The Interrelationship of Culture, Economics, and Security in Afghanistan
by Major Bradley Boetig
The Interrelationship of Culture, Economics, and Security in Afghanistan (Full PDF Article)
On October 7th, 2001 the United States military embarked on a quest to disrupt the use of Afghanistan as a terrorist base of operations. Before 2001, antiterrorism efforts were generally limited to direct-action efforts against terrorist camps and interests. After 9/11, however, it was determined that the United States has both a strategic and a moral interest in a prosperous and peaceful, democratic Afghanistan. It was thought that ad-hoc efforts to disrupt terrorist operations in one area would simply lead to terrorist activity moving into other areas, and that a lasting peace could only be attained through a comprehensive effort to eliminate the conditions that allow violent, extremist ideologies to flourish. Over the past eight years the international community has made tremendous effort to bring security and economic development to Afghanistan, but it has barely lifted a finger to help modernize the culture. It's now well understood by U.S. strategists that we'll never have lasting security in Afghanistan without economic development, but we haven't yet learned that there won't be sustainable economic development without cultural change. We must recognize that culture, economics, and security represent the three legs of a stool that is Afghanistan -- ignore one and it will never stand on its own.
Establishing democracy was presumed to be the solution to the Afghanistan problem. We quickly learned, however, that the Afghans are far more concerned with security and economic necessities such as food, shelter, clean water, and jobs -- concerns much lower down on Maslow's Hierarchy of Human Needs. This was made astoundingly clear in 2004 when the people voted overwhelmingly for a constitution that established the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan as a representative democracy, yet the breadth and strength of the Taliban has only been growing.
The Afghanistan conflict is now fully recognized as a counterinsurgency operation. Insurgencies gain the critical support they need from the population by exploiting grievances often unrelated to their cause. In rural Afghanistan, for example, the Taliban are often the only option the people have for security and jobs. Coalition forces are working furiously to counter these deficits by training the Afghan Army and Police, and by financing the building of roads, bridges, schools, hospitals, and a wide variety of public works projects. This insurgent-counterinsurgent tug-of-war appears to have become a stalemated contest of wills and endurance. And unfortunately, if there's one thing that insurgencies in Afghanistan are good at it is outlasting their foreign opponents.
The Interrelationship of Culture, Economics, and Security in Afghanistan (Full PDF Article)
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The author illustrates a clear lack of understanding of culture through his writings on the subject. A reading of Afghan history shows determined adversaries like Alexander, Ghengis, Tamur Lane, Imperial Brittan, and Russia have all failed when it came to taming the disparate Afghan populace and terrain. Simply stated, America would be foolish to wade into Afghanistan's cultural waters with success being defined as our ability to change it!
Ironically, the author is really recommeding policy makers proceed into a cultural paradox similar to the economic ones that he correctly derides. American policy makers should study and embrace Afghan culture in order to figure out how we can achieve U.S. policy goals within the existing framework.
Standard of living is relative - no matter how heart wrenching it is for western observers. Afghans are a tough and resilent people not accustumed to many of the 'luxeries' we have grown to expect in west. Our focus should not be on economic development per se but on establishing a form of gov't that could provide stability that would set the conditions for economic development to eventually occur.
Building infrastructure, hospitals and schools are neccessary but will all fail without a government able to provide for the rule of law. As we all know, all politics are local. Assigning a national government without providing government for the provinces and districts will not produce the effect we desire. Unfortunately, this task of local rule of law is compounded by the fact that many provinces are ethnically/culturally homogenious and resistant to a central gov't.
Afghanistan is a challenging problem and the lasting solution for Afghan stability must be an Afghan one - not a western one. We would be wise to focus our efforts as such.
I agree with the author that cultural changes and reform must take place, but they must take place within the context of the only historically unifying factor Afghanistan has ever enjoyed - Islam, especially as it relates to external intervention. I'm sure most readers know that Islam is not monolithic, and there are different sects within Afghanistan's population. But, if the population perceives that any cultural change or reform is incompatible with Islam, it will be rejected. Any reform, or cultural change perceived to be championed by external forces, that reform will likely be rejected. One also has to be able to legitimately outweigh Taliban claims on the "truth" - this can only be done by well-respected Afghani clerics. To change the population's views on the treatment of women, then one must show how current treatment is incompatible with Islam. Any discussion concerning real cultural change in Afghanistan must acknowledge the significance of Islam on the Afghani psyche.
Simply put, culture is everything. Until an open analysis on the negative aspects of Afghan culture is made, we will simply be fumbling in the dark. Mr. Foster is correct in that cultures do change (in fact I would argue that all cultures are in a constant state of flux that may not always be visible). It is not that Western culture is better. Many can certainly point to the negative aspects of Western culture. The point is that these specific aspects of Afghan culture need to be overcome in order for it to take part in the global markets. Major Boetig's point on Saudi Arabia is also missed in that the Saudi's have a natural resource to depend on so their culture is not as important to their economic well-being as a society that doesn't have natural resources (i.e.Japan). In the end, I believe Major Boetig's analysis is spot on.
As a Canadian surgeon who has worked much of the time since 1997 in Afghanistan in the government hospital system I share much of your sentiment expressed in the article. I also feel that political
correctness is hobbling real progress and I see the necessity to
challenge underlying elements of culture. However, the analogy with
Japan is difficult to apply because at the end of WW2 Japan was on it's
knees in virtually every sense whereas Afghans are still largely independent minded and critical of outsiders and in some sense seem to be dictating terms to donors. USAID has shifted to giving all its money for health directly through the MOPH and yet when I asked in MOPH what kind of thinking they were doing about how to pay for health care in 10 or 15 years there didn't seem to even have been any discussion of the issue.
Certainly culture needs to be changed. Many Afghans complain bitterly about certain aspects of culture that need to change. One anecdote circulating this year among Afghans which illustrates this is roughly as follows. Each country has a lake in Hell that is guarded to prevent the occupants from escaping. The lake of fire for Afghans however doesn't need guards because whenever someone tries to get climb out the others inside pull that person back in. The anecdote speaks for itself in terms of the aspect of culture that is being criticized.
It seems that many will interpret the call to change culture as a blanket condemnation of Afghan culture and an arrogant promotion of Western culture. That kind of simplistic response will block any chance of reform or change and is the same sort of response that Hanson's book CARNAGE & CULTURE has received. I believe that he is not saying that Westerners or their culture are superior in any moral or value sense but that Western culture has been more effective when it comes to military prowess and the same surely can be said for scientific progress and various other fields of professional endeavour. The question then as I see it is which parts of Afghan culture could do with some change and if so then how? If foreigners push too hard then there will be resistance. Is culture not changing inevitably with modernization through such things as internet, film, TV etc.? Do we need to select small elements of culture to work on that have a greater impact on quality of life, while avoiding the big ticket "shame/honor" issues that polarize and entrench? Is it not cultural change in Saudi Arabia when over three decades the number of women in post-secondary education goes from almost nil to surpassing that of men?
You have certainly made a point very clearly that desperately needs to be brought to the forefront.
I recieved a link to this article from the NATO CIMIC Fusion cell. After reading it, I'm disappointed in many of the points made by the author, and feel that prejudices such as those made in the article will hinder our operations, rather than promote them.
Early into the article, Maj Boetig states that Afghanistan's only hope is by legitimate integration into the global economy. Why? As we've seen over the past 8 months, being closely intertwined on the world economic stage is not necessarily a good thing. In fact, it's proven to be quite dangerous. There are a number of countries around the world that are not linked into the global economy. Do they participate with regional economic partners - yes. Can they thrive with regional economic partners - again, yes.
The following paragraph goes onto state that integration into the world economy (which may not be in GIRoA's best interest)will not happen until Afghanistan remedies their treatment of women. First - tell that to Saudi Arabia (or a number of Arab countries). It seems to me that Saudi Arabia is doing pretty ok in the global order depsite its restrictions placed on women. Secondly, Maj Boettig just dismissed hundreds, and more likely thousands, of years of Pashtunwali tradition. This I feel is dangerous - arrogance such as this leads directly to our failure. Pashtun's are known for their rich heritage and tradition. Whether we agree or not, to dismiss it so readily is I feel inappropriate...Aghan (or Pashtun) cultures do not erect enormous barriers to productivity - security, and the need to simply survive are pretty big barriers that are placed in the way first. I do not see how Greg Morgtenson (Three Cups of Tea) managed to build what he has been able to in the past 10-15 years in predominatley Pashtun areas by being so dismissive of the local culture.
Culture is not hindering progress. Our approach is/has hindered progress.