The Reoccurrence of International Terrorism in Somalia
by Joe Royo
Download the Full Article: Afghanistan Part II
Recent events in Somalia are slowly grabbing the world's attention. Is the world paying attention, though? In the 1990s another country followed a similarly dysfunctional pattern -- Afghanistan. There are lessons to be learned from the way Afghanistan fell to the Taliban in 1996 to how the al Shabaab terrorist network may be trying to seize Somalia. We should not only pay attention to the clues. We should act on those clues. The conditions are ripe to do something about it now. If something is not done now, we may be replaying what happened in Afghanistan with the Taliban all over again.
Download the Full Article: Afghanistan Part II
Major Joe Royo is a U.S. Army Special Forces Officer assigned to the Special Operations Training Detachment, part of the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk, LA. He recently served with the 3rd Special Forces Group and has multiple combat rotations to Afghanistan and Iraq as well as experience in Pakistan. He holds a MA in Diplomacy from Norwich University.
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I would argue that an Islamic government, extreme or not, is not something anyone should fret about. The Strategist would say "so what?" I'd say "who cares?" Whether in Afghanistan or what's left of Somalia. Neither the Taliban or al Shabaab were or are international terrorist threats, even considering their attack on Uganda or piracy in the Gulf of Aden (if the international community got off its arses and treated piracy not like a crime which should have its perpetrators arrested and legally prosecuted in a court of law; 3-inch deck guns would do the job just fine).
He's giving short shrift to his first COA (do nothing) and glosses over the fact that a CT strategy, if and when necessary, is not intended to "dismantled or completely dissolve" al Shabaab leadership or structure. We made the same mistake in Afghanistan. We only must stop the "metastasizing cancer" from extending beyond the borders. Targeting AQ and Taliban leadership in AFG would have done that. For some reason we decided to reconstruct the whole country, society, government, economy and all. I'd say the same tactic could be taken in Somalia; to ensure al Shabaab doesn't extend to threaten interests (our interests, not Ugandan, African Union, Ethiopian, etc) outside its borders. If the AQN starts getting cozy with them, targeting HVTs is all which is necessary.
Containment is a strategy overlooked for some reason today. The author's COA 1, our COA in A'stan, and any other failing state that we thing will become an "ungoverned space" threatening int'l security should be handled similarly: containment while domestic evolution works itself out. Someone will take power with the consent of the people or without. We can't go in and expect to provide them with anything, bottom-up or top-down, if they're not ready and wanting it. Local populations have a responsibility, not the US. We have a responsibility to protect our own interests. It is cheaper, more suitable, feasible, and acceptable.
I didnt think the Taliban had international intent, unlike the description provided in this article.
My understanding is their own interest was purely Afghanistan. It was AQ that took advantage of the mayhem and used Afghanistan as a host. With enough money thrown their way (like anyone in Afghanistan it seems) the Taliban provided the geographical base from which to begin AQ's global terror campaign. Once Sudan has evicted Osama, and he moved permenantly to Afghanistan, that is when the marriage of convenience really took off.
This is not to say that Shabaab has not learnt from the Taliban/AQ arrangement and is building its own base to take advantage of the tools of globalisation to wage terror elsewhere - starting close to home first.
The counterfactual could be if AQ has been kept ouf of Afghanistan the Taliban would have remained a localised extreme Islamist group.
Therefore if AQ is kept out of Somalia or bludgeoned to a minimum then Shabaab will remain a localised Islamist group?
The "local" Taliban in Afghanistan care only about their local piece real estate. Afghans seem to be united against foreigners but divided in peace - highly suspicious of outsiders.
So Anonymous your comment is worthy of consideration.
Put it this way. Are there certain parts of Afghanistan were ISAF does not operate or has minimal presence and thefore the local population is not interested in the Taliban or President Karzai's government? Not having ISAF around gives the Taliban little reason to convince the population to be galvanised against a common foe.
Certainly the Major makes a compelling argument, but every conflict is different, and consequently the approach should be also.
Before we introduce any American military presence in Somalia, covert or otherwise, we might heed Mademoiselle Bruton whom is lightly quoted, and advocates toward a constructive disengagement policy that recognizes Al-Shabaab's Islamist rule in Somalia as long as it does not engage in regional violence or terrorism. . .granted, that may be a tall order at this time line?
What I have observed so far is that our policy of supporting the TFG, has only allowed Shabaab to gain support, not only among the diaspora, but within the country as well to varying degrees. I can't believe introducing any American military footprint would do anything less than further exacerbate the problem.
Perhaps doing less might be doing more in this case?