The United States Should Rethink Power-Projection Abroad
Jeong Lee
I get tired of rehashing the same old argument time and again but feel that I must do so yet another time. Of late, I have been getting a lot of feedback on my ground forces merger piece— some positive but mostly negative.
Lest I be misunderstood, I welcome heated and passionate exchanges of ideas. Such discourses are evidence of healthy democracy at work which help to keep things in perspective. In short, robust discussion is what keeps the national security establishment on the cutting edge.
However, it seems that many of my strident critics tend to focus on the operational and tactical minutiae and quaint service traditions when advocating the need for maintaining two separate ground forces. One blogger seemed miffed that my piece does not fully take into account the fundamental differences in raisons d’être and functions between an Army Brigade Combat Team and a Marine Regimental Combat Team. And furthermore, he declaimed in a condescending manner that my piece overlooks the importance of “ability to fight combined arms and services” which enables the troops to possess “overwhelming combat power, both to quickly achieve objectives, and minimize losses to our force.”
To this, I should point out that even though both the United States Army and the Marine divisions successfully delivered a crushing blow to Saddam Hussein’s ragtag army in the early days of its invasion of Iraq through “shock and awe,” they found themselves ultimately mired in protracted and unwinnable counterinsurgency campaigns, not necessarily because of insufficient boots on the ground or the failure to execute counterinsurgency (COIN) operations, but because policymakers were incapable of accurately gauging the desire of the “the inhabitants of the Islamic world…[who have become] increasingly intolerant of foreign interference.” Also, his assertion is intrinsically flawed in that it overlooks the unpleasant truth that “the size of the armed forces is not the most telling metric of their strength.”
Worse still, in a risible attempt to rebut my arguments, one reserve Marine captain cites as one of his counterarguments the Marine Corps’ invention of the vertical envelopment tactics during the Korean War to justify his purported “truth” that “a market place of defense ideas is better than a command economy for strategy.” However, the captain blithely ignores in his tired recitation of historical precedents that air mobile warfare, wherein armed gunships provide tactical fire support for the infantry troops, was perfected by the Army and not the Marine Corps during the Vietnam War.
This does not even take into consideration the fact that many of my critics fail to understand the difference between expeditionary warfare and costly protracted occupation of sovereign territory. As I pointed out in my response to my readers, expeditionary warfare is of short-term nature meant to shock the enemy into submission while a protracted occupation of a foreign territory entails a long-term commitment. As recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan show, however, Marines have been performing anything but expeditionary warfare. Instead, they have served as an adjunct to the Army. The same was true during the Vietnam War where regiments from 1st and 3rd Marine Divisions established firebases all over South Vietnam.
Most importantly, many of my critics do not understand that in times of waning national power, there is a better alternative to strident militarism which only alienates the global citizens from the United States. Indeed, Professor Andrew Bacevich, Colonel Gian Gentile, and Tom Engelhardt are correct when they advocate that the United States should pursue “a strategy that accepts war as a last resort and not a policy option of first choice.” This requires that the United States focus on defending the homeland first before seeking to project its finite military might abroad. Given that the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have discredited the efficacy of finite military power, it would suit America’s interests to reorient its military towards homeland defense and perhaps pare down its size and functions through a service merger.
Indeed, sorely lacking in criticisms levied against my piece is any discussion on the need to redefine and reorient America’s strategic interests. It shocks me that none of my critics even bothered to ask if the United States really needs to police the world when it doesn't even have the wherewithal to fix its own dysfunctional government. Contrary to the argument that globalization dictates that the United States should continue to maintain military bases abroad to safeguard its commercial interests because “security, prosperity, and vital interests of the United States are increasingly coupled to those of other nations,” it should be noted that many advanced, industrialized maritime nations such as China, Japan, South Korea, Australia and Britain are interconnected but are capable of safeguarding their economic interests without stationing their Marines and soldiers on foreign soil.
Even more important, the United States should make good use of its soft power—its traditional strong suit. It used to be that people around the world admired what the United States stood for: economic justice, wealth, high quality education as represented through its prestigious research universities and think tanks, high-tech inventions and tolerance for others. However, after having traveled all over Asia, I am not sure that our Asian allies even take the United States seriously.
If you don’t believe me, just ask Secretary Kerry who recently complained about “jokes [emanating from our allies] about whether because we weren’t being paid, one country or another could buy our meals.” This should serve as a sobering reminder to the defense establishment as to what America’s true priorities should be.
Jeong Lee is a freelance writer and a Contributing Analyst for Wikistrat’s Asia-Pacific Desk. Lee’s writings on U.S. defense and foreign policy issues and inter-Korean affairs have appeared on various online publications including East Asia Forum, the Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, the World Outline, the Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC), the Naval Institute’s blog, RealClearDefense and Small Wars Journal.
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"Contrary to the argument that globalization dictates that the United States should continue to maintain military bases abroad to safeguard its commercial interests because “security, prosperity, and vital interests of the United States are increasingly coupled to those of other nations,” it should be noted that many advanced, industrialized maritime nations such as China, Japan, South Korea, Australia and Britain are interconnected but are capable of safeguarding their economic interests without stationing their Marines and soldiers on foreign soil."
Arguments:
a. China, Japan, South Korea, Australia and Britian are not the one's who are safeguarding their economic interests. We are.
b. Considering the potential adverse consequences of having China, Japan, et al, safeguard their economic interests (conflict of interests; arms race; war) are the present arrangements the better choice -- both for the global economy and all concerned?
I don't know where to put this comment so I'll just put it here, with the indulgence of SWJ and the author :)
From a FP article:
<blockquote>So what's the alternative to Air-Sea Battle? A good strategy needs to make aggression more expensive to adversaries than deterring aggression is to us. We should start by freshening up the strike paradigm. Rather than sinking billions of dollars into carriers and aircraft that have diminishing utility, we need to leap ahead to the next generation of warfare: We need to go unmanned. The technical services should invest in unmanned ships, aircraft, and submarines (except the ballistic-missile subs). If we possessed scores of aircraft-carrying ships with thousands of strike aircraft, rather than a few massive carrier groups, the Navy would be able to protect the global commons much more efficiently. The associated reduction in aviation training and shipbuilding costs would also relieve budget pressure. We could then discard the utopian assumption that land operations are optional.
We should leverage military-to-military contacts more than ever. Look at the example of Saudi Arabia. For decades, the United States maintained military and diplomatic relations. When Iraq invaded Kuwait, mutual interests converged, and Saudi Arabia became an unsinkable aircraft carrier and staging base.</blockquote>
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/11/20/no_more_easy_wars_army…
Interesting comments on ASB which I remain suspicious of but I don't really know so maybe I should just hold comment (Ha! Like that will happen).
<em>What I wanted to point out is that the American military gets gamed in its military-military relationships as much as it gets benefit out of it. </em> SA wasn't just Kuwait but 9-11 too....oh, never mind. Whatever. Habit.
Others must see that about the US military, or parts of it. They must see it and know it and work it, you know?
The post 9-11 events are such that is probably too painful for you to admit what really happened to you so maybe that's why you ignore it. The relationships have to be managed by people that are a little more savvy and I know that's easier said than done.
But what am I to think after everything that's happened? Trust, once lost....
You get gamed, okay? Admit it privately even if you don't want to publicly. I don't care as long as it's admitted somewhere.
jleeblogger:
Much as the troops are not able to pick the wars -- and kinds of wars -- they fight in,
This being determined by civilian leadership,
Likewise might civilian leadership, in many instances, not be able to choose the wars, and kinds of wars, that they fight in,
This often being determined, for example, by other nations, other actors and other factors?
Thus, these other nations, other actors and other factors determining, to a large extent, what a nation, its civilian leadership and its military can and cannot afford?
Now to attempt to square this circle for what are said to be our circumstances today:
To adequately provide for itself and other nations who are both (1) interdependent and (2) dependent on the expanding global economy, must not the United States (and others) have forces and capabilities ready who can adequately deter and/or deal with those things which typically damage, destroy, threaten or obstruct the global economy and the necessary expansion thereof, for example:
a. Great power conflict (as in the case of WWI then and China today),
b. Regional conflict(s),
c. WMD proliferation and, last but not least,
d. States and societies whose way of life, way of governance and values, attitudes and beliefs tend to stand in the way of where the global economy wants and, more importantly, needs to go?
In order for the United States DoD and the GOFOs to formulate a coherent strategic blueprint, first, they need to take a hard look at what the United States government can afford and cannot afford. If it cannot afford, for instance, to field nine COCOMs plus twelve carrier battle groups on top of four Marine Divisions and what have you, it makes every sense to trim some excess weight--even if it means that some service personnel and civilian DoD employees will be downsized. If downsizing and outsourcing are effective corporate models for management, then, why shouldn't it apply to our military?
Expeditionary capabilities, as you point out, are necessary provided that the operational, tactical and strategy side are carefully thought out and executed. As COL David Maxwell once told me via e-mail--and he may be right about this--troops don't get to pick the kinds of war that they want to fight in. That is the province of the civilian policymakers. But civilian overseers CAN hopefully choose fights wisely so that our military personnel do not bleed unnecessarily and still bring home a decisive victory.
In order for the United States DoD and the GOFOs to formulate a coherent strategic blueprint, first, they need to take a hard look at what the United States government can afford and cannot afford. If it cannot afford, for instance, to field nine COCOMs plus twelve carrier battle groups on top of four Marine Divisions and what have you, it makes every sense to trim some excess weight--even if it means that some service personnel and civilian DoD employees will be downsized. If downsizing and outsourcing are effective corporate models for management, then, when why shouldn't it apply to our military?
Expeditionary capabilities, as you point out, are necessary provided that the operational, tactical and strategy side are carefully thought out and executed. As COL David Maxwell once told me via e-mail--and he may be right about this--troops don't get to pick the kinds of war that they want to fight in. That is the province of the civilian policymakers. But civilian overseers CAN hopefully choose fights wisely so that our military personnel do not bleed unnecessarily and still bring home a decisive victory.
In order for the United States DoD and the GOFOs to formulate a coherent strategic blueprint, first, they need to take a hard look at what the United States government can afford and cannot afford. If it cannot afford, for instance, to field nine COCOMs plus twelve carrier battle groups on top of four Marine Divisions and what have you, it makes every sense to trim some excess weight--even if it means that some service personnel and civilian DoD employees will be downsized. If downsizing and outsourcing are effective corporate models for management, then, why shouldn't it apply to our military?
Expeditionary capabilities, as you point out, are necessary provided that the operational, tactical and strategy side are carefully thought out and executed. As COL David Maxwell once told me via e-mail--and he may be right about this--troops don't get to pick the kinds of war that they want to fight in. That is the province of the civilian policymakers. But civilian overseers CAN hopefully choose fights wisely so that our military personnel do not bleed unnecessarily and still bring home a decisive victory.
In order for the United States DoD and the GOFOs to formulate a coherent strategic blueprint, first, they need to take a hard look at what the United States government can afford and cannot afford. If it cannot afford, for instance, to field nine COCOMs plus twelve carrier battle groups on top of four Marine Divisions and what have you, it makes every sense to trim some excess weight--even if it means that some service personnel and civilian DoD employees will be downsized. If downsizing and outsourcing are effective corporate models for management, then, why shouldn't it apply to our military?
Expeditionary capabilities, as you point out, are necessary provided that the operational, tactical and strategy side are carefully thought out and executed. As COL David Maxwell once told me via e-mail--and he may be right about this--troops don't get to pick the kinds of war that they want to fight in. That is the province of the civilian policymakers. But civilian overseers CAN hopefully choose fights wisely so that our military personnel do not bleed unnecessarily and still bring home a decisive victory.
In order for the United States DoD and the GOFOs to formulate a coherent strategic blueprint, first, they need to take a hard look at what the United States government can afford and cannot afford. If it cannot afford, for instance, to field nine COCOMs plus twelve carrier battle groups on top of four Marine Divisions and what have you, it makes every sense to trim some excess weight--even if it means that some service personnel and civilian DoD employees will be downsized. If downsizing and outsourcing are effective corporate models for management, then, why shouldn't it apply to our military?
Expeditionary capabilities, as you point out, are necessary provided that the operational, tactical and strategy side are carefully thought out and executed. As COL David Maxwell once told me via e-mail--and he may right about this--troops don't get to pick the kinds of war that they want to fight in. That is the province of the civilian policymakers. But civilian overseers CAN hopefully choose fights wisely so that our military personnel do not bleed unnecessarily and still bring home a decisive victory.
Jeong Lee,
I think the article at this link written by COL Sledge touches on many of the concerns and recommendations you addressed in your article.
http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=19458
You clearly took an unpopular position and held your ground which I applaud. DOD has a very strong tendency to cling to what is and will defend what is until its last dying breath. It is well past time to move beyond our Cold War defense strategy, and I also think it is time to move beyond our GWOT, but I'm before we toss the baby out with the bathwater what should our defense strategy be? We can myopically focus on terrorists, but like criminals they will always be present, and we can’t afford to deny safe haven globally by attempting to reform governments and building their security forces. We can only afford to do this in the areas that present the highest risk to the US and its interests. Many are narrowly focused on a major conflict with emerging powers such as China or putting a lot of boots on the ground to stabilize a post war North Korea, etc. While others see cyber, organized crime, and failed states as the focus area, but with the exception of always stating that defense of the homeland is priority one, we have done a poor job of articulating what threatens the homeland. All the scenarios have merit and need to be considered, but as Sledge argues, we should first start with a strategy, which he argues is not the current National Defense Strategy. Regardless of what scenario or blend of scenarios you tend to lean towards supporting for analyzing future military capabilities needed I think most reasonable people agree that our strategic power ultimately rises from the strength of our economy, and then arguably it is followed closely by the strength of our ideas. Therefore, if we continue to cling to expensive and outdated ideas on national defense we actually put at risk what we claim to be protecting.
Sledge also argues that politics will ultimately prevent us having a coherent strategy that actually makes sense, so he recommends that DOD first develop a strategy based on sound logic, and then overlay the art of the possible based on political direction. While merging our two ground forces may be ultimately be a desirable option, it is doubtful this option falls in the art of the possible. I’m also not sure how you would conduct a cost estimate to see if the juice is worth the squeeze to conduct such a major change? At the end of the day we still need the capabilities the Marines provide, which are not what they’re doing in Afghanistan, but rather their expeditionary combined arms team in the littoral region capability. It is more complex than loading an amphibious boat and running across the beach, it requires a wide range of unique capabilities and skills, so even if the Army did assume this mission it would have to have amphibious groups (BDE, BN, TF, whatever) that are specially trained and equipped to conduct these operations, at best we remove a HQs and their staff, and perhaps save some money in streamlining schools, logistics, recruitment, etc., but how much? Economic considerations are absolutely critical, but they’re not everything. We also have to consider what is important to our culture based on our history, because certain things define us as a nation that are worth keeping and I think an argument could be made that the Marines fall in that category.
I do too. As I've said here before, I have all the mad love of an immigrant for the American Experiment but I also have a fear that all the hard work done by previous generations (and many brave folk here too, especially families that have served generation after generation) will all be pissed away.
It's so precious, how can some play so cavalierly with this beautiful place, this beautiful experiment in self-governance? I just can't understand it.
Madhu, what you just said is, by far, the most thoughtful, cogent and germane response to my article. Thank you for this. Just because I tell the policymakers to set their house in order first before venturing out to antagonize others or bankrupt themselves, it doesn't make me any less pro-American.
I am pro-American and I love American democratic ideals.
I like Bacevich because whether I agree or disagree he is willing to look with a hard eye at both the right and left. I think technocratic elitism is a much a part of it as a kind of corporate cronyism. Chicken and egg, they need each other, the do-gooders, the technocrats, the cronyists, the connected....
Good exchange.
But there is something intellectually unstatisfying about Prestowitz's observations although they are very astute and I guess I sorta made similar points earlier in the thread. It's back to cost benefit ratios again, and a lot of the problems is a Davos oligarchical elite class that doesn't know how to extract benefit for the American people from forward postures or home pivots.
Having lived in cities with large neighborhoods of poor, the pivoting back home can be done badly too. We spend a lot of money around here and it doesn't ever really improve the situation for the poor or the middle class, it just recirculates from the connected to the crony business types to the policitians, so on, in an endless loop.
So basically your oped was never about land force consolidation as an improvement to US warfighting ability, but about adopting a stance that redeploys US combat power back to US territory and downsizes it. Why didn't you use that as your thesis? Seems like you would have avoided a lot of the "misunderstanding" you seem miffed by.
Another article for discussion (a friend sent me the link after I alerted my friend to your article and this thread):
http://prestowitz.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/11/14/rebuilding_america
<blockquote>"The main fact is that while it's true that U.S. power is ebbing, it's not ebbing for lack of military presence or capability. It's ebbing because the U.S. trade deficit appears to be irreducible and U.S. industry continues to offshore not only production but also R&D and innovation while some of America's greatest educational institutions slash their budgets, even as those of China and most of the rest of Asia expand geometrically. In short, the U.S. is seen in Asia as a declining power because it can't compete, not because it can't fight.
Increasing the American military presence in the Asia-Pacific region will only cost more money and goad the Chinese to redouble their own military efforts. It won't produce a single new semiconductor or new company or higher American wages. In his post election speeches, the President has frequently talked about doing nation building at home and about rebuilding America. He's right. An economically stronger America wouldn't have to deploy 2,500 marines in the northern reaches of Australia or put 60 percent of its naval ships in the western Pacific. So how do we rebuild America?
<strong>For starters, we pivot not to Asia, but to America. Look, the Aussies are reducing their own forces. Why are we sending more troops to Australia? China has an economy growing at 7.5 percent while we struggle to hit the 2 percent mark. Why do we want to challenge China to an arms race that is likely to be more costly to us than to them? Remember that U.S. oil does not come across the Pacific. There has been a lot of concern about the off-shoring of U.S. jobs and technology. Yet, the U.S. military presence in Asia promotes a degree of stability that makes the Asian supply chain safe. In effect the Pentagon guarantees corporations who offshore their operations that they have nothing to fear in terms of disruption by doing so. This is like a subsidy for off-shoring. Why is America paying this subsidy?"</strong></blockquote>
This is thinking of the pivot as primarily military, however, which is unfortunately what is happening. Think of it differently--a diplomatic 'hand in"-- and it changes a basic calculus.
I'm going to have to rethink some basic assumptions about what is optimal for American interests and any rebalancing, although, in the strictest sense, the above is a kind of rebalancing too when examined through a non-military lens....
Am I being too clever by half?
The John Batchelor radio show had a bit about China and Japan but I was more interested for once in the technology than in the strategic question of how interested the US should be in all of this (I think, optimally: be careful wading in). Drones and other lower cost technologies are being used to push and test and poke and provoke (us too) and yet we talk so much about the largest most expensive fixes. Not a novel observation but it really strikes an outsider to all of this as a very strange sort of US self-conversation with bizarre assumptions.
What if the US wasn't wealthy? How completely differently we would look at all of this. In particular, it's almost as if the US military and foreign policy intellectual class has all the habits of a spoiled scion of a great family, the one that doesn't know how to do anything but assume a certain birthright and pay through the nose for everything....
To all my readers, here is food for thought: http://www.thenation.com/article/176819/dear-war-hawks-there-no-isolati….
You're quite right that they field light carriers--except China--at best. My point is not that they can carry fighter squadrons aboard, say, in the manner of the Nimitz carriers but that some of these nations have actually dispatched carriers for humanitarian relief missions. The ROK Navy, for instance, sent the Dokdo in the aftermath of the disaster in Haiti.
Mr. Lee,
If any East Asian nations, including China, Japan and South Korea, do field aircraft carriers and have duplicated our military capability and capacity to conduct humanitarian operations on the same scale as the U.S. please educate me with those supporting facts. Last I checked Japan only had a few helicopter carriers. China has one aircraft carrier whose operational status is questionable, it's not in the Phillippines doing HA and there is no equivalent HA response like the U.S. to date in the Phillippines from any other nation to date, which by the way is in China's back yard. Even Ikea beat China's meager donation of $100,000. China won't even send a hospital ship.
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=245150990
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/sns-rt-us-philippines-typhoon-china-…
As such I think its pretty safe to say China won't be employing its military to conduct HA anywhere in the world and on the same scale as the U.S. military can do anytime soon. Comedian Stephen Colbert has even started an effort to out donate China.
https://grabien.com/file.php?id=10869&searchorder=date
http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/afp/131115/china-urged-send-war…
Mr. Lee,
I think folks can appreciate your efficiency argument if it was divorced from the policy argument, even if at the end of the day they disagree with the conclusion. Where you lose folks is on the other two broad strands you weave on policy and budget. First on budget...our government shutdowns and mock-worthy political antics have very little to do with scarcity of cash and everything to do with parliamentary tactics of two dis functional parties. America's budget austerity is a political choice not a necessary condition. That means the next election can change the situation. Also, please don't forget that we have yet to hit pre 9/11 budgets.
On the policy issue, well, that too can change. But your preference for American denunciation of military power projection has little to nothing to do with the Corps or the Army. In fact, this very journal is named for a document that was produced to capture 4 decades of American interventionism using only the Navy and a tiny Corps.
I also want to point out that your definition of expeditionary warfare is painfully narrow. Warfare is employed to advance a national intent. Expeditionary warfare is not synonymous with BCT-scale Raids. It is projection of military forces beyond ones immediate borders for a purpose other than conquest, something the US hasn't been big on since the 1920's. Nor is it the antithesis of occupation. There is no such thing as occupationary warfare. In fact, an expeditionary force can conduct an occupation during a protracted campaign. Perhaps the USMC had no real business maneuvering past Umm Qasr and doing occupation rotations in OIF or OEF (if their true value is in littoral contexts), but if you had an argument to make there that the Corps wound up being redundant, it got lost in the political noise.
My understanding is that China--at least some within the system--want to be recognized as a great world power in their own right. This is not the same as being a world hegemon as you say but our main issues are in the realm of the economy, the stealing of technology and the use of international institutions in a kind of international competition with the US where we pay and they cash in. This is not about the military. A lot of these problems the US brought on herself. Anyway, I wasn't being specific about China. I was talking about the principle that you brought up about being involved abroad so that our near abroad is less contested.
Madhu, I am usually not too concerned about China because they are primarily localists in their thinking. Incrementalism tend to be less destabilizing than more aggressive policies. They want to be a respected regional power but not a world hegemon.
That said, my own ideas raise two concerns. First, they are currently in the seem between communal legitimacy and individualistic legitimacy. This can be an unsettling transition for the best of nations. Second, after that transition takes place they are likely to have a more expansionist philosophy. They may well feel the need to "help" other local states make the same transition ... A problem the U.S. experiences from time to time.
Modern western states and societies, when compared to others, are often seen as being more safe, more stable, more peaceful and more capable of providing for both their own citizenry and the needs of the world as a whole.
The goal then becomes to transform other states and societies more along modern western lines; this, so as to cause these other states and societies to, likewise, become more safe, more stable, more peaceful, etc.
It is important to note, however, that "conflict prevention," achieved in this manner, is only attained after -- and not before -- the adequate transformation of these other states and societies.
In the interim period between now and then, conflict and strife -- of every stripe and variety -- is expected to be the norm (the "era of persistent conflict"); this, due to the problems which states and societies often experience in making these sometimes difficult transitions.
Is it within this context, to wit: the interim period of less safety, less stability, less peacefulness and persistent conflict -- brought on by internal and external efforts to change, along modern western lines, the political, economic and social order of other states and societies -- that we might best understand the need for forces which are capable of both expeditionary warfare and protracted occupation, and both great and small war?
jleeblogger... this is why the world is so confusing. I don't know that punish and submission mean the same thing. "Shock the enemy into submission" means you shock the enemy into submission. Submission being the operative word. A punitive expedition i.e. expeditionary warfare does not necessarily have as an endstate for an opponent to submit. I venture to say that getting an opponent to submit is a much more difficult proposition than just punishing him/her and is in the realm of big war rather than expeditionary warfare. The exit strategy for punitive or expeditionary warfare is quite simple... Punish and depart.
Secondly... just war theory is not based on whether or not a nation is existentially threatened but the idea that all non-violent options must be exhausted before the use of force can be justified (among other requirements). I can still declare and engage in a just war even if the nation is not existentially threatened.
If Professor Bacevich, COL Gentile and Tom Engelhardt actually adhere to the notion that we can only go to war if the nation is threatened existentially then I have to disagree with this position for it is rather silly.
Thanks for the exchange...
r/
I believe you did not read the whole phrase. I wrote "shock the enemy into submission" which means that we go out of our way to punish the enemy. But that also assumes that there is an exit strategy involved and that the duration will be short.
As for Professor Bacevich, COL Gentile and Tom Engelhardt, they subscribe to the "just war" theory which states that we go to war as a last resort and only when our existential security is threatened.
Words and definitions are so confusing. Is expeditionary warfare War or a form of warfare? If expeditionary warfare is only a form of short-term warfare then is it not the best option NOT only to shock the enemy, but more importantly, to PUNISH the enemy for one or another transgression. A protracted occupation, by definition is not a form of expeditionary warfare. It is a long-term commitment.
Do Professor Andrew Bacevich, Colonel Gian Gentile and Tom Engelhardt advocate a stop of expeditionary warfare? Should the United States pursue a strategy that accepts expeditionary warfare as a last resort and not a policy option of first choice? I am not so sure.
For sake of discussion, I embrace expeditionary warfare the way I embrace the death penalty. The death penalty, in my mind, is not about deterrence. The death penalty is all about revenge, vengeance, and conveying the message that bad behavior will not be tolerated. Expeditionary warfare is a message of intolerance. Until we run out of juice; until our finite military power is totally discredited, expeditionary warfare may just be the only viable political-military response in this religious war in which we are engaged.
"The Phillipines is taking the U.S. very seriously right now with the humanitarian mission we are conducting there. Nobody else in the world can employ such a capability." I would dispute this. The fact of the matter is, East Asian nations, including China, Japan and South Korea, do indeed field aircraft carriers and have embarked on humanitarian missions with "such a capability."
And again, we run round and round in circles over tactics and SOPs, which, in my humble opinion, are hardly important within the context of national budget, and most important, geopolitical strategy. Clearly, it seems that we are talking past each other.
I'm not sure what the context of the comment is concerning, "I am not sure that our Asian allies even take the United States seriously." The Phillippines is taking the U.S. very seriously right now with the humanitarian mission we are conducting there. Nobody else in the world can employ such a capability.
I agree we do need to capture efficiencies, but I would argue for the need to keep a seperate Marine Corps and Army as it does promote a healthy competition in tatics, techniques and procedures as well as force development. Yes, the Marines developed Vertical Envelopment and the Army followed suit with a capacity the Marine Corps will never have. The Army, however, still retains an Airborne capacity that it never fully utilizes. You won't find the Marine Corps wasting resources on such a large Airborne capability, they know better, and the Army knows it as well. They just won't admit it.
The Marine brass is also not nearly as bloated as the Army either. You want to capture efficiencies? Merge the National Guard and the Reserve Components.
The budget IS forcing the U.S. to rethink power projection as well as the fact that the public has "Vietnam Syndrome" again from our adventures in CENTCOM. This can be good or bad. Case in point: When the President refuses to punish Syria for using chemical weapons on its own people and the only risk to U.S. forces was a faulty Tomahawk missile falling short of its target and Iraq falls apart, partially due to the chaos in Syria, then you know things have changed...especially when we already lost 4,500 lives "stabilizing" Iraq in the first place.
regarding trade - a little history lesson: the U.S. established an asymmetric trade relationship with Korea and Japan in the 1950s in order to encourage the development of their economies and stall the spread of communism. The U.S. did so while providing a security umbrella. We can argue the merits of American paternalism subsequent to WWII and the early days of the Cold War, but this policy did lead to a lot of the early industrial growth in East Asia. Our forward presence was tied to this policy - and justified on its basis. Supposedly, their products as imports enabled the U.S. to move up the economic food chain and integrated both the security and economic dynamics of select E. Asian countries and the U.S. Vast oversimplification, but this is the baseline of why trade-security linkage exists. Is it still relevant to this day? Success has brought with it it's own gravedigger. Both countries are economically successful and capable of their own self-defense. Despite some modicum of strategic logic to keep a U.S. presence in Korea and Japan, if they don't want us, we don't get to stay. By exiting gracefully, we may continue to engender better cooperation in the future - which is ultimately the objective. By shifting defense responsibilities more upon those societies, it also becomes a more likely scenario that we'll deal with real partners with robust capabilities and specific advantages not yet fully established.
Chris - I don't think you fully appreciate where the Army was going when it came to aerial envelopment post Korea. While the role of the helicopter may have taken a different or slower path if the Army didn't pursue it, the Army is not incapable of innovation. You may want to do some reading about the Army's efforts with intratheatre lift assets post Korea.
Secondly, why is it some Marines always attribute greater funding as the Army's secret sauce when it comes to innovation? Seems the Corps had enough funding to largely perfect amphibious warfare. BTW, the Army contributed ship to shore logistics and dedicated units to facilitate it. The Marines integrated that into amphibious doctrine.
I think you have valid points in the rest of your argument and agree the Marines do bring something to the equation.
"This We'll Defend" :)
I never once advocated doing away with military forces. I'd say as long as the United States can afford fielding a big military that is welcomed by global citizens, then, there is no reason not to field such a military. But given that the United States is in serious debt and has undergone several federal government shutdowns as a result, leaving things as it is perhaps is ill-advised. Look, you cite the Republican Guard as a poor example of a unified service without taking into account the fact they were Saddam's personal paramilitary separate from the regular army. Also, the IDF is a fine example of an integrated service that kicks ass.
Besides, the founding fathers never intended for the Union to meddle in the affairs of others.
Well, Mr. Lee is certainly entitled to his opinion. What is unfortunate is that his opinion largely rests on straw man “yankee go home” arguments, rather than empirical evidence based on capabilities. His rhetoric also seems based much more on political ruminations about America’s place in the world rather than valid policy concerns that military planners should be examining as recommendations to civilian leaders.
What Mr. Lee is not entitled to are the logical gymnastics he performs in order to attack my piece. While Mr. Lee states that I ignore “historical precedents that air mobile warfare, wherein armed gunships provide tactical fire support for the infantry troops, was[sic] perfected by the Army and not the Marine Corps during the Vietnam War”, he seems to have skipped the next few lines of my piece where I point out that the “a much better resourced Army…perfect[ed] the techniques of vertical envelopment to a higher degree than it ever could in Vietnam.” Mr. Lee performs a remarkable piece of reductionist logic in assaulting my premise using the same positive example I did, but in a way which only negatively impacts his reasoning for unification. Air mobile tactics and the creation of aerial fire support were certainly innovations the Army spurned on, but Mr. Lee conveniently forgets that they never would have created such tactical innovations if they would have stayed on the same path they were on in the Korean War where “the Army was not able or prepared to employ helicopters for other missions during that period” but did innovate in order to match a “Marine Corps…[which]… successfully demonstrated the helicopter's value in "vertical envelopment" operations” (note that is from the same evidence Mr. Lee quotes in his piece, again calling into question his logic).
Mr. Lee does not seem to understand my basic argument: that a fragile, unified defense establishment is bad for U.S. policy makers whether there are no sets of boots on foreign grounds or thousands. His advice that a complete withdrawal of US troops from foreign commitments is irrelevant to a discussion of how to organize the most effective U.S. military. Additionally, having a force that is big or small is also irrelevant to whether or not a unified ground force would be a better policy tool. Having different services, with different outlooks, creates options that policy makers can call from. Any policy is irrelevant to my argument as it is put forth, because it rests on the need for a military to meet the diverse needs of policy makers. As the only nation capable of having global effects across the whole spectrum of conflict, the U.S. military has a very diverse mission set to meet. Collapsing its capabilities by unifying ground forces while policy makers increasingly ask it to be ready for anything would be foolhardy. Mr. Lee’s evidence, logic, and conclusions are incomplete at best and historically bankrupt as viable policy prescriptions.
As a final note, it is interesting someone who seems to assail those who “get miffed” at his ideas uses bombastic, polemic, and emotional language in a response that targets authors much more than their ideas.
S/F
Capt Chris Barber
<i>Worse still, in a risible attempt to rebut my arguments, one reserve Marine captain cites as one of his counterarguments the Marine Corps’ invention of the vertical envelopment tactics during the Korean War to justify his purported “truth” that “a market place of defense ideas is better than a command economy for strategy.” However, the captain blithely ignores in his tired recitation of historical precedents that air mobile warfare, wherein armed gunships provide tactical fire support for the infantry troops, was perfected by the Army and not the Marine Corps during the Vietnam War.</i>
You've misread or misinterpreted Captain Barber's argument. He specifically notes the Army perfected vertical envelopment:
<blockquote>and in doing so enabled the much better resourced Army to perfect the techniques of vertical envelopment to a higher degree than it* ever could in Vietnam. </blockquote>
*the Marine Corps.
OTOH, to defend congressionals (from WOTR):
<blockquote>But Congress, for all of its dysfunction and parochialism, actually sends some fairly clear messages about what it wants in a military, through its hearings, annual defense authorization bills, and the voluminous correspondence from members to the Defense Department.
The key elements of what might be called the Congressional approach to defense are threefold: shift the bulk of force structure toward the reserve component, particularly the National Guard; reduce forces stationed permanently overseas; and <strong>limit investment in costly and unproven new systems in favor of continued production of updated current-generation systems that get the job done and sustain the industrial base.</strong></blockquote>
Emphasis mine. Interesting point on the industrial base. Outsourcing obviously has its pluses and minuses, to put it mildly.
I still have no idea if it's better to have fewer numbers with consolidation or without, if it is a wasteful redundancy or if different branches provide needed options within a shrinking system. This is over my head.
OTOH, that sort of forward presence doesn't mean we can't be undermined within our own system. Blogger Pundita once wrote a funny post about an American Natoist understanding of the world called Peaceful Sneaking:
<blockquote>The Han Chinese have been practicing unrestricted warfare since anyone can remember. How does the sahib think the map of China got so big? But they do it inch by inch and foot by foot. So when they speak of 'Peaceful Rising' what they mean is 'Peaceful Sneaking.'
All this looks new to Sebastian Gorka simply because he is a Natoist. The Nato governments never paid attention to Chinese (or Pakistani) aggression toward India until they became alarmed that China was carrying out unrestricted warfare against the USA.
The alarm came a little late in the day -- after the U.S. goverment did everything it could to play China against Russia, then got deeply in hock to China.</blockquote>
Does she have a point or am I falling for and perpetuating a stereotype? If you took out the word Han and talked instead about the government of China, would that work better?
Sigh. It's enough to keep up with reading about South Asia and American sensibilities, I can't add another topic. Too bad congressionals don't care as much about Army intellectual development as boondoggles for local constituents (although, if it was my job on the line making some military equipment, I wouldn't call it a boondoggle.)
I hear you. Valid point.
But sometimes people are correct for incorrect reasons :)
PS: Wait, I want to amend my comment. There are layers of understanding human nature and the processes at work. So, you can start with great power relationships and then fill in the gaps to see if the general is supported by the particular. Does that make sense? I'm still working this out, I don't this area as well as SA.