El Centro

Note: Marcos Castellanos is located about 25 miles South East of Guadalajara in the state of Michoacán. One of the issues that exists in Mexico is that if the military is currently removed from its stability and support operations (SASO) no other governmental institution presently exists to fill the void. Quite likely citizen vigilante groups (militias/private armies) would step in. As it is these groups already appear to be on the rise. Further, attempts to assess the present situation in Mexico are increasingly obscured as we are starting to see a media blackout on reporting/data concerning the gang/cartel conflicts. This blackout is stemming from the policies of the newly elected PRI presidential administration.

Via Borderland Beat:

"For more than 48 hours armed men held the entire town of Marcos Castellanos hostage, killing two people and kidnapping a police officer. After the attack most of the police force resigned - poorly paid police throughout the country are often victims of the violence they themselves try to battle. Lack of training and equipment means they are no match for criminal gangs.”

Note: This important, yet mostly forgotten, incident from 4 years ago represents a clear ‘firebreak’ in violence potentials for U.S. law enforcement officers vis-à-vis gang and cartel members armed with hand grenades. Such grenades are becoming more and more common in Mexico with thousands seized from the gangs and cartels. Their documented use against police personnel, vehicles, and facilities has occurred numerous times. They represent an increasing ‘officer safety’ concern on this side of the border.

Key Information:  Associated Press, “Cartel grenades may be coming into U.S.” NBCNews.com. 3 August 2009.

PHOENIX — It was a scenario U.S. law enforcement had long feared: A fragmentation grenade from Mexico's bloody drug war tossed into a public place. 

Only the grenade thrower’s bumbling prevented bloodshed in a south Texas bar — he neglected to pull a second safety clasp. But the act was proof that one of the deadliest weapons in Mexico's drug battle is a real threat to the U.S., and investigators are stepping up efforts to make sure it doesn't happen again.

While Mexican drug violence has been spilling across the border in the form of kidnappings and killings, grenades are a particular worry because they can kill large numbers of people indiscriminately, and they are a weapon of choice among Mexican cartel members.

“It’s one thing to shoot someone — that’s a very violent act. But to throw a grenade into a crowded bar or a crowded restaurant, that's a different type of criminal you are dealing with, a different mindset,” said Bill Newell, special agent in charge of the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives in Arizona and New Mexico…

Markings on weapons match 
The grenade that failed to explode in the bar in Pharr, Texas, had the same markings as grenades thrown in October at the U.S. consulate in Monterrey, Mexico, and at a television station in early January in the same city. The grenade thrown at the consulate failed to explode, and no one was injured when the grenade hit the Televisa network’s studio as it aired its nightly newscast.

But all three grenades were manufactured at the same time and place, and were at one point together in the same batch from South Korea. Their manufacture date was unavailable.

The United States and South Korea rank as the top two producers of the grenades seized in Mexico, according to the ATF…

The alleged gang member who threw the South Korean grenade into the Texas bar on Jan. 31 wasn't believed to have been acting on behalf of a cartel. Still, Hidalgo County Sheriff Guadalupe Trevino, whose office investigated the case, suspects there is a loose association between the gang behind the attack and Mexican cartel members.

After the grenade bounced off the floor and landed on a pool table, an off-duty police officer picked it up and threw it back out the door. No one was hurt, no arrests were made, and authorities are divided about whether the targets were rival gang members or off-duty police officers.

The incident led the ATF to issue a warning to law enforcement agencies along the border…

Handout photo provided by the U.S. Department of Alcohol,

Tobacco and Firearms [For Public Distribution]

Who: Gang members, thought to belong to the tri-city bombers, threw the hand grenade. A search warrant was served at 1023 Bell Street, Pharr, Texas with three suspects arrested and several pounds of marijuana and a shotgun seized. [2].

What:  A South Korean K-75 fragmentation grenade (based on the U.S. M67 grenade) was thrown into a bar containing off duty U.S police officers.  An unidentified man who looked in via the front door of the bar threw the grenade inside. The grenade bounced off the floor and landed on a pool table. It fortunately did not explode— a second safety clasp had not been pulled— and it was thrown back out the front door of the bar by one of the off duty police officers. This 2.5 inch spherical 14 ounce grenade produces “casualties by high-velocity projection of fragments” [6]. It has a 4-5 second delay once the fuse is properly activated that detonates 6.5 ounces of Composition B high explosive—“The 
effective casualty-producing radius is 15 meters and the killing radius is 5 meters” [6].


When:  Late on the night of Saturday 31 January 2009 [4].

Where:  The grenade was thrown into the ‘El Booty Lounge’ at 3701 N. Veterans Blvd in Pharr, Texas [3].

Why: Initially, speculation existed that the grenade might have been directed at the off duty U.S. police officers in the bar. Another view is now that “Investigators don’t suspect the Zetas of direct involvement in the attack on the Pharr bar. Instead, they believe members of the Tri-City Bombers gang may have been targeting top leaders of the rival Chicanos gang” [5]. A number of area gangs “…including the Tri-City Bombers, the Texas Chicano Brotherhood, the Texas Syndicate and the Hermanos Pistoleros Latinos…” are said to be violently competing for a spot as the designated South Texas enforcers for the Zetas and ongoing incidents are taking place as they prove themselves worthy [5]. Of the two lines of reasoning, the attack on opposing gang members—rather than upon U.S law enforcement officers—appears to be the more plausible one.

M67 fragmentation hand grenade

FM 3-23.30. 7 June 2005, 1-3 [For Public Distribution] [6]

Tactical Analysis: This was a very basic incident— a fragmentation grenade was tossed into a bar— initiated by a gang member untrained in the safety functioning of the grenade. Minimal recon was evident by the perpetrator peering in through the front door of the bar and tossing in the explosive device. Escape and evasion took place by means of running away and or hopping into a get-away vehicle. The criminal act was traced back to the perpetrator within a couple of days so basic OPSEC (operational security) procedures were not likely followed.  This could be attributed to either forensics (via fingerprints or surveillance footage), eyewitness accounts of the fleeing suspect, or ‘word on the street’ from the gang members or their associates bragging about the incident at the bar. The origins of the K-75 South Korean grenade were traced back to a warehouse in Monterrey, Mexico, which contained explosives and high-caliber weapons, which is believed to have belonged to the Zetas—the then paramilitary arm of the Gulf cartel. The grenade was tied to a production lot, via serial number tracing, to two other grenade attacks in Mexico—one against a Televisa news station and one against the U.S consulate in Monterrey [4, 5]. While at that point dozens of grenade attacks had taken place in Mexico, including quite a few across the border in the city of Reynosa, the cross border violence potentials that this attack signified with its tie in to a cartel stockpile of weapons and a U.S. based gang linked to that cartel [the Gulf cartel] is of importance. What is further troubling about this incident is the fact that off duty U.S. law enforcement officers were in a bar late at night that was either frequented by Chicanos gang members or actually contained them at the time of the grenade attack.

Sources:

[1]. Victor Castillo, “Three men arrested in Pharr house raid.” ValleyCentral.com. 2 February 2009, http://www.valleycentral.com/news/story.aspx?id=259259#.UKgv26X3C9Y.

[2]. “Pharr Grenade Correlation to Mexico Attacks.” Fox 2 News. 11 February 2009, http://www.foxrio2.com/4569/pharr-grenade-correlation-to-mexico-attacks/. See video.

[3]. To view the front of the bar, see the photos in this article. “Man throws grenade into bar outside Pharr.” ValleyCentral.com. 2 February 2009, http://www.valleycentral.com/news/story.aspx?list=~%5Cnews%5Clists%5Crecent&id=254235#.UKmmzqX3C9Y.

[4]. Ken Ellingwood and Tracy Wilkinson, “Drug cartels' new weaponry means war.” Los Angeles Times. 15 March 2009, http://www.latimes.com/news/la-fg-mexico-arms-race15-2009mar15,0,5675357,full.story.

[5]. Jeremy Roebuck, “Authorities fear RGV gangs competing for cartel work.” Valley Freedom Newspapers. 17 February 2009, http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:sN9l4k7LFIoJ:www.spislandbreeze.com/articles/cartel-3996-gangs-enforcement.html+grenade+pharr+texas+booty+lounge&cd=18&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us&client=safari.

[6].  “Chapter 1: Types of Hand Grenades.” Grenades and Pyrotechnic Signals, FM 3-23.30.  U.S. Army, 7 June 2005, http://www.umass.edu/armyrotc/Training/grenades.pdf.

Note—Photos of recovered cartel car bomb borne IEDs are relatively rare in Mexico. This incident dates back to 10 January 2012. It is somewhat reminiscent of recovered IEDs found in Iraq—however of a lesser tactical lethality.

Key Information: Sergio Chapa, “Car found with trunk full of explosives in Ciudad Victoria.” ValleyCentral.com. 10 January 2012.  Story includes 4 incident photos.

Who:  Mexican cartels; either the Zetas or the Gulf/Sinaloa cartels who are locked in a conflict over this region.

What:  Failed car bombing attempted based on an IED placed in the trunk of a 1989 Chevrolet Corsica. The driver of the vehicle parked the car next to a police building in the evening and then got into a compact vehicle that quickly drove the unidentified man away. The vehicle was identified as a possible threat to the facility/personnel and Mexican military and police ordnance disposal/bomb squad personnel subsequently disarmed the IED that it contained.

When:  Tuesday 10 January 2012.

Where:  In Ciudad Victoria, Tamaulipas next to the state police building (Avenida 16 de Septiembre sin número de la colonia Benito Juárez).  

Why: This was an attempted attack on the Tamaulipas state police (see analysis).

Source: Mexican Federal Police

Source: Mexican Federal Police

Tactical Analysis: Very basic car bombing attempt utilizing a limited yield device— an IED in the trunk of a car as opposed to a fully evolved VBIED— that apparently failed to detonate. The primary intent of the aborted attack was for threats & warnings and psychological warfare/terrorism purposes directed at the

Tamaulipas state police. The anti-personnel and somewhat limited anti-infrastructure/anti-vehicular effects of the detonation (blast and fragmentation) would only be considered a collateral/secondary outcome in order to generate ‘terror’ and ‘ambiguity’ concerning follow-on attack potentials— even though immediate pedestrian and glass fragment casualties to those in nearby buildings may have been significant. This is very much an insurgent TTP directed at Mexican state authority. 

IED Photographic Analysis:  Based upon the available photograph, the quality of which is poor, the bomb maker appears to be using a form of dynamite; which for the purposes of this analysis is going to be assumed to be between 40% and 60% straight dynamite.  There appears to be at least 10 sticks present, as some appear to be underneath others in the photograph. Without greater photo clarity, the dynamite in question may be commercial, military, or even a hand assembled / packaged explosive.  As the reader will note, the sticks within the package are not bundled together.

It should also be emphasized that, based upon the assembled explosive package as it is shown in photograph No. 2, questions are present regarding the potential for complete detonation of the package and, consequently, the skill level of the maker.

There are a couple of possibilities that exist regarding the intended method of detonation on the part of the bomb maker: 

1. The sticks have been individually capped and were to be electrically fired from a termination point (single “stick” size object) that may likely contain batteries and a switch closure circuit.  If this is the case, while the circuit might work, the layout is defective by design and would likely result in only a partial detonation of the package.

2. The sticks have been individually assembled with prima-cord for detonation by way of a single splice point to be initiated by a single blasting cap.  If this is the case, the cord junction at the individual sticks, as shown in the photograph, is not formatted correctly for a positive detonation using prima-cord with dynamite.  The photograph quality is too poor to determine if there may have been non-electric caps inserted within the sticks beyond the apparent connection.

It is important to note that the above analysis is based in part upon the format of the device as presented in the photograph.  It (the device) may or may not have been in this format when originally discovered in the vehicle.  It is possible that the sticks were originally bundled together, and that the person or persons rendering the device safe cut and removed the ties, tape, or wrappings prior to the taking of photographs.   This may have been warranted as part of the “render safe” process.

If the device in this case was properly formatted, and a total of ten sticks of 60% dynamite were present, the blast would have been substantial; obliterating the rear section and approximately 90% or greater of the vehicle’s body.  Structural and operational components of the vehicle above the chassis would become shrapnel.  Significant structural damage would have occurred to the closest adjacent buildings and windows within 100-meters or greater would have been blown out or damaged.

Significance: Car Bombs; Cartel Weapons; Cross Border Violence Potentials; VBIED Potentials

Editor's Note: This post originally appeared at the Baker Institute blog as part of its Viewpoints series. It is republished with permission.

The benefits of a Mexican gendarmerie

Mexican president Enrique Peña Nieto is starting his six-year presidential term with plans for a new paramilitary police force. The Gendarmería Nacional will initially consist of 10,000 officers. Originally proposed during his campaign with a target of 40,000 officers, the current plan was announced during a session of the National Security Council (Consejo Nacional de Seguridad) and the force is slated to police the contested plazas and regions impacted by insecurity.

Mexico’s security situation

Mexico has been embroiled in a complex drug war leading to a mix of high intensity crime and non-state armed conflict. Started under Vicente Fox, the conflict accelerated in 2006 under the administration of Felipe Calderón.  Drug cartels and gangs threatened civil order, challenged state forces and embraced extreme violence and barbarism to ward off interference from the state. High casualty rates—with deaths perhaps exceeding 100,000—combined with brutal beheadings, dismemberments, social cleansing leading to about 20,000 missing and a combination of refugees and internally displaced persons, were accompanied by direct infantry assaults on the police and military from cartels.

Car bombings, narco-tanks, and military-style tactics led to a situation where the civil police were outgunned. The military (both the army and Navy known by their respective Spanish acronyms, SEDENA and SEMAR) were deployed to stabilize the situation and contain the de facto ‘criminal insurgency.’ Corruption, impunity, and human rights violations complicate the situation. Kidnapping, extortion (collection of street taxes), and murder threaten the civil peace.  Police, corrections and judicial reform have become complicated and slow-moving necessities.  The Federal Police under the Secretary of Public Security (SSP) has been the primary federal law enforcement entity to respond, but military-style assaults and street battles waged by the gangsters have led them to become more of a formed police unit or gendarmerie than a community oriented law enforcement organ.  Similarly, the military and naval forces deployed to the conflict lack police skills, and have been accused of human rights violations.  Local and state police are often inadequately prepared and have lingering corruption and transparency challenges. Relations between the military and police are complex and sometimes strained in this complex conflict environment.

Why a gendarmerie?

Skeptics may ask “why a gendarmerie?”  The new 10,000 strong force will draw most of its initial complement from the military with the army (about 5,000 soldiers), and navy (about 2,000 sailors) contributing the bulk, require new statutory authority, and cost about $1.5 billion Pesos (US$ 117.4 million) for start-up in 2013 alone. Is this worth it? Indeed, respected security analyst Alejandro Hope, writing at InSight Crime, suggests that a gendarmerie may not be the right solution for Mexico’s security gap.  Hope notes that the new Gendarmería Nacional, as described in commitment #76 of the “Pact for Mexico” (the president’s new security plan), would create “a territorial body that allows the exercise of the sovereignty of the Mexican State [federal government] in all corners of the country regardless of their distance, isolation or weak state.”  Hope then outlines three objections to the new force: 1) there is no need for a rural police force, 2) there are insufficient potential qualified recruits for the force which would compete for resources and personnel from other police agencies, 3) It would create dual, competing national police forces (i.e., fragmentation).

Gary Hale, a drug policy fellow at the Baker Institute and former chief of intelligence for the Houston field division of the Drug Enforcement Administration , also questioned the rationale for a Mexican gendarmerie in previous Baker Institute Viewpoints blog.  For Hale, the question is will the force be effective, will it sap resources from other initiatives, and can it be made combat effective in enough time?  Hale also raises questions about command and control and relations with other police forces (at state, local, and federal levels). He concluded that if “properly trained, equipped and commanded, National Guard [i.e., gendarmerie] units in Mexico could serve to augment the offensive military forces that are needed to complement federal and state police forces.”

Filling the “security gap”

The police and military have different roles and core capabilities in democratic societies. The military frequently is challenged by the ambiguities of community policing.  On the other hand community police are challenged by intense combat.  Police are generally structured to work in one or two-person patrols and often lack the capacity to work in the formed units needed to counter armed, infantry-style assaults.  The Mexican military (both army and naval forces) has been used in the drug war to fill the gap in high intensity crime and in combat against non-state actors. This was a necessary step, but at best, a short-term solution. Military forces are not configured for policing (as allegations of human rights violations attest).  They are designed to fight other militaries, not investigate complex conspiracies or police the streets of a community. On the other hand, police are ill suited for addressing armed insurrection and military-type operations.  This ‘security gap” where neither police nor military are ideal is essentially the “missing mission.”

Modern formed police units (FPUs), also known as Stability Police Units (SPUs) like the French Gendarmerie or Italian Carabinieri fill the interstitial void in capabilities found in complex situations at the intersection between crime and war.  As defined by the US Institute of Peace, “Stability police are robust, armed police units that are capable of performing specialized law enforcement and public order functions that require disciplined group action. They are trained in and have the flexibility to use either less-than-lethal or lethal force, as circumstances dictate. They are rapidly deployable, logistically self-sustainable, and able to collaborate effectively with both the military and the police components of a peace mission.”  These are far from just ‘rural police,’ they are effective social control and security organs for operating in contested zones—both urban and rural–where there is a need to bridge policing and military operations.  The value of these forces was recognized in the Balkan conflicts and these modern gendarmerie units have played key roles in peacekeeping, order maintenance, counter-terrorism and anti-mafia operations.  The flexibility afforded by these units has led to the creation of the European Gendarmerie Force (EUROGENDFOR) comprised of contributing units from France, Portugal, the Netherlands, Italy, Romania, and Spain.

Conclusion: Flexible, agile response

Gendarmeries have flexible, expeditionary capabilities and can effectively bridge the demands of community policing, complex investigations, and military (light infantry) operations. Duplication and lack of coordination among other police services can be mitigated through joint training, staff rotations, and effective oversight.  A Mexican gendarmerie is not a replacement for the development of effective community police and state and municipal levels or the Federal Police, but when integrated with these forces as part of a ‘full-spectrum’ capacity, it can be an effective adjunct to eradicating cartel and gang violence and a viable tool for security sector reform.

Please see also this video on "Mexico, Drugs, and a Possible Way Forward."

Op-Ed: The Need For A "Half-Pivot to the Americas" by Dr. Robert J. Bunker and posted by the US Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute.

Much discussion has been generated over the still relatively new U.S. strategic “Pivot to Asia” and what this will mean for our national defense policy and force structure. This pivot represents what will become a multi-year shift from the legacy of 9-11, with over a decade’s focus on ground and counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, to a rebalancing of national effort, emphasizing air, naval, and space (both orbital and cyber) forces, focused on a rising China. Concern now exists that China, with the world’s largest population of over 1.3 billion people and the world’s second largest economy, will potentially emerge as a peer competitor to the United States.

As a result, a pragmatic policy of “engagement and containment” drawing upon both theories of neo-liberalism (win-win economic) and of realism (win-lose power) is at play in the U.S. foreign and defense policies supporting the strategic pivot. The intent of the new “China first” focus is not to prepare for the next war but, instead, engage in a shaping operation promoting good global citizenship on the part of an ascendant China mixed in with a bit of traditional offshore balancing (with a nod to Mearsheimer) just in case things do not quite work out as planned...

Chinese Organized Crime in Latin America by R. Evan Ellis, National Defense University, PRISM.

This study focuses on organized crime ties between China and Latin America associated with expanding commercial and human contact between the PRC and the region. A review of open source data and interviews with subject matter experts in Latin America find evidence of such ties in four areas: (1) extortion of Chinese communities in Latin America by groups with ties to China, (2) trafficking in persons from China through Latin America to ultimately smuggle Chinese expatriates into the United States or Canada, (3) trafficking in narcotics and precursor chemicals, and (4) trafficking in contraband goods. It also finds evidence of modest levels of activities that could become significant in two other areas, arms trafficking and money laundering.

Mérida Initiative: Transnational Security Governance or Governance Intervention?

Prof. Dr. Marianne Braig

SFB Governance Newsletter

Free Universität Berlin

December 2012

The war on drug cartels failed. Proof are the 80,000 dead and the approximately 30,000 missing persons as well as the brutal atrocities that have altered Mexican society during past years. The drug war determined the term of office of retiring Mexican president Felipe Calderón (2006-2012) and is equally intertwined with the Mérida Initiative (MI) which was launched in 2008 and was to introduce a new era of security cooperation between the USA, Mexico, and Central America.

See page 2 of the newsletter at: http://www.sfb-governance.de/en/publikationen/newsletter/index.html