by Irvin Oliver
Download the Full Article: U.S. Armor in Afghanistan: Worth the Effort?
With the arrival of 14 U.S. Marine M1A1 tanks in Afghanistan, it may be worth considering the wider role of armor and mechanized forces in irregular warfare. For many, the initial view may be that mechanized forces have little or no place in Afghanistan for several noted reasons -- the logistical burden of mechanized forces will further strain an already fragile supply chain; the Soviets used mechanized forces and failed; mechanized forces limit the effectiveness of counterinsurgency. While there may be some validity in all of these criticisms, they are flawed or incomplete arguments that rely on shaky assumptions. The primary consideration of the introduction of armor and mechanized forces into a situation like Afghanistan should be the means of employment and terrain considerations.
Download the Full Article: U.S. Armor in Afghanistan: Worth the Effort?
Major Irvin Oliver currently serves as an instructor of Comparative Politics at the United States Military Academy. Previously, he commanded D CO, 1-67 AR, 4th ID and he was the brigade plans officer for 2nd BCT, 4th ID.
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Major Oliver:
I agree with your assessment conclusion of Armor in Afghanistan and the flawed parallel to the Soviet Experience. The Russians, after the fall of the Soviet Union, saw disasterous use of armor in Chechyna the first time around in restricted and urban terrain. The second time around, they adapted their tactics and proved far more successful in their application of armor.
I would disagree with your statement that it would be a shock to see tanks in eastern Afghanistan. Not much comparitive analysis has been done to the restricted mountainous terrain in Afghanistan with that of Korea were tanks are part of the fight. They key is to operate tanks in restricted mountainous terrain as part of a combined arms maneuver with infantry, aviation, fires, and engineers clearing enemy forces from the ridge lines (to prevent top down PRG type attacks) and allow armor to push through narrow defiles to provide the shock and awe of mobile firepower. The same can be done in Afghanistan through the narrow mountain passes.
It is good to see a fellow strategist/armor officer that articulates the idea that armor remains a key asset both in irregular and conventional warfare.
Fellow Armor Advance Course Small Group Classmate: MAJ Chad M. Pillai, FA 59
It seems that the Marine M1A1s are being deployed in terrain that offers the best use of their capabilities against non-armor threats. Powerful day-night optics, precision long-range main gun and co-ax fire, and a mobile, well-armoured platform, should substantially effect operations by the infantry-based enemy forces.
The size of the armoured element, and it's proper deployment should reduce/negate logistic and close security issues.
It looks to me like the adaptability needed for this type of situation.