Blog Posts

The Phoenix Program and Contemporary Counterinsurgency - William Rosenau, Austin Long, Rand Corporation.

Fresh interest in the history of counterinsurgency has focused renewed attention on the Phoenix Program, the United States' primary effort to improve intelligence coordination and operations aimed at identifying and dismantling the communist underground during the Vietnam War. Modern-day advocates of the program argue that it was devastatingly effective, but detractors condemn it as a merciless assassination campaign. Without a clearer understanding of the truth about Phoenix and its overall effectiveness, analysts risk drawing flawed conclusions about the program's applicability to contemporary conflicts.

The authors explore the Viet Cong underground (the target of Phoenix operations) and the early US and South Vietnamese operations designed to dismantle it. Tracing the provenance and evolution of the Phoenix Program from these early operations, they identify the program's three elements and assess its overall success. They conclude that the truth about Phoenix and its effectiveness lies somewhere between the extremes of today's competing claims: The program made positive contributions to counterinsurgency in South Vietnam, but its political costs to the United States were substantial. The authors note that the Phoenix Program highlights the continuing importance of intelligence coordination and anti-infrastructure operations in contemporary counterinsurgency.

Full document at Rand.

Q & A with Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal - Julian E. Barnes, Los Angeles Times.

You have said that in Afghanistan protecting the population is the top priority. What does that mean you stop doing?

It means we put as much of our effort as we can to establish security for the population and we stay there so those other critical parts, governance and development, can happen.

Obviously everything comes at a cost. So it means we don't have as many forces to maneuver in the country. So we have to rigorously prioritize and then some things come later.

Read the entire Q & A at The Los Angeles Times.

Back to Basics

By Captain David Blair, US Air Force

Originally posted at Air University's The Wright Stuff.

(Hat tip to Colonel Bob Potter for sending this along to SWJ)

"... That I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same." That was how it went. There was not an exception for 'achieving childhood dreams,' nor an exclusion for 'as long as leadership has a coherent plan,' nor a caveat for 'as long as you're still doing what you signed up for.' After serving for the better part of a decade, perhaps I began to take my original oath somewhat for granted; perhaps I lost some of my focus on the reasons that first guided me to military service. I was comfortable, happy and proud serving as an AC-130 pilot, deploying several times a year to keep good guys safe and to take the fight to the enemy. That experience was one of the greatest privileges of my life, but it took a "needs-of-the-Air-Force" move to bring me back to the basics of duty, honor and service. I do not believe that I was alone in that mindset, nor do I believe that my story is unique. It is for exactly that reason that I believe my story may be worth the retelling.

Two years ago, in the middle of my third deployment in the right seat of an AC-130, I felt the world was more or less in order. I loved the Gunship, its mission and the community, I enjoyed the self-satisfaction that I was contributing to the fight; truly, I was living out a childhood dream of flying CAS (close air support) missions in combat as a Special Operations aviator. Like so many of my comrades, I believed in what I was doing and consequently poured my passions into learning the aircraft and the mission. I believed those efforts were finally resulting in a deep understanding of the weapon system. On the home front, I had just finished re-modeling my house, a three-year and $10K project. The West Florida housing market had already crashed, but no matter, because I was very much under the impression that I was going to be in Gunships and at Hurlburt Field for quite some time. I confidently assumed things were stable and secure... perhaps I had forgotten that the one constant in the fog and friction of warfare is that there are no constants...

America's New Nightmare - Ron Moreau, Newsweek.

Soon after 4,000 U.S. Marines flooded into Afghanistan's Helmand River Valley on July 2, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar called top Taliban regional commanders together for an urgent briefing. The meeting took place in southwestern Pakistan—not far from the Afghan border but safely out of the Americans' reach. Baradar told the commanders he wanted just one thing: to keep the Taliban's losses to a minimum while maximizing the cost to the enemy. Don't try to hold territory against the Americans' superior firepower by fighting them head-on, he ordered. Rely on guerrilla tactics whenever possible. Plant "flowers"—improvised explosive devices—on trails and dirt roads. Concentrate on small-unit ambushes, with automatic weapons and rocket-propelled grenades. He gave his listeners a special warning: he would hold each of them responsible for the lives of their men. "Keep your weapons on your backs and be on your motorcycles," Baradar exhorted them. "America has greater military strength, but we have greater faith and commitment."

In all likelihood, you've never heard of Mullah Baradar. The only Taliban leader most people know is Mullah Mohammed Omar, the unworldly, one-eyed village preacher who held the grand title amir-ul-momineen—"leader of the faithful"—when he ruled Afghanistan in the late 1990s. Omar remains a high-value target, with a $10 million U.S. bounty on his head. But he hasn't been seen in at least three years, even by his most loyal followers, and rarely issues direct orders anymore. In his place, the adversary that American forces are squaring off against in Afghanistan—the man ultimately responsible for the spike in casualties that has made July the deadliest month for Coalition soldiers since the war began in 2001—is Baradar. A cunning, little-known figure, he may be more dangerous than Omar ever was...

Much more at Newsweek.

Iran's nuclear program is suddenly receiving a flurry of attention from top Obama administration officials. Defense Secretary Robert Gates visited Israel today to exchange views on the subject with Ehud Barak, his counterpart. National Security Advisor James Jones will soon arrive in Israel, presumably to discuss the same topic.

Last week, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton proposed a U.S. "defense umbrella" over the entire Middle East should Iran fail to cease work on its nuclear complex. Other officials in the Obama administration soon attempted to repeal Clinton's remarks, while simultaneously implying that some kind of U.S. security umbrella has always been over the Middle East.

Just as the Truman and Eisenhower administration officials figured out at the beginning of the Cold War, a "defense umbrella" or security guarantee presents itself as a seemingly painless solution to an intractable security challenge. At first glance, issuing a promise to use military force later seems to be a more attractive choice than committing to use military force now. In the case of Iran, sanctions won't work before Iran has nuclear weapons. And a preventive air campaign is unappealing for a variety of reasons. Thus, a U.S. security guarantee for friends in the region seems like an easy solution.

But anyone who remembers the Cold War should recall that U.S. security guarantees for Western Europe, Japan, and South Korea were not easy, cheap, or simple. A U.S. guarantee for the Middle East against Iranian aggression will be even more problematic than were America's guarantees during the Cold War.

Our Soldiers Are Not Trained For The Wars They Are In - Cynthia Banham, Sydney Morning Herald.

Many Australians revere the military, and it occupies a sacred place in their consciousness. Soldiers put their lives on the line when we ask them to, in the name of keeping us safe. They are doing so now in Afghanistan, where an 11th soldier lost his life last weekend. But has our Defence Force become complacent about its status?

An adviser to the British and US militaries in Iraq and Afghanistan, Dr Daniel Marston, suggests that some Australian officers have questioned, to him, whether Australia's team training and mentoring Afghan soldiers is as educated on counter-insurgency operations as it should be. His comments hint at a disconnection in the political and military establishment over the nature of the mission, and teaching of Australian soldiers who are fighting there.

Are we fighting terrorists in Afghanistan or are we fighting a counter-insurgency to protect the local population? And if we are fighting a counter-insurgency, are our soldiers properly equipped for it? In the past few months there has been a great strategic shift in the way the war is being fought. The US is now fighting a war more focused on protecting civilians, and less on hunting Taliban. Coalition forces are trying to convince Afghans that - this time round - they will not abandon them to the insurgents.

Where possible, coalition troops are being partnered with Afghan soldiers, and are working across provincial boundaries, having learnt that confining troops to certain areas (all the Canadians in Kandahar, all the British in Helmand) is inflexible and that battalions must be able to move across the country. As one Australian historian recently there observed: "Insurgents pay as little heed to the provincial borders as they do to the Pakistani frontier."

While the Americans, in short, are fighting a counter-insurgency campaign, consider what the Prime Minister, Kevin Rudd, said about Australia's mission this week. The "underpinning reason" for being there, aside from the US alliance, was "acting against the global threat of terrorism"...

Much more at The Sydney Morning Herald. Join the discussion at Small Wars Council.

A Warrior Fighting the Wrong War is the title of Nate Fick's Washington Post review of By His Own Rules: The Story of Donald Rumsfeld by Bradley Graham.

Book Description

A penetrating political biography of the controversial Defense Secretary, by a longtime military affairs correspondent for the Washington Post.

Once considered among the best and brightest of his generation, Donald Rumsfeld was exceptionally prepared to assume the Pentagon's top job in 2001. Yet six years later, he left office as the most controversial Defense Secretary since Robert McNamara, widely criticized for his management of the Iraq war and for his difficult relationships with Congress, administration colleagues, and military officers. Was he really the arrogant, errant, over-controlling Pentagon leader frequently portrayed--or as his supporters contend, a brilliant, hard-charging visionary caught in a whirl of polarized Washington politics, dysfunctional federal bureaucracy, and bad luck?

Bradley Graham, who closely covered Rumsfeld's challenging tenure at the Pentagon, offers an insightful biography of a complex and immensely influential personality. What emerges is a layered and revealing portrait of a man whose impact on U.S. national security affairs will long out-live him.

A Warrior Fighting the Wrong War - Nathaniel Fick, Washington Post.

"The blizzard is over!" Donald Rumsfeld declared in the last of some 20,000 memos -- or "snowflakes" -- that had become a hallmark of his contentious tenure as secretary of defense. During the summer of 2003, a squall of snowflakes and counter-snowflakes blew through the offices of Rumsfeld and Gen. John Abizaid, the newly appointed head of U.S. Central Command, about the definitions of "insurgent" and "guerrilla warfare." Rumsfeld, over Abizaid's objections, resisted acknowledging the enemy in Iraq as an organized force because doing so would have suggested that the U.S. presence there was likely to be long and costly. But his denial merely delayed the inevitable, and, as in a real snowstorm, the cleanup began only after the last flake fell.

Rumsfeld is not a simple man. But the two biggest questions about his tenure at the Pentagon -- why the United States invaded Iraq, and why it so bungled the aftermath of the Hussein regime's fall -- are often answered with only the simplest of explanations: ideology and hubris.

In this meticulously researched and compelling book, veteran Washington Post reporter Bradley Graham acknowledges these contributors to the national-security travails of the Bush years, but he highlights another as well: the secretary of defense's unwavering commitment to military transformation, his vision of a leaner, more lethal Department of Defense. The early phases of the war in Afghanistan apparently vindicated this concept, while the prospect of war in Iraq promised a wider proving ground for it - but the nasty counterinsurgency campaign that followed threatened to undermine it...

More at The Washington Post.

Here is the latest edition of my column at Foreign Policy.

Topics include:

1) The Domino Theory returns,

2) Thank you, Rafael Correa.

Earlier this month, retired Marine Colonel TX Hammes wrote an article in Armed Forces Journal regarding the drawbacks of pervasive PowerPoint use in the military. He challenged readers to compete in an essay contest at AFJ, with a selection of books as the prize.

Col. Hammes' article has gotten quite a reception throughout the blogosphere, with a few sites (Red Team Journal by Adam Elkus, Building Peace by "Reach 364", The Best Defense by Thomas Ricks) posting their own replies.

In the hopes of spurring some conversation on the topic--I'm too into the whole instant gratification thing to wait for the winner to be announced in November--I'm posting my own reply to Col. Hammes.

In January 2009, a military-oriented site, "Company Command", asked current Army commanders and platoon leaders in Iraq what they spent most of their time doing. One officer, Lt. Sam Nuxoll, answered flat-out: "Making PowerPoint slides"...

Air Force Report Envisions a Broader Use of Drones - Christopher Drew, New York Times.

Small remotely piloted planes are now used mainly to gather intelligence and fire missiles at insurgents. But over the next several decades, the Air Force envisions building larger ones that could do the work of bombers and cargo planes and even tiny ones that could spy inside a room.

In a report released Thursday laying out a "flight plan" for developing pilotless systems, the Air Force also said it could eventually field swarms of drones to attack enemy targets. And it will have to be ready to defend against the same threat, which could become another inexpensive way for insurgents to attack American forces.

Col. Eric Mathewson, who directs the Air Force task force on pilotless aerial systems, said in an interview that the service sketched its vision to encourage contractors and university researchers to help create the technologies...

More at The New York Times.

Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan Requires New Thinking

By John House

Special to American Forces Press Service

WASHINGTON, July 23, 2009 -- International forces in Afghanistan must garner popular support among residents to defeat the insurgency, the director of counterinsurgency training there said yesterday.

"This is different from conventional combat, which is terrain or enemy focused," Army Col. John Agoglia, director of Counterinsurgency Training Center Afghanistan, said during a "DoDLive" bloggers roundtable.

"Counterinsurgency is population-focused," Agoglia said in his update on the center's doctrine, curriculum and methodologies. "How we operate in and amongst the population will determine the outcome more than traditional measures, like capture of terrain or attrition of the enemy."

Making sure all involved in the war see counterinsurgency "as a mindset, and not just a training event, ... and that this mindset permeates all actions they take," is one of Agoglia's guiding principles.

A counterinsurgency mindset that encompasses prevention of civilian casualties, fosters public trust in the government and establishes conditions for economic growth is necessary to win the war, Agoglia said...

Combat Advisors: Longer Deployments Required

by Major Morgan Smiley

Several recent articles have cited the growing interest in accelerating the development and expansion of Afghanistan's security forces, which will directly influence the number of US forces sent there to serve as advisors and trainers.

Currently, we have increased the number of advisors by adding a 4000-man brigade to the training element already in place in Afghanistan, and I suspect this will help. But another part of this equation that we ought to consider is how long those advisors remain with their Afghan counterparts. My recommendation....combat advisors need to be on-ground for at least 18, but no more than 24, months. The longer we stay with them, the greater our chances of inculcating in our Afghan allies what we are trying to teach.

While adding more advisors helps to address the issue of expanding Afghan security forces (more advisors means more Afghan forces that can be trained), another equally important area to address is the dynamic created by those advisory teams and how it impacts the Afghans we advise, how our efforts influence their cultural mind-set. We talk of this war as the "Long War" because counterinsurgencies are traditionally lengthy affairs, often taking the better part of a decade to conduct. Despite our acknowledgement of this oft-stated point, we seem to ignore it or brush it aside in favor of our typical "more is better" and "hurry, hurry, hurry" approaches.

The current deployment schedule calls for US units to deploy for 12 months. While this may be adequate for combat units executing traditional combat missions, it is not conducive for the mission of the combat advisor...

Iraqi Prime Minister Open to Renegotiating Withdrawal Timeline - Spencer Ackerman, Washington Independent.

Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki opened the door for the first time Wednesday to the prospect of a U.S. military presence in Iraq after the December 2011 deadline for troop withdrawal set by last year's bilateral accord - something President Obama appeared to rule out during a joint appearance on Tuesday.

Speaking to an audience at the U.S. Institute of Peace in Washington, Maliki said the accord, known as the Status of Forces Agreement, would "end" the American military presence in his country in 2011, but "nevertheless, if Iraqi forces required further training and further support, we shall examine this at that time based on the needs of Iraq," he said through translation in response to a question from The Washington Independent. "I am sure that the will, the prospects and the desire for such cooperation is found among both parties."

Maliki continued, "The nature of that relationship - the functions and the amount of [U.S.] forces - will then be discussed and reexamined based on the needs" of Iraq...

More at The Washington Independent.

Wanat (VIII): An Army Report Finds a Major COIN Failure - Tom Ricks, Best Defense at Foreign Policy.

The Army's study of what happened in the Wanat battle a year ago in eastern Afghanistan is even harder on senior U.S. military commanders than I was in my series on it back in February, saying that they didn't understand counterinsurgency doctrine and also that some of their statements about the fight were misleading at best.

The report, which is still in draft form, contradicts a few aspects of the accounts provided by some of the senior officers involved, implicitly raising integrity questions. That's especially significant because two officials at Fort Leavenworth have told me that the Army inspector general's office is investigating how the Wanat incident was reported and reviewed. I also hear that congressional interest in the situation is growing.

The report, which has not been released and was written for the Army's Combat Studies Institute by military historian Douglas Cubbison, finds multiple failures by the battalion and brigade commanders involved...

... The report also is in awe of the bravery and persistence of the 42 soldiers and 3 Marines who fought at Wanat, as I am. I knew that some continued to fight after being hit several times. But I didn't know that one continued to pass ammunition even when he was mortally wounded.

I also think the Army deserves praise for having the honesty to have this report done. I am told that the final version will be released soon. Let's hope it isn't thrown out the back door at 5 pm on a Friday afternoon in August.

Much more at Best Defense.

Charlie Rose: A conversation with Christopher R. Hill, U.S. Ambassador to Iraq.

NPR's On Point with Tom Ashbrook - The New Fight in Afghanistan. Guests:

Joining us from Kabul, Afghanistan, is Laura King, reporter for The Los Angeles Times. She's recently been in the country's far eastern region, near the Pakistan border, at Forward Operating Base Salerno. Her piece in today's LA Times reports on a new wave of coordinated Taliban attacks.

Also from Kabul we're joined by Pamela Constable, reporter for The Washington Post. She's just back from Lashkar Gah, the capital of Helmand Province, the focal point of the current coalition push. She's also been in Faizabad recently, in the country's remote northeast.

From Hardin, Montana, we're joined by Gretchen Peters, a journalist who has covered the Afghanistan-Pakistan region for more than decade with the Associated Press and ABC News. She is author of the new book Seeds of Terror: How Heroin Is Bankrolling the Taliban and Al Qaeda.

From Monterey, California, we're joined by Kalev Sepp, professor of defense analysis at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School. He is a retired Army lieutenant colonel and special forces officer. From 2007 to January 2009, he served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations Capabilities, helping to oversee global counterterrorism policy.

The New Fight in Afghanistan - Audio of today's program.

The July 2009 issue of the Combating Terrorism Center's CTC Sentinel is now online. Articles include:

The Terrorist Threat to Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons - Shaun Gregory

The Significance of Qari Zain's Assassination in Pakistan - Rahimullah Yusufzai

Pakistan's New Offensive in South Waziristan - Samir Syed

A Diagnosis of Somalia's Failing Transitional Government - Anonymous

The Status of Conflict in the Southern and Central Regions of Somalia - Michael A. Weinstein

A New Phase of Resistance and Insurgency in Iranian Baluchistan - Chris Zambelis

Incorporating Law Enforcement Interrogation Techniques on the Battlefield - Gretchen Peters

Recent Highlights in Terrorist Activity

Five weeks after Iran's presidential elections it is now clear that Iran's ruling elite has split into two factions. The question now is whether Iran's security forces will split.

Former presidents Rafsanjani and Khatami have now publicly questioned the legitimacy of President Ahmadinejad's reelection. In doing so, they have questioned the legitimacy of Supreme Ruler Khamenei's authority (see NYT, Economist). This is a dramatic development and almost guarantees a deep political crisis inside Iran.

Gates Calls for Increase of 22,000 Soldiers

By John J. Kruzel

American Forces Press Service

WASHINGTON, July 20, 2009 -- Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates today announced plans to add up to 22,000 soldiers to the U.S. Army's ranks.

The plus-up of active duty troops will take the Army from 547,000 to 569,000 forces in what Gates characterized as a temporary increase of the Army's "end strength" for three fiscal years.

"This is an important and necessary step to ensure that we continue to properly support the needs of our commanders in the field while providing relief for our current force and their families," the secretary told reporters during a Pentagon news conference.

Gates pointed to escalating violence in Afghanistan and an added U.S. presence there, political turmoil in Pakistan and elimination of the so-called "stop-loss" policy of involuntarily extending a soldier's length of service as reasons behind the decision...

U.S., U.K. Differ on How to Confront Foes - United Press International.

A new strategic study has spotlighted different approaches adopted by British and U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan to confront armed opponents and the tensions created over the differences, publishers for the Kingston University-led research said Monday.

"Hearts and Minds? British Counterinsurgency from Malaya to Iraq," a special issue of the Journal of Strategic Studies, said the different approaches favored by British and U.S. commanders in Iraq had become a "hot topic" because the military allies looked at ways of combating insurgents from divergent perspectives...

... the various interpretations of "hearts and minds" led to confusion about what degree of consent could be expected from the people and the implication of this for the use of force.

The study said the British military had been generally more "political" and less coercive in its approach to counterinsurgency...

The British approach to counterinsurgency has influenced the recent development of U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine, said the study, citing Petraeus and others. But there are still considerable differences in the British and U.S. approaches to counterinsurgency, and that has led to severe tensions in the relationship between these allies, according to the study.

The study concluded the "hearts and minds" description of the British approach to counterinsurgency might soften its public image, but it was not an effective guide to operations, because it could be interpreted in such divergent ways...

More at United Press International.

Last week I attended a seminar on China at the Brookings Institution. At the seminar David Finkelstein gave a must-read presentation on China's grand strategy. Finkelstein is a retired U.S. Army officer and director of CNA China Studies at CNA Corporation.

Some key points from the presentation:

It's not often when a SWJ friend lands a starring role in a network news series -- so we were quite excited when we learned that Roger Carstens will be co-starring in NBC News' The Wanted. Congratulations Roger and best of luck with the show! Continue on for the NBC News press release and an update featuring Washington Post commentary... The Wanted airs tonight at 2200 EST...

Center for Complex Operations: 2nd Annual Conference

July 28, 2009

National Defense University

Washington, D.C.

The Center for Complex Operations Second Annual Conference will introduce the CCO's latest initiatives, including lessons learned collection efforts, a complex operations journal, and fourteen new case studies written for teaching and training.

Date and Time: July 28, 2009 at 2:00PM. The conference will be followed by a cocktail reception.

Agenda

1:30 PM Registration

2:00 PM Opening Remarks

Dr. Hans Binnendijk

Director, Center for Technology and National Security Policy

Ambassador John E. Herbst

Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, Department of State

Dr. James Schear

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense

2:45 Keynote Address

Lieutenant General David W. Barno, U.S. Army (Retired)

Director, Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies

3:15 Break

3:30 Lessons Learned from the Three Ds

Moderator: Michael Miklaucic, CCO (USAID)

Panelist 1: Ambassador James Dobbins, RAND

Panelist 2: Colonel (P) H.R. McMaster, TRADOC, Army Capabilities Integration Center

Panelist 3: Dr. David Kilcullen, Crumpton Group

4:45 CCO Research Initiatives: Complex Operations Case Studies Series

Moderator: Bernard Carreau, CCO

Panelist 1: Colonel Peter Curry, Marine Corps War College (Invited)

Panelist 2: Dr. Volker Franke, McDaniel College (Invited)

5:30 Closing Session

Ambassador Robin Raphel, Senior Vice President, Cassidy and Associates (Invited)

6:00 Reception

Registration

Please RSVP to Jacqueline Carpenter at [email protected] or (202) 685-6348.

Location

Lincoln Hall Auditorium, National Defense University, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C.

For additional Information: Check the CCO Portal for event updates: ccoportal.org.

'How This Ends': Iraq's Uncertain Path toward National Reconciliation - Michael Eisenstadt and Ahmed Ali, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

During Iraqi prime minister Nouri al-Maliki's visit to Washington next week, the Obama administration will likely seek to reinvigorate that country's flagging reconciliation process as part of ongoing efforts to establish a stable political order in Iraq. Progress, however, continues to be hindered by ongoing violence, deep-seated suspicions, and partisan politics, raising questions about the ultimate prospects for national reconciliation...

Much more at The Washington Institute.

Town Hall Meeting to Announce the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) - Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, July 10, 2009. Excerpt follows:

... We don't have the luxury of deciding which issues to deal with. We need a framework and a vision that will allow us to address all of them; to, in effect, multitask to get the results and outcomes that we're seeking. And we have to work simultaneously on the urgent, the important, and the long term. Now I have been fighting for the resources that we need to do our jobs. We cannot send diplomats and development experts into the field underfunded and underequipped. But unless we make better use of the talent and tools at our disposal, we're not going to succeed. We need to align our resources with strategic priorities to direct our funds and to maximize our impact. As individuals, as an organization, we need to work better, work smarter, and work together with more partners in and beyond our government. And instead of simply trying to adjust to the way things are, we need to get in the habit of looking to the horizon and planning for how we want things to be.

To help us in that effort and to enable the Department and USAID to get ahead of emerging threats and opportunities and to make the case effectively for OMB, the Congress, and the people of our country for the resources we need, today, I'm announcing that we will, for the first time ever, conduct a Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review, a QDDR, if you will. I served for six years on the Armed Services Committee in the Senate. And it became very clear to me that the QDR process that the Defense Department ran was an important tool for the Defense Department to not only exercise the discipline necessary to make the hard decisions to set forth the priorities, but provided a framework that was a very convincing one to those in the Congress, that there was a plan, people knew where they were headed, and they had the priorities requested aligned with the budget, and therefore, people were often very convinced that it made good sense to do whatever the Defense Department requested.

Well, I want to make the same case for diplomacy and development. We will be doing this quadrennial review, which will be, we hope, a tool to provide us with both short-term and long-term blueprints for how to advance our foreign policy objectives and our values and interests. This will provide us with a comprehensive assessment for organizational reform and improvements to our policy, strategy, and planning processes. And this will help make our diplomacy and development work more agile, responsive, and complimentary. This is what we mean when we talk about smart power.

I think we need this type of bottom-up strategic review to coordinate our work and to accelerate transitions from old ideas and outmoded programs. A State Department QDDR protocol will give us the strategic guidance we need to help us allocate our resources more efficiently and deploy people where they will have the most impact. I think it's a new way of doing business that will give us the dynamism that we should have and better equip us to deal with the accelerating rate of change that we confront...

Full text at US Department of State. (H/T Dave Maxwell)