Withdrawing the BCTs
by Colonel Robert Killebrew, Small Wars Journal Op-Ed
Transition in Iraq: Withdrawing the BCTs (Full PDF Article)
A meeting with the JCS is the first item on President Obama's agenda after he takes office on 20 January. As reported in the national press, he intends to fulfill his campaign promise of withdrawing all remaining Brigade Combat Teams in Iraq within the next 16 months.
Assuming the present state of affairs in Iraq continues, getting the combat brigades out in 16 months should be a doable objective that American military leaders can wholeheartedly support. The reduction in violence, the progress of the Iraqi army, and the shaky but generally positive direction of the Iraqi government all seem to indicate that in a year or more the U.S. and allied contribution can have become mainly -- though not exclusively -- to support Iraqi security forces. This is not, however, "endex" in Iraq, and we can still lose this war if we fail to make a satisfactory transition from warfighters to supporters.
Our basic objectives in Iraq under an Obama Administration will almost surely remain what they have been under President Bush's; a generally democratic and secular Iraq, a U.S. ally at peace with its neighbors, and a bulwark against Iranian aggression at the head of the Persian Gulf. Whether those objectives, all or in part, are achieved depends on how we handle the transition from combat to support of the Iraqi government and its security forces.
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Bob,
Nice work on the challenges of transition. I'm glad you brought up the challenges the SOFA brings to the implementation of these three efforts. For some this will be something of a paradigm shift. I know the word "paradigm" may seem over used to some, but moving to a relationship where U.S. forces are invited at the request of a sovereign host nation authority may require a modified mindset (for some there is no "may" about it). This can be seen as an evolution in our relationship with Iraq. In this case I like "evolution" better than "phase" because it does not share some of the same doctrinal associations.
I like the idea of establishing the basis for an ODC (Office of Defense Cooperation) now as opposed to waiting to DEC 2010. This is a large task, and one that we should prepare for now and with great energy. The idea that whatever command exists at the time can simply morph into an ODC (or MAAG), or that we can simply pull one out of body of another element is wishful thinking at best - particularly given the other two major efforts we have to undertake. Such a line of thinking will create the most adhoc of organizations - one that is probably doing far too much with far too little, and which is born with an identity crisis.
Establishing this ODC is a major effort, and may be the task which better postures both us and the GoI to achieve our policy objectives.
I am concerned about the time-line. It is fixed to a degree (although the Iraqi leadership can re-look the SOFA should they desire). We should consider the date solid so as you mentioned we won't be surprised when "lunch is served". My thought is that this ODC should perhaps be looked at in depth right now - early in 2009. It could be the best vehicle for future cooperation with a partner we wish to retain, and have a vested interest in seeing succeed.
Resourcing this ODC with the right people, and exploring what its roles should and can be, and then giving it a chance to evolve could easily take a year. We do not wish to go down the road of a "wall of band-aids" where new parts are added to cover the wounds of painful self discovery - we've done that before and often don't discover critical gaps until we are up against a wall. We should also take this chance to build a solid relationship with DoS with respect to the ODC's conception as State assumes a greater role - we should do this before we have to put it into practice.
A backwards planning time-line that has the ODC assuming responsibilities in JAN 2011 and walks the key dates backwards would be a good first step. This should be balanced against the responsibilities of the existing MNC-I (and other "I"-commands)so that those entities can begin to divest them selves of certain responsibilities while assuming a greater role in closing out its specific theater responsibilities.
While we did some good work last week on some of those responsibilities and functions, this aspect of an ODC seemed largely new to at least a significant part of the audience. There seemed to be a lack of understanding that soon the music would stop - at least the tune that we've learned the words to. It seemed to me that there was a desire to see the next year or two in isolation - divorced from the transition called for by the SOFA.
I'm inclined to suggest that to get this more right it will require more effort than a service Title 10 WG - and perhaps should be the subject of Inter-Agency experimentation. It will have to be organized and conducted under a DoD lead with respect to resources and experience in experimentation, but from birth this should be a partnership with DoS as its critical we all understand the "paradigm shift". I think it would also be prudent to make at least parts of it open to both our normal partners, and those who may become significant partners later on - this may mean that at least some parts need to be UNCLASS.
This also gets to Bob's point about personnel policies. Manning such an ODC/MAAG at this point has strategic importance - it can serve as a stage setter. The analysis to determine what functions it will fulfill for the first couple of years at least needs to be considered carefully in light conditions an the objectives of both the USG, its partners and the GoI. These functions should frame the requirements and that should allow the ODC to figure out what resources and authorities it will require, and starting sorting out its relationships. This could be critical if we determine that certain key personnel require additional skills or education, or to give the functional areas the time to sort through the qualified candidates and determine the right guy or gal for the job. I might also mention its the right thing to do by our people so they can take care of their families. I suspect we'll get a better crop of candidates by this methodology as opposed to "see a hole fill a hole" - not to mention it gives the leadership time to build their team out of contact so to speak, vs. the pick up game we mostly play in such efforts - e.g. the ODC personnel would also take part in the experimetnation. This should be the initial focus of the experimentation.
The second thing the experimentation might consider is the implementation of the ODC, and how to will affect the transition - think 2010 - 2011 time frame. We self induced friction before as commands (or command like structures) sort themselves out. This should be done in coordination with planners from the various "I" commands as well as Inter-Agency and perhaps Multi-National coordination.
Finally, the experimentation should consider the role of the ODC post JAN 2011. What are the various USG, GoI, MNP and adversary (and competitor) goals with respect to Iraq, and how can the ODC support the advance, reconciliation or frustration of those objectives so that the USG and the GoI advance their relationship?
Bob, I did not hit on ARFORGEN with respect to the other two very important efforts you brought up. They also require a great deal of thought, but I think they at least are being given due consideration - hope to see you at more of the UQ events.
Best, Rob