Tit-For-Tat: Kenya, Somalia, and the Resurgence of al-Shabaab

Tit-For-Tat: Kenya, Somalia, and the Resurgence of al-Shabaab

Scott F. Mann

Given long-term fears regarding ongoing militant and terrorist group activity in Somalia, it is tempting to jump to conclusions about the implications of the Westgate mall attack in Nairobi, Kenya. Al-Shabaab, the group that claimed responsibility for the attack, has been watched with great apprehension for years by the United States. Its willingness to harbor foreign fighters and terrorists, as well as its merger with al-Qaeda in 2012, has placed it among a select group of extremely violent non-state actors. Certainly with the attack in Kenya, al-Shabaab has seemingly changed its strategy, broadened its definition of enemy and target, and expanded its aims beyond Somalia’s borders. Such a conclusion, however, would be at a minimum premature and at a maximum entirely incorrect. Such a conclusion would ignore the pattern of interaction between Somalia and Kenya over the last decade and lose sight of al-Shabaab’s ultimate and declared goals. Without such an understanding of al-Shabaab and its motivations, any policy response will likely fail.

The rivalry between Kenya and al-Shabaab is not new. Kenya has long been active in Somalia’s internal politics, sponsoring a peace process that lasted from 2002-2004 and yielded the Transitional Federal Government (TFG).[i] As Ken Menkhaus notes, Kenya’s support for the TFG “earned it Shabaab’s wrath.”[ii] More recently, following an upsurge in attacks in 2010 and 2011 along the Kenyan border, including a number of high profile kidnappings, Kenya launched a military invasion to push al-Shabaab back from the border. Kenya’s presence in Somalia persists to this day as part of the African Union peacekeeping mission in Somalia.

Al-Shabaab, for its part, has been conducting raids, small-scale attacks, smuggling operations, and fundraising inside Kenya. [iii] al-Shabaab has also aggressively sought to recruit new membership from Kenya’s roughly 2.4million politically marginalized ethnic Somalis, in Kenya’s North Eastern Province and elsewhere.[iv] There have also been worries about potential for radicalization among the roughly 500,000 Somali refugees in Kenya.[v] In 2010 and 2011, according to the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Reponses to Terrorism several low-casualty shootings and small bombings, attributed to al-Shabaab, occurred in Nairobi.[vi] These activities in Kenya, while worrying, have always been peripheral to the group’s central aims. Indeed, the list of activities does not suggest that Kenya is a core area of strategic focus for al-Shabaab, but rather a secondary resource and support base. Al-Shabaab has always remained a Somalia-centric and focused group.

Seen from this perspective, the Westgate attack is just the latest volley in an ongoing exchange between Kenya and al-Shabaab. As with all of al-Shabaab’s past violence, this act is fundamentally about power in Somalia. The group’s statements have confirmed its actions in Nairobi were in direct response to Kenya’s soft and hard power interventions. Quotes from al-Shabaab’s Twitter account directly tied its actions to those of Kenya. “Kenyans were relatively safe in their cities before they invaded us and killed Muslims #Westgate.”[vii]  Thus, Kenya is a target because it has become a party in Somalia’s ongoing internal conflict. So while this attack might represent an escalation in the conflict between al-Shabaab and Kenya, the attack in Kenya is still an extension of al-Shabaab’s fight in Somalia, rather than a deviation from it.

With this in mind, how should the attack be addressed, first, by regional actors, and second, by the United States? Kenya has pledged a swift and painful response to the attack.[viii] While such a response is understandable, it will prove a difficult road, and may not yield the results Kenya desires. Indeed, since the collapse of the central government in 1991, Somalia has repeatedly proven itself to be a quagmire of the first order. Recent gains in stability made by the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) forces, while promising, have been geographically limited, and have not been solidified sufficiently to be considered permanent.  Ironically, for all of their internal divisions, Somalis have historically found some semblance of unity in their opposition to the presence of external actors. While Kenya may seek to devastate al-Shabaab through some sort of military offensive, it may instead strengthen al-Shabaab by driving more Somalis to the group. Some have even suggested that the Westgate mall attack was part of deliberate strategy on the part of al-Shabaab to provoke a reprisal from Kenya as the basis for a recruitment drive.[ix] That would be a risky strategy, but possible nonetheless.

Kenya, then, must proceed carefully. Its operations must balance the nation’s counterterrorism aims with the need to find viable, trustworthy allies within Somalia. Unless Kenya can garner the support of the Somali population, the Kenyan response will perpetuate the threat rather than eliminate it. Kenya must also cleverly balance Somalia’s complex clan politics. Rushing to pick winners in the aftermath of any operation will just as quickly create new opposing alliances, likely favoring al-Shabaab.

More importantly, Kenya could also benefit from some self-reflection, and look internally for persistent sources of insecurity. For example, radical Islam has increasingly found traction among the sizeable population of politically marginalized ethnic Somalis.[x] Its broader Muslim religious minority of roughly to 4.3 million people[xi] represents another point of weakness for the country. The October 4^th killing of a Muslim cleric with purported ties to al-Shabaab, and the subsequent riots in Mombasa show the high level of tension, and potential combustibility of the internal security situation.[xii] In order to counteract the temptations of al-Shabaab’s militant message, Kenya must seek dialogue with, and inclusion of, its ethnic and religious minorities, while simultaneously avoiding indiscriminate and draconian security measures.

The United States would do well to remain on the periphery of any response. Direct US involvement would be the quickest way to provide al-Shabaab with the propaganda bonanza it needs to recruit a new generation of jihadists. Luckily, a hands-off, back-room approach seems to be the Obama Administration’s current strategy regarding regional conflicts (i.e. Syria). Thus, while the administration’s pledge of support for Kenya is important,[xiii] it is even more important for regional actors to take the initiative to improve stability.

Al-Shabaab has proven its resilience and ambition, as well as the tremendous growth in its capabilities. There are many unanswered questions about the Westgate Mall attack, such as the extent of al-Shabaab’s coordination with, and the degree of involvement of, Kenya’s al-Hijra group.[xiv] If true, al-Shabaab’s use of sophisticated, high-level transnational coordination may not bode well for the region, especially if the group decides to replicate its success, both in Kenya and with extremist groups based elsewhere. Nevertheless, despite its dramatic – and tragic – extraterritorial attack, al-Shabaab remains a Somali group focused on power within Somalia. Its actions may require a robust response, but such a reaction must be carefully calibrated to bring the Somali population along in support. Ultimately, this situation presents opportunities for both al-Shabaab, as well as those who desire regional stability.  While the situation is ripe for transformation, it remains unclear who will benefit.

End Notes