The Impact of FCS Technologies

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates settled the question of the FCS in part announcing major cuts in the FCS program and a reopening of the bidding process for Army modernization on April 6, 2009.1 This paper will argue Secretary Gates made the correct decision due to extraordinary costs, falling capabilities, and an incestuous relationship with the lead systems integrator making for difficult program oversight.
The 2006 Army Game Plan describes the Future Combat System as pioneering:
"the next generation of war fighting capabilities, including the construction of a new class of manned and unmanned air and land vehicles. FCS will optimize total combat effectiveness by connecting these new capabilities to the Soldier through a tightly integrated battle-management network."2

If this sounds ambitious it is well to remember the thinking is reflective of the time in which the program was adopted: at the end of the century during the height of the dot-com boom when the internet and networking solutions were thought the answer for every problem. This thinking is again reflected in the White Paper Systems Overview, "it (FCS) will network existing systems, systems already under development, and systems to be developed..."3 The paper goes on the praise the systems of the FCS as "connected via an advanced network architecture that will enable levels of joint connectivity, situational awareness and understanding, and synchronized operations heretofore unachievable."4 It is interesting that the language describing the FCS continued to sound like a plea for venture capital years after the Army had committed to the program.
The Government Accountability Office reported to Congress in 2008 on the progress of the FCS program. Findings of the GAOs investigation included an examination of the definition, development, and demonstration of FCS capabilities; Army plans for production commitments for FCS risks related to completion of development, and an estimate for costs related to complete development and production.5 The GAO found the program halfway through its development and budget demonstrated knowledge well short of expectations and noted FCS was entering a phase of development traditionally the most expensive and problematic.6 This should not come as a surprise as the same report states the Army committed to the FCS program in 2003 "before defining what the systems were going to be required to do and how they would interact."7
In addition to lagging behind on capabilities demonstration, spiraling costs have also plagued the program. The 2008 GAO report to Congress notes the Armys cost estimate of $160.9 billion remained essentially the same as the previous year, but at a reduced number of FCS systems, with the Army planning to further reduce systems in order remain within the projected cost development ceiling.8 The GAO report also notes two independent cost estimates were significantly higher than the Army projections, but does not state what those estimates were.
Contributing to the problems noted above was the Armys relationship with the Lead Systems Integrator, Boeing. As an LSI, Boeing worked in partnership with the Army in managing the program. Although this lends a certain flexibility to the Army, the GAO noted that oversight difficulties can come from such an arrangement . In 2007 the GAO was recommending the Secretary of Defense "take steps to strengthen oversight of the FCS program and assess whether the experience of the LSI on FCS has broader implications"9 for defense acquisitions in general.
In the Future Combat System program the Army embarked upon a very ambitious project attempting to field a system of systems in a "shorter timeframe than for an individual weapons system."10 This in addition to the dual relationship with the LSI contractor, poorly defined initial requirements, spiraling costs with diminishing expectations were all cited by Secretary Gates in his April 6th decision to cancel the vehicle portion of FCS. The Secretary is recommending a re-evaluation of the entire Army modernization program, including reopening a competitive bidding process.11 Hopefully the lessons of the Future Combat System will be applied going forward.

1 Gates, Robert M. Budget Press Briefing, Arlington, VA. April 6, 2009. Online at http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1341; accessed 19 April 2009.

2 US Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Staff, Executive Office of the Headquarters Staff Group. The 2006 Army Game Plan in F100 Managing Army Change, Selected Readings and References. US Army Command and General Staff College, July 2008. p. F101AB-15

3US Department of the Army, Future Combat Systems (Brigade Combat Team)(FCS[BCT] 14+1+1 Systems Overview, 14 March 2007 in F100 Managing Army Change, Selected Readings and References. US Army Command and General Staff College, July 2008. p. F104AB-4

4 Ibid. p. F104AB-4

5 United States Government Accountability Office, Report to Congressional Committees, Defense Acquisitions, 2009 Is a Critical Juncture for the Armys Future Combat System, GAO-08-408 (Washington, DC: GAO March 2008) in F100 Managing Army Change, Selected Readings and References. US Army Command and General Staff College July 2008. p. F104AC-4

6 Ibid. p. F104AC-4

7 Ibid. p. F104AC-5

8 Ibid. p. F104AC-4

9 United States Government Accountability Office, Role of Lead Systems Integrator on Future Combat Systems Program Poses Oversight Challenges, GAO-07-380 (Washington, DC: GAO, June 2007) in F100 Managing Army Change, Selected Readings and References. US Army Command and General Staff College July 2008. p. F104AD-3.

10 Ibid, p. F104AD-3.

11 Gates, Robert M. Budget Press Briefing, Arlington, VA. April 6, 2009. Online at http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1341; accessed 19 April 2009.