Lessons Encountered: Learning From the Long War - National Defense University Press Online Book
Lessons Encountered: Learning from the Long War began as two questions from General Martin E. Dempsey, 18th Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: What were the costs and benefits of the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, and what were the strategic lessons of these campaigns? The Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University was tasked to answer these questions. The editors composed a volume that assesses the war and analyzes the costs, using the Institute’s considerable in-house talent and the dedication of the NDU Press team. The audience for this volume is senior officers, their staffs, and the students in joint professional military education courses—the future leaders of the Armed Forces. Other national security professionals should find it of great value as well.
The volume begins with an introduction that addresses the difficulty of learning strategic lessons and a preview of the major lessons identified in the study. It then moves on to an analysis of the campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq from their initiation to the onset of the U.S. Surges. The study then turns to the Surges themselves as tests of assessment and adaptation. The next part focuses on decisionmaking, implementation, and unity of effort. The volume then turns to the all-important issue of raising and mentoring indigenous security forces, the basis for the U.S. exit strategy in both campaigns. Capping the study is a chapter on legal issues that range from detention to the use of unmanned aerial vehicles. The final chapter analyzes costs and benefits, dissects decisionmaking in both campaigns, and summarizes the lessons encountered. Supporting the volume are three annexes: one on the human and financial costs of the Long War and two detailed timelines for histories of Afghanistan and Iraq and the U.S. campaigns in those countries.
The lessons encountered in Afghanistan and Iraq at the strategic level inform our understanding of national security decisionmaking, intelligence, the character of contemporary conflict, and unity of effort and command.
They stand alongside the lessons of other wars and remind future senior officers that those who fail to learn from past mistakes are bound to repeat them.
Comments
Liked the title of “Lessons Observed” versus “Lessons Learned”---because we obviously haven’t learned given current inaction. Have not read it all yet, but found this quote interesting by Adam Gopnick (?):
<blockquote>The last century, through its great cataclysms, offers two clear, ringing, and, unfortunately, contradictory lessons. The First World War teaches that territorial compromise is better than full-scale war, that an “honor-bound” allegiance of the great powers to small nations is a recipe for mass killing, and that it is crazy to let the blind mechanism of armies and alliances trump common sense. The Second teaches that searching for an accommodation with tyranny by selling out small nations only encourages the tyrant, that refusing to fight now leads to a worse fight later on, and that only the steadfast rejection of compromise can prevent the natural tendency to rush to a bad peace with worse men. The First teaches us never to rush into a fight, the Second never to back down from a bully. </blockquote>
This seems to indicate that perhaps we have swung from the one extreme of entering and staying too long in Vietnam and Iraq to the other end of the spectrum of inadequate military commitment in Libya, “Syria”, the current “Iraq”, and Ukraine. If, as this paper points out, a middle ground “Goldilocks” just-right solution is seen as bad when trying to influence civil leaders to pick the middle option, surely such a military compromise is appropriate given the two extremes we have seen that failed to work recently. If we are to afford to fight such future wars and maintain our leadership in the world then something has to be done to afford to be able to use the appropriate level of “M” in DIME.
To get an idea of how war costs have evolved, the final chapter of this effort has a cost annex. It points out that OEF/OIF have been the most expensive wars in treasure in all of U.S. history other than WWII. Thankfully, they at least were <strong>by far</strong> the least expensive in blood if that is limited consolation. So how do we solve the “treasure” problem without the usual major military budget cuts after each war that lead to “blood” problems when we fight the next war unprepared and under-resourced in ground force levels. In the last chapter of this study, a table shows the annual costs for OIF and OEF and other items like Overseas Contingency Operations funding. The total budgeted cost for both wars and OCO, etc. was over $1.6 trillion between FY 01-14. However, the highest cost years were as follows:
2006 - $124 billion
2007 - $170 billion
2008 - $195 billion
2009 - $157 billion
2010 - $165 billion
2011 - $165 billion
One surprising aspect was how Afghanistan spending increased dramatically in the last few years. From 2001-2007 spending there averaged only $21 billion annually which increased to $39 billion in 2008 and $56 billion in FY 2009 during the Afghan surge. However, during and <strong>well after</strong> that Afghan surge, spending increased dramatically:
FY 2001-2007 Average - $21 billion
FY 2010 - $94 billion
FY 2011 - $107 billion
FY 2012 - $101 billion
FY 2013 - $86 billion
FY 2014 - $77 billion
Most likely, drawdown and withdrawal expenses account for many of those OEF costs of the last few years, but that also argues that ground forces are most costly when air-inserted deep into territory inaccessible to military land convoys from sea ports. Contractor costs, “build” costs, and airpower fuel, both aerial refueling and trucked, at a true cost of $400 a gallon also are likely culprits when looking at the difference between a 2001-2007 average of just $21 billion annually compared to FY 2014 costs of $77 billion when presumably most ground forces were already withdrawn or not routinely going outside the wire of a reduced number of FOBs/COPs.
Afghanistan and Iraq illustrate that conflict is expensive, but most costly in well-inland areas with Texas-sized distances, large dispersed populations, and without much established infrastructure. OIF and OEF then could constitute worst-case scenarios for use of ground and airpower. However, the Iraq surge illustrated that potential exists to surge early and avoid the long, costly, drawn-out conflicts that otherwise result if insurgencies get opportunities to exploit early under-resourcing in ground stability forces and supporting airpower.
How then do we pay for a military large enough to surge early and support higher early annual war budgets? For starters, we need the tax revenue to support our military without running up large deficits. In addition, you don’t cut taxes during a war. Let’s look at this link to see who pays taxes, who could pay more, and how much more in taxes it would require to keep our nation strong, involved abroad, and solvent simultaneously:
http://taxfoundation.org/article/summary-latest-federal-individual-inco…
Within the tables in the link focusing on the latest year available of 2009 (just after the recession), you learn the following:
In 2009, the top 50% of U.S. taxpayers paid $846 billion in federal income tax. The bottom 50% paid just $20 billion. Of that top 50%, the wealthiest 25% paid $756 billion. The top 25% of taxpayers (34,996,000 filers) that year had total adjusted gross incomes (AGI) of $5.15 trillion, or an average of $149,292 per tax filing individual or family paying an average of $21,916 in federal income tax which is just 14.7% overall tax rate.
2009 taxpayers in the top range of 75% to 50% (34,995,000 filers) had total AGI Income of only $1.62 trillion (1/3 of the top 25%), or an average of just $46,963 per tax filer paying an average of $2,609. This is our true “upper” middle class that paid just $90 billion in taxes that year (5.6%) of AGI. Remember that the entire bottom 50% of filers in 2009 paid just $20 billion in federal income tax, but ample sales and other taxes.
So, although the top 25% already paid a lot, had they each paid an average additional amount of just <strong>$184.62</strong> per two-week paycheck in federal income tax it would have generated an additional $165,580,800,000 in revenue (34,496,000 tax filers x $4800). On average that $165 billion would have paid most OIF/OEF worst case war costs while reducing our deficit in non-war years and paying for climate change expenses, while sacrificing relatively little of that families $149,292 average AGI.
Compare the low additional taxes for our wealthiest who can afford it to the $700-1000 annual increased costs that CNN showed as the estimate per U.S. family to address climate change. Who can better afford to pay for climate change costs? The bottom 50% that paid just $20 billion in federal taxes, paid large sales and property taxes, and cannot afford that future $700-1000 annual increase in power bills? Maybe instead it is the top 25% of U.S. taxpayers who <strong>could</strong> finance federal subsidies for power companies to convert power plants and individuals to move to solar and windpower.
Bottom line is the top 25% of taxpayers continue to reap great benefits from our nation while they seldom send their kids off to fight wars, stabilize conflicts afterwards, and provide support for civil authorities in solving problems like refugees, disaster assistance, and climate change. The wealthiest Americans get enormous tax reductions from the interest on million dollar homes which in turns leads to crazy housing inflation in large urban areas. They can pay tens of thousands of dollars each year to send their kids to the best colleges (even private grade and high school), yet continue to contribute to our deficit and debt by not paying enough on the upper parts of their income.
This is the kind of income inequality that Donald Trump (who I don’t like) is tapping into. He is stressing only the hedge fund types not paying enough, while in reality our nation must address others in high income ranges that could relieve our debt by paying more in federal income tax <strong>and</strong> more social security tax on upper parts of their income beyond the current cap at $118,500. We can’t claim we need to increase defense spending unless we find means to pay for it. The U.S. can’t withdraw from the world claiming we can’t afford to stay engaged. Without deterrence and a stabilizing forward presence, conflict and world chaos to include the specter of 9/11-style terror using WMD or state-use of nuclear weapons are much more likely. The bottom line is pay me now or pay me later after a nuke goes off in NYC.