by Lieutenant Colonel Paul Yingling, Small Wars Journal
Irregular Warfare and Adaptive Leadership (Full PDF Article)
First, I'd like to thank the leadership and staff of the Command and General Staff College for putting this event together. It's an honor to speak to this class; I'm told that 78% of you are veterans of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Before going further, I'd like to thank you for your service to our country and acknowledge the sacrifices your families have endured to make that service possible. I'd also like to acknowledge that your class is broadly representative of the war effort itself, including every service in the Department of Defense, as well as our allies and our interagency partners. I'll keep my comments short; given your experiences, your questions comments are likely to be far better than my responses.
I'd like to open our dialogue today on the subjects of irregular warfare and adaptive leadership. When I was a battalion XO in Iraq in 2003, I served with a company commander whose vehicle was struck by an early version of an IED. The fragmentation shattered his windshield and severed his antennas, the smoke and dust obscured his vision and the blast temporarily deafened him. In the first critical seconds after the blast, the commander saw the ubiquitous white pickup leaving the blast area, but didn't pursue it. His battalion commander was furious, and later harangued the captain for his failure to act. The company commander was crushed; he felt the battalion commander was questioning his courage, and in fact he was.
The battalion commander later complained to me about his company commander's inaction. He was right on the tactics -- in those rare moments when we make contact with insurgents, if indeed this truck contained insurgents -- we must capture or kill them. I was less certain about his methods of leader development, so I asked about the company commander's preparations for deployment. For example, prior to deployment, who had the authority to cancel PT in the event of an electrical storm? He answered, 'the brigade commander had that authority.' I then asked him, who had the authority to change the PT uniform, if for example it was warmer than expected? That decision was at the battalion level. This company commander, who only a few months ago lacked the authority to tell his troops to come in out of the rain or take off their hats, was now expected to pursue the enemy unto death.
Officers conditioned to conformity in peacetime cannot be expected to behave boldly and flexibly in combat. This phenomenon is not new.
Irregular Warfare and Adaptive Leadership (Full PDF Article)
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I agree 100% with the author that troops often have a more honest view of thier officer's and SNCOs ability to lead than do their superiors. In my experience and both a NCO and officer those leaders (both officer and NCO) who are well respected by the rank and file are often looked down on by their peers and chain of command. These occurs for two reasons: 1. Good leadership is often not based on conformity to regulations and instructions, but on the ability to make decisions after balancing the risk involved and the desired end state based on commander's intent, 2. Leading by example, often more can be accomplished by setting the right tone or climate in an unit or organization. That is set by a leader's particapation and involvement at the lowest levels. Both of these are important in Irregular Warfare, because decisions must be made by the lowest members of a unit that often have the most contact with the civilian populace and whose interaction with have operational and strategic impacts either negative or positive.
<I>"I've never understood why officers are officially evaluated primarily by their superiors, when it's their subordinates who really know whether or not they're effective."</I>
And, I would add, their peers. The Lieutenants know which LT is the dud and the Captains know which CPT is the dud.
<I>"I've always wondered why the Army doesn't implement an evaluation program much like those administered in colleges and universities around the country--teacher evaluations."</I>
Good point. Combine that with some <a href="http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=69340&postcount=30">… evaluations</a> and I think we could go a long way toward making evaluations more effective gauges of potential and better mechanisms to provide feedback that will help the rated individual develop.
Well said:
<blockquote>Our subordinates judge us every day, but weve created a system to make sure that promotion boards never hear those judgments, and our officer corps is worse for it. Some fear that 360 degree evaluations will become 'popularity contests but in my experience those fears are unfounded. Troops admire leadership and despise pandering, and have a much better record than promotion boards of distinguishing between the two.</blockquote>
I've never understood why officers are officially evaluated primarily by their superiors, when it's their subordinates who really know whether or not they're effective. I've always wondered why the Army doesn't implement an evaluation program much like those administered in colleges and universities around the country--teacher evaluations. At the end of each semester, the professor leaves the room, the TA passes out the Scantron questionnaire forms with the extra sheet for comments, and the students fill them out anonymously. Then the forms go to the Dean. Why doesn't the military evaluate PLs, COs, and BCs like this? But instead of every soldier filling out the form, it would be answered by, say, only subordinate NCOs and officers.
I typed up my own forms and did this for one of my platoons at the end of my time, and it was the best, most honest feedback I ever received in the Army. If similar questionnaires on the other PLs had been passed up to my commander and the BC, they would've been able to better compare the effectiveness of their PLs.
Hits many nails on heads...<blockquote>"Our system of senior leader development remains essentially unchanged since the Cold War - the same system that produced the officers who for the last generation failed to prepare for irregular warfare. Our organizational structures have changed only slightly since 911, and still lack sufficient intelligence, civil affairs, linguist, special operations, military police and security force development capabilities required by combatant commanders."</blockquote>and much more. BZ
Most important message:<blockquote>"As field grade officers, our most important tasks are to anticipate events and <b>empower our subordinates to act wisely and boldly</b> on the decentralized battlefields of the 21st century. The world has changed a great deal in the last fifty years, but the Department of Defense has not. <i>(Emphasis added / kw)</i></blockquote>