by Octavian Manea
Download the Full Article: The Use of Air Power in Limited Wars: Interview with Professor Earl H. Tilford, Jr.
How would you describe the doctrinal mindset of the US Air Force on the eve of America's involvement in the Vietnam War? To what extent were the WW2 experiences (the air wars against Germany and Japan) the core, formative experiences of the US Air Force doctrinal mindset? What meant "the right use of the air power" for the US Air Force doctrinal Weltanschauung?
The doctrinal mindset of the United States Air Force in 1960 and 1961, on the eve of America's involvement in the war in Vietnam, was focused on strategic deterrence through atomic and nuclear dominance over the Soviet Union. The efficacy of strategic bombing had its roots in the post-World War I period when people like Italy's Guilio Douhet, Britain's Sir Hugh Trenchard, and the American air power advocate Billy Mitchell sought a way to avoid the carnage experienced in ground warfare, especially on the Western Front in France, by going to the enemy's heartland and destroying both the enemy's war making capacity and will to fight by strategic bombing to devastate industry and the socio-economic infrastructure of the opposing force. The origins of that strategy can be traced to General William T. Sherman's "March to the Sea" in the closing months of the American Civil War in 1864 and early 1865.
The atomic bomb made the difference. In theory, the atomic bomb wedded to the delivery system provided by the four-engine, Boeing B-29 bomber, made it possible for air power to be decisive in warfare. That established the foundation for the establishment of a separate United States Air Force, a service enjoying equal status with the US Army and US Navy.
In the immediate post war period, after the U.S. Air Force gained separate service status in September 1947, bomber pilots dominated its leadership and the Strategic Air Command, established in 1946, became the premier command within the US Air Force because its mission epitomized "the right use of air power" (capable of destroying any enemy's industrial and war-making capacity), in the Air Force's doctrinal weltanschauung. By 1961, the budget for the Air Force was nearly twice that of the US Army. In fact, the budget for the Strategic Air Command was larger than that allocated for the entire US Army.
Download the Full Article: The Use of Air Power in Limited Wars: Interview with Professor Earl H. Tilford, Jr.
Dr. Earl Tilford is an adjunct professor with the Honors College at the University of Alabama. He was Professor of History at Grove City College (until July 2008) where he taught courses in military history, national security, and international and domestic terrorism and counter-terrorism. A retired Air Force intelligence officer, Dr. Tilford earned his PhD in American and European military history at George Washington University. From 1993 to 2001, he served as Director of Research at the U.S. Army's Strategic Studies Institute. He also authored three books on the Vietnam War and co-edited one book on Operation Desert Storm. He is living in Tuscaloosa, Alabama where he has written a history of the University of Alabama in the 1960s titled, "Turning the Tide: The University of Alabama in the 1960s."
Editor's Note: This interview continues Octavian Manea's counterinsurgency inquiries. Octavian is the Editor of FP Romania, the Romanian edition of Foreign Policy.
About the Author(s)
Octavian Manea was a Fulbright Junior Scholar at Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs (Syracuse University) where he received an MA in International Relations and a Certificate of Advanced Studies in Security Studies.
Comments
Move Forward:
A country needs to learn lessons from its past failures and it past successes. The lesson of the Vietnam Conflict was not the cost, it was the failure of our government to have viable strategic goals and objectives and the political leaderships lack of a will to win. The LBJ / Nixon (inherited) goal of maintaining a "free" and separate South Vietnam through the application of American force, or though any means including diplomatic, was simply not achievable given LBJ's paranoia about China and belief he could somehow convince (his) dedicated enemy (the North Vietnamese) that they could not outlast this country and should therefore stop sending their men and supplies into the South through essentially wide open, jungle protected, borders. An especially absurd set of LBJ beliefs given Giap's proven formula that the west would run out of patience before he ran out troops. There is no military solution to the LBJ goal and required methods. It simply did not compute.
In our current situation, I would agree with your last statement that the US needs forward bases, especially in the Middle East to secure our needed flow of oil. Those can be placed, as some are, in Bahrain, Kuwait, in the Kurdish area of Iraq whose independence we should help secure given their very pro-western and secular attitude, possibly in Jordan, with supply storage in Israel as at present. I would withdraw from Turkey absent a change in their Islamic government and trend in that direction and would not provide them with F-35's.
I have never advocated isolationism, just that we employ our military force to secure our nation's vital strategic goals in the manner prescribed by the Powell Doctrine and not waste out country's military resources and money on a cost ineffective and eventually unsuccessful COIN military streaker. We should use out technology based weapons systems to our advantage and not fight rifle to rifle.
This country and NATO will be leaving Afghanistan at some time--probably sooner than most of that war's supporters wish. The Pashtun Taliban controls most of the Northwest territories in Pakistan and the area they do not control is not dominated by the Pakistani Army. They have never truly held that area. It is only through our encouragement that their army has become involved in that area. Given their concentrations along their Indian border they will never have enough troops or be tough enough to subjugate that area. It is not our concern who runs that area--Taliban or otherwise, long as it is not a haven for Al Qaeda operations. Yes, I would employ our weapons systems to remove them regardless of collateral damage.
Afghanistan and the Pakistan NW Territories are tribal areas and will never be controlled by any Central Government. The Karzai government won't last the proverbial minute once the US withdrawal is over unless we want to spend billions and continue troops there forever, and we are not. That is reality.
The Pashtuns do not want to live in the outdoor cold in the winter, which is the environment our massively employed cruise missile can provide them if they harbor post- Bin Laden followers. Let them systematically know that one village after another will be destroyed as the price of that harboring. Send them and we will leave you alone is the message.
As for your interesting scenarios, the South Koreans (ROK's and KMC are more than capable of controlling their border against infiltration and would hand the North Korean Army their head on a platter. I don't believe I proposed moving out of Korea. Again, it is COIN operations I believe are generally costly and useless and directly our military in the wrong direction, depriving the US of the ability to respond to the more normal threat such as Iraq's invasion of Kuwait requiring multi-division style response.
The Ukraine is in Russia's sphere of influence and not our concern, nor should Turkey be our concern.
Russia is not, and can not logistically sustain a military attack almost anywhere outside its direct neighborhood. I have a number of friends who were in the Russian military in their Afghan War. I asked them, why did you only employ an average of 120,000 men (including their air forces) at any one time. As they said, contrary to western belief, the Russians lack a decent logistical capability and could not sustain more than that number at one time time.
How strategically different the world would have been if we had minded out own business
and left the Russians alone in Afghanistan. Their brutal tactics were mopping up the Afghan resistance. Where would have Al Qaeda found a refuge. Certainly not that deep inland.
Israel is not going to attack Iran as it lacks quantitatively sufficient air power for that effort. Leave the Israeli's alone and they can take care of Hezbollah if they so wish. The Syrian regime is not going to risk its army, therefore its power base, on a war with Israel.
The very successful, but costly, Iron Dome missile system and the forthcoming laser based weapons systems are going to nullify the value of Hezbollah's and Hamas's missiles / rockets. Weapons systems are about to cross the border into a new technological era that will for a long time hand the advantage to the defense.
The Chinese military lacks the logistical capability to maintain any effort outside its borders for more than a few miles.
Application of ground warfare on the scale of the 1991 Iraq war, or your example of 1945 Okinawa, is something I believe is the mission of the military, again as does the Powell doctrine.
Again, it is nation building COIN type operations with which I, and many in the military, current and past, disagree is a valid and effective use of our armed forces.
Also, I disagree with evaluating the effectiveness of American military operations and the accompany performance of its Generals and Admirals when they are required to fight a war under the tactical restrictions placed on them as during LBJ and Nixon's Vietnam Conflict. Political policy may dictate the course of a war, but when it renders it un-winnable, simply acknowledge that fact and do not blame the Generals and Admirals or view those carrying out orders as de facto having tunnel vision. We line types could see far more clearly than staff evaluators believe. However, one obeys orders in the line officer world, be it in the air, on land, or on sea. That doesn't mean one can't see the obvious.
Contrary to an above noted opinion, Pilots (at least Navy pilots) do not believe that flying over Afghanistan and making noise over an area instead of dropping armaments on meaningful targets is a valid use of aircraft or worth the cost and risk. It is a tactic or method imposed on them by the COIN ground types. It is not an air power objective and only helps the pilots insure they have sufficient hours for their flight pay. If it is of value to COIN types, then so be it. I wouldn't know, that has never been my world.
Other than Special Forces type Operations such as in the Philippines and in early Afghanistan, lets put the COIN manual back on the historical shelf and rebuild out ground forces in division form, which the Marine Corps has maintained as have some parts of the Army, I believe. A military approach advocated bfy the former Commandant of the Marine Corps and many other retired Generals and Admirals.
Move Forward,
Your future scenarios are plausible, but do you actually think ground troops would be deployed to any of those situations before they're stabilized by the strategic and operational forces? Of course we need ground troops, either Army or Marines, to follow-on in major scenarios, but they won't be the first on the scene.
Bottom line is there will and have been many times in emerging scenarios when land forces are in a supporting role. Once a situation is stabiized, the supporting/supported roles shift for occupation, but thinking land forces should always or predominantly be the supported force is folly that will take our nation down a very dangerous path.
CBCalif, appreciate your service in one of our darker hours. I'm sorry you lost so many brothers in Vietnam. But I'm equally incredulous that you don't recognize the threat of terrorist WMD that makes current efforts far more critical at far less cost in allied lives and GDP.
Since there are 40 million Pashtuns and the vast majority live in Pakistan, are you suggesting we bomb Pakistan when the Taliban acts up again on both sides of the border after we leave? How about when LeT launches a terrorist attack in Europe or the U.S.?
You're obviously a smart guy, but believe you overlook numerous shortcomings of all-airpower/seapower scenarios.
Scenario 1: North Korea infiltrates/tunnels/hovercrafts/flies into South Korea and hides in the mountains in between guerilla actions or hugs/shells urban areas. Where do you bomb without hurting SOUTH KOREANS or wasting weapons on targets you cannot find or that are deeply buried.
Scenario 2: Russia attacks Ukraine and goes to ground parking tanks next to UKRAINE schools and hospitals and their houses. Turkey allows permission for U.S. ships to enter the Black Sea but it is too confined and Russian manage to sink several ships and mines sink others.
Scenario 3: USSR attacks northern and central Germany far from any shoreline and naval assets are shoehorned into a vulnerable Baltic Sea. West German air force bases are struck leaving airpower trying to fly out of France, Spain, and Italy but by the time they are having success...you guessed it, tanks are parking next to WEST GERMAN civilians
Scenario 4: Israel attacks Iranian nuclear sites and Iran retaliates by launching massive TBM salvoes at oil handling/refining facilities driving the price of oil up to $300/barrel. Numerous mobile hidden TBM continue to inflict damage with limited ability to find them from high altitude, or strike those parked in urban areas.
Scenario 5: Lebanon and Syria attack Israel with rockets and Israel retaliates with airstrikes against parts of Beirut...but other Lebanese are also affected who now are no longer against Hezbollah. Airpower against tunnels and other hidden targets proves ineffective. An Israeli naval vessel is struck by a disguised anti-ship missile.
Scenario 6: China attacks Taiwan, Okinawa, South Korea and Guam leaving no place close from which to launch retaliatory airstrikes. DF-21D since a carrier. Next Gen bombers fly deep into China and fearing a nuclear strike or catastrophic losses, China nukes off the Hawaiian islands and the Panama Canal. Attempts to cut off oil at the Straits of Mallaca leads to China sabotaging some of the few stateside oil refineries as a tit for tat.
Scenario 7: Its WWII and the allies are trying to move within range to attack Japan. 12,500 American servicemembers die to take Okinawa. 60,000 Japanese Soldier die and another 150,000 civilians because few will surrender. But we had to take the terrain. Just bombing it or shelling it from sea would not be sufficient.
Catch the drift. It's far too easy for invading threat armies to hug ALLIED civilians and their infrastructure/sensitive sites. It's equally essential for us to take and hold terrain to restore international borders or secure airfields for airpower, and ports for the Navy.
No one should believe that the way in which US land, air, and sea power was applied in the Vietnam Conflict could have resulted in victory, presuming that result was defined as enabling South Vietnam to continue as an independent nation, free of interference from Viet Cong and / or NVA forces given the political restrictions placed by the Johnson / Nixon Administrations on the use of American military force.
There appear to be many summaries of it, but the Powell Doctrine correctly defines how military force should be applied: Should this nation resort to force, every resource and tool should be used to achieve decisive force against the enemy, minimizing US casualties and ending the conflict quickly by forcing the weaker force to capitulate.
The question as to whether the United States should have attempted to prevent the North Vietnamese from continuing their effort to unite "their" country was a political one, not a military question.
There is one primary rule of war which should never be violated, Always bring the enemy to battle on our terms, not on their terms, or if one wishes use the language of the Powell Doctrine. Since WWII this country has violated that principle over and over and the wars into which its political leaders have committed its military have produced what should be the expected, results generally short of victory.
Military strategy may always be required to conform to political policy from the White House, and the Generals and Admirals will almost always attempt to apply force in conformance with that policy, but that doesn't mean that the resulting ineffectiveness and failure to produce the desired result is due to their ineptitude or a failure of the weapons systems. One cannot squeeze blood out of turnip, as the expression goes.
Given the restrictions placed on the US military's application of force during the Vietnam Conflict, there was no American military force formula that was going to bring the results that Johnson desired. Our dear president and his White House staff were in over the head and doomed this country to a costly failure.
Again, from a tactical perspective, if one wanted to cut North Vietnamese ties with its industrial base, then destroying Haiphong Harbor, mining the area, and destroying the rail lines into the country from its north would have done the trick.
The strategic persuasion goals of the air campaign against the North was a ridiculous policy from the White House and McNamara staffs. No military officer in their right mind believed those had a chance of success.
The Johnson Administration pols had their hands on many military decisions, down to a ridiculous level and we paid the price.
Studies are fascinating, but any officer participating in military operations against the North during the second half of the 1960's could see what was occurring long before our withdrawal with honor. That is meant to be a sarcastic view of the Nixon / Kissinger policy. I would presume the same could be said for those operating in South Vietnam.
While many of the South Vietnamese military were dedicated and good fighters, their upper leadership was corrupt and inept and our de facto abandonment of them after our leaving ensured their loss. However, from a tactical perspective, if one recalls, the first post- withdrawal North Vietnamese conventional invasion was stopped cold by American Air Power and South Vietnamese fighting.
Long before the conflict ended each branch of the military wanted out of the war imposed on it by politicians. One the military knew could not be won. The army knew it was being ruined by the war, its NCO's were either being lost or leaving in droves, the US Navy's strategic concern was the Russian Navy and control of the sea, yet it was loosing countless pilots and aircraft flying against the identical meaningless targets in North Vietnam and wasting precious resources maintaining 40+ ships in the Gulf of Tonkin instead of concentrating on anti-submarine, anti-air warfare and missile development. And, the Air Force apparently was concerned with restoring its pre-conflict budget position versus the other services, pehaps so it could continue its comparatively much better troop quarters (true--the quarter's difference, but humor). Of course, General Creighton Abrams did succeed post-Westmoreland in pacifying almost all of South Vietnam, but to what end.
The recent years venture into COIN is another example of a violation of the Powell Doctrine. Instead of fighting a war relying on this country's superior fire power and technology with clear military goals, our military now fights on the enemy's terms--reduced to rifle to rifle, generally at a time and place of the enemy's choosing. Nation building is not the job of the US military. It is not a viable strategy, it takes to long, the costs are prohibitive....
From a strategic perspective, it mattered not to this country who ruled the area then known as South Vietnam, and it matters not who rules the area known as Afghanistan. Our only vital or strategic interest in Afghanistan is to prevent Al Queda from having a safe haven-- which only the Pashtuns could or will provide. Provide some arms to the various Northern Alliance Tribes so they can maintain their independence from the Pashtuns and / or Taliban, and withdraw after letting the Pashtuns / Taliban know that if they once again give Al Queada refuge our B-52's, et al will be back. Otherwise, let the Afghans enjoy themselves in the cultural wasteland of the 10th Century.
The same is true for Iraq. Our only vital strategic interest in the Middle East is to ensure the free flow of oil to the Western Industrialized World. Whatever the reason for the Bush venture, once we had demonstrated the power of the US military, that country should have been handed over to a quickly reconstituted Iraqi military and our forces pulled out.
The current venture into Libya also leaves one to wonder, at least from a military perspective, unless the White House is interested in testing the accuracy of our cruise missiles. It appears to be meaningless gun boat diplomacy to secure no vital interest.
Weapons systems cannot make up for an inadequate national strategy or a lack of a reasonable strategic goal. Political policies requiring the application of massive military force at the nation level will rarely if ever succeed if the use of that military force is severely restricted--as in the Vietnam Conflict. That is all the Generals and Admirals were trying to tell.
Perhaps, the Generals and Admirals should have all resigned or spoken out publicly rather then trying to carry out what they knew could not succeed. That is not life in the organization world. Would the public and politicians have called that a mutiny or patriotism--at the time?
Jed, may not be politically feasible now but it might in the near future. Aero-Nautical seems to go together. Space should be in there to. A military version of NASA. Army aviation is so specialized I think it should remain separate. Instead CAS (close air support) it should be Close Army Support and let them have what they need to do the job. Plus the Army should be pursuing a Strategic plan of reconnecting America and the Americas. A Western hemisphere plan of interstate and super-state connection of trains, trucks and tanks.
Dr. Tilford, your earlier comment about pursuing a Negative Object is critical. The Defense is nothing but a short term shield until you can pursue a positive or final Objective. We seem to have a policy of be like America or we will come beat you up. Not very positive and not a winning option IMO.
While not politically feasible, merging the USAF and USN makes much more sense than merging anything with the Army (though I'm still convinced each should be separate). The USAF and USN both have the strategic power projection role, but the Army is limited to very tactical situations...necessary to seal the deal, but not strategically effective in deterrence or containment situations that "should" be the norm in between (instead of?) major conflicts. The COIN-type extended engagements we've fought for the last decade, with no significant successful outcome, should be avoided at all cost--and we do have a choice when it's not for national survival.
Maj Connolly,
Your input is limited by your experience...you see conflict as looking up from a static battlefield with no readily discernable enemy. You're thinking the Air Force should be limited to doing what is good for the Army, not what is good for the nation strategically. The fact that many of your seniors in the Army see things the same way is precisely why the nation can't afford to subordinate its Airpower to ground commanders outside their role as JFCs for the limited engagements we're in currently.
Agreed, Slap. Proper targeting and the ability to hit the target are essential to making any strategy work. But the targets must be appropriate to the strategic or tactical goal.
You may have a point about merging the Air Force with the Navy since both are essential to moving supplies and both have a power projection role. The savings would be in administrative bureacracies and PME.
The first thing is to get the intellectual component right. I would recommend doing away with all service academies and the multi-structured PME we now have to educate all officers at a single National Defense University located in Washington, DC to take advantage of the educational and political assets in the local area. Undergraduate officer education would be a five year process with a the first two years spent in a core curriculum. The last three years cadets would "shred" out into specific services. Later education would be more intensive and closer to graduate education. If we extend service careers from between 20 to 32 years to between 25 and 40 or 45 years, there would be time for more serious academic preparation. The National Defense University could also handle specialized educational needs like military law and medicine. Keep in mind, Slap, war is first and foremost an intellectual endeavor.
Exactly how the services should realign I'm not sure. It could be putting the Army and Air Force back to gether or, as you suggest, putting the air and naval components together. Realignment might also include giving space to the Navy or creating a Space/Cyberspace service.
In any event, gutting the bureaucracy should be the goal. Additionally, while pay needs to be sustained at a reasonable level, the promotion system needs to be reworked. Cut the number of flag officers by half would be a good start. Officers should also be eligible for promotion to the next highest rank the day they are promoted into their current rank. Truly talented people could and should be advanced rapidly while accomodations should be made for effective officers to remain in a specific grade for longer periods. The emphasis should always be upon service to the nation and not on promotion. The Air Force has been particularly bad about feeding careerism.
Just a few thoughts.
Earl Tilford
"In todays constrained financial environment, merging the Air Force and Army would be a smart move. It saves money, reduces administration overhead and ensures the proper forces are used for the battles we face today." posted by Maj Connally
I think that is a bad idea. They should merge with th Navy, they would compliment each other.If they merge with the Army it would turn into a revenge type situation, it would be like marrying your ex-wife again, not likely to work. The Armies Aviation requirements are different and they should do what they are doing now and develop them separately.
"In todays constrained financial environment, merging the Air Force and Army would be a smart move. It saves money, reduces administration overhead and ensures the proper forces are used for the battles we face today." posted by Maj Connally
I think that is a bad idea. They should merge with th Navy, they would compliment each other.If they merge with the Army it would turn into a revenge type situation, it would be like marrying your ex-wife again, not likely to work. The Armies Aviation requirements are different and they should do what they are doing now and develop them separately.
Actually, while I have enjoyed--and continue to enjoy--an academic career, I served in the Vietnam War, in Southeast Asia between October 1970 and October 1971 as an intelligence officer assigned to Udorn Royal Thai Air Force Base where my job was to brief the general in charge of air operations over northern Laos. During that time I acquired a good understanding of what was going on in the Air War...better I would argue than most pilots whose world view of any military operation is, of necessity, somewhat restricted. After the war, while still serving in uniform, I was part of a team of Air Force officers and civilians writing a 14 volume history of USAF operations in Southeast Asia. So my view of the war is not that of a hide-bound academic.
There is no argument that the American air power could have reduced North Vietnam to nothing in two weeks. We could have done it in one afternoon if we'd wanted to get particularly nasty by bombing dikes or even using nuclear weapons. But that WAS NEVER ON THE TABLE. Why...politics and policy. War is, above all, political and it inevitably defers to policy.
The Johnson administration's big mistake, hitching onto that of the Kennedy administration. was never to define a clear strategic goal in Southeast Asia other than negative ones like "not widening the war" and "not preventing a communist take over of South Vietnam." Negative goals cannot be turned into effective war winning strategies. By the time the White House provided clear cut goals, it was 1969 and the war was irrevocably lost by that time. Sure, the US could have raped North Vietnam with massive bombing campaigns...it had that capability...but politically that was not a viable option and Richard M. Nixon knew it. The best he could get was "peace with honor" and a "decent interval" for US withdrawal. Great nations DO NOT go to war so they can withdraw their forces and get their prisoners of war returned.
By 1970, when I arrived at Udorn, the Air Force was desperate to get out of the war with its reputation in tact so that the "real war," the post Vietnam budget battles with the Navy and Army, could be won.
I recommend CBCalif read something other than US Grant Sharp and William Momyer on Vietnam. Read Mark Clodfelter's "The Limits of Superiority: The Air War over North Vietnam." I modestly recommend "Crosswinds: The Air Force's Setup in Vietnam" as well.
Dr. Tilford brings up a very valid point in remerging the Air Force and Army. As a US Army officer who worked closely with the Air Force in Afghanistan, the supporting operations performed by the Air Force are highly redundant except for extended range intra-theater lift.
Theater lift can be categorized into two categories: CONUS to Theater, Theater to FOB. For the most part, lift capabilities from CONUS have been contract to commercial providers, while tactical lift is handled by the Army rotary wing assets. The one area where the Air Force has stepped up support is their usage of C-130 for dirt strip landings.
Since the Air Force was initially reluctant to support ISR operations through their UAV assets, the Army was forced to procure their own assets. The Armys Warrior Alpha is identical in capability to the Air Forces predator, with the exception that it is flown from theater instead of Nellis AFB. By training NCOs and Warrant Officers to fly these, the Army has been able work around the Air Forces cultural limitation that that restricts piloting duties to Officers.
Unfortunately Ive also seen how the Air Force demonstrates their "Show of Force", simply by flying fast and low in the hope of scaring the enemy. This is very effective, but not a very efficient usage for multimillion dollar assets. If the Air Force and Army were merged, I suspect wed see many more A-10s in production... being flown by Warrant Officers, and much less emphasis in the expensive Joint Strike Fighters. Im sure its fun to fly fast, but our military needs to focus on getting the most "bang for the buck" when we spend our military dollars.
In todays constrained financial environment, merging the Air Force and Army would be a smart move. It saves money, reduces administration overhead and ensures the proper forces are used for the battles we face today.
This solely represents my opinion, not that of the US. Army
Worth pointing out is that the West drew the line between North and South, and that the war that America stumbled its way into some 10 years later was far more a conclusion of the ongoing effort to unify Vietnam under Vietnamese rule, free of governments established by/answering to Western powers such as France or the US.
To "Defeat" North Vietnam, as CBCalif points out, was very much within our capability, but could have very easily brought China into the was as happened in Korea in the 50s. It also would not have "defeated" the nationalist goals of the Vietnamese people to be free of governments overly influenced by external powers. BL, the war would have continued to its ultimate end of a unified, sovereign state.
US history paints a very biased view of that conflict. For us, Vietnam was a critical pawn to be played in a much larger game of containing the Sino-Soviet threat. We sacrificed our national principles, as well as Vietnamese independence and sovereignty, to that end.
Given Vietnam's equally strong resistance to China exerting influence over them is the obvious irony that there never was any threat of Vietnam becoming an extension of Sino influence into Southeast Asia. This is what happens when we overly focus on the ideological and strategic approaches applied by an insurgent populace, rather than on what their actual goals are. Communism was a tool, and Maoist approaches are just smart insurgency. Independence and Self-Determination were the real goals all along.
(And more air power or less air power can help shape that, but certainly not create or deny either one).
"PS: I do not have an axe to grind, I was a shipboard officer, not an aviator" by CB Calif
Well done CB Calif, you sure know your stuff. My parents were working for the then Martin Marietta Corp. the Walleye missile systemactuallyll a TV guided glide bomb) was being rushed into production for the Navy. The First one was dropped by an A-6 Intruder and took out a NortVietnamesese power plant.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AGM-62_Walleye
First, I was a Naval Officer and heavily involved in the War against North Vietnam in 1966 and 1968 including collecting and assessing intelligence information the supplies entering into Haiphong Harbor.
To many papers such as this have been prepared by those without actual experience, at least as reflected in the content of this paper.
The military , at least during the Vietnam Conflict, did not have the luxury of determining the military strategy that would be employed against North Vietnam nor did it have the opportunity to determine the tactics that would be used. Even targets were selected by the brilliant political staff under Lyndon Johnson. Convoys moving along Route One (in North Vietnam) could not be fired upon without DC approval.
The massive amount of armament supplies entering the country from the sea or via exposed rail lines from China could not be interdicted until they reached the Ho Chi Minh Trail, etc. While the bomb tonnage dropped in North Vietnam was substantial, it was almost always dropped on the same (repeat) strategically useless targets--again selected by DC (our Capitol), and of course the NVA knew we would be returning over and over.
The Admirals and Generals that the author of this paper so derides from the safety of his academic chair were absolutely correct.
Had Lyndon Johnson merely said use whatever conventional power and tactics you deem necessary to force North Vietnam out of the war and out of the South, it would happened within short order.
Academics forget, going into that war was not a choice of the military. The generals and admirals were opposed to it and in the August 64 paper told Johnson. As the US Navy investigation of the Tonkin Gulf incident, prepared by CINCLANT determined, that destroyer squadron's Op Orders came from a source other than the NAVY.The White House grabbed up all copies of the report. This is not second hand commentary.
A no holds barred bombing campaign against targets such as Hanoi, Haiphong, Vihn, the dams north of Hanoi, the railroad lines into the China, stopping all traffic along Route One and the systematic destruction of the smaller towns combined with large scale Sherman like raids into the North by the Marine Divisions, etc. would have brought North Vietnam to its knees. That country was far more than a bunch of hut level rural villages. The people in the cities that were left alive would have been starving, Their electricity would have been out all over the country, the ports would be in ruins and no supplies moving into the country. Their army would have to involved in battling the raiding marines who would have piled up their bodies.
For those who don't believe that American firepower could destroy the North Vietnamese (for who I have great respect--smarter then Johnson Inc) Army's fighting ability, that is because they hand no first observation of the air campaign against the North Vietnamese divisionsw surrounding (Westmoreland's) Khe Sanh.
One cannot judge the effect of strategic / tactical weapons systems if they are only assessed as politicians allow them to be used--when those politicians place unconscionable restrictions on their application at the necessary cost of American lives.
The academic commentary in this paper suffers from a failure to understand that fact.
PS: I do not have an axe to grind, I was a shipboard officer, not an aviator.
"I recently read a forthcoming chapter by Dr. Tilford in an anthology to be sponsored by a think tank in the United Arab Emirates in which he recommends a radical reorganization of the US Department of Defense" posted by C.A.Self
So you think the UAE should be in charge of reorganizing the Department of Defense? Do you really think that is a good idea?
I have read most of Dr. Tilford's many writings on the topic of air power. I believe his criticisms are well-founded and to the point. I recently read a forthcoming chapter by Dr. Tilford in an anthology to be sponsored by a think tank in the United Arab Emirates in which he recommends a radical reorganization of the US Department of Defense. I believe the next administration has an excellent opportunity for visionary leadership in the twenty-first century by considering Dr. Tilford for the position of Secretary of Defense. This position needs to be filled by a person with Dr. Tilford's objective view of the big picture, and with his characteristic lack of a personal agenda and imperviousness to political pressure.
Steve,
Is this clearly bogus:
<em>As an independent ground arm, the US Army deals with the US priorities ahead of any other particular service's priorities.</em>
or this:
<em>As an independent naval arm, the US Navy deals with the US priorities ahead of any other particular service's priorities.</em>
It seems to me those are not bogus - each service puts national priorities above the priorities of another service, which is how it should be. They all work for the same "boss" and their first priority is satisfying that boss, not satisfying each other.
Steve,
My claim you considered bogus was that the AF's top priority is defined by national requirements, not by any other services priorities. That's a true statement, just as the Army prioritizes in the ground environment based on national requirements vice supporting any other particular service. My distinction was with the air arms of the other services vice the Air Force. You interpreted it through your lens and took my meaning to be that the USAF is somehow better than the other services.
With that, I'll let your attempt to spread your perspective of the USAF fail on its own lack of merit.
Andy,
My comment was in response to Jed's claim that "As an independent air arm, the USAF deals with the US priorities ahead of any other particular service's priorities." That's clearly bogus. I didn't say that the AF shouldn't look to its own priorities.
As for the 1950s being a long time ago, in terms of how institutions operate it really isn't. In all honestly, I think the AF hit its "peak" in terms of operations, flexibility, and focus in the 1980s. After that it's really just been flailing for a mission and reasons to keep its high percentage of the defense budget intact.
One of the things I like about Tilford's writing is that he provokes people to think. And I'd rather have that than read another screed by someone like Warden who thinks that airpower can do anything if it's only turned loose with no restrictions.
Slap,
How often has the US met an opponent in battle since World War II who could actually stafe or bomb our ground forces (or needed to do so to achieve their objectives)?
Steve,
The 1950's was a long time ago and 1950's Air Force priorities are not relevant today. Your claims that the Air Force does airpower for "its own priorities" is a strange criticism. For example, if I said the Army does ground power according to "its own priorities" few would consider that controversial. It's only natural that the ground forces, who are experts in their realm, would organize their forces according to priorities they - the experts - set. Why is the Air Force not accorded similar deference? This strikes me as an example of the kinds of double-standard criticism that's often leveled against the Air Force and it's also reflected in Dr. Tilford's interview.
Secondly, subordinating the Air Force to the Army isn't going to make airpower any less attractive for those looking to wage war on the cheap. Transferring air assets to another bureaucratic entity isn't going to prevent those assets from being used.
From the interview with Dr. Tilford:
<blockquote>However, Allied forces did not find, fix and annihilate the two Republican Guard Divisions. No doubt many of these well-trained and dedicated soldiers went on to play a key role in the insurgency. In effect, our attempt going to the "inner ring" set in motion a strategic chain of events that led to the longest military
involvement in US history. Thank you air power. </blockquote>
These are stunning accusations and need to be backed up by more than mere assertion. The first contention is disputed by the Iraqi Perspectives Project report, which was based on interviews with Iraqi military leaders.
Secondly, blaming the "longest military involvement in US history" on the perceived failure of air power is more than a stretch.
<blockquote>Anyway, PGMs are virtually useless against compact sedans filled with four thugs armed with AK-47s. This is especially so when bombing is from 15,000 feet.</blockquote>
PGM's are perfectly capable of taking out thug-filled sedans. The problem is distinguishing thug-filled sedans from civilian sedans and that is a problem that isn't at all unique to airpower. The ground forces in Iraq and Afghanistan have mistakenly and tragically shot-up sedans with civilians from much closer than 15,000 feet.
Here Dr. Tilford confuses a force application problem with an intelligence problem. This is a mistake this is made all too often even by many in the Air Force who think targeting intelligence will be better and more timely than it turns out to be in reality.
Overall, I think Dr. Tilford makes some good and legitimate points, but much of rest is, unfortunately, ill-informed, irrelevant or rehashed criticisms. It's a line of argument where failures both tactical and strategic are blamed on air power and the solution to these perceived failures is invariably bureaucratic subordination of the Air Force to the Army with little explanation of cause and effect.
Jed,
The AF deals with its own priorities first, just like any other service. How else do you explain some of their odd decisions over the years (such as attempts to do away with Tactical Air Command in the 1950s or the constant push for a manned bomber)? Air power as done by the AF is certainly organized and done for its own priorities. The airlift community has typically been marginalized, even when that works against the best interests of the nation.
I understand fully the successes of air power. But most advocates are unwilling to admit that air power might have shortcomings, let alone examine them openly and honestly. And therein lies part of the problem.
Steve,
Based on your first comment, I stand by mine; INDEPENDENT Airpower is key to my statement.
Army and Marine aviation units are tied to and subordinate to their respective ground forces. That is deemed a good investment by the respective services, to be paid out of their topline...no issues from me on that.
While the Navy necessarily ties most of it's aviation capabilities to the carrier fleets, it does apply those assets in an independent manner against joint targets for the most part.
As an independent air arm, the USAF deals with the US priorities ahead of any other particular service's priorities. In addition, they have been able to flexibly apply assets to support ground forces...I would argue any perceived shortfalls of Airpower in Iraq or Afghanistan have been more attributable to restrictive ROE (by ground-centric commanders)than to limits placed by the USAF.
Don't forget that our main ground forces in OIF and Desert Storm closed with an enemy that was only about 10-20% combat effective, at most. That decimation was due mainly to independent air (USAF primarily with USN) activity, not tied to any ground maneuver unit. Those deep strike forces would not be a priority for ground-centric commanders.
You guys really have no clue what independent Airpower has meant to the success of ground forces over the years. All services have their issues with prioritization, but do you really believe the Army leadership that has created a COIN-centered force over the last decade can think past the horizon enough to ensure US strategic needs are met?
Raise your heads above the ultra-tactical foxhole we're stuck in right now and realize joint does not mean, "What can the other services do for the Army today?"
CAS and theater lift are important missions, but they very seldom should be the most important missions of the Air Force. If you believe otherwise, you need to broaden your perspective and think about what's really important to the US, not just the US Army.
In this article Professor Tilford says:
"Among the first steps should be the re-integration of the US Air Force back into the Army. Strategic strike is no longer the purview of manned bombers or even missiles."
A simpler (and maybe more political acceptable) solution might be to downsize the AF budget, take CAS away from the AF, and allow the Army to operate fixed wing CAS aircraft.