The Jones Insurgency Model

As I look at this thing we call "insurgency" I offer simply this:

Motives and purposes of governance for the decisions it makes; or intervening powers for the reasons they intervene are absolutely moot, irrelevant and immaterial to the perceptions of the populace that determine for the sake of causation for insurgency rather governance is perceived as "Poor" or "Good."

So no, I will not rationalize bad behavior for what one convinces theirselves is necessary, mandatory, or even "existential" behavior.

One purpose of the model is to make this very point. "HOW" one goes about the pursuit of national interests is fully within their own control. Factors that contribute to perceptions of Poor Governance are often taken on simply because the decision makers have discounted (to their peril) the importance of those popular perceptions.

So, as I stated in the paper; I do not like bullies or victims either one. So any government that puts on the cloak of "victim" to rationalize behavior that contributes to poor governance is not justified in those actions. As they sew, so shall they reap. Same applies to those governments that bully others to compromise their relationships with their own populaces in order to appease a stronger outside power. The likely result has always been insurgent uprisings in that appeasing, bullied country. Today, however, it is also manifesting in acts of terrorism against the stronger, outside bullying country as well.

Welcome to Globalization. It is indeed a bold new world, and while the nature of insurgency remains constant the rules for intervention have changed.

Let me (at great risk) offer one last historical example (wish me luck) and then leave the field:

Japan, in the second half of the 19th Century, was forced (by foreign powers) to decide whether to "open" its society to foreign influences and whether to adopt "modern" ways.

The decisions made by those who governed Japan during this period resulted in a number of insurgencies -- and in the deaths of a number of foreigners living/working/visiting in Japan.

Should we attribute these insurgencies and these "terrorists" deaths to Poor Governance (on the part of both the governors of Japan and the foreign governments who coerced and supported many of these governors)?

Or should we suggest that these insurgencies and these terrorist deaths were simply part and parcel (and part of the price that often must be paid) for making Good Governance choices; choices which, by their very nature, tend to unavoidably aggrieve and alienate a significant segment of the population (for example: the "old order")?

Is it possible that today's insurgencies and today's foreign terrorism can best be seen in the light of this latter paragraph?

Is so, does this help explain why the United States military has adopted the concept of "an era of persistent conflict" and "a permanent state of war" as its new operating environment?

COL Jones:

"Certainly when governments make bad choices they create conditions of poor governance." (Which can often lead to insurgencies.)

I agree that this BAD choice/POOR governance model can -- and often does -- lead to insurgencies.

My argument, however, suggests that, likewise, when governments make GOOD choices and apply GOOD governance this, also, and in equal measure, quite frequently leads to insurgencies.

As I noted in my explanation above, the problem of actually having to make a choice ("good" or "bad") will generally cause for grevience and alienation of one segment of the population or another.

I am terrible with historical examples, but let me give it a shot:

The American Civil War.

One could suggest that, in this instance, (1) the US government was forced to make a choice and that (2) the choice made by the US government was a GOOD one and constituted GOOD governance. This choice/governance, however GOOD, did not preclude but rather caused a rebellion/insurgency that threatened the viability of the state and society of the United States. This, due to irreconcilable differences.

My argument suggests that (1) this problem of necessity forcing choice = insurgencies occurs consistently throughout history and still today and that (2) even when governments make GOOD choices and exercise GOOD governance, they frequently cannot overcome but rather aggravate the problem of irreconcilable differences and, thereby, cause insurgencies. This is often unavoidable.

In such instances, these insurgencies cannot have been prevented and simply must be put down (often by way of speed, force, aggression and conflict) -- for the overall good of the state and society concerned.

"Slap, I love ya brother, so before you fortify yourself in your basement with a Ka-bar, your .45, a case of Snickers bars and your set of Billy Jack VHS tapes, let me offer you this lifeline:"

No worries, I am an eternal optimist, besides the Final Billy Jack sequel is being worked on maybe even a TV show....no way I'm gonna miss that!

"This is one of the primary purposes of the Jones Model, to help identify what the essential problems are, and to focus energy there.

1. What can we do to enable the perceptions of Legitimacy of governance in Afghanistan?

2. What can we do to enable improved perceptions of Justice in Afghanistan?

3. What can we do to enable improved perceptions of respect for all members of the Afghan populace?

4. What can we do to provide the people of Afghanistan with the certainty of Hope?"

1-You could do what I did when I did my model testing....ask them? Be warned....people have some strange ideas on how to fix things....but also some good ones will emerge. Point being and I am serious on this, why not try a massive (very large sample opinion poll) PYOPS used to have pretty extensive capabilities for that back in my day.....but they saw "Billy Jack" at the Drive In theater like most normal folks so you may have to outsource it to some capitalist media organization.

2-Find that "Green Beret Guy" that wrote that paper on Tribes, in the paper he said he had a CD and a lap top of the 911 attack and he showed it to some chief who had no idea it had even happened. That was smart IMO because he established his "Moral Purpose" for being on his turf. Tribes are gangs to me and any gang-banger would understand that such an attack would require revenge/justice. That may create a bonding effect with the target group by giving them some respect in their ability to help you get revenge/justice and in exchange for that you could offer to help with their local governance, but yet the target group would keep "respect" by not being viewed as some charity case. It would be an exchange among leaders who have great responsibilities, not just GI's and Animal Shepards......make any sense? Later.

This is great to see someone post his theories and then defend them in a rational, civil interchange with others. This sort of thing is increasingly becoming rare in today's world. Well done all.

Any model I see... I have to test it myself, so I did an informal 4 question Jones Model poll with 10 people. Unscientific to be sure but very revealing if somewhat depressing.
Time for some music on Good Governance. Share The Land by The Guess Who....Oh no they are Canadian!

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rLQJ4toj-JY

Let me propose something of an alternative to the Jones Insurgency Model.

COL Jones offers "the simple proposition that insurgency happens when governance fails." Thus, Poor Governance = Insurgency.

And he notes that "it is the duty of civil governance to maintain the internal peace to a society."

I suggest that the duty of civil governance is -- not to maintain the internal peace of a society -- but to rather to maintain the overall strength, viability and security of a nation/society.

Herein, constantly and throughout history, governments, by various necessity, have been forced to make a choice; a choice which tends to alienate one segment of the population or another; this leading to an insurgency.

Thus, I suggest that insurgency happens when governance is forced to make a choice.

For example: A primary foreign policy focus of the United States today is to force certain nations to "transform." This causes these nations to have to make a choice between:

a. Opening their societies up to the "modern" world and massive foreign influences and

b. Maintaining a more closed and more excluse society.

Herein, Good Governance or Poor Governance can only be determined by whether the choice made by the government ultimately:

a. Allows that the society is strenthened and remains secure or

b. Leads to the marginalizing, weakening and/or destruction of the subject state/society.

Thus, my alternative model suggests something alone the following lines:

Choice, Forced By Necessity = Insurgency.

"In some aspects was this not what Kilcullen was talking about in one of his first articles where he went extensively into "Conflict Ecosystems" and systems analysis?" by Outlaw7

Outlaw.

Yes, I believe it is. But I have been preaching Systems Analysis ever since I came here....way before Killcullen I might add. And I don't know anything new. Most of it I learned in the 4th grade when it was called "The General Systems Theory" which is based on Biology. By the time I got to high school....the same theory was just called Ecology, had to keep it simple for the hippies you know.

To give you an example in the 4th grade in order to learn the I-P-O model (Input-Process-Output-to an environment) we had to learn why are Flamingos Pink??? The answer is they are not pink, they are white!!! they only become pink when they eat shrimp found in there environment. The point being all living systems use some type of I-P-O procedure but the final output is often shaped by the LARGER environment in which the system operates.

The main problem as I have also pointed out long ago is there is confusion over the Systems Engineering Theory vs. The General System Theory(Ecology Conflict System). One deals with living adapting systems the other with non-adapting machines which I was also exposed to at the same grade level because of the NASA moon mission. In fact this was one of the keep points that kids were supposed to learn in the flipping 4th grade!

Somehow over time everything got all messed up and it took people like Killcullen to revive the General Systems theory(much to his credit I might add)but it will take a Col. Jones to simplify it enough to where senior civilian leadership can understand it because "they got so much schoolin they don't no nuthin."

The reason....the very purpose of systems thinking is make things clearer and easier regardless of the specific system you are dealing with because it is based upon a single "General" model that can absorb unlimted "Environment Specific Inputs" and arrive at good answers.

Sound Good...LOL

slapout9:

"It has no affect on what I am trying to get to with my work. My work is to attempt to understand the fundamental human dynamics at work, which I believe to be relatively timeless and universal; manifesting uniquely (like snowflakes, all formed the same way, yet all unique due to the environment they were formed in) based on all of the many environmental factors involved." by Col. Jones

In some aspects was this not what Kilcullen was talking about in one of his first articles where he went extensively into "Conflict Ecosystems" and systems analysis?

To indicate that his thinking is alive and well in academia this following article is really worth the read---maybe academia is not as hung up as the military when it comes to really analyzing ideas and driving further thinking on those ideas.

If anyone has followed my comments on "conflict ecosystems" and the definitions of Ecology of/Ecosystem of an Insurgency here at SWJ you will recognize a number of points that agree with my defintions and are voiced by Col. Jones in the quote.

It is and will always remain "about the eocsystem" and we can disguise it any name we want to and give it any name we want to, but we will fail in any COIN environment if we do not fully understand "ecosystems and the theories of open source warfare".

"When it comes to security, think 'natural'"
May 20, 2010

Security systems could be more effective if officials looked at how organisms deal with threats in the natural world, University of Arizona researchers suggest in the May 20 edition of the journal Nature.

The authors are working with security and disaster management officials to help put some of their recommendations - such as decentralizing forces and forming alliances - into practice.

"Anytime you have the illusion of full security, you get adaptation," said Rafe Sagarin, an assistant research scientist in the UA's Institute of the Environment who is the lead author of the opinion piece. "Terrorists figure out unexpected means of attack, hackers come up with new software to break through firewalls, and pathogens develop resistance to antibiotics."

Instead of relying on large, centralized bureaucracies that move slowly and often lag behind in addressing threats, the authors encourage officials to look to the natural world for principles that could prove less costly, more flexible and more effective at countering threats.

The security issues of modern human societies are analogous to those of many organisms, according to Sagarin and his co-authors. In nature, risks are frequent, variable and uncertain. Over billions of years, organisms have evolved an enormous variety of methods to survive, grow and proliferate on a continually changing planet. The key to their success is their ability to quickly adapt to rapidly changing threats, and change their structures, behaviors and interactions accordingly.

Avoid centralization

Unlike many security agencies or entities in the human world, the most adaptable and successful organisms avoid centralization. Instead, they distribute tasks among decentralized, specialized groups of cells or individuals.

Sagarin points to the octopus' camouflaging strategy to illustrate this principle: Its networks of pigment cells, distributed all over its body, react to and match the colors of the surroundings, blending the animal into the background.

"We can learn something from the octopus about the war in Iraq and Afghanistan," Sagarin said, specifically with regard to the threat from improvised explosive devices, or IEDs.

Just like the octopus' decentralized network of pigment cells, he pointed out, troops on the ground function like independent sensors that can assess a threat more accurately, more timely and more realistically than a large, centralized organization that is geographically removed from the action and largely follows a top-down approach of command.

"The individual soldiers in the war zone are the most adaptable unit out there," he said. "They are in a better position to recognize and address an emerging threat in time than a centralized bureaucracy."

Sagarin and co-authors point out that terrorist networks such as Al Qaida have recognized the advantages of this approach and operate a loose network of largely independent subgroups.

"About 1,500 soldiers had died from roadside bomb blasts between the time troops identified the threat and the time MRAPs (mine-resistant, ambush-protected vehicles) were deployed to deal with the situation."

Even after the blast-resistant vehicles arrived, they proved only moderately effective against a quickly moving threat that is constantly changing and rapidly adapting to new challenges.

"These MRAPs are huge, lumbering things that weigh 16 tons," Sagarin said, "The insurgents, on the other hand, drive around in small pickup trucks. They quickly figured out the MRAPs were limited to certain roads and started placing roadside bombs specifically along those routes."

Enlarge
The octopus relies on a network of pigment cells to blend in with its surroundings and escape detection. In a similar way, a decentralized network of ground forces may assess threats more quickly and respond more appropriately than a centralized command entity located far away from the action, UA's Rafe Sagarin suggests. Credit: Daniel Stolte, UA Communications

Let the attacker know you're ready

Another lesson could be learned by looking at how organisms deal with the constant threat from predators, according to the authors. A key feature is the capacity to reduce uncertainty and turn it into an advantage.

Hunting prey uses a lot of energy, Sagarin explained, which is why predators seek to ambush their prey. As soon as the prey is aware of their presence and ready to engage in defense, a pursuit might no longer be worth it.

Ground squirrels, for example, use alarm signals when a predator is lurking nearby, not only to warn their peers, but also to make it known to the attacker its cover is blown.

"When a prey species makes an alarm call of any kind, the game is up," Sagarin said. Suddenly, things have become a lot harder - if you're a hawk, you want to swoop down on a squirrel and not get scratched in the face."

Remarkably, ground squirrels use alarm signals that are very specific to the threat. If the predator is a mammal (which can hear), they utter alarm calls. If it is a snake (which cannot) they use tail-flagging to signal its presence.

The less specific an alarm call is, the less efficient it is in eliciting an appropriate response, the authors argue and point to the U.S. Homeland Security's threat advisory for national and international flights, which has remained at level orange (high) since August 2006. This static, ambiguous and nonspecific system creates uncertainty or indifference among the population that it is meant to help protect.

Form allies

Another principle often observed in nature is symbiosis, the formation of allies.

"Symbiosis is not always between friends," Sagarin said, pointing to the example of cleaner wrasses, small fish specializing in picking parasites off other marine animals, sometimes entering their mouths. The clients could easily swallow the cleaner wrasse while it is going about its job.

"But they don't," Sagarin said. "It's a mutual beneficial relationship in which the larger fish provides the cleaner fish with a food source and protection, and the cleaner keeps it free from parasites in return."

A lesson of how symbioses can successfully be applied in the human realm was demonstrated in Iraq in 2007, the authors note, when Gen. David Petraeus's strategy to form alliances with local leaders - including those who had been hostile - resulted in more tip-offs about IEDs and fewer American casualties.

Issue challenges

Two years ago, Sagarin and colleagues published a book titled "Natural Security: A Darwinian Approach to a Dangerous World." The research group has since begun to "make its observations more actionable for the people on the ground," as Sagarin put it. Working with emergency management coordinators, cybersecurity experts, soldiers, police chiefs, air marshals, homeland security officials, fire chiefs and public health officials, the group's ideas have generated a lot of interest.

"One of the main lessons we learned is that issuing challenges is more effective than giving orders when there is a need to develop security measures," Sagarin said. He pointed to the DARPA Grand Challenge as an example, in which the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency of the Department of Defense put on a prize competition for the development of a driver-less vehicle capable of navigating difficult terrain on its own.

"Anytime you pose a challenge, not only do you get a diverse population of problem solvers, but you get them to learn from each another."

However, despite decentralization, it is important to still have an overarching structure to provide guidance and encourage the development of new ideas.

"An octopus is still an octopus," Sagarin said, "not just a random collection of cells."

"The bottom line of all this is, you can't just put up a wall around something and expect it to protect it against every possible threat. Attackers will always figure out a way."

More information:
"Decentralise, adapt and cooperate," Rafe Sagarin et al., Nature, Vol. 465, May 20, 2010.
"Natural Security - A Darwinian Approach to a Dangerous World," Raphael Sagarin and Terence Taylor, University of California Press, 2008.

Provided by University of Arizona (news : web)

This just became mandatory reading for my students in Phase IV, 18A MOS, SFDOQC.
DOL-
Longdaddy, 18A SGI

Schmedlap,

Ah yes, the BetaMax versus VHS counter-point is a good one, and I forgot to consider that in terms of marketing and advertising :).

The acceptance and institutionalization of ideas is an interesting study. Now, if COL Jones published it through an academic institution or a think tank, hmmm....

v/r

Mike

One of the greatest Presidential speeches ever given and one of the greatest acts of Good Governance. It was and is "The Moral Equivalent Of War"

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-tPePpMxJaA

"Can time constraints -- relating to the very real interests, concerns, needs and agenda of a nation/great power -- cause a nation/great power to, reasonably and intelligently:" by BillC

BillC, until Col. Jones gets back I will take a stab at it. Time can be an issue but I don't see how it affects the model's validity.
The Carter doctrine is a perfect example. Many people forget that there were 2 parts to it.

One was to use Military force to guarantee access to Oil that Saudi Arabia had used as a weapon against us during the Oil embargo, hence his famous "Moral Equivalent of War Speech". His part 1 decision (use of force) matches all 4 Jones model factors for good governance.

His part 2 decision was to organize the resources of the USA to where we would never again be Dependant on the ME for energy security. In particular the Strategic Oil Reserve and yearly Oil import reduction targets. Again his part 2 decisions are not as well known. But they again get a positive response on all 4 factors of the Jones model for good governance.

He is the last President who at the end of his watch could say the USA was importing LESS oil than when he took office, hence we were more secure and he was leading a good government, no other President can say that.

That is why I say he was the last Strategic President we had. His 2 part Strategy would allow us to survive short term and long term regardless of what our enemies did or didn't do. That is good Strategy and that is Good "Governing Dynamics" IMO

"You might want to try to tweak and refine this model so that its scope is not just insurgencies in general, but insurgencies following state collapse and/or arising in nation-building/state-building scenarios and/or arising in societies whose politics align along tribal and ethnic lines."

I'm not sure if that is relevant with Jones' Model. He describes popular violence as a function of poor governance. Time is not in the equation. The elimination of a lifecycle or time allows for a broad model that could be used to describe insurgencies within a stable, unstable, or failed gov't. That's one thing that I like about it.

Let me pose the question as follows:

Can time constraints -- relating to the very real interests, concerns, needs and agenda of a nation/great power -- cause a nation/great power to, reasonably and intelligently:

a. Embrace speed, force, aggression and conflict as the only means available for securing its interests and achieving its goals in the time required, and

b. Reject patience, example and "good governance;" especially when it has been determined that such methods have not, cannot and will not allow the nation/great power to secure its interests and achieve its goals in the time available?

Or, in such instances -- wherein the lengthy application of patience, example and good governance is unfeasible -- must nations/great powers simply forego their security, their interests and their continued wellbeing?

"And Slap, at the time Mexico wasn't the problem at all. It didn't really factor in from our perspective because conditions were different. Where Mexico came in was as a "safe haven" for hostile elements of many tribes...who in turn used the U.S. as a "safe haven" for their raids into Mexico." By Steve Blair

From a systems standpoint I would say that is a problem.....system boundry control. Which points to another point, at the time much of the areas in question were simply "territories" were they not? Statehood came later for many (could be wrong) but the point is the System "Governing Dynamics" helped to create the Comoncheros and we are still seeing this effect to this day. My analysis through the Lones model anyway.

Ack...date above should be 1870 and not 1872.

Bill C,

Your example of the Indian Wars is flawed on a number of levels, but that has more to do with attempting to simplify it I think. And Slap, at the time Mexico wasn't the problem at all. It didn't really factor in from our perspective because conditions were different. Where Mexico came in was as a "safe haven" for hostile elements of many tribes...who in turn used the U.S. as a "safe haven" for their raids into Mexico.

Bill's comment implies that there was a conscious decision made to seek a military solution to the issues on the Frontier. In fact there was no such decision made. Rather we saw a number of competing government and industrial interest groups pushing their own agendas forward, and policy (such as it was) grew from whatever faction happened to gain the most traction at any point in time. There were also a number of what might be considered non-state actors (mainly the Territorial authorities and local residents...and these were not always the same things) who could have a major impact on policy at any given time.

If you look at 1872 as just one example of this, the military happened to be the major diving force behind Indian policy at that time, and had almost succeeded in having control of some agencies (what are now called reservations) shifted to military officers and away from the Indian Bureau. All that came to a screeching halt after the Marias River Massacre, which led to outcry back East and a Congressional decision to not shift authority for agencies. This in turn led to Grant's so-called "Peace Policy" where he sought more 'neutral' control for the agencies and in the end turned to the numerous church societies then in existence. The whole Marias affair started with agitation by Montana territorial authorities, and was exacerbated by factional divisions within the Bloods and Piegans (to include the incorrect identification of a friendly camp as hostile by a scout).

The above is a capsule version, and isn't as complete as I might like. But it does convey the point that 'policy' during this time shifted frequently, and could be modified or sabotaged by any number of actors. Treaties could be negotiated and then fail due to Congress' failure to make appropriations for rations and agency activities (or through blatant corruption and fraud at the agency level).

Frontier expansion was nowhere near as orderly or planned as the earlier example implies. To assume that it was allows us to miss many interesting lessons and observations from the period.

Or more specifically let Billy Jack(The Greatest green Beret Ever) explain it.

http://billyjack.com/index.php?menuID=Page&pid=38

Here is how I would apply the model.

1-If your goal/mission is illegitimate than change the goal/mission. Relative to the ME we need to focus our resources on total energy indepence...not changing people who don't want to change. There is no military solution to the ME but we could have a political solution to ensure the survival of the US. The Carter Doctrine was and is still sound....he was the last Strategic President we had relative to energy Independence.

2-As it relates to the west (US) this was a classic case of failing to realize that the real problem was the larger system of Mexico.....not the Indians. And because of this we now have a case of a "suppressed insurgency" along our border according to Bob's model. Just my opinion on using the model.

The problem, it would seem, is time. Consider the following example:

In the later 19th Century, the United States determined that, in order to provide for its immedate and rapidly expanding needs, it would need to quickly tame and incorporate the West -- and quickly transform, reduce and/or eliminate the American Indians.

At this time, the United States acknowledged that, because of the immediate nature of its needs, it would not be able to use the more humane method of applying significant patience, example and "good governance" to this problem.

Rather the United States accepted that only by way of aggression and conflict could the United States achieve its goals in the time required.

Today, the United States sees the immediate and rapidly expanding needs of the international community -- and the problems of the Middle East and other such "backwards" areas of the world -- in much this same light.

Thus, the acknowledgement that:

a. Significant patience, example and "good governance" has not -- and will not -- achieve the mission in the time required and that, therefore,

b. Only the application of more immediate, more aggressive and more decisive measures (resulting in an accepted "era of persistent conflict") can hope to get the job done (in the time required).

For clarification:

The "government" in the scenerio I have described above is the "international community" (the term of legitimacy, authority and implied legality used by our national leaders in recent years).

The head "governor" of this government is the United States.

Within this construct, the "global insurgency" is considered to be very real -- as it is seen to be the sum of all persons, groups, nations, cultures and/or societies that would oppose the will of this global government (the international community) and global governor (the United States).

A main goal of this government and governor is to cause certain of the more difficult nations and societies to be transformed -- so that they might better meet the needs of the international community/United States.

The method used by the international community/United States -- to achieve this transformation of various nations and societies -- is via their local governments.

Thus if "good governance" is to be achieved in this scenerio, it would seem that this must originate with and be orchastrated by the government in-charge of these matters (the international community) and must be led by and be overseen by the governor in-charge of this government (the United States).

Is the requirement to transform nations and societies -- so as to meet the international community's needs -- beyond the bounds of what "good governance" can provide?

(Thus, the acknowledgement of our new reality as "an era of persistent conflict" -- and "a permanent state of war" -- via the "global insurgency" [anyone who opposes the "international community" direction to transform].)

Or can the international community (with the US in-charge) -- through "good governance" -- reconcile a conflict between (1) those who require the transformation of other nations, peoples and societies and (2) those other nations, peoples and societies who are unwilling, or are unable, to transform?

How might we apply our learning re: "The Jones Insurgency Model" to the following problem:

Today, our national and military leaders often suggest that the United States is:

a. The indispensable head of a new "international community" and

b. That this new international community today faces the problem of a "global insurgency" due to its critical need to

c. Transform entire nations and societies such that these nations and societies might better support and service the needs of this expanding international community.

The friction derived from this problem/process (of having to transform entire nations and societies -- so that they might better provide for the "international communities" needs) causes our national and military leaders to see the future as one of "an era of persistent conflict" and "a permanent state of war" (primarily insurgencies?).

In light of COL Jones guidance, how specifically might the United States -- in its role as the leader of the "international community" (1) do good governance, (2) achieve its mission of transforming entire nations and socities so as to meet the international community's needs and (3) cause the global insurgency to go away?

The last anonymous was me.....I got excited and stuff and forgot to type in my name....Ken White would understand.

"It has no affect on what I am trying to get to with my work. My work is to attempt to understand the fundamental human dynamics at work, which I believe to be relatively timeless and universal; manifesting uniquely (like snowflakes, all formed the same way, yet all unique due to the environment they were formed in) based on all of the many environmental factors involved." by Col. Jones

Solid gold!!Now that is Systems Thinking as I originally learned it. General theory principles that can lead to "Infinite Variety" a very important Systems Thinking principal. The system that can create the most variety inside a General framework/model will prosper/survive/win. The Enemy is not a country it is a system. Colonel Jones model can be applied to any "people governing system" regardless of state/non-state, public or private,peaceful or criminal.

Jones:

This confuses me:

"For those who find comfort in constructs, such as "generational warfare," or "Irregular warfare," or even the ecology of insurgency described by Outlaw; if those constructs help you to understand, they all fit within this model. For me personally I had to get past the new labels and try to understand at the fundamental human level what is going on; what is timeless, and what is being accelerated and connected in new ways by the modern tools of information and travel."

I certainly don't disagree with the last section there, but generational war, irregular war, and ecology models all have substantially different theoretical foundations - that is, even when applied to the same system, they tend to produce different pictures. Sometimes these pictures are close enough for us to pick out the "real" dynamics behind something; but often it really comes down to whatever model you prefer.

How can all these different models, which look at things differently, have different ontologies and foundations, and VERY different ways of examining conflict, be a part of your model? If that's how you see it, your model is either so fantastically complex (like M-theory requiring the development of an entirely new mathematics to explain itself), or so general and vague that everyone who disagrees is still nevertheless on the team.

You *seem* to be saying the latter, but based on your comments, I also don't think your model is quite so reductionist. Can you help a brother out?

Here's a link to an article that addresses the issues brought up by Anonymous @ 2:13. <a href="http://www.thenation.com/article/aiding-insurgency">Aiding the Insurgency</a> by Luke Mogelson in <i>The Nation</i>.

A recent example of a "claimed" successful Civil Goveranance from Iraq.

Sometimes CG is not the only answer to insurgencies as it does not always answer the core reasons why insurgencies start.

"Last summer the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) closed one of its largest projects in Iraq, declaring that it had been a virtually unqualified success. The Community Stabilization Program (CSP), which cost $675 million over its three years of operation, has been lauded as one of the wars most effective counterinsurgency operations. Launched in May 2006, it was USAIDs chief contribution to the Bush plan of rescuing a tailspinning military adventure with a civilian surge and increased focus on economic development.

... According to several senior military and government personnel, however, this vaunted program was responsible for sending millions of taxpayer dollars to Iraqi insurgents via a complex web of contractors and subcontractors. These sources claim that although USAID was fully aware of the problem, it delayed acting for as long as possible, unwilling to pull the plug on a program that generated propitious statistics, even when it jeopardized American lives."

I wish there was simply a LIKE button for SWJ articles b/c I approve of COL Jones' message.

We're starting to get closer to the truth outside of the zero-sum nonsense between COIN and CT and the inability to differentiate between occupation and FID in this post-colonial world that others would espouse.

3000 years ago, King Solomon struggled with the same unknowns in Ecclesiastes. He laments,

"Again, I looked and saw all the oppression
that was taking place under the sun:

I saw the tears of the oppressed--
And they have no comforter;
Power was on the side of their oppressors--
And they have no comforter."

Well Done Col Jones.

De Oppresso Liber

Robert:

Using this quote--how does one then explain the Taliban rise, fall, and re-arise? The whole thing cannot be as simple as civil governance?

"In the beginning of their war against Islam, [the Crusaders] had announced that one of their
main goals was to destroy the Al-Qaeda organization in Afghanistan; and now, look what
happened? Thanks to God, instead of being limited to Afghanistan, Al-Qaeda broke out
into the entire Islamic world and was able to establish an international expansion, in several countries, sending its brigades into every Islamic country, destroying the Blasphemersfortresses, and purifying the Muslims countries.

I would argue that there are far deeper ecosystems that exist within any country to include the US that governments tend to fail to understand. If a government could detect those ecosystems then in fact they could address the needs/wants of that ecosystem or ecosystems more effectively along the lines you write about before the ecosystem decides on it's "common ventures". They don't simply because they are usually blind on one eye. "Hear no evil, see no evil"

"Ecosystem of an Insurgency:

An insurgent ecosystem is a system whose members (members defined as being either an insurgent group or groups) benefit from each other's participation via symbiotic (mutually beneficial and self-sustaining) relationships.

The main goal of an insurgency ecosystem is to generate common ventures. It forms when many small and potentially diverse (origin, tribe, religious belief, etc.) insurgent groups join together to fight a common predator (the counter-insurgent or state).

Insurgent ecosystems attract and retain members (groups) due to network effects:

• The benefits of the ecosystem (shared ventures) are so great that groups wont leave it (although temporary departures to avoid targeted pressure from counter-insurgents are possible).
• The ecosystems features (i.e. immediate access to shared resources) make it easy for new groups to form and participate.
• The growth of the ecosystem results in an exponential increase in benefits (i.e. more segmentation and specialization) for all of the member groups. IE Attacks by one group creates opportunities for other groups. The buying of resources (ie small arms, explosives) creates a market for groups to sell into and makes it easier for other groups to get access to the resources.
• An ecosystem can have groups directly fighting each other through direct battles - but it can also have indirect fighting (or competition) between groups for access to resources (people, money, strategy etc).

Once an ecosystem is established in a particular region/area, it becomes very difficult for the counter insurgent to eliminate it. The presence of multiple groups means that the counter insurgent must divide its efforts. Operationally, a focus on one group leaves other groups to operate freely and success against one group yields very little overall benefit. Removing leadership does not mean that the group will cease to exist. The leadership may be replaced by other parts from the same group or other groups. Or a new group will move into the space left open by old group. Strategically, the diversity of the groups in the ecosystem (different reasons for fighting) means that it isnt possible to address a single set of issues or grievances at the national level that would reverse the insurgency (via negotiated settlement, repatriation, etc.)."

"Liberal policies of enabling immigrants to retain their old languages and customs in distinct communities provide rich soil for the the growth of future insurgencies." by Col. Jones

Bob,That is some Strategic Stuff. It is Warden's Ring #3 Infrastructure as it concerns Human Infrastructure based Insurgencies. Ring #3 is essentially concerned with what "connects" the systems togather....not just physical objects as it is often interpreted. Language is the most basic conection between person to person communcation Insurgencies. Customs and traditions again are the "connecting" SOP's of Insurgencies/Gangs. Just had to through that out here....you understand. LOL