Ukraine Sept 2024
The Kursk Offensive and Beyond
By Martin Stanton
A few weeks ago, I published my initial thoughts on the (surprising) Ukrainian offensive towards the Russian city of Kursk. To summarize, I viewed it as a positive development that added a new dimension – Ukrainians holding territory that was clearly Russian before Putin’s Feb 2022 invasion of Ukraine – to what had become an increasingly static war. It’s been a month. Let’s look at where everyone is.
The Ukrainians are still inside Russia, but Russian defenses are solidifying: The good news for the Ukrainians is they still hold the Russian territory they took in the first weeks of the offensive and are still making incremental gains. The bad news is the Russians appear to have massed sufficient forces to contain the Ukrainians penetration. Breakthroughs like the ones we witnessed in early August are probably no longer possible.
The Ukrainians did not resource the offensive for deep operational maneuver: Although the Ukrainians were successful, they ultimately did not commit enough forces to “follow on and pass through” the units used in the initial breakthrough to keep up the momentum. Much like the under resourced CFLCC had to pause during the march up to Baghdad in 2003, the Ukrainians had a good offensive initially but lacked to depth of forces to maintain their offensive without pause. Perhaps the words “did not” are too strong because that would imply resourcing choice. It’s equally likely that the words “could not” are more accurate. The Ukrainians may have thrown everything they reasonably could have into this offensive, hoping for a military / political result (sort of a Ukrainian version of the Germans Ardennes offensive in Dec of 1944).
The offensive has done some good: It has caused useful attrition of the 2nd line Russian units that were holding (for them) an economy of force sector. It caused the diversion of some Russian reserves to deal with the breakthrough. Ukraine holds Russian territory, this has embarrassed Putin and given the Ukrainian home front a badly needed shot in the arm from morale perspective.
However, it is not a game changer: Although it was successful in diverting some Russian reserves, the offensive was not successful in getting the Russians to discontinue their main offensive towards Pokrovsk – which has made slow but steady progress over the past month. Nor has it caused the Russians to panic at an operational level. Bottom Line, the Russians are dealing with the threat at Kursk but sticking to their own priorities.
Best way forward for Ukraine: The Ukrainians have gone as far as they can reasonably go in their Kursk offensive. The key thing is for them to hold onto some Russian territory as a bargaining chip for negotiations. The smart way to do this would be to prepare positions behind the current Forward Line of Troops (FLOT) on the most advantageous terrain and then withdraw behind those positions as soon as they are complete. It doesn’t matter if the Russian territory they hold is 20KM inside Russia or 5KM as long as its inside Russia. Shortening the lines behind a prepared defense and reconstituting an operational reserve would allow the Ukrainians to still hold a portion of Russia and increase their ability to address burgeoning threats like the one developing at Pokrovsk.
Release of NATO provided weapons to strike inside Russia is key: The single most impactful thing the US (and NATO) could do right now to assist Ukraine would be to remove any restrictions on NATO provided weaponry from striking into Russia. The Russians largest advantage is their ability to mass and sustain forces (however clumsily) without having to be concerned about the impact of deep fires on operational level targets in the Russians transportation and logistics systems. The Russians are already using deep fires into Ukraine – restricting the Ukrainians from replying in kind is counterproductive.
What are the dangers? At this point the most dangerous thing for Ukraine to do is to continue their advance towards Kursk. Without follow on forces they run the increasing risk of being pinched off in a smaller version of the Soviet’s Operation Saturn that surrounded Stalingrad in Nov of 1942. I would be the first to say this does not look imminent, but (as with the Germans at Stalingrad) if you leave a force out hanging for too long with weak flanks the Russians will eventually take advantage of it. This would be disastrous for Ukraine. Better to quit winners and withdraw in good order.
Where is it all going? By the look of things right now the Ukraine war is going to reach its third anniversary without resolution. The big questions now are (1) Can Ukraine hold Russian territory as a bargaining chip and (2) Can they continue to slow the Russian advance towards Pokrovsk to the grinding and costly affair that it currently is? Also (3) Will the release of NATO provided systems for deep strikes into Russia have an operational level impact on Russian maneuver/sustainment?
Stay tuned folks….
Martin N. Stanton is a retired Army officer living in Florida. The opinions expressed here are his own and do not reflect any USG or DOD position.