El Centro

More on Mexico's Federal Police firing on a US Embassy vehicle via the New York Times.

The two Americans who were wounded when gunmen fired on an American Embassy vehicle last week were Central Intelligence Agency employees sent as part of a multiagency effort to bolster Mexican efforts to fight drug traffickers, officials said on Tuesday...

The CIA declined to comment. But American officials, speaking on condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to release information, said no evidence had emerged so far that the Americans were targeted because of their affiliation...

The New Security Reality: Not Business as Usual - A Strategic Studies Institute Op-Ed by Dr. Max Manwaring.

The past several years have marked the beginning of a different security era than that to which we are accustomed. Accordingly, it requires a new orientation. Whether we like it or not, whether we want it or not, and whether we are prepared for it or not, the United States and the West are engaged in a number of unconventional, undeclared, and undefined asymmetric wars...

Transnational Organized Crime, Terrorism, and Criminalized States in Latin America: An Emerging Tier-One National Security Priority by Douglas Farah, Strategic Studies Institute.

The emergence of new hybrid (state and nonstate) transnational criminal/terrorist franchises in Latin America operating under broad state protection now pose a tier-one security threat for the United States. Similar hybrid franchise models are developing in other parts of the world, which makes the understanding of these new dynamics an important factor in a broader national security context. This threat goes well beyond the traditional nonstate theory of constraints activity, such as drug trafficking, money laundering, and human trafficking, into the potential for trafficking related to weapons of mass destruction by designated terrorist organizations and their sponsors. These activities are carried out with the support of regional and extra-regional state actors whose leadership is deeply enmeshed in criminal activity, which yields billions of dollars in illicit revenues every year. These same leaders have a publicly articulated, common doctrine of asymmetrical warfare against the United States and its allies that explicitly endorses as legitimate the use of weapons of mass destruction. The central binding element in this alliance is a hatred for the West, particularly the United States, and deep anti-Semitism, based on a shared view that the 1979 Iranian Revolution was a transformative historical event. For Islamists, it is evidence of divine favor; and for Bolivarians, a model of a successful asymmetrical strategy to defeat the “Empire.” The primary architect of this theology/ideology that merges radical Islam and radical, anti-Western populism and revolutionary zeal is the convicted terrorist Ilich Sánchez Ramirez, better known as “Carlos the Jackal,” whom Chávez has called a true visionary.

In response to border security legislation passed in a Congressional sub-committee mid-December 2011, Andres Oppenheimer’s op-ed Mexico’s Drug Cartels Are No “Terrorist Insurgency” criticizes the suggestion that Mexican cartels are “terrorists” and that the U.S. should employ “counter-insurgency tactics” to “protect U.S. citizens from external threats.”  While transnational organized crime (TOC) elements operating in Latin America may not be engaged in an ideological “terrorist insurgency,” the observed conflict between TOC elements (to include cartels and gangs) and regional states can be accurately described as a “criminal insurgency.”   According to John P. Sullivan, who has written extensively on this phenomena over the past several years, a “criminal insurgency” occurs when criminal enterprises compete with the state not for traditional political participation, but rather to free themselves from state control in order to maximize profits from illicit economic activity.  In so doing, TOC elements seek to establish zones of “dual sovereignty” within states where they have freedom of movement, perceived legitimacy from the communities they exploit, and the complicity or acceptance of state political actors.  Ultimately, the result is pervasive corruption, evidenced by a reciprocal criminalization of politics and politicization of crime.

Although the tools of criminal insurgents identified by Sullivan are most apparent in Mexico, growing evidence supports concerns that criminal insurgency threatens to undermine weak governance throughout Central America, especially in Guatemala and Honduras.  This insurgency, waged largely on behalf of the lucrative cocaine trade, seeks to secure trafficking corridors for an estimated 95 percent of the cocaine departing South America for the United States.  Following are some of Sullivan’s criminal insurgency tactics with selected examples of their implementation in Central America:

Symbolic and instrumental violence, including attacks on journalists, police, the military, elected and judicial officials

• In Honduras, rights groups report the murder of at least 20 journalists since the 2009 coup.
• Criminal elements murdered the former Honduran presidential advisor for anti-drugs in December, 2011.
• Suspected criminal insurgents ambushed a police convoy in the drug-infested Aguan Valley of Honduras in September 2011.
• Drug runners exchanged gunfire with Honduran counter-drug police during multiple drug plane interdiction operations between 2011 and 2012.

Exerting control over turf

• In Guatemala, the government admits it has lost control of the Petén and Alta Verapaz departments to the Mexican cartel, Los Zetas.
• The remote eastern Honduran department of Gracias a Dios is largely abandoned by the government and serves as a staging zone for TOC elements.
• In Nicaragua, TOC exploits indigenous communities’ centuries-old reticence to “outside” government presence in the northeastern RAAN department.

Information operations including corpse-messaging, banners, graffiti, demonstrations, blockades and kidnappings

• Los Zetas massacred 27 peasants in the Guatemalan department of Petén in May 2011, leaving a cautionary message written in blood.
• Separate raids conducted by Mexican soldiers in November 2011 freed 15 and 23 kidnapped Honduran nationals held for ransom by Los Zetas.

Utilitarian provision of social goods

• In Guatemala, TOC elements have secured the loyalty of communities by distributing food, providing jobs, medicine and investing in infrastructure.

 Co-opting (and corrupting) government actors

• In Honduras, an estimated 10% of congressional members are drug traffickers (16 members) and the mayor of Copan, a major tourist attraction, allegedly works for the Mexican Sinaloa cartel.

In accordance with the framework of insurgency described by Sullivan, the above examples make it apparent that Central America, like Mexico, faces a criminal insurgency.  While Oppenheimer objects to the U.S. implementation of a terrorist counter-insurgency strategy in Mexico it is clear that the situation in Mexico and Central America requires some type of strategy that will prevent the failure of states in our own backyard.  In Crime Wars: Gangs, Cartels and U.S. National Security, Bob Killebrew and Jennifer Bernal from the Center for New American Security offer various strategic considerations in response to the security threat posed by criminal insurgencies in Latin America:

• The U.S. must lead a hemisphere-wide effort to confront and defeat the TOC threat to civil society.
• The huge geographic scope of criminal networks makes this challenge multi-national.
• Any U.S. strategic effort must include appropriate assistance to Latin American states to strengthen security and law enforcement institutions.
• The U.S. must focus on cleaning its own house by reducing the use of illegal drugs and the influence of gang culture.
• Defeating TOC enterprises will take a long time.

To some degree, the U.S. is involved in addressing each of the considerations provided by Killebrew and Bernal.  The U.S. is engaged in bi-lateral and multi-national counter-TOC efforts throughout the Western Hemisphere, exemplified by the efforts of the Merida Initiative and specialized DOD entities such as the Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF-S) and Joint Task Force Bravo (JTFB).  The U.S. plays an active role in the hemispheric Organization of American States (OAS) Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission, which seeks to address the means by which criminal insurgencies thrive.  Security and law enforcement in the region continues to improve through State Department’s Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI), focused on countering the destabilizing actions of TOCs.  While some suggest that demand for drugs in the U.S. is the center of gravity for criminal insurgency in the hemisphere, modest progress continues against reducing the use of illegal drugs as noted in the latest National Drug Control Strategy.  Unfortunately, TOC networks in Latin America, birthed in Mexico and Colombia and now spreading throughout Central America, are not new; their power base has expanded incrementally over decades and will require significant time to undo.

While indicators suggest that criminal insurgency is spreading in Latin America, most recently to Central America, it is unclear whether the current U.S. response will be sufficient to prevent the failure of states in the region.  In accordance with the President’s 2010 National Security Strategy, it is a matter of national security to “invest in the capacity of strong and capable partners.”  Governments that are incapable of meeting their citizens’ basic needs represent unstable regions that may directly threaten the American people.  As the national counter-insurgency effort in Iraq and Afghanistan continues to draw down over the next two years, reallocation of resources within our own backyard deserves serious consideration.   If the status quo prevails, criminal insurgency may create the conditions for the next long war.

New Book by SWJ El Centro Fellow Paul Rexton Kan

I had the privilege of reading the galleys of this excellent work. It is due out in October 2012. The geo-criminality section of the book is brilliant. Professor Kan’s deep analysis presented in the work will be a welcome addition to the debate surrounding the growing conflict that is taking place in Mexico and in other regions of the Americas.

Cartels at War: Mexico's Drug-Fueled Violence and the Threat to U.S. National Security

Mexican Cartel Strategic Note No. 13: City of Hidalgo, Texas, Fearful of Cartel Violence Potentials— Will Not Release New Police Chief’s Photo

Via Dave Hendricks, “Amid cartel concern, Hidalgo withholds police chief’s photo.” The Monitor, July 30, 2012,  http://www.themonitor.com/news/hidalgo-62623-concern-photo.html:

HIDALGO — Concerned drug cartels might attack Hidalgo’s new police chief, the city refused to release his photo last week.

Releasing a photo of interim police Chief Julian Guzman “may endanger the life or physical safety of the officer,” according to a letter from Hidalgo’s lawyers to the Texas Attorney General’s Office. If the argument holds, official photos of top Hidalgo County law enforcement officials could be off-limits to the public.

“The officer’s position may make him a potential target for violence by cartel operatives wishing to operate within the City of Hidalgo and surrounding areas in their attempts to get to and from Mexico and to conduct illegal activities,” according to the July 19 letter appealing a public information request from The Monitor.

Guzman couldn’t be reached for comment.

It’s a dramatic argument for Hidalgo, where police have recently focused on graffiti. Beyond that, most police calls involve alarm systems and the occasional traffic accident. With roughly 30 police and 11,200 residents, Hidalgo has more officers per capita than most Rio Grande Valley cities.

“Like you said, it’s a pretty safe city to live in,” said Mayor Martin Cepeda, adding that he didn’t know about the letter. “We have to understand that we’re public figures. We’re seen every day, especially if you’re the police chief.”

Texas law allows cities to withhold police photos “the release of which would endanger the life of physical safety of the officer.” Typically, the exception applies to undercover officers or patrol officers who might later work undercover.

Local police chiefs routinely attend city meetings and hold news conferences, making them recognizable figures. Across the border, though, Mexican police and soldiers often hide behind masks.

“But on the U.S. side, it’s just a little bit different. We shouldn’t hide,” said Hidalgo County Sheriff Lupe Treviño, perhaps the Valley’s most recognizable law enforcement official. “As leaders, as law enforcement CEOs, we shouldn’t hide from the bad guys. We need to confront them head-on. And that’s what I've been doing since I took over the Sheriff’s Office.”

Former Customs and Border Protection spokesman Felix Garza agreed. He regularly appeared on TV broadcasts and spoke to reporters before retiring last year.

“That’s the role of a police chief or somebody who’s a public servant: That you have to make yourself available to the public by name, face, whatever,” Garza said.

While he occasionally thought about safety, Garza said he traveled across the U.S. and Mexico without fear. He now lives in Hidalgo.

“So in short, I don’t think their argument holds any water,” Garza said.

For further background on the threat environment in Hidalgo, Texas, see the video Hidalgo Police Chief Says Threats From Cartels Are Constant. KRGV. Jan 12, 2012, http://www.krgv.com/news/hidalgo-police-chief-says-threats-from-cartels-are-constant/. Transcript:

HIDALGO - A Valley police chief says cartel threats against police departments happen all the time. CHANNEL 5 NEWS obtained a DPS memo warning the Gulf Cartel would open fire on police officers to protect the load.

Hidalgo Police Chief Vernon Rosser gets dozens of alerts, tips and warnings every day. That intelligence comes from his officers, informants or the feds.

"You have to take intelligence for what it is," says Rosser.

He says part of his job is sorting the good info from the bad. Rosser says good information is specific.

"Something that's tangible, something that the officers can see who it is," says Rosser.

His officers will be using intelligence to look for a vehicle used in a shooting at a car wash in Edinburg on Thursday. He says that's a helpful tip. The memo he got in his inbox the other day was not. It came from the DPS.

The letter, citing FBI information, warned departments in the McAllen area that the Gulf Cartel was willing to open fire in order to protect a valuable load moving south.

"It's either going to be one of two things: money or drugs," says Rosser.

Rosser says that's information his officers take with them every day. They don't need a memo to know cartels are willing to open fire. These tips come in all the time. He says the threat from the cartels is constant, so this is no more than a reminder for his officers to stay alert.

Analysis: The Chief’s Message at the Hidalgo Police Department website is at http://www.hidalgotexas.com/police.html#. No picture of the interim police Chief Julian Guzman is present. Apparently the former police chief, Vernon Rosser, resigned 1 June 2012 in a settlement agreement in which he was paid $114,000.00 to leave quietly as a result of a city council shake up that took place in the 12 May elections [1]. Of note is that Rosser said in a 14 May interview that the new mayor’s uncle, Rudy Franz, was the real power broker in the city of Hidalgo and that talking about it would likely end his career. Veiled allegations of localized corruption or, at the very least, instances of business hardball taking place were also made [2]. Franz and cohorts were swept into office running as “…the Concerned Citizens of Hidalgo who campaigned on reforming the Police Department” [3]. Their platform stated that the police department was going beyond its ‘serve and protect’ role and intimidating individuals in the process of carrying out its sworn duties.

While the circumstances of the departure of the old police chief, whom it is agreed was far from politically correct in his mannerisms, is clouded, it was well known that he did not fear having his picture circulated in the media. What makes absolutely no sense is the new Hidalgo city position on not releasing the picture of interim police Chief Julian Guzman. If this was an internal decision to somehow limit the political visibility of the interim police chief (as part of a reform process or for other reasons) or triggered by intelligence pertaining to actual officer safety issues—which appears highly unlikely— is unknown. Either way, the position that such a release “may endanger the life or physical safety of the officer” [4] signals to the American public and the cartels that the city is now fearful of Mexican cartel targeting of its top law enforcement officer. This policy is highly detrimental to US national and strategic interests because of the symbolism attached to it. Ongoing US deterrence of Mexican cartel violence directed at US law enforcement officers and public officials is derived from a ‘trip wire’ posture. Once this ‘trip wire’ has been activated by an attempted or successful attack on US such public service personnel, an immediate and overwhelming law enforcement (and allied US governmental) response is initiated. This response is meant to severely punish such Mexican cartel transgressions, and by so doing, deter such future policies and actions by the cartels.

The city of Hidalgo’s breakaway policy will potentially send the message that the threatened use of terrorist assassination/targeted killing TTPs (tactics, techniques, and procedures) by the cartels in Mexico can be successfully utilized against US law enforcement officers and public officials on American soil. Such a policy, if left unchecked and potentially replicated by other American border cities, could create an initial and ever deepening fissure in the ‘trip wire’ defense based on overwhelming response to Mexican cartel transgressions. It has now even been suggested, via attempts at dark humor, that the interim police chief of Hidalgo will next be forced to next don a black balaclava (ski mask) for his personal safety as an extension of this policy. This is the tragic reality that exists in many regions of Mexico today due to the worsening of its internal security environment. US national and homeland security interests would best be served by the rescinding of the city of Hidalgo policy and the immediate release of the picture of interim police Chief Julian Guzman. Senior US law enforcement and public officials should not live in fear of Mexican cartel violence potentials— rather, they should serve openly and if any violence should be directed against them then the US national response should be immediate, overwhelming, and exceedingly coercive in nature.

End Note(s):

1. Dave Hendricks, “Hidalgo pays $114,000 to settle with former police chief.” The Monitor, June 19, 2012, http://www.themonitor.com/articles/hidalgo-61706-former-pays.html.

2. Dave Hendricks, “Hidalgo power broker forces out longtime police chief.” The Monitor, May 14, 2012, http://www.themonitor.com/articles/hidalgo-60861-longtime-police.html.

3. Ibid.

4. Dave Hendricks, “Amid cartel concern, Hidalgo withholds police chief’s photo.” The Monitor, July 30, 2012,  http://www.themonitor.com/news/hidalgo-62623-concern-photo.html.

Tags : El Centro, Mexican Cartel Note, Strategic Note

Stuck in the Mud: the Logistics of Getting Out of Afghanistan - In her latest article published in Foreign Affairs.com, Vanda Felbab-Brown discusses current U.S.-Pakistan relations and logistics in Afghanistan, including the reopening of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border for NATO trucks and the challenges of the Northern Route via Central Asia.
 

Although the border showdown has been resolved, Pakistan's persistence in providing safe havens to Afghan militants continues to anger and frustrate Washington. But Pakistan's trump card -- its own internal fragility -- remains in hand. Its government is weak, its economy is in shambles, the country suffers from massive electricity blackouts, and severe poverty and unemployment are widespread...Resolving the logistics to get out of Afghanistan on schedule is important. But staying in Afghanistan in a sufficiently robust and wisely structured presence so that security can be strengthened and Afghan governance improved is even more crucial. The worst possible outcome would be to be rushing out of Afghanistan and then lacking even the logistical routes to do so.

Public Security Challenges in the Americas - In a recent Brookings Institution report that analyzes key issues for Latin America, Vanda Felbab-Brown responds to Kevin Casas-Zamora and Lucía Dammert as they call for a comprehensive approach to fighting crime within the Latin America region (pages 75-76).

Although frequently portrayed as an effective solution to the problem of organized crime, mere legalization of illicit economies, particularly of drugs, is no panacea. There are no shortcuts to reducing crime in Latin America and improving law enforcement forces there...Without capable and accountable police that are responsive to the needs of the people and backed up by an efficient, accessible and transparent justice system, neither legal nor illegal economies will be well managed by the state...Such a multifaceted approach in turn requires that the state address all the complex reasons why populations turn to illegality, including law enforcement deficiencies and physical insecurity, economic poverty, and social marginalization. Efforts need to focus on ensuring that peoples and communities will obey laws—not just by increasing the likelihood that illegal behavior and corruption will be punished, but also by creating a social, economic, and political environment in which the laws are consistent with the needs of the people and seen as legitimate.

The apparent election of Enrique Pena-Nieto as President of Mexico is a development that is full of irony and contradictions. Pena-Nieto, from the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), promised to create an open, transparent government that respects human rights and delivers economic growth.  However, most voters appeared to want a return to the past, when the PRI’s seven-decade rule was known as the “perfect dictatorship” and held a lock on the political process, economic investment and societal control.  It seemed to be this last part of the PRI’s ability, societal control, which tipped many people’s vote in favor of the PRI due to their fatigue from the nation’s unrelenting drug war.  As one woman explained her vote for the leader of the PRI, “He'll stabilize the cartels. He'll negotiate so they don't hurt innocents.”[1]  Yet, politicians negotiating with drug traffickers is inherently an undemocratic, secretive and corrupt practice. In short, when it comes to the promises of an open, transparent and clean government, many voters hoped Pena-Nieto was lying to them.

To be fair, Pena-Nieto has not promised to lay-off the cartels entirely, but his strategy appears to be far from clear.  In some instances he has said that he wants to remove the Mexican military from police work, but keep it in more violent cities.  He has said that he wants to create a type of national gendarmerie to take on the cartels, but how this new institution will differ from the Federal Police or work alongside it has not been spelled out.  He has mused that limiting the focus on capturing kingpins and concentrating on smaller drug trafficking organizations might bear fruit. The hazy outlines of all of this seem to mean that he will not directly take on the cartels as intensely as his predecessor.  Will a less confrontational approach by the incoming PRI president lead to a hoped reduction in Mexico’s drug fueled violence that has claimed over 50,000 in six years and created widespread misgivings about democracy among the Mexican citizenry?  Is this a “Narco Spring” where traffickers and gangsters are given a freer hand in the illegal drug trade as long as they stop the killings?

Other “Spring” movements were popular uprisings in authoritarian countries where citizens took to the streets and demanded transitions to democratic rule.  This is yet another contradiction represented by Mexico’s Narco Spring—it will be ushered in by a democratic process that included voters who wanted a return to a less democratic time, hoping that this will reduce the pressure on violent criminal enterprises and end the bloodshed.

Former senior members of PRI and Partido Accion Nacional (PAN) governments have prepared the fields for a Narco Spring by arguing for not just a less confrontational approach, but a tacit deal that involves the government permitting the cartels to traffic drugs without high-level violence in exchange for limited prosecutions and the end of extraditions to the US.  Former Foreign Minister Jorge Castaneda suggested illegal activities by the cartels would be permitted if they curbed public violence.[2] President Fox’s former spokesperson, Ruben Aguilar, argued that “we must constrain the actions of organized crime, obligate them to obey the rules of operation and in this context, we would have to accept the possibility of…legalizing the sale of drugs under certain agreements.”[3] One of the PRI’s leaders in the senate seemed to pine for a return to the old understandings between it and the cartels by saying that when the PRI was in power “I never saw a decapitation in the streets of Mexico.”[4]

There are many reasons that a Narco Spring will not live up to the hopes of a less violent Mexico.  Re-establishing the previous arrangements between the PRI and the drug cartels is moot because many of the contemporary drug trafficking organizations and their leaders were not around before the PAN came to power in the year 2000.  There are also a greater number of large and small trafficking groups, making any sort of balance of power brokered by the PRI less than plausible.  All of this has been clear even in the intervening 12 years of the PAN’s hold on the Presidency; much of the political power in Mexico has been pushed out towards the states.  Four of the six most violent states have had PRI governors during the time that the PAN held the Presidency; in two of these states—Coahuila and Tamaulipas—the PRI has never lost power.  In spite of the authority of the PRI in these regions, drug violence continued or worsened.

The unlikely success of a Narco Spring would nonetheless bode ill for Mexico.  Rather than viewing a government rapprochement with the cartels as the failure of the rule of law, Mexican civil society may become amenable, making such tacit deal making more broadly acceptable.  Under such a “peace”, it would be difficult to know where the drug cartels’ influence on Mexican politics begins or ends, or even if the government has any means to affect the actions of the cartels should they step outside the tacit agreement.  Any Narco Spring could be merely a transition towards Mexico becoming a fully flourishing narco-state. 

Recent InSight Crime articles by

SWJ El Centro Fellow Steven Dudley

Folk Singer's Death Shines Light on Nicaragua Police Corruption

Monday, 09 July 2012

The investigation into the July 2011 murder of Argentine folk singer Facundo Cabral has unveiled a devious criminal network based in Nicaragua— a country that many consider a model for avoiding high-level mafia infiltration— which may involve the country’s celebrated police force.

Video: An Interview with Nicaragua’s Police Chief

Monday, 09 July 2012

Nicaragua is the poorest country in Central America and has the smallest police force, yet its murder rate is the lowest in the region, and its police are seen as a model for others. On June 19, InSight Crime interviewed national police chief Aminta Granera about the challenges facing the region and her country.

Why Mexico Police Reform Could Defeat Even Colombia’s Ex-Top Cop

Monday, 09 July 2012

Retired Colombian police chief General Oscar Naranjo makes a sexy choice as a security advisor for Mexico's President-elect Enrique Peña Nieto, but the bureaucratic and political challenges Naranjo will face in Mexico may surprise him and strangle his attempts to reform the country's security forces.