by Captain Crispin Burke, Small Wars Journal Op-Ed
Sorry, Pentathlete Wasn't on the Syllabus (Full PDF Article)
In the last few years, the Army has been promoting the "Pentathlete" model of leadership: a leader skilled in his or her tactical field of expertise, as well as skilled in all forms of military as well as diplomatic power. Indeed, it is a reflection of the change that is needed in our officer corps, changing our personnel system and our zeitgeist from an industrial-age model to an information-age model. Unfortunately, the Pentathlete is only getting lip service at the various captains' career courses in the Army.
Sorry, Pentathlete Wasn't on the Syllabus (Full PDF Article)
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UltimaRatioRegis said:
"To wit, we cannot ignore our shoot, move, and communicate skills and expect every other conflict to be a counterinsurgency 4th generation scenario."
Shoot, move, and communicate skills are required in every conflict regardless of type. If we do not have those skills we cannot fight and win whether the conflict is MCO or IW. I certainly hope no one has the idea because Iraq and Afghanistan are IW or COIN environments that we can neglect our shoot, move, and communicate skills.
"Obviously, our junior officers are being placed in an unprecedented predicament--they have been amassing combat experience like no other generation since World War Two."
This is true to a large extent for a COIN environment, but does not answer the mail in learning and mastering the complexities of fighting an adversary whose combat power might reach rough equivalence to our own. The OPFOR represented a WP doctrine, which, like any RED force opponent, IS USEFUL in context.
But the warning of the CMC, General Conway, rings louder as time passes. To wit, we cannot ignore our shoot, move, and communicate skills and expect every other conflict to be a counterinsurgency 4th generation scenario.
Those COIN skills and techniques are very important, but along with, and not in place of, those needed for high intensity 3rd generation warfighting. We have infantry and armor that has not maneuvered and exploited, and artillery that has not fired in support of that maneuver, in quite some time.
If we have a generation of company grade officers and NCOs who are deficient in those skills, we will cease to hold the great advantage that our technology and training has hitherto given us.
I don't find CPT Burke's assessment to be valid across all of the career courses. I'm currently attending the Maneuver Captains Career Course at Fort Benning, and while we still did modules on classic "high intensity" warfare - planning a defense to repel a mechanized brigade and such - there has also been emphasis on civil considerations and counterinsurgency operations. Small group instructors (SGIs) critique students on civil considerations even when briefing orders that involve a mechanized company team offense. I would like to see some more detail on actual COIN TTPs, but the assumption here is that most of the students know it because they've done it, and that we need to be refreshed on their "conventional" warfighting skills. However, at least here at Benning, the situation is not as dire as the article implies.
We had a number of student-taught classes, and I picked the one on urban operations, as it seemed the most relevant to the current conflict. I began the class by saying that everything in the Army's OPFOR manual was pretty much nonsensical--it said that the Opposition Force, an imaginary enemy that only operates at our national training centers, prefers not to fight in urban terrain. In direct opposition, of course, to the experience in Iraq (and elsewhere) in which there has been urban fighting.
This was just one of the things that I added to my course critique (I actually asked for extra pages). Suffice to say, I didn't prove very popular.
Excellent article and yet another example of the facts -- let me say again; <u>facts</u> -- that our training AND our personnel policies are still based on World War II models. Both systems require radical revision.
Having served as a Branch Chief at a Service School, I am aware of the fact that the Schools are comfortable assignments, that they will resist change and with too few exceptions, enjoy the status quo. In my experience, any progress at the two Schools with which I am familiar was due to those exceptions -- people who got things done in <i>spite</i> of the School culture.
We are long overdue for corrective action...