A Strategic Analysis of Sri Lankan "Kinetic" Counterinsurgency and its Theoretical Implications
by Christian Chung
Download the Full Article: The Killer Tiger Roared
Conventional wisdom and recent developments in the study of the art of conducting "traditional" counterinsurgency (COIN) has defined the importance of a population-centric approach to COIN in which a "whole of government", integrated political component is central to an effective partnership with the host nation in ultimately defeating the insurgency.
Using an analysis of the COIN campaign in Sri Lanka against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, this study contends that governments conducting COIN against an insurgency that has a primary focus on military-kinetic operations, and not on building political legitimacy with the population, can defeat the insurgency by competitively executing a hyper-kinetic COIN strategy, in which political reform is not emphasized, political strategy is diminished, and armed force "kinetic" operations are mainly utilized.
This study further extends this strategic comparison to encompass a renewed outlook on COIN strategy: that COIN, in both Foreign Internal Defense and Internal COIN, is a strategic competition with the nature of the insurgency itself, through the principle of adaptive competitive strategic advantage; and as such, any predisposition to a "population-centric" approach is a fallacy in outlook.
The article demonstrates, in its analysis of Internal COIN, that the nature of counterinsurgency for a particular campaign is defined by the nature of the insurgency as well as the nature of the counterinsurgent force, and not merely by executing the staple strategy of winning the "hearts and minds" of an indigenous population without prior proper analysis.
Download the Full Article: The Killer Tiger Roared
Christian Chung is a high school senior attending a full time dual enrolled college program, at The College Academy at Broward College. The article is part of an independent original research project conducted with the Social Science department at BC on COIN.
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Comments
This is indeed an excellent paper. Christian, you did a great job on this.
I will only add that the jury is still out on the enduring effectiveness of this effort. In many respects, the government has merely reset the conditions of failure that gave rise to the insurgency in the first place. Sometimes that may well be enough. Time will tell.
Bob
Well after reading this maybe the we will better understand that success again the Taliban means doing what is needed to destroy them. Attack there bases in Pakastane, attack there communication lines, and most of all attack them whereever they are. In war winning is everything, this crap about strategic coin etc is just a fools way of playing war. Lets get to it. when they start bleeding and bleeding bad then peace will be at hand. Bomb, destroy and kill should be the strategy not diplomocy.
"Using an analysis of the COIN campaign in Sri Lanka against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, this study contends that governments conducting COIN against an insurgency that has a primary focus on military-kinetic operations, and not on building political legitimacy with the population, can defeat the insurgency by competitively executing a hyper-kinetic COIN strategy, in which political reform is not emphasized, political strategy is diminished, and armed force "kinetic" operations are mainly utilized."
I don't think this study can make this case. I'm with you on the need for the counterinsurgent to adapt itself to leverage its strengths against the nature of the insurgency. A contributing factor to the LTTE's defeat, as cited in this paper, was the "conventionalization" of their armed forces - something they weren't ready to do to meet the SLA (Mao warned against making the Phase II to III transition too quickly and this study shows that this warning is a good one). Transition to a conventional force is not the same as a military-kinetic focus. One could argue the Taliban are M-K focused and dabble in governance, but their military focus is guerrilla in nature.
I would say that this study says that governmental forces can use kinetic, conventional approaches when their insurgent interlocutors do, which they are unlikely to do. I don't know that it helps us much when the insurgents use guerrilla tactics or a third party is the primary COIN force. I don't see the U.S. population supporting a 26-year war of attrition in the hopes that the insurgents will field a conventional army prematurely so we can do what we do best. Also, Robert C. Jones is right - we have yet to see if SL's lack of governance, etc will just provide the tinder for a new insurgency instead of proving the utility of kinetic COIN ops.
Otherwise, I wish I had written and researched this well when I was in high school. Certainly food for thought...
There are many key differences between Afghanistan and S.L. that may or may not be understated. The most important one is that fighting for radical Islam is different from fighting for your piece of land in the north of one island.
The Sinhalese could get away with killing large numbers of civilians in a short amount of time because of limited consequences, foreign-policy wise. It also helps to be an Island rather than be a landlocked country neighbored by a terrorist haven. Despite the fact that India has a state called Tamil Nadu, Indian Tamilians had little interest in supporting their Tamil brethren to the south.
The Tamil insurgency has important lessons for the situation in Afghanistan but not in the way that most of us might think.
Great work!!!!!
But a few short caveats as I am pressed for time:
I don't think anyone says lethal tactics can't work in COIN, only that they only work effectively in certain contexts - namely:
- By a regime supressing an internal rebellion inside its own borders. What is tolerated by a government within its borders is very, very, different than the same action done by a third party.
- When the enemy is isolated and cannot flee to sanctuary. That was the point of my article, that once "surrounded" and cut off, of course they could be destroyed. If someone could articulate how to isolate the various Taliban groups given the terrain and political issues I'm all ears.
- Adopting a Sri Lankan model of counter-insurgency by a western government attacking a threat in a third country abandons any sense of moral leverage available to that country in the future. Is playing that strategic chip worth the tactical benefits?
- One point made on the NDU blog about my article was that Sri Lanka was a unique "insurgency", more civil war/Phase III like than a subversion. Like Malaya, the insurgents were confined to a single minority sub-group among the population. The Taliban's various groups encompass almost all regions and sub-groups of the country to various extents. Not so for the Tamils, who were ethnically and geographically isolated, thus reducing the subversion threat in Sinhalese controlled areas.
But great work. Looking forward to your future works.