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Senator Jim Webb, a Democrat from Virginia, was secretary of the Navy in the Reagan administration. He serves on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Senate Armed Services Committee, where he is chairman of the subcommittee on personnel. He served in Vietnam as a Marine infantry officer.

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Dr. Rodger Shanahan was the Chief of Army Visiting Fellow at the Lowy Institute for International Policy and is now a non-resident Fellow at the Institute. The Interpreter is the blog of the Lowy Institute for International Policy, an independent international policy think tank.

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Dr. Steven Metz is the author of Iraq and the Evolution of American Strategy.

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Lieutenant Colonel Mark O'Neill was the Lowy Institute's inaugural Chief of Army Fellow. Mark is the author of 'Confronting the Hydra: Big problems with small wars', a Lowy Institute paper on counterinsurgency strategy. The Interpreter is the blog of the Lowy Institute for International Policy, an independent international policy think tank.

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Continue on for the PBS NewsHour with Jim Lehrer, transcript of the interview with Defense Secretary Robert Gates, 2 December 2009...

Over the past three months President Obama and his team have analyzed the Afghanistan problem from first principles. Yet in spite of this effort, their solution is not likely to make the problem go away. Regrettably, the next few years are likely to reveal that America still lacks a winning strategy for modern irregular conflict.

The two speeches

President Obama wishes he could have given two speeches on Afghanistan.

The first would have been heard only by the Taliban, Pakistan's governing elite, and by Afghanistan's population wondering which side of the fence to jump to. Obama's message to this group would have been, "I am escalating this war in order to suppress the Taliban, wipe out al Qaeda, and create space for Afghanistan to take over the war."

The second speech would have been heard only by the American electorate, and especially those who most passionately supported his campaign in 2008. His message to this group would have been, "I will get America out of the Afghan war, starting in July 2011."

Alas, Obama could give only one speech to be heard by all. Tonight's speech attempted to transmit the two messages. Unfortunately, it is very likely that Obama's signals got crossed - the Taliban, Pakistan's governing elite, and Afghanistan's population heard the second message, that America is getting out, while the President's supporters angrily heard the first. The result is a muddled strategy that will reinforce bad behavior in the region, will be unconvincing at home, and will not help the morale of soldiers in the field.

Bad behavior rewarded

In order to succeed in Afghanistan, the United States needs actors in the region to change their behavior. Under Obama's plan they have no reason to do so. Now that they know the start date of America's withdrawal, the Taliban can continue to ambush U.S. soldiers and Marines, avoid major contact, and conserve their forces for a post-NATO Afghanistan. The U.S. needs Afghanistan's elites to be a real government and not feudal lords preparing their own fiefdoms. Instead, President Hamid Karzai and his allies will divert what assets they can and look for a new major-power patron. Fearing that India might be that patron, Pakistan's intelligence service will continue to support the Afghan Taliban as its proxy army. Obama's attempt to send two messages ensures that Afghanistan will get messier in the years ahead.

Meanwhile, Democrats old enough to remember the 1960s will remember that the rebellion against the Vietnam War began as a civil war within the Democratic Party. That episode seems likely to repeat.

The roots of Lyndon Johnson's failure in Vietnam extended back to mistakes made in the Eisenhower administration. Similarly, Obama's escalation in Afghanistan ratifies a murky decision made sometime in the middle of the Bush administration to construct a strong and competent central government for Afghanistan, something alien to its culture and history. The nation-state model is the reflexive Western response to modern conflict. When applied to Afghanistan, the nation-state model supplied the West with a weak partner, and the Taliban with a powerful recruiting tool and a security guarantee for its sanctuaries in Pakistan.

America's war in Afghanistan

Regrettably, this is not likely to be Obama's last speech or even his last policy for Afghanistan. Obama is hoping to leave the Afghanistan problem behind him as he prepares for a second term. But the problem will still be there, perhaps worse than ever. And the American electorate will be left wondering what the purpose was for escalating the war in 2010.

Afghanistan is not "Obama's War," it is America's war, and always has been. What America still needs is a winning strategy for this war and for future irregular conflicts. We all have a responsibility for solving that problem.

Hearts and minds? Overrated. If you want to run a successful counterinsurgency, it all starts with the person at the top.

On Thursday, December 3rd, Mark Moyar will appear at the Pritzker Military Library to discuss his new book, A Question of Command: Counterinsurgency from the Civil War to Iraq. This event is free and open to the public. The presentation will begin at 6 p.m., preceded by a reception for Library members at 5 p.m. It will be webcast live on pritzkermilitarylibrary.org and recorded for later broadcast on WYCC-TV/Channel 20.

Moyar takes issue with much of the current U.S. Army / Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual, which guided the "surge" in Iraq. Though its creation was overseen by Gen. David Petraeus, whose leadership he considers a near-perfect model for counterinsurgency, Moyar finds the general's most important qualities de-valued in the manual, which suffers from what he calls a "population-centric" emphasis toward defeating an insurgency by depriving it of public support. Using case studies from the Philippines, Vietnam, and other conflicts over the last 150 years, Moyar argues instead that counterinsurgencies succeed or fail based on the leaders involved: their ability to inspire subordinates, adapt to complex situations, unify civilian and military efforts, and identify capable sub-commanders, both from their own ranks and the target population.

Though A Question of Command describes historical insurgencies around the world, Moyar posits that the American South, after the Civil War, may have been the best model for the situation in Iraq. Whereas Grant and Sherman had led major victories on the battlefield, it was lesser-known leaders like Brig. Gen. Robert F. Catterson and Maj. Lewis Merrill who had the most success against insurgent forces such as the Ku Klux Klan. A Question of Command attempts to capture the qualities and decisions that set those leaders apart, making their successors easier to find.

Mark Moyar is Professor of National Security Affairs at the Marine Corps University. He is also the author of Triumph Forsaken: the Vietnam War, 1954-1965 and Phoenix and the Birds of Prey: Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism in Vietnam. Moyar's writings have appeared in the New York Times, the Washington Post, the Wall Street Journal, and other publications. He received a B.A. summa cum laude from Harvard and a Ph.D. from Cambridge.

Seating for this event is limited, so reservations are recommended. Call 312.587.0234 or email [email protected].

Education professionals in Illinois may earn 1.5 Continuing Professional Development Units (CPDUs) for attending this event.

About the Pritzker Military Library

The Pritzker Military Library is a non-partisan, non-profit research institution located at 610 North Fairbanks Court in the Streeterville neighborhood of Chicago, near the Magnificent Mile. Admission is free and open to the public, Monday through Friday from 8:30 a.m. to 4:30 p.m., and also for scheduled evening events.

Since opening in October 2003, the Pritzker Military Library has produced over 250 programs including events with award-winning authors, interviews with Medal of Honor recipients, and Emmy-nominated panel discussions on military issues. All programs are presented free of charge in front of a live audience, webcast live on the Internet, and recorded for later broadcast on WYCC-TV/Channel 20, a PBS affiliate. Programs are also available for download as audio podcasts.

The mission of the Pritzker Military Library is to acquire and maintain an accessible collection of materials and develop appropriate programs focusing on the Citizen Soldier in the preservation of democracy. The 5,000 sq. ft. facility features a collection of books and films on subjects covering the full spectrum of American military history, along with vintage posters, photographs, medals, uniforms, and other artifacts from private donors and the collection of the Library's founder, COL (IL) James N. Pritzker, ARNG (Ret.).

To learn more, visit pritzkermilitarylibrary.org.

Phil's comments:

III MAF Pacification in Vietnam

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US Opts for Limited Surge - Jonathan Weisman and Peter Spiegel, Wall Street Journal.

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Steve Coll at The New Yorker asks what if we fail in Afghanistan? "Last week, I found myself at yet another think tank-type meeting about Afghan policy choices. Toward the end, one of the participants, who had long experience in government, asked a deceptively simple question: What would happen if we failed?" A follow on post can be found here.

Tom Barnett on the bottom-line on nation building - BLUF: "It costs the United States $1 million a year to keep a soldier inside a theater of operations such as Afghanistan. The math is easy enough: For every thousand troops, the price comes out to $1 billion a year."

Via e-mail from the Council on Foreign Relations - "in advance of President Obama's announcement on U.S. strategy in Afghanistan, CFR offers expert analysis and background resources from a broad range of views."

Over at Commentary's Contentions Max Boot says one word from Obama can rejuvenate troop morale and that word would be victory. "That is a word that has been missing so far from Obama's vocabulary. I hope it is not MIA on Tuesday night."

Foreign Policy releases its first top 100 global thinkers list. Yes another list - but you guys seem to love dissecting them - and yes - General P and Dr. K are on that list.

Andrew Exum (not quite back from the dead) has a new reading list - this one on irregular warfare courtesy of the U.S. Army War College. There's also a link to AM's counterinsurgency reading list.

Last week, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) censured Iran for its "breach of its obligations" to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and for its refusal to comply with UN Security Council resolutions directed at Iran's nuclear program.

Iran responded by announcing a plan to greatly expand its uranium enrichment capacity, with plans to add 10 additional enrichments sites. Even though Russia and China joined Europe, the United States, and a majority of other countries in the IAEA vote against Iran, the Iranian government did not hesitate to escalate its breach with the IAEA and the Security Council.

The Iran government is likely only a few small steps away from quitting the NPT and ejecting IAEA monitoring from its country. Should, as seems likely, Iran leave the NPT and disappear from IAEA monitoring, it will then be the Security Council's responsibility to formulate a response. But the international legal system designed to prevent nuclear weapons proliferation -- a system comprising the NPT, the IAEA, and the Security Council -- has yet to demonstrate that it can stop countries that are determined to build a nuclear weapons capability.

The Security Council will likely impose much stiffer economic and financial sanctions against Iran. Based on its decisions to escalate the dispute, the Iranian government doesn't seem concerned by this prospect. It must be concluding that side deals, smuggling, and oil market leverage will suffice to allow the regime to meet its goals.

The likely failure of sanctions to change Iran's behavior would then bring the contentious issue of preventive war back into focus. No doubt the Security Council is many months, probably years away from taking up this debate. It remains to be seen whether it will fare any better than did the League of Nations in the 1930s. In the meantime, the international community will have to contemplate how it will cope with a nuclear nonproliferation system which is useless against determined regimes.

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You've Had Eight Years, Now Get Us bin Laden, Brown Urges Pakistan - Philip Webster, The Times.

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Britain Presses Pakistan and Afghanistan on Militants - John F. Burns, New York Times.

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- T.E. Lawrence, Twenty Seven Articles, Article 15

T.E. Lawrence's quote has become quite possibly the most over-used quotation by the U.S. Army in recent memory. Nearly every military presentation regarding our recent conflicts has some form of it embedded in the text. Nearly all U.S. military officers can parrot it with rote precision. However, application of Lawrence's wisdom in the field remains spotty. One doesn't have to look far to find accounts of U.S. soldiers and advisors emulating Larry the Cable Guy's "Git r' Dun" philosophy to prevent failure in Iraqi (or Afghan) forces. Sometimes this is required, but too often our own hubris and self-perception as the all-knowing American military overcomes the wisdom of listening to the host nation.

I learned this lesson the hard way in Tal Afar, Iraq. From March-May 2006, my company engaged in a difficult struggle for control of the Hai al Sa'ad neighborhood in the northwest part of the city.

More at The Wall Street Journal.