing information to include from troops on the ground in contact, the JTAC, and all kinds of other ISR assets.
<blockquote>3rd Reaper is survivable only in a “permissive” environment, which in truth means an absence of air defenses.</blockquote>"Permissive" is an ambiguous and grossly overused and misinterpreted term that fails to recognize what the operational environment threats are to remotely piloted aircraft following a stealth aircraft SEAD and DEAD campaign. A stripped down high hour Predator crashed into a river in Baghdad after it ran out of fuel thinking it would be shot down by air defenses. It wasn't. Do you think your typical gun or MANPAD threat can even see a remotely piloted aircraft at higher altitudes?
<blockquote>4th Nil radar warning receiver,missile warning receiver,countermeasures dispenser or Radio Frequency Countermeasure! </blockquote>
I was talking about manned helicopters. RPAs risk no men/women pilots and cost a lot less. A trade-off of one expensive air defense missile for an RPA is not a bad exchange particularly if it means the threat turns on radars long enough for a partner Apache/Guardian to target it. Perhaps countermeasures for RPAs will come later. Who knows.
<blockquote>5th Even five Reapers would not match the air to ground capability of one A-10.</blockquote>True, but the flight hour costs for 8 Reapers are about the same as one pair of A-10s. One pair of Warthogs can support one area for a relatively brief time in hours and aerial refueling will be required. Eight Reapers can support eight AOR areas nearly continuously providing security, information collection, and lethality until other manned aircraft arrive and are provided accurate coordinates and situational understanding thanks to the Reaper/JTAC interface.
<blockquote>6th Command datalink is vulnerable to radio jamming.</blockquote>And GPS bombs destroyed GPS jammers in OIF. A jammer is an emitter that can be targeted. The threat nations that can destroy lots of satellites are few and deterred by MAD and in China's case...trade. The Army is not dependent on satellite datalinks.
1st Operational level MQ-1/9 is ONLY 10-15 000MSL-inside MANPADS and flak envelope
2nd RPV have Very Narrow fiel of view.It is through a “soda straw”
3rd Reaper is survivable only in a “permissive” environment, which in truth means an absence of air defenses.
4th Nil radar warning receiver,missile warning receiver,countermeasures dispenser or Radio Frequency Countermeasure!
5th Even five Reapers would not match the air to ground capability of one A-10.
6th Command datalink is vulnerable to radio jamming.
Steve,
Actually, I believe the USAF and Navy tend to exaggerate threats they face because naval threats in particular are largely hypothetical given no major sea battles since WWII or large amphibious assaults since Inchon. Look at the Israeli record in the 1982 Bekaa valley: 82 to zip in air-to-air. No F-15 has ever been shot down. The Russian and Chinese air forces and navies contain mostly old aircraft and ships that could not compete with our subs and air-delivered munitions able to sink/down them. Their carriers would soon be submarines.
No other world air force or air defense threat is remotely comparable to the main two threats and they would not be threats that long. However, the F-35, F-22, and B-2 and whatever costly LRS-B we end up with deplete these air defenses and fighter threats so that our helicopters and low-cost drones can operate with relative impunity other than long-range missile attacks. No need to fill our fleets with vast numbers of stealth drones. We are building a costly stealth manned aircraft fleet that at some point could be converted at relatively low cost into a standby largely-parked remotely piloted aircraft fleet. The Navy's UCLASS fleet for instance does not need extraordinary penetrating stealth given the EA-18G, F-35B/C, stand-off munitions, and a future USAF capability.
I was disappointed to see former UN ambassador John Bolton claim this morning that MANPADs can shoot down high-flying remotely piloted aircraft. That's wrong. AAA guns can't either. They don't reach that high and that's why F-35s etc. will fly at medium altitudes. I was disappointed to attend a 2011 Fort Benning reconnaissance conference that barely addressed Army manned and unmanned aircraft capabilities. A well-respected historian think tank PhD in attendance made untrue claims about helicopter and RPA vulnerability apparently unaware of modern aircraft survivability equipment enhancements. Retired MG Scales tried to point out advantages of RPA and UAS but his thoughts were met with silence.
The ground, air, and sea components all speak and think different languages. Joint education is intended to build fluency between the components but only the Marines get close to understanding cross-domain warfare and even they are infantry-centric. We must listen when the USAF tells us that the A-10 won't survive radar air defenses. They are not exaggerating.
Did my other comment about integrated air defenses survive because I don't see it and personally did not delete it. General Hostage addressed most of your concerns but your point about flying hour costs deserves a response. According to a Mark Thompson article in Time, an A-10C costs $17,716 per hour but recall that they fly in pairs adding up to nearly $35.5 thousand.
In contrast a single B-1B costs $57,807 per hour. Due to its speed and endurance you conceivably could have a single aircraft supporting all of Afghanistan at any given time (my speculation). In contrast you may need 3 pairs of A-10s in different sectors I speculate. Then add aerial refueling not necessary for the topped off B-1B but essential for the A-10C with a KC-10A costing $21,170 per hour.
In this analysis, manned fixed wing costs are about a wash. Then consider the cost of a Predator at $3679 and a Reaper at $4762 per hour. Helicopter costs also are lower than the A-10C. The A-10C had its day but time and threats move on. My handle is "Move Forward" in response to another's "Backward Observer" name. This is another example where looking backward does not offer the correct answer to future conflict. Think Syria and Sunni areas of Iraq that may host future terrorists thinking they have safe haven. We can't overfly Syria with 4th generation airpower but future F-35s and current B-2s/F-22s can strike terror networks wherever they choose to originate.
I don't tend to take the AF's word on this stuff, honestly. They've wanted to get rid of the A-10 for years. I know about integrated air defenses, thanks. I also know that the AF's theories about this kind of thing tend to break down very quickly once combat starts. There will be times when an F-35 HAS to fly into an AAA zone. And as soon as we lose one or two in that environment the AF will find reasons not to send them in again. The AH-64 doesn't have the loiter time or the survivability to be a realistic replacement for the A-10. That's another red herring.
There's far more money to be saved mothballing the B-2 or the B-1 than there is taking the A-10 fleet out of commission.
At this point the F-35 is barely capable of flying....so I think it's a bit premature to say that it can survive in a high-threat air defense environment. I also think it's incredibly premature to claim that it could survive any sort of AAA hit. Also, given its high cost per unit, how likely will it be that the AF will actually use the F-35 in a high-threat zone? Also, what's the cost per sortie of a B-1 versus an A-10?
Sorry, but I remain unconvinced that we're wise to get rid of our best CAS platform. If cost-cutting is really the issue, look at the B-1 or B-2 instead.
What Dave says is clearly correct. However, let's point out that the A-10 has had its share of fratricide as well. At an Nasiriyah a Marine controller cleared A-10s to make up to seven passes that struck Marine AAVs that Pennsylvania Air Guard pilots should have recognized. Some say up to 10 Marines were killed in those attacks while an official CENTCOM report claimed it was only one and the others were enemy fire.
In 1991 at the Battle of Khafji in Saudi Arabia, an A-10 Maverick killed up to 11 friendlies. In Basra on April 6, 2003, an A-10 destroyed two British Warrior IFVs killing one and wounding five.
As in the an Nasiriyah fratricide that involved an erring ground controller, this could have resulted from a JTAC failure, not a B-1B shortcoming. Later in 2007, the USAF began installing Sniper XR pods on B-1Bs that allow highly magnified views of the target area coordinates for confirmation. Let's also point out that plenty of Predator/Reaper/Gray Eagle/Shadow full motion video is also being fed into TOCs for confirmation in many TICs.
Beyond these facts, the article simply omits that an A-10 will not be able to survive against modern radar air defenses. An F-35 can survive in that environment. In addition, a B-1B can lob small diameter bombs a substantial distance to fly under radar air defenses and turn away before reaching their envelope. An A-10 could do this to some degree but lacks the B-1B and other fighter's speed that makes lobbed bombs travel farther. In addition, the B-1Bs afterburner along with other fighters can get those aircraft on scene much sooner. A B-1B also can lob multiple bombs simultaneously for larger threats on the battlefield.
Finally, these continuing claims that the A-10 is the only game in town also neglects to mention that AH-64D/Es, OH-58Ds, and Marine Cobras can provide close combat attack and Marine CAS while flying under air defenses. Their smaller Hellfire and gun munitions are less likely to create fratricide and can be used in close proximity to friendlies and civilians. Remotely piloted aircraft also can contribute to many TICs with lethal support.
I am a great believer in technology but there is still no substitute for the human element and decisive leadership. And we have seen what has gone wrong with incorrect use of GPS in the pas prior to this incident. Although this will be taken as a defense of the A-10, I think it is a testament to professionals doing their jobs; some getting it wrong, and some getting it right in the heat of combat. The title is wrong. A-10's did not save the day, professionals did.