A Strategic Imperative on the 21st Century Battlefield
by Nick Masellis, Small Wars Journal
Human Terrain A Strategic Imperative (Full PDF Article)
Six months into a one-year deployment, my unit was shifting its area of operation from the southeastern Tigris River city of Al-Kut, to one of the main centers of adherents to the Shia sect of Islam -- Karbala. The city of Karbala, and particularly the twin mosques that tower over it, is central to the Shia Islamic faith. The significance of these structures is embedded in the culture, economy and faith of the over half a million residents, as well as of the millions of people who pilgrimage every year to visit the sacred, ancient metropolis.
However when I first arrived to the city and noticed the massive golden domes, I knew nothing of their significance; I knew nothing of the story behind the shrines and the history behind them; and I was still ignorant of the general cultural milieu. I was not at all unique -- we all were mesmerized by the mosques and the culture around us, but had no clue where to begin in order to understand what they meant in the context of our presence among the people apart from: 1. do not get near the mosques; and 2. do not fire on them if fired upon from its vicinity. But more importantly, the prevailing attitude at the time seemed to be that we didn't really have to understand anything beyond the latter. That seemed to be a reasonable tenant; after all, why would it be necessary to know such things about any given area, people or buildings? How, if at all, is it pertinent to the mission?
Well, one of the gravest shortfalls in the early years of Iraq stabilization" was the lack of such understanding. That the tribes and religious sheiks had, in the midst of the political vacuum that developed after the fall of Saddam's regime, assumed control and influence. The majority of military and civilian leadership in Iraq did not understand these religious and ethnic nuances, which heavily contributed to the sectarian violence and militias that developed in areas like Najaf and Karbala. Moreover, corruption in the country ran rampant, especially through the local police, who had a long history as a force of subversion and brutality. Even the interpreters were at times influenced by their own biases; to include the fear for their own lives and those of their families. As a result, this depreciated the value of effective translation, actionable intelligence and serious engagement with the population -- essential components in counterinsurgency operations.
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Comments
Deja Vu all over again...
<i>Everything</i> get lost in the Intelligence 'system.'
That's all too familiar, Jennifer10 -- the Army wants NCOs to act responsibly and with good judgment. Most do in spite of the fact that their training and education is aimed about three to ten mils below their accommodation and capability levels.
Treat people as if their competence and mental acuity is marginal and they'll generally act that way on the rationale that if they're going to be accused of it, they might as well do it because it's easier...
I'm not at all sure we can afford to continue that wastage.
Ken: Thank you
For the last few weeks, I've been working on a paper regarding exactly the issue mvlakovic and Ken White raise about NCOs. "Strategic sargents" and junior enlisted men are receiving cultural training and education (its limited, but it exists), but there's no feedback system to put their lessons learned back into the training system. Before you guys jump in and say, "uhuh, there is": my interviews and blog reviews tell us this- the systems that could be collecting all that human terrain knowledge are being shortcircuited by a combination of factors. To name a few: it gets lost in the intellegence system, contractors who feel that they "own" the cultural material presented in their classes, bias on the part of academics that keeps the experience of NCOs and enlisted men out of the discussion, and lack of appropriate tools for collecting their information at the appropriate time. I've tried to contact Nick about this directly, when his iSoldier article was published, but alas, no response...
It's not sexy reading, but a discussion on this topic is more useful in light of the Knowledge Management Field manual. There's a doctrinal disconnect that causes the issues Nick points out. IMO- this issue is a syndrome-type thing: lots of symptoms with an amorphous cause, but clearly a systemic failure causing a predictable set of dysfunctions.
<b>Nick</b>, thank you for taking my comments as they were meant -- not blanket criticism but rather pointing out some things that were, in my opinion, deserving of another point of view and some thought. Your article is good and the topic needs attention, no question.
On the interventions, agree they may occur and we can all hope we are smarter about the future than we have been in the past. Regardless, we certainly need to be prepared to execute them and we need to be better culturally attuned in the run up and when committed.
Sorry about the Sir Haldane bit -- it was too good to resist -- I recalled a lengthy beer laden lecture from a wild Australian many years ago when he spotted in the USAIS issue of <i>"The Defence of Duffer's Drift"</i> a reference to "Sir Swinton" instead of Sir Ernest. We historically do not do the culture awareness and knowledge thing well...
<b>mvlakovic</b><blockquote>"...it should be the company commander and platoon leaders' responsibility to understand their AO's human terrain and then incorporate that understanding into their patrol briefs with some coordinating instructions for BOLOs, market activity, prayer times, etc."</blockquote> Yes. If the troops aren't adequately informed, trained and performing, the chain of command is at fault. Though I very strongly suggest you add the NCOs.
If you don't it will only get done if there are Officers in sight and that cannot -- and should not -- always be the case.
Nick,
I second most of what Ken White mentions, especially the training packages, but I'd say that in a COIN environment soldiers just need to respect the people they live and work amongst. It also helps to pass out tip cards as they greet people with "As-salama-lay-kum" on patrol. That way, from the respect they show the people, they gain the necessary trust and those people they gave the tip card to might be more comfortable to call the tip line if they see or know of bad dudes in the neighborhood. Simple is better, no?
Maybe the soldiers who read in their down time (as opposed to playing Guitar Hero) might take to reading more about Arab culture, but it should be the company commander and platoon leaders' responsibility to understand their AO's human terrain and then incorporate that understanding into their patrol briefs with some coordinating instructions for BOLOs, market activity, prayer times, etc.
Ken,
Thanks for your response to the piece; you certainly touched on some very important points.
I particularly appreciate your comments regarding training packages to be "echelon tailored." There is certainly value in that idea.
You say that such "interventions are not necessary or wise." Well that may be the case, and you may find that I would agree with that in more ways than one. However, such interventions are ongoing and, I think we can agree, to be fairly likely. So, if that is indeed the case, we need to have preparation and tools available to confront such threats.
And though it is not the "province" of the general purpose forces (again, I agree), it has been the mission of the general purpose forces for some time now... Therefore, maintaining the status quo and solely relying on "other ways to impose our desired solutions," muchless the current system dealing with cultural awareness, is not sufficient.
But I submit to you, just like I did in the article, that my suggestions are "no silver bullet;" indeed, there is no such thing in this case. And yes, at the end of the day if there is still a "lacking" from folks in "authority," than anything you or I suggest here is disadvantaged to say the least.
Oh and ouch on the "Sir Haldane" catch - Not the best mistake to make given the nature of this piece!
I've just read 20 pages which have some merit -- we don't do other cultures well and we need to do better. Agreed. It emphasizes the need for full spectrum capability -- yet focuses on a minute element at one end of the spectrum.
It also has suggestions that are, I believe, rather flawed. First, this early statement:<blockquote>"Though many of these issues could very well have been destined to occur to one degree or another, there was a strategic failure in not preparing to deal with the situation and adequately work with, and protect, the people."</blockquote>is somewhat correct and never seems to be adequately addressed.
Our cultural error was not really strategic -- it was Operational; among other operational errors, the Army was not prepared to rapidly disseminate helpful cultural knowledge to people who would be better able to do their jobs armed with such information.
The proposal is a typical unwieldy bureaucratic proposal for rectification. Such efforts <i>always</i> founder on their own weight. Checking boxes seldom produces results. Incentive pays will be taken if offered but will not effect the desired changes across the force. They almost never do...
The article mentions availability of a current 34 cultures worth of exportable packages. I suspect more cultures will be made available. The problem is to determine which of those merit study and which can be safely ignored. An Army that may be committed on very short notice to anything from a humanitarian aid mission to major combat operations anywhere on the Globe truly has a problem in this regard...
We do not need cultural training across the Institutions. Aside from significant perishability and personnel turnover problems and thus great waste, the difficulties in predicting which culture(s) may be of great interest and when preclude a rational approach.
The press for training packages to be made readily available to deploying units should continue but those packets need to be tailored for and have an 'immediacy of need' or they will be of little to no value. The average US Army combat unit will not pay much heed to that sort of training unless there is a clear need to focus.
To facilitate successful employment, training packages have to be echelon tailored; i.e. for Platoon/Company, Battalion/Brigade and TF/JTF level and must be designed to provide historical <u>and current</u> information of tactical value for the level intended. Provide the leaders the requisite information and hold them responsible for training their Troops.
Oh, speaking of cultural awareness -- it's Sir James or Sir Aylmer, not Sir Haldane
In addition to the contingency Training packages, a political advisor, preferably an area qualified FSO, should be assigned to each Brigade. No, we do not have those. Yes, we should have them IF we intend to continue intervening here and there around the globe. I do not think such interventions are necessary or wise -- there are other ways to impose our desired solutions -- but we must acknowledge they could happen and we should be prepared for them even while trying to avoid them by preempting the problems. That is the province of the Department of State and Special Forces, not the general purpose forces.
We have had for many years a program for the training and use of foreign area specialists and of drawing on the collective wisdom of the universities in this country. Lacking has been anyone in a position of authority paying much attention to that knowledge. So the error has not been a lack of cultural knowledge but the failure of the Army to use the knowledge it had. Nothing suggested in this article will change that.
What is required is a systemic exportable on demand Training Package effort that incorporates current affairs and an expanded Foreign Area Officer program -- plus a process that <b>encourages</b> the political and military leadership to heed the advice of panels of those Area specialists instead of ignoring their advice as has been the practice.