The Parable of Little America: A Discussion with Rajiv Chandrasekaran
Stemming from his must-read book, an important discussion about Helmand, Kandahar, and America's flawed attempt to save Afghanistan.
Stemming from his must-read book, an important discussion about Helmand, Kandahar, and America's flawed attempt to save Afghanistan.
An interview with Lieutenant Colonel Robert W. Schaefer, the author of “The Insurgency in Chechnya and the North Caucasus: From Gazavat to Jihad.”
Population-centric counterinsurgency?
At Carl Prine's Line of Departure, Victoria Fontan traces the journey of Mollah Nadhom from bystander, to al-Qaeda insurgent, to Abu Ghraib, to Sawha member and human intelligence source. It ended on January 25 with shots from a silenced gun in Baghdad.
Because Mollah Nadhom is just another casualty of counter-insurgency, liberal peacemaking and nation-building, the moral of his story remains: Never trust an occupier who claims to be working for “peace,” for this peace is never what it claims to be.
I enter the COIN argument to say that the debate is misplaced in an article at Foreign Policy's Af-Pak Channel.
Before arguing about counterinsurgency as a tactic or a strategy, we must first acknowledge a key point: America did not enter any of these wars (going back to Vietnam) as a counterinsurgent or a nation-builder. America entered these wars with ill-defined strategic goals, the result of lowest common denominator bureaucratic negotiations. These goals were not sufficiently thought out, clearly stated, or properly subscribed to by the government writ large, resulting in nearly immediate drift. This fact should point us toward the true roots of the problem.