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Mexican Cartel Strategic Note No. 2

Colombian Intelligence (Departamento Administrativo de Seguridad - DAS) Compromised by Drug Traffickers¹

Intelligence Pulse: On 18 September 2011, the newspaper Semana obtained records of the identities of all 6,800 DAS (Colombian intelligence) officials, including undercover agents and their missions, and noted that thousands of intelligence documents were also leaked. The current director of the DAS confirmed the leaks, stating that DAS officials who stole information sold it for personal profit. Semana alleges that the intelligence was passed on to various drug kingpins. President Santos has said he plans the closure of DAS by November 2011.¹

Analysis: While this note may not specifically pertain to the Mexican cartels, it has been included in this series to show the need for robust OPSEC (operational security) and counter-intelligence programs for Western Hemispheric nations threatened by cartel and gang threats. The government of Colombia is considered very sophisticated in responding to these threats given its initial experiences with the Medellin and Cali cartels dating back to the 1980s. This incident represents a severe blow to Colombian intelligence gathering and covert operations capabilities.² Further, well known linkages exist between the narcotics traffickers and criminal groups in Mexico and Colombia and their sharing of intelligence gathering tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). Similar threat potentials directed at Mexican and American intelligence organizations focused on the Mexican cartels and the criminal insurgencies taking place in their own respective territories must be considered. These potentials exist for all areas of Mexico and increasingly throughout the US with major threat concentrations in Texas and within the border zones of California, Arizona, and New Mexico.

Notes

1. This intelligence pulse— originally titled “Colombia - DAS officials leak intelligence to drug traffickers for profit” — was provided with the permission of Samuel Logan, Director, Southern Post (www.southernpulse.com), and a SWJ El Centro Fellow.

2. Additional reporting suggests that most of this information was leaked in 2009 and that the ongoing breach of security at DAS has continued. See Travis Mannon, “Colombia’s intelligence chief takes responsibility for massive information leak.” Colombia Reports. Monday, 19 September 2011, http://colombiareports.com/colombia-news/news/19057-colombias-intelligence-chief-assumes-responsibility-over-massive-information-leak.html.

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Mexican Cartel Strategic Note

Mexican Cartels (Transnational Criminal Organizations) Now Operating in Over 1,000 US Cities; Up From 195 US Cities

The recent publication of the US Department of Justice National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC), National Drug Threat Assessment 2011 (http://www.justice.gov/ndic/topics/ndtas.htm#y2011) (August 2011) provides an important strategic insight into Mexican cartel penetration into the United States. On p. 8 of the document, a single sentence states:

Mexican-based TCOs were operating in more than a thousand U.S. cities during 2009-2010, spanning all nine OCDETF regions.

The corresponding note (g) is as follows:

Included are traffickers who purchase illicit drugs from TCO associates and distribute them on their own, cells that function as an extension of the TCO to traffic illicit drugs in the United States, and cells that provide warehousing, security, and/or transportation services for the TCO.

Prior publicly released National Drug Intelligence Center data on Mexican TCOs (Transnational Criminal Organizations) operating in the United States dates back to a situation report and a series of maps from April 2008. The Situation Report: Cities in Which Mexican DTOs Operate Within the United States (http://www.justice.gov/ndic/pubs27/27986/index.htm). This sentence from the Discussion section provides a baseline concerning Mexican cartel penetration into the United States:

Federal, state, and local law enforcement reporting reveals that Mexican DTOs operate in at least 195 cities throughout the United States.

The acronym “DTO” stands for Drug Trafficking Organization which has since been replaced by the acronym “TCO”— Transnational Criminal Organization— used in the 2011 document— to convey that the Mexican cartels are now viewed as more threatening and capable (with transnational reach) entities. This data comes from

“Federal, State, and Local Law Enforcement Reporting January 1, 2006 through April 8, 2008”. No corresponding note exists concerning the metrics of the data pertaining to this report, though it assumed, that the same data collection methodology was utilized by the US Department of Justice analysts. If this assumption is accurate:

This would mean that Mexican cartel operational penetration into US cities is now thought to be 500% higher than previously estimated in the time frame of roughly three years. The baseline of “at least 195 cities throughout the United States” has increased to “more than a thousand U.S. cities”.

While the April 2008 document was supported by Map 1. Cities reporting the presence of Mexican drug trafficking organizations showing the locations of the Mexican cartels in the United States, the new August 2011 National Drug Threat Assessment does not provide such a map. A query and public request for information to NDIC public affairs concerning the release of such a map was made. The response was that such a map would now be considered a law enforcement restricted document. While this might be understandable from an operational security (OPSEC) and counter-intelligence perspective, it is in variance with an open public debate on the Mexican cartel (and gang) threat to the United States and the more encompassing threat to Mexico, Central America, and other regions of the Western Hemisphere.

If US Congressional and Senate committees—such as the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee (http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/subcommittees.asp?committee=8)— and those focusing on homeland security are to continue their public hearings on this broadening threat, some consideration should be made as to US strategic requirements and open public debate. Ten years after the 9/11 attack by Al Qaeda, the United States has reached a pivotal strategic decision point in our national policies. Are we to continue with our national security policy of focusing on that terrorist entity (and its group of networks) as the dominant threat to the US and the homeland or will the Mexican cartels (and their supporting gang networks) now be recognized as replacing Al Qaeda as the number one threat to our government and safety of our citizens? While the violence potentials of Al Qaeda are universally recognized— we will never forget the thousands of our dead mourned after 9/11— the violence associated with the criminal insurgent potentials of the Mexican cartels and their ability to corrupt and undermine governments in the Western Hemisphere must now be considered far more threatening to our nation.¹

Notes

1. Two issues should be further clarified. First, any type of Al Qaeda inspired attack taking place domestically— even a botched suicide bombing attempt against the DC metro system— would result in heightened media sensationalism and a continued US Governmental focus on Al Qaeda as the primary threat to this nation. The fallout from such an incident would likely serve to downgrade our perceptions related to the greater threat stemming from the more corruptive and subtle insurgent activities of the Mexican cartels combined with their use of symbolic violence. Second, I want to reiterate that the cause of global jihad promoted by Al Qaeda and other elements of radical Islam are still a significant threat to US interests and our global security posture. In the case of our allies in Europe, for example, Al Qaeda and radical Islam continue to be the number one external and internal strategic threat to many of these nations. When our own domestic security scales weigh the threats, however, Al Qaeda and radical Islam, has to now be considered less of a threat to the security of the United States than the Mexican cartels and their associates. Ultimately, while we can live with governmental failure and internal strife in Afghanistan and/or Iraq—we cannot say the same concerning Mexico, given the cross border cartel infiltration we have now identified per the National Drug Threat Assessment 2011.

Mexican Cartel Tactical Note # 3: Narco Armored Vehicle Threats and Countermeasures

Robert J. Bunker

Who: Mexican Cartels (Lev III/IAFV; primarily Zetas & Gulf Cartel)

What: The deployment of narco armored cars and improvised armored fighting vehicles (IAFVs) in Mexico as a byproduct of the criminal insurgencies taking place.

When: I&W (indications & warnings) traced back to at least 1979 to the Dadeland Mall shooting in Florida tied to a Colombian cartel assassination team using improvised ballistic protection in a delivery truck (historical). Mexican cartel deployment of armored SUVs begins by the late 1990s and has greatly increased over time. A firebreak was crossed with the initial deployment of improvised armored fighting vehicles (IAFVs) in 2010.

Where: Threat Level I- sporadic at best in Mexico; Threat Level II- throughout cartel areas of operations in Mexico; Threat Level III- primarily in North-Eastern and Central Mexico, with vehicles recovered in the states of Chihuahua, Coahuila, Nayarit, Nuevo Leon and Tamaulipas.

Why: For well over a decade now, a deadly arms race has been taking place in Mexico between the various warring cartels and their gang and mercenary auxiliary forces. Weaponry has been shifting from civilian arms to law enforcement arms and then to infantry combat small arms. The introduction of cartel enforcers with former military and special forces backgrounds has resulted in the fielding of cartel units that have been increasingly professionalized. A component of this process is the deployment of armored SUVs and improvised armored fighting vehicles (IAFVs).

Synopsis of Narco Armored Vehicle Threats

Threat Level	Description	Encountered	Specifics
I (Defensive)	Vehicle with Improvised/Hasty Ballistic Protection	‘War wagon’ at Dadeland Mall, Florida (1979); sporadic/hasty use in Mexico (current)	Ballistic vests hanging inside a delivery truck to provide protection to Colombian cartel assassination team (historical); vests, sand bags, and/or steel plates for basic ballistic protection
II (Defensive)	Professionally Armored SUV	Throughout Mexico (Increasingly since the late 1990s)	Internal armor kits, ballistic glass, run flat tires
III- Early (Offensive)	Improvised Pill Box/Firing Position on Bed of Truck [see Gerardo for evolutionary examples]	Primarily North-Eastern and Central Mexico (~2009-2010); typically superceded by more mature variant	Work trucks with soft cabs; armored screens/box with firing ports for gunmen in bed
III- Mature (Offensive)	Improvised Armored Fighting Vehicle (IAFV) [aka “narco-tanks” (narcotanques), “Rhino trucks,” and “monster trucks” (monstruos); [Sullivan/Elkus]	Primarily North-Eastern and Central Mexico (since 2010)/td>	Platforms used are typically work trucks/ heavy equipment. Exterior armor plating (.5 to 2.5 cm), gunports, and air conditioning for mounted troops; external gun mounts, turret firing ports, breaching rams
IV (Offensive)	IAFV with organic tank-like gun	*Predicted Evolution*	Level III with organic anti-vehicular main gun

Tactical Analysis

Narco armored vehicles come in defensive (Lev I-II) and offensive (Lev III) variants. While Lev II vehicles were superior in defensive armor to early Lev III vehicles (which did not have protected cabs/driver compartments), the early Lev III vehicles utilized gun ports as an offensive innovation. This allows for mounted infantry tactics to be conducted much like those undertaken by military units.

Defensive Vehicles

Threat Level I: Hasty/improvised ballistic protection utilized in otherwise soft vehicle. Countermeasures: Utilize shredder/hardened projectiles (via shotgun) and higher velocity AP rounds (via semi-auto rifles) for anti-personnel use and to target tires and engines (radiator) for mobility kills, establish perimeter to allow for more specialized SWAT response.

Threat Level II: Professionally armored SUVs can be encountered alone or in “commando units” of up to dozens of vehicles in Mexico. These threats can also be interspersed with soft (unarmored) vehicles. Since firing ports are atypical, cartel gunmen lose primary defensive advantage when dismounting to engage other forces, still, the armored doors/vehicle body can be used for ballistic shielding purposes. Countermeasures: Attempt mobility kills against tires and engines (radiator), target dismounted gunmen with small arms fire, establish perimeter to allow for more specialized SWAT response. The deployment of spike strips and/or commandeering trucks/big rigs to isolate avenues of approach/contain in urban choke points may be warranted.

Offensive Vehicles

Threat Level III- Early: Armored fighting position/pill box placed on the truck bed. Countermeasures: Target driver in soft cab, engine (radiator), and/or tires for a mobility kill. Maintain standoff ranges/establish perimeter to allow for more specialized SWAT/military resources to engage armored position/pillbox.

Threat Level III- Mature: An improvised armored fighting vehicle (IAFV) with full body protection, gun ports, and an air conditioning unit carrying between 5-20 cartel gunmen. Variants may include breaching rams, turreted gun ports, cell boosters (for communications), and other innovations. Sizes range primarily from work trucks through dump truck size vehicles. They are somewhat like the Mexican Federal police vehicle El “rinoceronte” but cruder in appearance. Tires may be exposed or protected by armor—no “run flat” tire usage evident to date. These vehicles have only been seen individually or in small numbers operating together though dozens of these vehicles (possibly more than 100) have now been built. The attachment of a few of these vehicles to provided security to a narco armored SUV convoy (Level II threat) must now be a consideration. Note— cartel gunmen riding in these vehicles may be carrying RPGs (Rocket Propelled Grenades) or tube launched anti-tank weapons that allow them to target and knock out opposing cartel IAFVs. This represents an additional concern in addition to military small arms (assault rifles, launchers, and grenades) being carried by these mobile infantry forces. This threat is beyond most Mexican state and federal law enforcement response capabilities. Countermeasures: Military medium and heavy tanks and other anti-armor systems; in dire situations can target tires for mobility kill, utilize spike strips, and/or commandeer trucks/big rigs to isolate avenues of approach/contain in urban choke points while awaiting military support.

Threat Level IV (Predicted Evolution): Linear projection of the Level III Threat into the future. Superior anti-vehicular offensive capabilities of such an organic (main) gun added to IAFVs would generate a threat way beyond Mexican state and federal law enforcement response capabilities. Probable 50 Cal. initial machine gun system usage with an eventual increase into smaller 20-40 mm cannon sizes derived from AA (anti-aircraft) guns. Countermeasures: Same as Level III- Mature; responding to this threat would basically turn this into a conventional military AFV engagement. Utilizing attack helicopters with anti-armor systems against these vehicles would be warranted.

No expectation exists for US law enforcement inside US territory to encounter a narco improvised armored fighting vehicle (IAFV) [Level III Threat]. While such a vehicle, in an overwatch position in Mexico, could conceivably cover a drug load going into the US, such a scenario presently appears unlikely—though co-opted personnel in Mexican military vehicles in years past have been involved in such incidents. Far more likely scenarios for US law enforcement on the US side of the border are sporadic/potential encounters with Mexican cartel operatives in defensive oriented Level I and Level II threat vehicles. [Note- some instances of cartel vehicles containing caltrop and oil slick dropping compartments have been reported. The effectiveness of such systems will vary].

*Countermeasures guidance underwent a basic tactical review by retired law enforcement and military personnel with extensive special operations field experience.

Significance: Cartel Tactics; Cartel Weaponry; Law Enforcement Countermeasures/Response; Officer Safety Issues

Sources

“Mexican Cartels now using ‘tanks’”- William Booth, Washington Post, June 7, 2011.

“Narco Motor Trend”- Gerardo, Borderland Beat, June 19, 2011. [See source for extensive collection of vehicular pictures].

“Monster Trucks in Mexico: The Zetas Armor Up”- STRATFOR, July 4, 2011.

“Narco-Armor in Mexico”- John P. Sullivan and Adam Elkus, Small Wars Journal, July 14, 2011.

“'Narco-Tanks': Mexico's Cartels Get Asymmetric Weapons”- Gordon Housworth, In Sight, July, 2011.

Also see the numerous English and Spanish http://www.youtube.com video clips of these vehicles.

Read more about Mexican Cartel Tactical Note # 3: Narco Armored Vehicle Threats and Countermeasures

Narco-Armor in Mexico

Narco-Armor in Mexico

by John P. Sullivan and Adam Elkus

Download the Full Article: Narco-Armor in Mexico

Known alternatively as "narco-tanks" (narcotanques), "Rhino trucks," and "monster trucks"(monstruos), the crude armored vehicles emerging in Mexico's cartel war are evidence of a changing tactical logic on the ground. "Narco-tanks" are better characterized as improvised armored fighting vehicles (IAFVs)—portending a shift in the infantry-centric nature of the cartel battlespace.

Narco-tactics have been, for the most part, infantry-centric—consisting of small raids, blockades, and gun battles. The use of armored sport utility vehicles for transportation, raids, and tactical in-battle maneuver is largely an extension of the small unit infantry operations that characterize the tactical logic of the cartel war. The presence of armored vehicles ups the ante.

Download the Full Article: Narco-Armor in Mexico

John P. Sullivan is a career police officer. He currently serves as a lieutenant with the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department. He is also a Senior Research Fellow at the Center for Advanced Studies on Terrorism (CAST). He is co-editor of Countering Terrorism and WMD: Creating a Global Counter-Terrorism Network (Routledge, 2006) and Global Biosecurity: Threats and Responses (Routledge, 2010). His current research focus is the impact of transnational organized crime on sovereignty in Mexico and elsewhere.

Adam Elkus is an analyst specializing in foreign policy and security. He is Associate Editor at Red Team Journal. He is a frequent contributor to Small Wars Journal and has published at numerous venues including The Atlantic, Defense Concepts, West Point CTC Sentinel, Infinity Journal, and other publications. He blogs at Rethinking Security.

About the Author(s)

Speaking of Mexico....

... please tell me this is an example of sensationalized reporting or the source is a bald-faced liar. If not, then let's stop debating whether we should call this an insurgency or not and start debating whether the events down south are part of our world or a Mad Max world:

Narco Gangster Reveals the Underworld by Dane Schiller of the Houston Chronicle. BLUF: "Cartels have taken cruelty up a notch, says one drug trafficker: kidnapping bus passengers for gladiator-like fights to the death."

Mexico: A Mosaic Cartel War

Mexico: A Mosaic Cartel War

by Paul Rexton Kan

Download the Full Article: Mexico: A Mosaic Cartel War

A situation of high-intensity crime does not mean that a war is not occurring in Mexico. But it is a war of a different kind. In fact, there are several conflicts occurring at once that blend into each other. There is the conflict of cartels among each other, the conflict within cartels, cartels against the Mexican state, cartels and gangs against the Mexican people and gangs versus gangs. When combined, they form a mosaic cartel war that creates an atmosphere "somewhere between Al Capone's Chicago and an outright war". It is not an irregular or regular war; neither is it a small war nor a general war, nor a limited war, nor a total war, nor any of the familiar appellations given to armed conflicts fought by conventional militaries. And, finally it is not "a war about nothing." It is a multidimensional, multiparty and multi-location armed conflict fought among criminal groups over what are essentially criminal goals; the groups are resisted by the state while their goals are rejected by it, making the state a party to the conflict.

Download the Full Article: Mexico: A Mosaic Cartel War

Paul Rexton Kan is currently an Associate Professor of National Security Studies and the Henry L. Stimson Chair of Military Studies at the US Army War College. He is also the author of the book Drugs and Contemporary Warfare (Potomac Books 2009) and was recently the Visiting Senior Counternarcotics Advisor for CJIATF-Shafafiyat (Transparency) at ISAF Headquarters in Kabul, Afghanistan. He recently completed field research along the US-Mexico border for his forthcoming book, Cartels at War: Mexico's Drug Fueled Violence and the Threat to US National Security (Potomac Books).

About the Author(s)

A Strategy for Mexico?

A Strategy for Mexico?

by Johnny M. Lairsey Jr.

Download the Full Article: A Strategy for Mexico?

For over a century, United States foreign policy was guided by the Monroe doctrine. Then, around 1890, a nascent concept of American Imperialism was popularized and served to shift foreign policy away from the Monroe Doctrine. Since then the United States has exercised many different forms of foreign policy. The current United States foreign policy as evinced by the United States Secretary of State proclaims that United States freedom and prosperity is linked to the freedom and prosperity of the rest of the world. The approach the United States Department of State uses to preserve our freedoms and prosperity includes building and maintaining international relations and protecting ourselves and our allies against transnational threats. Given the existing conditions in Mexico and the United States current approach to foreign policy the United States should assert its national powers to defeat transnational criminal organizations and help to improve the conditions in Mexico. However, before taking action the United States must clearly articulate the purpose of why it is taking action in a foreign country.

Download the Full Article: A Strategy for Mexico?

Mr. Johnny Lairsey is DA Civilian serving as a Plans Specialist at US Army North, the Army Service Component Command to US Northern Command and is a recent graduate of the School of Advanced Military Studies. He has over five years of experience as a plans specialist in an operational headquarters and has extensive experience working with other US Government agencies. The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

About the Author(s)

Mexican Cartel Tactical Note # 2

Mexican Cartel Tactical Notes: No 2. Ambush/Targeted Killing of US Law Enforcement Officer (San Antonio, Texas)

Mexican cartel linkages to this incident are currently being investigated but have not been confirmed by US Law Enforcement

Who: Sergeant Kenneth Vann, 48, Bexar County Sheriff's, Texas.

What: Ambush-Targeted Killing of US Law Enforcement Officer.

When: About 2:00 AM Saturday 28 May 2011.

Where: While in uniform, sitting in his marked patrol car at a traffic light at Loop 410 and Rigsby Road (on San Antonio's southeast side) on his way to a call.

Why: Unknown. Initial speculation via Sheriff Amadeo Ortiz is that the officer was randomly targeted because he was a governmental representative/symbol of authority. No motive has been established and no one has claimed credit.

Synopsis: Hasty overview; The officer was waiting at a traffic light. The flashing lights/siren were not turned on in the patrol car and the officer was obeying traffic laws. A small white car is thought to have pulled up next to Sgt. Vann's vehicle. A gunman then fired an estimated 28 rounds via a semi-automatic weapon— possibly an AK-47 assault rifle—at the officer in two bursts. Sgt. Vann was pronounced dead at the scene. Suspect(s) are still at large.

Update: On Tuesday, a sheriff's spokesman said investigators were looking for a royal blue Ford F-150 pickup truck that left the intersection where the incident took place. The small white car has been found and is being processed by forensics. Reward of $127,000.00 now offered for the arrest of those responsible; More than 300 officers from 10 law enforcement agencies—armed with about 1,300 warrants— were deployed to the streets of San Antonio on Tuesday, May 31 in order to get leads concerning this incident.

Tactical Analysis: Derived from news photos of the crime scene and satellite imagery. Kill zone was established at a traffic signal going forward toward I-410 bridges underpass; channeled avenue of approach/confined terrain on Rigsby Road going forward. Location is also well suited for E&E (escape and evasion) of engaging forces (I-410 and 87). The targeted killing appears to have occurred via shots entering the passenger side of the patrol vehicle that struck the officer on the right side of his body. This places the law enforcement officer at an immediate tactical disadvantage in his response since he would be required to shoot through the passenger side of his vehicle to return fire. The targeted killing appears to have been conducted in a tactically proficient manner. TTPs/Weaponry/ Ford F-150 pickup truck (of interest) appears consistent with cartel operations in Northern Mexico.

Significance: Officer Safety Issues; Reward Amount/Mass Warrant Approach; Psychological Warfare/Insurgent Tactics (If determined to have cartel linkages); Cartel Violence Spillover (If determined to have cartel linkages).

Source(s):

"Search Continues For Sergeant's Killer - Investigators Working Full-Time To Find Sgt. Kenneth Vann's Killer" - Tim Gerber, KSAT 12 News, Wednesday, June 1, 2011

"Officers Hope Warrant Roundup Leads To Info In Sergeant's Death: 10 Agencies Join Efforts In Warrant Roundup" - David Sears, KSAT 12 News, Tuesday, May 31, 2011

"Reward For Info On Vann's Death Raised To $127K: FBI Offering $50,000, In Addition To $77,000 Already Raised" - KSAT 12 News, Tuesday, May 31, 2011 (UPDATED: June 1, 2011)

"Mexican Drug Link Probed in Ambush Murder of Texas Lawman" - Borderland Beat, Tuesday, May 31, 2011 | Borderland Beat Reporter Ovemex. Original Reuters Link

"Slain Sergeant's Widow Speaks Out: Yvonne Vann Asks For Public's Help Solving Husband's Slaying" - Jessie Degollado, KSAT 12 News, Monday, May 30, 2011

"Suspect Who Gunned Down Deputy Remains At-Large: Sgt. Kenneth Vann Shot, Killed Early Saturday Morning" - Simon Gutierrez, KSAT 12 News, Sunday, May 29, 2011

"Bexar County Deputy Slain in 'Senseless' Ambush" (See crime scene photos/video) - Associated Press, WFAA.com, May 28, 2011

Mexican cartel linkages to this incident are currently being investigated but have not been confirmed by US Law Enforcement

Dr. Robert J. Bunker

Mexican Cartel Tactical Notes

Here is a great 2 minute video ("Rival gunmen clash in Nayarit: 28 deaths reported") from a Mexican news station posted on YouTube via Borderland Beat. The video displays an engagement aftermath - that would be dead cartel foot soldiers in body armor/tactical gear.

We don't usually see many such body armor images. Since we are getting armored cars showing up more and more in Northern Mexico along with all the military infantry weapons (frag grenades et al) the need for body armor should come as no surprise.

Also -- apparently a Mexican Federal Police helicopter was engaged by Knight's Templar small arms fire and forced to land yesterday. See "Knights Templar attack Federal Police helicopter in Michoacan".

Dr. Robert J. Bunker

Societal Warfare South of the Border?

Extreme Barbarism, a Death Cult, and Holy Warriors in Mexico:

Societal Warfare South of the Border?

by Dr. Robert J. Bunker and John P. Sullivan

Download the Full Article: Societal Warfare South of the Border?

This short essay is about impression—gut feelings combined with a certain amount of analytical skill—about recent trends taking place in Mexico concerning the ongoing criminal insurgencies being waged by the various warring cartels, gangs, and mercenary organizations that have metastasized though out that nation (and in many other regions as well). The authors spent over eight hours sequestered together about a month ago on a five-hundred mile 'there and back again road trip' to attend a training conference as instructors for the Kern County Chiefs of Police. Our talks centered on Mexican Drug Cartels, 3rd Generation Gangs, 3rd Phase Cartels, Criminal Insurgency Theory, and a host of related topics most folks just don't normally discuss in polite company. In the car, and at the conference, we were bombarded by Sullivan's never ending twitter and social networking news feeds—in Spanish and English—linked to the criminal violence in Mexico. If Dante had been our contemporary, we fear, he could just have easily taken a stroll through some of the cities and towns of Mexico using those news feeds and substituting the imagery for the circles of hell he described in his early 14th century work the Divine Comedy.

The hours of conversation about the conflicts in Mexico, bolstered by the news feeds and even the Q&A from the training time provided to the Kern Chiefs, provided us both with much to reflect upon. Additionally, both authors are currently co-writing three essays for a follow-on project to the earlier Narcos Over the Border (Routledge) book, the work that zenpundit.com found as "...one of the more disturbing academic works recently published in the national security field, not excluding even those monographs dealing with Islamist terrorism and Pakistan," concerning Mexico's immense problems. If this were not enough, as part of our ongoing collaboration, the authors have been trying to determine what to make of Hazen's June 2010 International Review of the Red Cross paper "Understanding gangs as armed groups." Her conclusions just don't correlate with the empirical evidence stemming from the cartel and gang related incidents regularly occurring in Mexico. That work suggests to us that American street gang researchers, whose work Hazen utilized as the basis of her analysis, are totally insulated from the reality of the conflicts in Mexico—just as are many members of the American public and their elected officials. For good or for bad, we are not so well insulated, having tracked what has been taking place in that country for some years now. The ongoing review (for the purposes of identifying cartel tattoos, cult icons, and instances of ritual killing) of the images of the tortured and broken bodies—some no longer recognizable as once ever being human beings— continually haunts us both.

Our impression is that what is now taking place in Mexico has for some time gone way beyond secular and criminal (economic) activities as defined by traditional organized crime studies. In fact, the intensity of change may indeed be increasing. Not only have de facto political elements come to the fore—i.e., when a cartel takes over an entire city or town, they have no choice but to take over political functions formerly administered by the local government— but social (narcocultura) and religious/spiritual (narcocultos) characteristics are now making themselves more pronounced. What we are likely witnessing is Mexican society starting to not only unravel but to go to war with itself. The bonds and relationships that hold that society together are fraying, unraveling, and, in some instances, the polarity is reversing itself with trust being replaced by mistrust and suspicion. Traditional Mexican values and competing criminal value systems are engaged in a brutal contest over the 'hearts, minds, and souls' of its citizens in a street-by-street, block-by-block, and city-by-city war over the future social and political organization of Mexico. Environmental modification is taking place in some urban centers and rural outposts as deviant norms replace traditional ones and the younger generation fully accepts a criminal value system as their baseline of behavior because they have known no other. The continuing incidents of ever increasing barbarism—some would call this a manifestation of evil even if secularly motivated—and the growing popularity of a death cult are but two examples of this clash of values. Additionally, the early rise of what appears to be cartel holy warriors may now also be taking place. While extreme barbarism, death cults, and possibly now holy warriors found in the Mexican cartel wars are still somewhat the exception rather than the rule, each of these trends is extremely alarming, and will be touched upon in turn.

Download the Full Article: Societal Warfare South of the Border?

Dr. Robert J. Bunker and John P. Sullivan are frequent contributors to Small Wars Journal.

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