US Soft Intervention in One of The World’s Hardest Conflicts
El Mahdi Habib-Alla al Sanosi
Joshua Saidoff
The civil war in Sudan has produced mass displacement, famine, tales of systematic rape and ethnic killing. The numbers suggest the scale of suffering: 10 million displaced,[1] 25.6 million facing acute hunger,[2] and casualty counts exceeding 20,000 killed[3] and 33,000 injured[4].
The civil war represents more than a domestic tragedy. It has become a battleground for global and regional powers, each advancing their own agendas at the expense of the Sudanese people. Central to the conflict is a power struggle between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), which stems from the former Islamist regime of Omar al-Bashir, and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), the modern successor of militias responsible for atrocities in Darfur (currently engaging in fighting the Houthis in Yemen). International human rights NGOs reported that both sides have attracted external support in the form of mercenaries, weapons, logistics and funding from nations such as Russia, UAE, Iran, and Egypt.[5]
In stark contrast to these powers' interventions, the United States has employed a strategy of soft intervention under the Biden Administration, leveraging soft power tools: diplomacy, alliances, and humanitarian aid in place of traditional military intervention.[6] This article argues that the U.S. approach, though far from perfect, presents the most viable path to securing both American strategic interests and a stable future for Sudan.
The Context of U.S. Soft Intervention
Sudan’s civil war is not an isolated conflict but part of a larger geopolitical struggle between global and regional powers. The involvement of Russia, China, Egypt, UAE, Iran, and others highlights Sudan’s strategic importance.[7]
Russia’s support to the RSF included significant numbers of Wagner mercenaries, drones and weapons. In exchange, Russia received large quantities of gold, which it used to circumvent US sanctions.[8] Russia has since switched allegiances to the SAF in a bid to expel Ukrainian special forces from the country and secure naval basing rights Red Sea coast.[9]
Iran’s support for the SAF has included the provision of advanced weapons like reconnaissance and combat drones which have had an appreciable effect on the course of the war. In exchange, Iran has also sought naval basing rights along the strategically significant Red Sea, within striking distance of Iran’s own rivals, Israel and Saudi Arabia.[10]
In contrast, the U.S. has avoided direct military intervention, instead focusing on diplomacy and coalition-building. This shift from traditional intervention to soft power reflects the Biden Administration’s general approach to foreign policy, particularly in regions where direct military engagement is seen as costly and potentially counterproductive.[11]
Defining Soft Intervention
Traditional military interventions, even those framed as humanitarian efforts, rely on the projection of hard power. In the case of Sudan, however, the U.S. has adopted what can be called soft intervention—the use of diplomacy, alliances, and humanitarian aid to influence the trajectory of the conflict without deploying military force.[12] By organizing peace talks in Jeddah and Geneva and mobilizing international humanitarian assistance, the U.S. aims to ease the immediate suffering of Sudanese civilians and stabilize the conflict, while encouraging a long-term resolution to the conflict and a return to democratic governance.[13] This strategy relies on the attractiveness of American political and economic support, rather than on coercive force.
Soft Intervention in the Context of U.S. Grand Strategy
The U.S. strategy in Sudan is part of a broader security strategy aimed at maintaining global influence while avoiding costly entanglements. The civil war in Sudan presents a test of how effectively Washington can leverage its soft power to compete with China and Russia in regions where direct military intervention is no longer a feasible or desirable option.
Russia’s support for the RSF and its recent shift toward the SAF is part of its broader effort to expand its military reach in Africa and gain access to the continent’s resources such as gold.[14] China, meanwhile, has used its Belt and Road Initiative to strengthen its foothold in the country, investing in oil infrastructure and seeking to control key ports on the Red Sea.[15] Both powers seek to challenge U.S. influence in the region.
Instead of responding with hard power, the U.S. has sought to use diplomacy to broker peace and stabilize the region. This strategy recognizes that Sudan is a critical link in the Red Sea’s geopolitical web and that instability there could have far-reaching consequences for U.S. allies in the Middle East and Africa. By positioning itself as a mediator rather than a military actor, the U.S. seeks to undercut Russian and Chinese ambitions while promoting a peaceful and stable Sudan.
Leveraging Regional Alliances
A key component of the U.S. approach in Sudan is its reliance on regional allies. Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the UAE have all played significant roles in the peace talks, while the African Union and United Nations have provided multilateral legitimacy. This strategy is consistent with the broader U.S. policy of working through alliances and international organizations to address conflicts and crises in Africa.[16]
By involving regional powers in the negotiations, the U.S. not only strengthens its alliances but also reduces the likelihood of unilateral military action by any one actor. Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have their own interests in the Sudan. The UAE and Saudi Arabia, for instance, are keen to ensure that Islamist or extremist elements do not gain ground in Sudan, given their own domestic security concerns and rivalry with Iran.[17] The UAE also views Sudan as a source of food and gold.[18] Egypt views the stability of Sudan as critical to its own national security. As a downstream riparian state on the Nile, Egypt is vulnerable to its upstream neighbor, Sudan, who can alter the flow of the lifegiving river.[19] Egypt is also vulnerable to increased refugee outflows from Sudan, due to its porous shared border.[20] These countries have contributed to conflict in Sudan.[21] By including these countries in the peace process, the U.S. incentivizes them to pursue diplomatic solutions rather than further military escalation.
The involvement of international organizations like the African Union and the UN also serves to legitimize the peace process. This multilateral approach helps to diffuse perceptions of Western neo-imperialism and encourages buy-in from both the Sudanese belligerents and the broader international community.
Containing Iran and Normalizing Ties with Israel
Sudan’s civil war also has significant implications for the broader Middle East, particularly in terms of the ongoing rivalry between Iran and Israel. For years, Sudan sheltered al-Qaeda and was a critical conduit for Iranian arms shipments to Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Following the ouster of former dictator, Omar al-Bashir, Sudan joined the Abraham Accords, making peace with Israel and opening itself to the world economy. Iran’s backing of the SAF represents its attempt to regain a foothold in the Red Sea and pose a direct threat to Israel and Saudi Arabia.[22]
Both the RSF and the SAF have signaled that they prefer U.S. patronage over Iranian support, going so far as to reaffirm their openness to normalization with Israel, seeing it as a pathway to international legitimacy and economic relief. The U.S. has seized on this opportunity, pushing for closer ties between Sudan and Israel as part of its broader strategy to isolate Iran and strengthen the pro-Western alignment of Arab states.
By facilitating Sudan’s reintegration into the international community through diplomacy rather than military force, the U.S. hopes to anchor the country within a regional framework that promotes stability and counterbalances Iranian influence.
Limited, Incremental Gains
While the U.S. strategy of soft intervention offers a pragmatic alternative to military engagement, it is not without its challenges. The initial peace talks in Geneva and Jeddah yielded only limited commitments from the SAF and RSF, and the establishment of humanitarian corridors remains tenuous at best. Moreover, the SAF’s refusal to attend the Geneva talks in person highlights the fragility of the peace process and raises questions about the sustainability of a purely diplomatic approach.[23]
The Road Ahead for US Policy
Additional engagement from allies and international organizations will be necessary to remind the SAF and RSF of their promise to allow free passage and unfettered distribution of aid. Guiding the parties towards peace and eventual subordination to civilian control will require a sustained all-hands effort on behalf of the US, regional allies and international actors. Preventing the allies from acting at cross purposes and preventing adversaries from taking the lead will require US leadership. Competing foreign military interventions can doom countries to endless civil war. The US will have to keep all its allies on sides in support of one goal: conflict resolution.[24]
A future US administration may be tempted to act unilaterally to suppress conflict in The Sudan. However, this may have adverse long-term consequences. US coercion would be likely to produce popular resentments that could later be exploited by domestic elites. This could create an opening for China, Russia and Iran to exploit anti-American sentiments to re-insinuate themselves in Sudanese politics.
Ultimately, the most durable solution for Sudan will come through diplomacy, careful alliance management, and the patient application of soft power. By guiding both factions toward peace and reintegrating Sudan into regional security structures, the U.S. can not only end the conflict but also secure its long-term strategic interests in the region. Soft intervention, if applied consistently and strategically, offers the best hope for a peaceful resolution to the Sudanese civil war and a stable, Western-aligned Sudan.
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[1][1] United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, ‘Sudan: Situation Report’, OCHA, 3 September 2024.
[2] United Nations Children’s Fund, ‘Sudan Is Facing an Unprecedented Hunger Catastrophe, Say UN Agency Chiefs’, UNICEF Press Release, 27 June 2024.
[3] Samy Magdy, ‘UN Official Sys Sudan’s War Has Killed at Least 20,000 People’. Associated Press. 8 September 2024.
[4] United Nations Human Rights Council, Fifty-Seventh Session, ‘Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan’, A/HRC/57/23, 5 September 2024.
[5] Amnesty International, ‘New Weapons Fueling the Sudan Conflict’, AFR 54/8252/2024, 25 July 2024. International Crisis Group, ‘Sudan: A Year of War’, 11 April 2024. Benoit Faucon, Nicholas Bariyo, and Summer Sid, ‘Ignoring U.S. Calls for Peace, Egypt Delivered Drones to Sudan’s Military.’ Wallstreet Journal, 14 October 2023.
[6] Joseph Biden, ‘Remarks by President Biden Before the 78th Session of the United Nations General Assembly’, United States Mission to the United Nations, New York, NY, 21 September 2023
[7] Cameron Hudson, ‘Looking Ahead after a Year of Conflict in Sudan’, Center for Strategic and International Studies, CSIS, 12 April 2024. Jonathan Campbell-James, ‘Curbing Outside Intervention in the Sudan War’, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 4 April 2024.
[8] Catarina Doxsee, ‘How Does the Conflict in Sudan Affect Russia and the Wagner Group?’ Center for Strategic and International Studies, CSIS, 20 April 2023. Andrew McGregor, ‘Russia Switches Sides in Sudan War’, The Jamestown Foundation, Eurasia Daily Monitor vol. 21 no.102, 8 July 2024.
[9] Oscar Rocket & Mohammed Amin, “Sudan War: Russia Hedges Bets by Aiding Both Sides in Conflict”, Middle East Eye, 6 May 2024.
[10] Areej Elhag, “Iran in Sudan: Fears of a Sudanese Popular Mobilization Forces”, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Fikra Forum, 31 January 2024.
[11] ‘U.S. Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa’, The White House, August 2022.
[12] The term “Soft Power” was coined by Joseph Nye, (Nye, ‘Soft Power The Means to Success in World Politics’, Hachette, London, UK, 2009.) It refers to the use of non-coercive means, such as attraction, persuasion and cooption in the practice of foreign affairs. A country’s alliance portfolio, provision of foreign aid, and diplomacy can be relevant to the exercise of soft power. The term “soft intervention” is a novel coinage, meant to differentiate the American intervention in Sudan with traditional, coercive / “hard-power” interventions practiced by other countries, and by the United States elsewhere in the world.
[13] Anthony Blinken, ‘The United States Invites the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Foces to Ceasefire Talks Co-Hosted by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Switzerland’, United Staes Department of State, 21 July 2024.
[14] Rocket & Amin 2024
[15] Michael Curtin, ‘Sudan: the “Forgotten War”’, Stimson Center, 14 February 2024.
[16] ‘U.S. Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa’, The White House, August 2022.
[17] Alex de Waal, ‘Sudan is Collapsing – Here’s How to Stop it’, Chatham House, 2 February 2024. Mohammad Salami. Sudan’s Crisis is Pitting the Persian Gulf Monarchies Against Each Other’, The Hill, 23 June 2024. Khalid Abdelaziz, ‘Islamists Wield Hidden Hand in Sudan Conflict, Military Sources Say’, Reuters, 27 June 2023.
[18] May Darwich, ‘Sudan is Burning and Foreign Powers are Benefiting – What’s in it for The UAE’, The Conversation, 12, September 2024.
[19] Jan Gallemi Albas, “Impact of the Sudanese Civil War on Egypt” Universidad de Navarra’, Document of Work, 14 May 2024.
[20] Noha El Tawil, ‘Egypt Hosts 300K Registered Sudanese Refugees: UNHCR’, Ebypt Today, 21 April 2024.
[21] Mark Townsend, ‘“Smoking Gun” Evidence Points to UAE Involvement in Sudan Civil War’, The Guardian, 25 July 2024.
[22] Elhag 2024.
[23] Alex Rondos, Hatin Madien; Jawhratelkmal Kanu. ‘Without Sudan’s Warring Parties in Geneva, What’s Next for Peace Talks?’ United States Institute of Peace, 4 September 2024.
[24] Zineb Riboua, ‘The Geopolitics of U.S. Engagement in Sudan’, Foreign Policy, 16 May 2023. Manal Fatima, ‘A Diplomatic Solution in Sudan Demands Greater US Engagement with its Arab Allies’, Atlantic Council, 10 April 2024.