The British in Malaya and American Military in Lebanon
by Augustine Marinelli, Small Wars Journal
Intelligence and Third-Party Intervention (Full PDF Article)
As the Cold War fades into memory, the United States' likelihood of fighting a conventional war fades with it. The United States and other countries must now contend with unconventional warfare in places like Iraq and Afghanistan, where third-party intervention in unconventional civil/sectarian conflict is the order of the day. In such conflicts, an effective intelligence apparatus is of paramount importance. The current U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual notes that good intelligence information provides the basis for successful operations against the enemy, which, in turn, provide more solid intelligence, creating a cyclical effect. The Field Manual's assessment will form the theoretical basis upon which this study will examine England's successful 1948-1960 intervention in Malaya and the United States' failed 1982-1984 mission in Lebanon.
In both cases, intervention occurred to support existing governments beset by civil war. In Malaya, the British military sought to defeat an insurgency waged by Communists. In Lebanon, the Americans sought to establish an environment that would permit the Lebanese military to secure to the Beirut area—what President Ronald Reagan called the essential precondition for the Lebanese government to stabilize the country. The British accomplished their objective, due in part to the effectiveness of military operations supported by an excellent intelligence-gathering system in the cities and jungle villages of Malaya. The Americans, hampered by poor intelligence support, were unable to foster a better environment for the Lebanese military to function and were driven from Lebanon by a devastating terrorist attack in 1983.
Intelligence and Third-Party Intervention (Full PDF Article)
