A New American Grand Strategy by General James Mattis, Hoover Institution (26 February 2015)
The world is awash in change. The international order, so painstakingly put together by the greatest generation coming home from mankind’s bloodiest conflict, is under increasing stress. It was created with elements we take for granted: the United Nations, NATO, the Marshall Plan, Bretton Woods and more. The constructed order reflected the wisdom of those who recognized no nation lived as an island and we needed new ways to deal with challenges that for better or worse impacted all nations. Like it or not, today we are part of this larger world and must carry out our part. We cannot wait for problems to arrive here or it will be too late; rather we must remain strongly engaged in this complex world.
The international order built on the state system is not self-sustaining. It demands tending by an America that leads wisely, standing unapologetically for the freedoms each of us in this room have enjoyed. The hearing today addresses the need for America to adapt to changing circumstances, to come out now from its reactive crouch and to take a firm strategic stance in defense of our values.
While we recognize that we owe future generations the same freedoms we enjoy, the challenge lies in how to carry out our responsibility. We have lived too long now in a strategy-free mode.
To do so America needs a refreshed national strategy. The Congress can play a key role in crafting a coherent strategy with bipartisan support. Doing so requires us to look beyond events currently consuming the executive branch.
There is an urgent need to stop reacting to each immediate vexing issue in isolation. Such response often creates unanticipated second order effects and more problems for us. I suggest that the best way to cut to the essence of these issues and to help you in crafting America’s response to a rapidly changing security environment is to ask the right questions.
These are some that we should ask…
Comments
What is it that our grand strategy is based upon? What is it that our grand strategy must achieve -- in peace as in war?
In this regard, consider the following from NSC-68 -- in the section entitled "The Fundamental Purpose of the United States:"
BEGIN QUOTE
The fundamental purpose of the United States is laid down in the Preamble to the Constitution: ". . . to form a more perfect Union, establish justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity." In essence, the fundamental purpose is to assure the integrity and vitality of our free society, which is founded upon the dignity and worth of the individual.
END QUOTE
https://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/coldwar/doc… (See Page 5)
What is it, thus, that provides the purpose for American power and, accordingly, for grand strategy?
BEGIN QUOTE
The objectives of a free society are determined by its fundamental values -- and by the necessity for maintaining the material environment in which they flourish.
END QUOTE
https://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/coldwar/doc… (This time, look to subparagraph "B" on Page 9)
This being the case, then might we suggest that it has been in this "maintaining the material environment in which free societies might flourish" light that American grand strategy (and, accordingly, American foreign and domestic policy?) has been directed -- yesterday as today?
Thus, in this exact light, to understand both (a) the grand strategy of "containment" in the Old Cold War of yesterday and, indeed, (b) the grand strategy of "enlargement" in the New/Reverse Cold War of today?
https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/lakedoc.html
Additional Note:
As to Azor's contention, below, that "American grand strategy has always been predicated upon countering an existential threat," and that "the United States never had a grand strategy to become the most powerful nation on earth or to hold that coveted position," to consider the alternative position offered, for example, by Christopher Layne in his "Rethinking American Grand Strategy."
Herein, Layne notes (also using NSC-68 as his reference) that "(1) the purpose of American power is to 'foster a world environment in which the American system can survive and flourish' and that (2) the 'strategy of preponderance would probably be pursued even if there was no Soviet Union.' "
https://www.jstor.org/stable/40209580?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents (see the top of the second column of Page 9)
Thus, properly understood, the perceived value of preponderance lies in the understanding that, via this approach only, might we best be able to "maintain [or, indeed, enhance!] the material environment in which free societies might flourish?" (While, in a lesser position, this such objective might be much harder to effect/to achieve?)
Bottom Line Question:
GEN Mattis -- and via his here-presented views on "grand strategy" -- indicating both his understanding of, and indeed his agreement with, the enduring truths offered by NSC-68 above?
Quite frankly, I think that Congress will prevent a war of choice on the of Operation Iraqi Freedom.
Both Hillary and Trump are hawkish with respect to China, but I expect a lower probability of intervention in the MENA region under Trump and the death by delay of NATO BMD.
As much as the Iraq War figures in the popular discourse due to over 170,000 deaths, including 4,500 Americans, Operation Odyssey Dawn was actually worse from the perspective of international relations and national security. Why? It drove a nail into the coffin of nuclear non-proliferation, which was followed by Putin's violation of the Budapest Agreement. There is no reason why any aspiring nuclear power should treat Russian or American guarantees or agreements seriously.
I don't see anything new here, other than an attempt by Mattis to come across as more intellectual.
Mattis demonstrates a profound misunderstanding of history. American grand strategy was always predicated upon countering an existential threat and America's alliances were held together by convenient self-interest as much as they were by shared values.
Unfortunately, Mattis and many Americans remain fixated on a 10-15-year period during which the United States appeared to be the only superpower. Yet the policies that created this brief "unipolar moment" were not intended with this outcome in mind.
Precision-guided munitions and stealth platforms were not developed to shock and awe the developing world; they were designed to give the United States a fighting chance when Soviet armored columns swarmed the Fulda Gap.
The United States never had a grand strategy to become the most powerful nation on Earth nor to hold that coveted position. In World War II, it allied with the aggressive and genocidal regime of the Soviet Union in order to defeat the greater threat of Germany. During the Cold War, it allied with various tyrants and butchers in order to counter the Soviet Union, and left the Baltic republics, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania and East Germany to their fate.
Back to the drawing board...
Bill........FP is always about creditability....and this WH has had none since it drove on the policy of "doing nothing stupid".....and the incoming WH has no strategy other than staying in power for eight years........I have been beating this drum with the current WHfor two full years now as there was not a single strategic strategy to be seen other than let's not get into any trouble that causes problems for my legacy.....
Mattis as SecDef must adhere to the inner decisions made largely by a very proRussia set of Trump natsec advisors not counting Trump himself.....Kelly has not decisions based on DHS which does not cover Russia and Flynn is already a know entity when it comes to Russia since his foreign agent days....
We seriously need to see how many times Cater was overridden by the Obama advisor Rhodes and his NSC....to see where the limitations on Mattis are...
Journo who investigated Exxon Mobil, whose boss might be new US Sec of State: reporting on them was "harder than reporting on the Bin Ladens"
So how is Mattis then to suppose to override a close Putin personal friend if US FP goes in a direction he cannot support????
Well worth the time to read to understand our next (if confirmed by the Senate) Secretary of Defense's views. I'll address this article in more detail in the forum, but a few key points on many our minds that jumped out at me.
- The international order is NOT self-sustaining. It is also important to note it was not written in stone, so the international order has and continues to evolve, but its evolution to meet the interests of new powers is different than abandoning the fundamental principles that is built upon to maintain an acceptable semblance of global stability. Thus . . .
- Strategy should be proactive, not reactive. The former Chairman in a parting interview with the Joint Force Quarterly pointed out this administration was not looking for strategy, but options to respond (react) to various situations around the world. It is long past time we move beyond this reckless and aimless approach to foreign policy to advance our national interests. Hence . . .
- Stop reacting to each issue in isolation. I think the current Defense focus on the 4+1 challenges is wrong headed, it is based on a legacy approach to tying resources to strategy based on fighting a conventional (or nuclear) war with specific actors based on their current and projected military capabilities. While this may be a good approach for our industry, it doesn't scratch the itch of advancing our national interests. This approach doesn't adequately address how we can employ the military to support a broader whole of government approach to win without fighting short of going to war, or how using military force short of armed conflict or even during an actual war will achieve our political objectives. This leads to another GEN Mattis' point.
- What are the key threats to our vital interests? I recommend backing up from this question and clearly identifying what are our vital national interests? Only then can we identify what threatens them. This leads to another point he made.
- Is America good for its word? Contrary to the unsupportable argument that the world rejects the American model and we're in a reverse Cold War, the majority of the world does accept our view on how the international order should work. The rejectionists are limited in number, but they are increasingly willing to use coercion to push their views on others (because we no longer effectively opposed it). As GEN Mattis states we have a number of allies and partners around the world (to include in the Middle East) who would be more than willing to stand with us if we had a clear vision and were perceived to be true to our word. Credibility matters, we don't have it now.