Back to the Future: Next Generation Forest Brothers

By Mareks Runts

"The history provides the familiarization required to avoid the errors to which the historically deprived are especially prone."[1]

The Forest Brothers refers to the organized armed resistance fight in the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.[2] The movement arose in 1944 at the end of World war II and lasted until 1956. This article will explore the relevance of the Latvian Forest Brothers to the modern Latvian National Armed Forces and attempt to draw lessons from the historical experience of the 20^th century movement.

Today, the Baltic states are on the forward lines of NATO's eastern flank. It is a potential front line that became a very topical issue after the Russia-Ukraine conflict in 2014. The armed forces of all three Baltic states and forward-deployed NATO troops are not much compared to Russia's potential conventional offensive military capabilities. In the case of conventional war with Russia, various war game results show that occupation of Baltic states will be fast and inevitable.[3] Therefore, armed resistance and unconventional warfare are an essential part of the Baltic defense plans.

In case of occupation of the country, Latvian resistance effort will be based on a guerrilla fight, where the leading role is for armed forces soldiers, and the similarity with last century`s Forest Brothers experience is significant enough to be taken into account in planning for future warfare. Otto Fiala discusses the Forest Brothers in his Resistance Operating Concept, where he primarily looks at the Lithuanian and Estonian Forest Brothers. This article expands Fiala by considering the Latvian Forest Brothers through the lens of modern Low-Intensity Conflict theory.

Per the U.S. Army’s Field Manual 100-20, there are dynamics common to all insurgencies or resistance movements, namely: leadership, ideology, objectives (strategic, operational, and tactical), environment and geography, external support, phasing, and timing, organizational and operational patterns.[4] As historical examples show, insurgencies or resistance movements were successful if they used these dynamics effectively and according to the changing conditions. It is essential to look at the Latvian Forest Brothers from these dynamics' perspectives to draw the necessary conclusions from this historical experience.

Leadership

Because of several factors, the Forest Brothers were a decentralized organization, creating strengths and vulnerabilities. In 1944, two establishments worked in Latvia, trying to organize guerrilla warfare. One was the General Command of the German Army, which prepared to stay behind sabotage groups to fight against the Red Army. The other was the Central Council of Latvia, which was preparing to fight for the independence of Latvia against both occupying powers Germany and the USSR. The Germans destroyed the Central Council of Latvia, but the German organization ceased with the German capitulation in the Second World War. As a result, the Latvian Forest Brothers did not have centralized leadership, so the guerrilla movement in Latvia developed independently as a popular initiative.[5]

Larger guerilla organization operated in all the municipalities of Latvia, usually with professional officers in the lead. The organizations consisted of battle groups that were led by officers with combat experience and Latvian army, Guard organization or German legion background.[6] Later in the guerrilla fight, there were attempts to set up a centralized leadership, but they were unsuccessful.[7] It is worth mentioning that a considerable disadvantage is that there was no strategic level leadership because there was neither a shadow government nor a Latvian government in exile. The lack of centralized leadership made it difficult for Soviet Security forces to detect and destroy groups of Forest Brothers. However, it also hindered the greater effectiveness of the guerrilla organizations in the fight against the Soviet occupation regime.

Ideology

The ideology of the Forest Brothers was based on the struggle for a free Latvia, and they were following classical freedom fighter's ideals.[8] The guerrilla movement was also based on the hatred of the Latvian people towards the communist ideology and occupation.[9] The hatred was based on the recent memory of Soviet occupation in 1940 when certain groups of the Latvian population were deported to Siberia, arrested, or killed.[10] It should be noted, however, that not everyone who joined the Forest Brothers movement was an ideological fighter. Some movement members were certainly driven only by self-preservation instincts: to avoid repression by Soviet forces or to flee mobilization into the Red Army. Today, it is impossible to say how many ideological fighters there were in the Forest Brothers movement and how many just tried to save their lives by joining the movement to hide from the Soviet occupation regime.

Objectives (Strategic, Operational, and Tactical)

The strategic objective of the Forest Brothers was the restoration of Latvia's national independence. It was clear that it could be done only if the Western countries waged war against the Soviet Union, and then the plan was that the guerrillas would support the offensive operation by large-scale disruptive actions.[11] This was the main reason why the Forest Brothers chose a strategy to preserve the guerrillas for Latvia's future war of liberation.

The operational objective for the guerrilla fight was to prevent the strengthening of the Soviet occupation regime in Latvia. To achieve this, the tactical objectives of the Forest Brothers were to disrupt the formation and operation of Soviet civil administration and repressive apparatus in the regions of Latvia, to prevent the collection of state fees, as well as to protect the population from regime repression and terror.[12]

Environment and Geography

The Forest Brothers were a distinctly rural guerrilla movement, and about 80% of the national partisans were peasants.[13] Large percentage of peasants can be explained because, by large, Latvia was an agricultural country, and the auxiliary network was usually family members of the Forest Brothers.[14] That is why guerrilla groups stayed near their homes, where they hid in forests and swamps that provided the best cover and concealment. There are no inaccessible mountain ranges or impenetrable jungles in Latvia, but there are forests that cover about a third of the country's territory and another third of the territory was covered by swamps, which were also successfully used by the Forest Brothers for their benefit.[15]

Figure 1. Plan of the Forest Brothers Camp "Island Shelters" in Stompaku swamp.[16] Example of how Forest Brothers used swamps as a natural obstacle to protect their camps.

The Latvian Forest Brothers were certainly helped by the fact that most of Latvia was dominated by the agricultural economy, and rural areas were widely inhabited by homesteads where subsistence farming was practiced.

External support

The Latvian Forest Brothers movement did not receive the much-anticipated external support from Western countries. The special services of Britain, the U.S., and Sweden did not provide any assistance to the Latvian Forest Brothers. Although they sent their agents to the occupied Baltic territory, their task was to gather intelligence and not to support national resistance movements.[17] It should be noted that there was local support from Lithuanian partisan groups that carried out attacks on Soviet targets in the territory of Latvia and also gave sanctuary in their territory to the Latvian Forest Brothers when they had to avoid the Soviet occupation forces.[18]

Phasing and Timing

The armed resistance of the Latvian Forest Brothers can be divided into three phases. The first phase took place from the summer of 1944 to the summer of 1946.[19] Large-scale guerrilla offensive operations characterized this phase. The offensive operations begin with the advance of Soviet troops in Latvia.[20] The main reason why this phase ended was the loss of international political support. At the 1945 Yalta Conference USSR, U.K. and U.S. divided spheres of influence, and three Baltic states were re-incorporated into the Soviet Union without any objection from allies.[21]             

The second phase began in the autumn of 1946 when the Forest Brothers also suffered significant losses amongst guerrilla fighters.[22] Minor guerrilla offensive actions characterized this phase. The main effort was put on preserving the fighting force in hopes that the geopolitical situation may change and there would be an opportunity to contribute to the liberation of Latvia. The phase ended in 1949. when after mass deportations, Soviets destroyed auxiliary networks for Forest Brothers.[23] There was a burst of activity when people joined the Forest Brothers' movement to avoid deportations, and operations were launched to disrupt the activities of the occupying forces. Still, they were quickly suppressed, and the partisans left without a support network were forced to seek refuge or legalize.[24]   

Figure 2. The parishes where the activities of the Forest Brothers took place until 1949 are shown in green.[25]

The third and final phase of the armed struggle lasted from 1950, until the end of 1956, when organized armed resistance ended.[26] The beginning of the phase was dominated by sporadic guerrilla activities against Soviet security forces. A mass resettlement program was introduced in the early 1950s where peasants from homesteads were forced to move to the villages, further reducing the already limited Forest Brothers auxiliary network.[27] At the end of the phase, activities in organized groups were stopped, and the Forest Brothers continued to act mainly as lone fighters, attacking local collaborators of the occupying power.[28]

Figure 3. The parishes where the activities of the Forest Brothers took place from 1950 until 1956 are shown in green.[29]

Compared with classical examples of phasing and timing (Latent and Incipient phase, Guerrilla Warfare phase, War of Movement phase), armed resistance in Latvia started with the Guerrilla Warfare phase.[30] Unlike the resistance movements, which are organized covertly and systematically to overthrow the occupying power, in the case of Latvia, there was a transition from conventional warfare to armed resistance, which allowed to skip the Latent and Incipient phase. Unfortunately, without external support, the armed resistance did not reach the War of Movement phase.

Organizational and operational patterns

At its height there were 12,000-13,000 people in the ranks of Forest Brothers, and they were actively supported by at least 25,000 auxiliaries.[31] Armed resistance consisted of three elements: guerrillas, auxiliary, and illegals. Illegals were hiding amongst the population either under fake names or in places far away from their actual residence. Even though few of them performed underground-type tasks, this was not an underground movement, as the primary motivation was to hide from the occupying forces, and when there was a threat that they might be exposed, they joined guerrilla groups.[32] The occupying power realized the dangers posed by an organized underground movement, so as early as 1946, potential underground members were identified and prohibited from having positions in official institutions.[33]  Therefore, Latvia's armed resistance was forced to exist without the underground organization primary element of the resistance movement. The core of the guerrilla movement was made up of former soldiers, policemen, and people fleeing Soviet rule, but the auxiliary element was composed of their close relatives.[34] Initially, the largest guerrilla groups reached hundreds of members. Still, as the pressure of occupation forces increased, they began to break down into smaller elements up to individual fighters in the final resistance phase.[35]

The Latvian Forest Brothers' operational pattern was that of rural guerrilla fight against an occupying power.  Guerrilla operations were directed against military targets, occupation authorities, and officials. It should be noted that propaganda activities also played an important role.[36] Guerrilla groups were printing and distributing leaflets and periodicals, which were distributed throughout the territory of Latvia.[37]

Figure 4. Periodicals published by the Latvian Forest Brothers and their distribution places in Latvia from 1944 to 1948.[38]

Findings

Examination of dynamics common to all successful insurgencies reveals that the main drawback of the Forest Brothers movement was the lack of external political and military support.  It should be noted that the leadership of the guerrilla organizations was competent to assess the situation very clearly and draw appropriate conclusions. As their objectives show, their main task was to support the Western war with the USSR. It is proof that the Forest Brothers understood very clearly that it was not possible to win over the superiority of the Soviet security forces without external support. Even though at the end of 1945 it was clear that the Western countries would not start a war with the USSR and thus there would be no external support, the Latvian Forest Brothers were able to continue the long-standing resistance. They were able to achieve this by adapting their organizational and operational patterns to the changing situation and skillful use of the environment and geography that ensured survival. It is possible that if the resistance movement had political leadership, such as a government in exile or a shadow government, then despite the fact that the Western countries rejected an open confrontation with the USSR, it would be possible to provide limited political and military support to the Forest Brothers.

From an organizational point of view, a significant shortcoming was that the Forest Brothers movement did not have an underground organization. This vulnerability played a crucial role in the final phase of armed resistance when the Forest Brothers were forced to leave their refuge in forests and swamps and begin to hide among the population. Operating in such an environment requires significant support from the underground organization and requires specific skills that the Forest Brothers did not have. The guerrilla warfare was organized based on military tactics with which most members of the movement were familiar.

The origin of these failings lies chiefly in the lack of preparation for the resistance against an occupying power in the pre-war period.[39] There was no planning, training of personnel, the establishment of infrastructure, preparation of material and technical means. Highly likely that not much of the prepared infrastructure and materials would survive the three consecutive occupations of Latvia. However, personnel trained in guerrilla warfare would undoubtedly have increased the efficiency and survivability of the Forest Brothers.

Conclusion

In preparing for a possible guerrilla war in the case of Latvia (the same factors may apply to all Baltic states), several important factors must be taken into account. First, geography does not provide strategic depth. Forests and swamps will no longer provide a safe haven from modern technology, and it must be taken into account that most of the population now lives in cities. This means that staying in forests and swamps will not provide auxiliary support and the necessary connection with the population. It means that preparations should be done for urban guerrilla warfare. The environment in Latvia is not favorable from the aspect of trading space to get time as suggested in Mao's rules for guerilla warfare.[40]

The second factor is Russian Rear Area operation capabilities and level of violence what they are ready to put against any resistance,[41] that excludes the possibility to build up resistance movement slowly and incipiently. It means that Latvia should prepare to start armed resistance from the first days of occupation. Otherwise, resistance members and supporters will be taken out one by one without a chance to influence the adversary significantly.

The strategy for Latvia is to wage guerilla warfare from the first days of occupation the same way as Forest Brothers did it. Armed resistance in Latvia mast commences with guerilla warfare phase where soldiers will play a central role. The shortcomings of last century's Forest Brothers, especially the lack of centralized political leadership, need to be addressed. As in the past century, in the event of future occupation, the liberation of Latvia from occupation will depend on external support and ensuring it will be the main task of political leadership. As history shows, it is impossible to succeed against an occupying power when it is strong. Resistance movements should wait until power deflation occurs, or a third-party force will help it.

Lastly, the human environment in Latvia is not supportive for resistance operations. Study shows that only one-third of military-age males are ready to participate in armed resistance.[42] Only half would be ready to support without participating in armed activities; this indicates that Latvia's population has a relatively low will to defend the country.  This is one more argument that armed forces are critical and should form the core for guerilla fight against occupying power.

In sum, the forest brothers offer reasons for optimism about Latvia’s capacity for resistance, but also cautionary warnings. The next-generation Forest Brothers should learn from history and adopt the last century's Forest Brothers experiences for current circumstances.  They should prepare for an urban guerrilla fight and be ready to support coalition forces on the liberation of Latvia. 

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