Small Wars Journal

El Centro

The Challenge of Violent Drug-Trafficking Organizations

Mon, 10/24/2011 - 5:23pm

The Challenge of Violent Drug-Trafficking Organizations: An Assessment of Mexican Security Based on Existing RAND Research on Urban Unrest, Insurgency, and Defense-Sector Reform by Christopher Paul, Agnes Gereben Schaefer, and Colin P. Clarke.

Violent drug-trafficking organizations (VDTOs) in Mexico produce, transship, and deliver into the United States tens of billions of dollars’ worth of narcotics annually, but their activities are not limited to drug trafficking. VDTOs have also engaged in human trafficking, weapon trafficking, kidnapping, money laundering, extortion, bribery, racketeering, and assassinations. In an effort to clarify the scope and details of the challenges posed by VDTOs, a RAND team conducted a Delphi expert elicitation exercise, the results of which offer an assessment of the contemporary security situation in Mexico through the lens of existing RAND research on related issues. The exercise centered around three strands of prior RAND research on urban instability and unrest, historical insurgencies, and defense-sector reform. Although this prior research was not designed specifically for the study of Mexico, all three areas offer applicable insights. Assessment scorecards from these projects were used to obtain input from the expert panel and to guide the resulting discussion. The goal was not to break significant new ground in understanding the dynamics of drug violence in Mexico or to offer a qualitative assessment of these dynamics, but rather to provide an empirically based platform for identifying key areas that merit further investigation.

Mexican Cartel Tactical Note # 5

Mon, 10/24/2011 - 2:11pm

Key Information:

Via “Monterrey: Army attacked in car bomb ambush.” Borderland Beat

Thursday, October 20, 2011 [1]: 

A parked car loaded with explosives was detonated by remote control as a military convoy drove by in Monterrey’s southside in an ambush reminiscent of attacks on U.S. forces in the Middle East.

The incident took place around 5:10 am this morning on Avenida Revolucion close to the intersection with Ricardo Covarrubias, in the Colonia Ladrillera, outside of a machine shop/auto garage.

A military source said that during a surveillance patrol in the Colonia Ladrillera soldiers detected a suspicious vehicle, a black Jetta, which resulted in a pursuit thru Avenida Revolución.

As the pursuit continued north on Avenida Revolucion a Nissan Sentra or Tsuru with Tamaulipas license plates was detonated remotely moments before the Army vehicles passed the location, between Berel and Ricardo Covarrubias.

No soldiers or civilians were reported injured in the attack.

Debris from the blast was scatterd over several meters. The door to the machine shop was heavily damaged and windows were broken in buildings for at least a block.

Avenida Revolucion remained closed as bomb experts and forensic examiners investigated the blast scene.

[Includes 8 photos of the incident scene and a 4 minute Mexican news video: view via http://www.borderlandbeat.com/2011/10/monterrey-army-attacked-in-car-bomb.html.]

Via “Army seizes explosives in Veracruz.” Borderland Beat. Thursday, October 20, 2011 [2]:

In a security operation that occurred Wednesday in the southern Veracruz city of Coatzacoalcos, military personnel seized high explosives, detonators, weapons, cell phones, military type equipment and stolen vehicles from a safehouse located in the colonia Brisas del Golfo area of the city.

The El Universal news agency reported that Mexican Army sources in Coatzacoalcos identified the explosives seized as 45 C-4 plastic explosive charges.

Five suspects were detained by the military during the operation.

[Includes 5 photos of the seized explosives, cell phones, vehicles and weapons: view via http://www.borderlandbeat.com/2011/10/army-seizes-explosives-in-veracruz.html].

VBIED Anti-Vehicular/Anti-Personnel Ambush:

Who: Los Zetas [assumed]

What: I&W event involving a VBIED (Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device)/car bomb deployed against a mounted Mexican Army patrol by means of an ambush.

When: Thursday, October 20, 2011 at 5:10am in the morning [3].

Where: On Avenida Revolucion close to the intersection with Ricardo Covarrubias, in the Colonia Ladrillera, outside of a machine shop/auto garage in Monterrey, Mexico.

Why: The Mexican military is attempting to help pacify Monterrey, Mexico, bring down the homicide rate, and limit local drug cartel and gang political influence. The ambush is a response to this Mexican military operation.

Tactical Analysis: Provides an Indications & Warning (I&W) event concerning Los Zetas [assumed] tactics and capabilities. A cell phone detonated improvised explosive device (IED) placed inside the trunk of a small sedan is the most plausible—making it a VBIED (vehicle borne IED)—method of attack. The explosive type utilized is unknown but C-4 is quite probable; these assumptions have not been confirmed forensically and therefore are only speculative. A cartel vehicle was used as bait to bring a mounted Mexican Army patrol into the prepared kill zone. The VBIED was detonated prematurely with no soldiers or civilians injured in the ambush. Scenario 1: The VBIED was meant to be utilized in an efficient anti-vehicular/anti-personnel role to produce maximum Mexican military causalities. The ambush was unsuccessful due to the premature VBIED detonation and/or the explosive yield/dynamics utilized (small yield/non- directional). Scenario 2: The VBIED was utilized symbolically (as a warning) to the Mexican military to cease/limit their operations in Monterrey [4]. No matter the accuracy of either scenario, this incident represents the first recorded use of a VBIED against a mounted Mexican Army patrol and a further escalation of VBIED tactical evolution taking place in the criminal insurgencies in Mexico. The VBIED in an ambush role component itself is not unique— it was utilized in the VBIED attack against dismounted Mexican law enforcement in July 2010 in Ciudad Juárez perpetrated by the Juárez cartel [5]. Explosives seized: The C-4 explosives (45 packages), detonators, and cell phones seized in Veracruz, Mexico, prior to the VBIED attack demonstrate that caches of bomb making materials belonging to Los Zetas [assumed] exist in other regions of Mexico and can be used to fabricate additional VBIEDs [2]. Further, if the recent Mexican Cartel Tactical Note No. 4 is referenced, it can be seen that C-4 explosives (3 packages) are once again identified related to a Los Zetas [assumed] weapons cache [6]. Potentials: The assumption must be considered that Los Zetas possess a growing VBIED fabrication and deployment capability.    

Significance: Cartel Weaponry; I&W; Officer Safety Issues; TTPs

Source(s):

1. The original Mexican news sources are:

http://www.elnorte.com/seguridad/articulo/654/1306879/.

http://www.elnorte.com/seguridad/articulo/654/1306973/.

2. The original Mexican news source is: http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/notas/802722.html.

3. The alternative time of 4:00 AM for the incident has been provided in other news sources. Both times suggested would mean that the device was detonated under cover of darkness (sunrise is at 7:42 AM) while visibility levels are lower.  For sunrise validation see http://www.timeanddate.com/worldclock/astronomy.html?n=162&month=10&year=2011&obj=sun&afl=-11&day=1.

4. This perception is attributed to John P. Sullivan, an El Centro Senior Fellow, during discussions on 20 October 2011 concerning the use of symbolic and instrumental violence pertaining to this VBIED ambush.

5. Note—C-4 explosives were utilized via cell phone detonation. For more information pertaining to that incident see John P. Sullivan, “Explosive Escalation?  Reflections on the Car Bombing in Ciudad Juarez.” Small Wars Journal. 21 July 2010, http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/explosive-escalation.

6. David Kuhn and Robert Bunker, “Mexican Cartel Tactical Notes: No 4. Cartel Military Weapons Cache Discovered Near Fronton, Texas.” Small Wars Journal. 15 October 2011, http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/mexican-cartel-tactical-note-4.

 

Mexican Cartel Strategic Note No. 5

Wed, 10/19/2011 - 5:25pm

Key Information:

Via the statement of Alan Bersin, Commissioner, Customs and Border Protection (June 2011):

Since October 1, 2004, 127 CBP employees have been arrested or indicted for acts of corruption including drug smuggling, alien smuggling, money laundering, and conspiracy. Of the 127 arrests, 95 are considered mission compromising acts of corruption. This means that the employee’s illegal activities were for personal gain and violated, or facilitated the violation of, the laws CBP personnel are charged with enforcing. An example of the impact a single corrupt employee can make through a mission compromising act of corruption can be seen in the instance of former CBP Technician Martha Garnica who was indicted federally in 2009. In 2010 Garnica was sentenced to 20 years in federal prison, ordered to pay a $5,000 fine, and serve four years of supervised release after pleading guilty to conspiring to import over 100 kilograms of marijuana into the United States, conspiring to smuggle undocumented aliens, three counts of bribery of a public official, and one count of importation of a controlled substance.

Apart from the 95 cases identified above, the remaining 32 arrests are considered non-mission compromising acts of corruption in which the employee’s illegal activities involved the misuse or abuse of the knowledge, access, or authority granted by virtue of their official position in a manner that did not facilitate the violation of laws that the agency is charged with enforcing at the border. These cases fall into one of five broad categories: Theft; Fraud; Misuse of a Government Computer/Database; False Statements; and Drug-Related Offenses [1].

See Crossing the line: Corruption at the border; 128 cases shown [http://projects.cironline.org/bordercorruption/] at Center for Investigative Reporting for specific case information. The interactive site contains individual case profiles, supporting documentation, and case statistics; gender, agency, years or service, type of crime, state, year, age and duty station [2].  

Analysis:

Much of the concern relating to the Mexican cartels focuses on acts of violence such as homicides, assaults, and torture along with the illicit economic activities of narcotics trafficking, kidnapping, extortion, bulk thefts, and human smuggling. A large component of Mexican cartel operations is derived from the targeted corruption of public officials within their areas of operation. The initial intent is to achieve impunity and freedom of action. This represents the ‘insurgency’ element of the criminal insurgencies taking place in Mexico, Central America, and now over the US Southern Border, an element, according to John Sullivan, that is still not recognized by many individuals. Essentially, the public agency (be it local, state or federal) being targeted is compromised one official at a time. When combined with the threat (and subsequent use) of violence the well known cartel technique of offering the choice of silver or lead (¿Plata O Plomo?) is achieved. This is akin to the environmental modification of a street, barrio, or plaza controlled by a cartel or gang with the imposition of a new set of values (narcocultura) and rules (cartel political authority)— though, in this instance, it is directed at a public entity in order to compromise and co-opt it (representing the aggregate of all of the individuals corrupted). What has worked so successfully in Mexico and Central America is now being incrementally utilized by the cartels against the United States’ ports of entry—and, we can also assume, much deeper into the US homeland. The following quote from Alan Bersin is most telling in this regard:

CBP IA agents participate as active members of the FBI-led National Border Corruption Task Force (NBCTF) initiative. Presently, CBP IA agents are deployed in 22 Border Corruption Task Forces (BCTFs) and/or Public Corruption Task Forces (PCTFs) nationwide, including 13 task forces operating along the southwest border. These multi-jurisdictional, multi-agency task forces share information, intelligence, and investigative resources in an effort to combat border corruption. The task force approach serves as a force multiplier on corruption investigations and allows for a higher level of return on the investment of appropriated resources [1].

The FBI-led National Border Corruption Task Force (NBCTF) initiative is now very active and appears to be growing. How this threat to US sovereignty will further evolve is unknown. What is recognized is that as a nation we can recover from cartel violence directed at our officials and our citizens—the corruption of our public institutions is an entirely different matter. This element of the criminal insurgent threat represented by the Mexican cartels must not be underestimated. Per Andrew Becker and Richard Maros:

Since 2006, the number of investigations has more than tripled, from 244 to about 870 last year, according to the Department of Homeland Security’s Office of the Inspector General [3].

We already have at least 127 Customs and Border Protection employees indicted or convicted in corruption cases—that list is going to grow along with that of public officials in other city, state, and federal agencies. The question is to what extent and, ultimately, what our national response is going to be to protect our public institutions from criminal co-option.

Notes:

This Strategic Note is a byproduct of discussions between the author, John Sullivan, and Dr. David Shirk after the Justiciabarómetro Ciudad Juarez Police Survey event held at the Trans-Border Institute (TBI), University of San Diego, San Diego, CA., Tuesday 18 October 2011. The author would like to thank John Sullivan for his analytical insights pertaining to criminal insurgencies and to David Shirk for his identification of the Center for Investigative Reporting border corruption case dataset.

Source(s):

1. Statement of Alan Bersin, Commissioner, Customs and Border Protection, before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Disaster Recovery and Intergovernmental Affairs on “Border Corruption: Assessing Customs and Border Protection and The Department of Homeland Security Inspector General's Office Collaboration in the Fight to Prevent Corruption.” 9 June 2011. http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/testimony/testimony_1307549850535.shtm.

2. Crossing the line: Corruption at the border; 128 cases shown. Center for Investigative Reporting. 17 October 2011. http://projects.cironline.org/bordercorruption/. (See also the extensive list of news reports and documents).

3. Andrew Becker and Richard Marosi, “Border agency’s rapid growth accompanied by rise in corruption.” Center for Investigative Reporting. 17 October 2011. http://centerforinvestigativereporting.org/node/4885.

Mexican Cartel Tactical Note # 4

Sat, 10/15/2011 - 5:51pm

Mexican Cartel Tactical Notes: No 4. Cartel Military Weapons Cache Discovered Near Fronton, Texas.

Who: US Border Patrol Agents find a Mexican cartel (assumed) weapons cache and turn it over to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco Firearms and Explosives (BATF) for further investigation. Border Patrol Chief Rosendo Hinojosa made comments to the media pertaining to the incident.

What: Black bag found in the brush containing:

            • 6 Assault Rifles [See Photo]

            • 1 Rocket Launcher [See Photo]

            • 1 Grenade Launcher

            • 3 Packages of C-4 Explosives (Per News Video)

            • 1 Lower Receiver for an Assault Rifle

            • 20 Magazines

When:  Tuesday, 13 September 2011.

Where:  Near Fronton, Texas, North of the Rio Grande River on US soil. Mexican city reference: Roughly between Nuevo Laredo and Reynosa.

Why:  The weapons cache was either left in the brush near the Rio Grande for pick up or abandoned due to US LE presence in the vicinity. One assumption is that the weapons were meant for a cartel kill-team/enforcers operating in the region; another is that they were on their way to Mexico.

Photo Forensics:

Photo: Courtesy of US Customs and Border Protection (For Public Release)

General ID information only due to the angle and resolution of the picture.

Top Weapon: An enhancement of the sling ring and end cap shows that it is an M-72 Light Anti-tank Weapon (LAW), possibly an A2 model.

2nd Weapon: Either an AR-15 or an M-16 (selector on opposite side) that appears to be a “parts” weapon. It is not in fireable condition as the recoil spring and recoil spring housing are missing along with the stock.

3rd Weapon: Appears in all respects to be an AR-10 (7.62mm x 51mm).  The verified size of the magazine well is consistent with that of a 7.62mm magazine and the slight forward cant of the well is germane to the AR-10 only.  Additionally, the enlarged head on the take-down pin on the receiver of this Armalite is not common to other AR models, but does occur on the AR-10; and the size and format of the brass deflector on this weapon only occurs on the AR-10. There is also no forward assist on the receiver. Production time period and exact model variance from the angle of view is uncertain.

4th Weapon: An AK action in a polymer stock; possibly a knock-off that was originally semi-auto possibly converted to full.

5th Weapon: Weapon with the well-worn receiver appears to be a select-fire M-4 carbine.

6th Weapon: appears to be a Model SAR-4800 Sporter Rifle in 7.62 x 51mm.  The pistol grip on the stock has been trimmed way down to fit a smaller hand.  The barrel has also been cut off just ahead of the gas piston adjustment for maneuverability.

7th Weapon (Partial): No ID due to partial image.

Tactical Analysis: Mexican cartel weapon caches containing military grade weaponry have been regularly found throughout Mexico and even close to the US-Mexican border. This specific cache was found on US soil and contained a rocket launcher (M72 LAW), a grenade launcher (type not identified), and C-4 explosives in addition to assault rifles. Of significance is that an earlier weapons cache was also discovered in this same area by US Border Patrol personnel (assigned to the Rio Grande City Station) on Wednesday 16 March 2011. During that incident a suspicious pickup truck was viewed and when personnel searched the area where it had stopped they found a large duffle bag hidden in the brush. The bag contained:

            • 8 AK-47 Assault Rifles

            • 2 AR-15 Assault Rifles

            • 350 Rounds of Ammo (Varying calibers)

• 2 Grenades (Type not identified; blown in place by local bomb squad)

• 1 40mm Grenade Launcher [See Photo; appears to be a M-203 variant]

These weapons were also turned over to the BATF for further investigation.

Photo: Courtesy of US Customs and Border Protection (For Public Release)

Initial analysis suggests that cartel operatives for whatever reason, likely Zetas or Gulf cartel personnel given the location of the find, are now bringing heavier infantry weapons into the United States. That analysis, however, is in variance with earlier statements made by Chief Hinojosa who said the weapons in the March seizure were being smuggled into Mexico. In that case military grade weapons such as the 40mm Grenade Launcher (presumably stolen and then resold) are loose in the US and are being sent to Mexico. In either scenario the rocket and grenade launcher seized in September 2011 (and the grenade launcher seized earlier) pose a significant US officer safety threat as does the C-4 which can be utilized in an improvised explosive device (IED) role.  

Significance: Cartel Weaponry; Officer Safety Issues

Source(s):

Mark Nino, “Border Patrol Agents Seize Weapon Cache”. KVEO 23- Rio Grande Valley. 14 September 2011, http://www.kveo.com/news/border-patrol-agents-seize-weapon-cache. [See Video]

Ildefonso Ortiz, “Border Patrol finds rocket launcher, grenade launcher, explosives near Rio Grande.” The Monitor. 14 September 2011, http://www.themonitor.com/news/launcher-54726-grande-grenade.html.

Rio Grande Valley Border Patrol, CBP Public Affairs, “Agents Find Cache of Weapons near Rio Grande”. 17 March 2011, http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/news_releases/archives/march_2011/03172011_3.xml.

South Texas Today, “BP Agents Find Weapons, Ammunition and Grenade”. 17 March 2011, http://mannydelarosa40.wordpress.com/2011/03/17/bp-agents-find-weapons-ammunition-and-grenade/.

Mexican Cartel Strategic Note No. 4

Wed, 10/12/2011 - 5:16pm

The Document: Texas Border Security: A Strategic Military Assessment was published in September 2011 and authored by Barry McCaffrey and Robert Scales, Ph.D. — both retired Army generals and highly respected national security thinkers. Colgen LP (www.colgen.net) was commissioned by Texas Department of Agriculture which was tasked by the 82nd Texas Legislature to undertake this assessment. The document, which garnered significant media attention when first released, can be accessed at: www.texasagriculture.gov/.../46982_Final%20Report-Texas%20Border%20Security.pdf.

The main document is 59 pages in length and also contains a section with additional pages composed of twelve attachments. The document has an executive summary and a general bibliography of works influencing the assessment but is not endnoted. The study was initially prompted by the pleas of rural farmers and ranchers in Texas to help secure the border due to the Mexican cartels establishing themselves on their lands. Per Commissioner Todd Staples, Texas Department of Agriculture:

The report offers a military perspective on how to best incorporate strategic, operational, and tactical measures to secure the increasingly hostile border regions along the Rio Grande River. It also provides sobering evidence of cartel criminals gaining ground on Texas soil.

In addition to a discussion of the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of conflict, high points of the report go on to discuss Texas as a narco-sanctuary, the State of Texas’ organization for combat via a Unified Command system, the role of the Texas Rangers, the effectiveness and flexibility of the system utilized by Texas law enforcement, and solving border security problems together. General recommendations in paragraph form are then provided concerning communications and the network, operations, intelligence, technology, and learning to further enhance the Texas border security system.

Analysis:  This is a very significant and cogent assessment and will greatly impact the Mexican cartel debate that is taking place in the United States. What is most striking is that the State of Texas was compelled to commission a report that took a military analytical perspective on Mexican cartel spillover—essentially narco-sanctuary emergence on American soil with dedicated battalion/brigade level equivalent C2 (command and control) facilities (p. 19). While such sanctuaries have been established in Central America by the cartels, the fact that they are now found in the border counties of Texas is of immense concern. Additionally, the attachments found in the report were meant to provide concrete proof of the magnitude of the threat posed by the cartels and their gang associates in both Texas and Mexico.

While the report will primarily have operational level utility, via the recommendations made, for Texas law enforcement, it raises more strategic and political questions than it answers— thought this surely has to be part of the intent of the 82nd Texas Legislature in commissioning it. The report helps to bring the media spotlight to the conflict in Texas— one of the many theaters of operations the cartels and gangs are now engaged—albeit a transit center of gravity into the US with all the major plazas it contains.

One strategic questioned raised concerns the corruptive influence of the cartels in addition to their propensity for violence. The assessment was written by retired generals and is primarily focused on cartel ‘combat potentials’ and a military-like response to them. Of increasing concern is the undermining of US public and law enforcement officials and institutions. This poses an equal if not greater threat to the State of Texas. The ¿Plata O Plomo? (Silver or Lead) technique of using corruption and violence directed against a law enforcement unit to negate it is synergistic in nature and no different in many ways than the use of armor, infantry, and artillery forces to negate an opposing military unit.

One broader political question raised by this report is the relationship between the US Federal Government and the State of Texas. The Federal Government has many obligations to the entire nation— to ensure our economic prosperity (via programs such as NAFTA), to provide for the health and welfare of US citizens (via National Drug Control policy), and to maintain lawful immigration and guest visitor programs (via National Immigration policy). Arguably, it is not scoring high marks on the later of these obligations and very mixed results on the former ones. Where it is fully deficient is in contending with Mexican cartel penetration into the United States, the association of these cartels with gangs and other criminal groups, and the more encompassing illicit economies on which they capitalize. The State of Texas is facing much of the brunt of this issue— though Arizona is also significantly impacted with the kidnappings, incidents of public corruption, and cartel operatives deployed in its border zones.

By all appearances, ‘Texas is being hung out to dry’ by the current executive administration and legislative houses in Washington DC. While this might not be the case, the current DC power structures appear for the most part either in denial or at a loss or unable to respond to the situation taking place in Texas. Quite possibly we are now faced with an “intractable national problem” that is coinciding with massive governmental debt and deficit, polarized political parties full of too many politicians and too few statesmen, a still recovering global economy, and an upcoming presidential election year. None of these bode well for the situation in Texas, a state that is increasingly on a combat footing against Mexican cartel intrusions onto sovereign US soil.

Mexican Cartel Strategic Note No. 3

Wed, 10/05/2011 - 5:39pm

The Document: On 25 July 2011, the National Security Staff released its Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime: Addressing Converging Threats to National Security. The report is available at (http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/nsc/transnational-crime) and can be accessed as a pdf or in html by using the links provided (1). The contents are as follows:

i. Definition

ii. Letter from President Barack Obama: Executive Summary;

I. Introduction,

II. Transnational Organized Crime: A Growing Threat to National and International Security,

III. Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime: Priority Actions;

1. Start at Home: Taking Shared Responsibility for Transnational Organized Crime,

2. Enhance Intelligence and Information Sharing,

3. Protect the Financial System and Strategic Markets against Transnational Organized Crime,

4. Strengthen Interdiction, Investigations, and Prosecutions,

5. Disrupt Drug Trafficking and Its Facilitation of Other Transnational Threats,

6. Build International Capacity, Cooperation, and Partnerships.

Key Statements:

a). The characteristics of transnational organized crime (TOC) may include that— “They attempt to gain influence in government, politics, and commerce through corrupt as well as legitimate means;”

b). “Criminal networks are not only expanding their operations, but they are also diversifying their activities, resulting in a convergence of transnational threats that has evolved to become more complex, volatile, and destabilizing. These networks also threaten U.S. interests by forging alliances with corrupt elements of national governments and using the power and influence of those elements to further their criminal activities.”

c). “In January 2010, the United States Government completed a comprehensive review of international organized crime—the first on this topic since 1995. Based on the review and subsequent reporting, the Administration has concluded that, in the intervening years, international—or transnational— organized crime has expanded dramatically in size, scope, and influence and that it poses a significant threat to national and international security.” 

Western Hemisphere Overview: “TOC networks—including transnational gangs—have expanded and matured, threatening the security of citizens and the stability of governments throughout the region, with direct security implications for the United States. Central America is a key area of converging threats where illicit trafficking in drugs, people, and weapons—as well as other revenue streams—fuel increased instability. Transnational crime and its accompanying violence are threatening the prosperity of some Central American states and can cost up to eight percent of their gross domestic product, according to the World Bank. The Government of Mexico is waging an historic campaign against transnational criminal organizations, many of which are expanding beyond drug trafficking into human smuggling and trafficking, weapons smuggling, bulk cash smuggling, extortion, and kidnapping for ransom. TOC in Mexico makes the U.S. border more vulnerable because it creates and maintains illicit corridors for border crossings that can be employed by other secondary criminal or terrorist actors or organizations. Farther south, Colombia has achieved remarkable success in reducing cocaine production and countering illegal armed groups, such as the FARC, that engage in TOC. Yet, with the decline of these organizations, new groups are emerging such as criminal bands known in Spanish as Bandas Criminales, or Bacrims.”

Analysis: This strategy was released less than three months ago and according to Bob Killebrew “…is in effect a replacement for the now-outdated U.S. strategy to combat terrorism. This is a good first step” (2).  While I agree it is a step in the right direction, the threat perceptions underlying it are overly traditionalist—some would even say woefully obsolete— and representative of static 20th century thinking. I thus have very great concerns regarding the threat assumptions underlying the strategy since, if the baseline assumptions are faulty, then the rest of the strategy that is derived from those assumptions becomes highly suspect (3). Unfortunately, 21st century ‘street realities’ of the last eleven years taking place in Mexico, in areas of Central America, and in other locales appear in no way to have influenced the threat perceptions underlying the strategy. At best, transnational organized crime is viewed as gaining ‘influence in governmental politics’, ‘forging alliances with corrupt elements of national governments’, and ‘threatening the security of citizens and the stability of governments throughout the region’ (within the context of some Central American states). Such perceptions are indicative of the primacy and immutability of the nation-state as a social and political form of human organization. TOC within this threat context is viewed much like bloated ticks feeding off of host states. They represent parasitical organizations drawing upon illicit, and at times licit, economies to sustain themselves. TOC, such as the Mexican cartels, could thus never criminalize, capture, or kill a host state—or a region or city within it— based on these threat perceptions. The emergence of a ‘criminal-state’ or a ‘new warmaking entity’ or the existence of a ‘criminal insurgency’ taking place within a state simply cannot be accounted for in a strategy derived from these threat perceptions. The governments and citizens of Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras should no doubt be comforted by the fact that they are only threatened with issues of stability and no more. While the strategy may serve to perpetuate the legalistic charade of the nation-state’s ‘monopoly on political violence’ and ‘control over its sovereign borders,’ it does a great disservice to the American people and others by not fully recognizing the TOC threat. Criminal-insurgencies are currently raging across Mexico, in areas of Central America, and in other locales (4). Cities and regions have been captured by de facto politicized cartel and gang entities with criminal para-states established by the Zetas, the Sinaloans, and other criminal organizations. This is representative of the blurring of crime and war ‘nightmare scenarios’ which have been debated since the 1990s and have since manifested themselves throughout the globe. Until US governmental threat perceptions mature—especially in strategic documents that outline our national policies— the cartel and gang threats we are now witnessing in the Western Hemisphere will continue to be misunderstood and underestimated.  

Notes 

All quotes without notes pertain to the White House strategy document.

1. Also see “Attorney General Eric Holder Speaks at the Announcement of the Transnational Organized Crime Strategy”. Justice News. Monday, 25 July 2011, http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2011/ag-speech-110725.html.

2. Col Robert B. Killebrew, U.S. Army (Retired), “Crime & War.” Proceedings. October 2011: 26. This citation contains a note thanking Killebrew’s CNAS colleague Matt Irvine for his initial perception concerning it replacing the U.S. counterterrorism strategy.

3. My concerns are very different than those articulated by the TransBorder Project, a project of the Center for International Policy in Washington, DC. See Tom Barry, “U.S. Drug War Turns to Transnational Combat”. Border Lines. Wednesday, 3 August 2011, http://borderlinesblog.blogspot.com/2011/08/us-drug-war-turns-to-transnational.html.

4. The developed construct is attributed to John P. Sullivan in 2008. Many of his writings on this subject first appeared in Small Wars Journal.

Mexico's "Narco-Refugees": The Looming Challenge for U.S. National Security

Wed, 10/05/2011 - 10:19am

Mexico's "Narco-Refugees": The Looming Challenge for U.S. National Security

by Paul Rexton Kan

Strategic Studies Institute

 

Since 2006, when Mexican President Felipe Calderon declared war on the drug cartels, there has been a rise in the number of Mexican nationals seeking political asylum in the United States to escape the ongoing drug cartel violence in their home country. Political asylum cases in general are claimed by those who are targeted for their political beliefs or ethnicity in countries that are repressive or are failing. Mexico is neither. Nonetheless, if the health of the Mexican state declines because criminal violence continues, increases, or spreads, U.S. communities will feel an even greater burden on their systems of public safety and public health from "narco-refugees." Given the ever increasing cruelty of the cartels, the question is whether and how the U.S. Government should begin to prepare for what could be a new wave of migrants coming from Mexico. Allowing Mexicans to claim asylum could potentially open a flood gate of migrants to the United States during a time when there is a very contentious national debate over U.S. immigration laws pertaining to illegal immigrants. On the other hand, to deny the claims of asylum seekers and return them to Mexico where they might very well be killed, strikes at the heart of American values of justice and humanitarianism. This monograph focuses on the asylum claims of Mexicans who unwillingly leave Mexico rather than those who willingly enter the United States legally or illegally. To successfully navigate through this complex issue will require a greater level of understanding and vigilance at all levels of the U.S. Government.

Gangs and Guerrillas

Mon, 10/03/2011 - 7:19am

The Fall issue of The Culture and Conflict Review is now available, and I wanted to highlight one specific article that culminates several years of study and collaboration between local police forces and military officers comparing and contrasting domestic gangs/drug issues in Salinas, CA with modern counterinsurgency efforts.

Domestic Insights: Gangs and Guerrillas: Ideas from Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism,

Edited by Michael Freeman and Hy Rothstein

Can counter insurgency strategies be used to fight urban gangs? This question was discussed
in a conversation between the Mayor of Salinas, the Provost of the Naval Postgraduate
School and Representative Sam Farr. It became apparent during that discussion that there
were many similarities between insurgent behavior and gang behavior—similarities that
would make a more rigorous analysis worthwhile.

These similarities are readily apparent when reading General Petraeus’s counterinsurgency
guidance for U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan (see Appendix I). In his list of twentyfour
“rules,” many of them resonate, but especially the following: secure and serve the
population; live among the people; help confront the culture of impunity; hold what we
secure; foster lasting solutions; consult and build relationships, but not just with those who
seek us out; walk; act as one team; be first with the truth; fight the information war aggressively;
manage expectations; and live our values. Ultimately, these guidelines intend to reach
the same end state as urban policing does: a safe and secure population.

With this theme in mind, the faculty of the Defense Analysis Department at the Naval
Postgraduate School, experts in counterinsurgency operations, were enlisted to address
these similarities and to share their theories, models, and ideas from their own disciplines of
political science, sociology, anthropology, international relations, and more. This collection
of short papers is the result.

The goal of this project is to share the ideas developed to fight insurgents and terrorists and
see if they can be adapted or modified to help the people of Salinas think about their city’s
problem with gangs in an innovative way. Consequently, each chapter is intentionally left
short, as they are intended to stimulate thought more than fully explain any one model or
theory. The direct application of each chapter’s concept is left to the reader.

While this project was put together for Salinas’s use, the ideas developed in these short
papers will be useful not only for the city of Salinas but also for other cities combating gang
violence.

 

Contributors

John Arquilla, Professor, Defense Analysis Department, Naval Postgraduate School
Leo Blanken, Assistant Professor, Defense Analysis Department, Naval Postgraduate School
Doug Borer, Associate Professor, Defense Analysis Department, Naval Postgraduate School
Dorothy Denning, Professor, Defense Analysis Department, Naval Postgraduate School
Sean Everton, Assistant Professor, Defense Analysis Department, Naval Postgraduate School
Michael Freeman, Assistant Professor, Defense Analysis Department, Naval Postgraduate School
Brian Greenshields, Senior Lecturer, Defense Analysis Department, Naval Postgraduate School
Heather Gregg, Assistant Professor, Defense Analysis Department, Naval Postgraduate School
Rebecca Lorentz, Research Associate, Defense Analysis Department, Naval Postgraduate School
Gordon McCormick, Professor, Defense Analysis Department, Naval Postgraduate School
Matthew Peterson, Lieutenant Commander, US Navy, Masters Student in the Defense Analysis Department, Naval Postgraduate School
Hy Rothstein, Senior Lecturer, Defense Analysis Department, Naval Postgraduate School
Kalev Sepp, Senior Lecturer, Defense Analysis Department, Naval Postgraduate School
Anna Simons, Professor, Defense Analysis Department, Naval Postgraduate School
David Tucker, Associate Professor, Defense Analysis Department, Naval Postgraduate School
Steve Twing, Professor, Department of Political Science, Frostburg State University
Greg Wilson, Colonel, US Army, Special Operations Forces Chair, Defense Analysis Department, Naval Postgraduate School