by Dan Green
Going Tribal: Enlisting Afghanistan's Tribes (Full PDF Article)
As United States policy-makers undertake a series of exhaustive reviews of U.S. policies in Afghanistan, they are taking a closer look at Afghan tribes as part of a new strategy for confronting increasing violence.
Much of this newfound interest stems from the very successful turnaround of Anbar Province, Iraq, where Arab tribes played a key part in changing the province from a hotbed of the Sunni Arab insurgency to a place where security has improved to the point that U.S. troops are beginning to be withdrawn.
The tribes are also receiving increased attention because the U.S. does not have enough troops available to undertake a proper counterinsurgency campaign, because of existing requirements in Iraq and the dwell time required between deployments.
But as tribes assume a more central role in our Afghanistan strategy, it is essential that we approach the challenge informed by our experiences in Iraq, not dominated by them, and that we craft a pragmatic strategy that will achieve enduring security effects for the Afghan population.
Afghanistan's tribes must forcefully confront the insurgency and not be overwhelmed by it, while maintaining the active support of the people and reducing the tendency of the tribes to fight among themselves.
All of this must be done while building the capacity of the Afghan state without creating a parallel tribal system. Though this would seem to be an almost insurmountable challenge, it is not impossible, and to quote General David Petraeus's view about creating security in Iraq: "Hard is not hopeless."
Going Tribal: Enlisting Afghanistan's Tribes (Full PDF Article)
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Comments
Ian,
Hope all is well. Just a very short comment. You are 100% correct that "knowing" about tribes will not help you KNOW what a pashtun tribesman will do or react to certain things. However, knowing a SPECIFIC man (Pashtun or otherwise) over a long time frame will allow you to be as predictive as one can about behaviour. And what I am talking about is NOT rapport, but a relationship.
As I have said over and over again, what the Afghan tribesman wants is the two things we can't/won't give him: time and a relationship.
With an Afghan tribesman it's all about the realtionship.
But that is just a personal observation!
Take care.
STRENTTH AND HONOR
Jim
Dave,
Tried sending email to your contact Dave but it opens outlook and my email address won't register. I don't want to post my email address in open forum and wondering if you could read it from the comment box (says not displayed or made public)?
Dan,
Great to hear you are over here. If Dave can't get you my email I will get a throw away acount or something. You have some great ideas in your paper and with a little tweaking could be a successful model for what I am trying to do. I look forward with talking with you.
Thanks for your time
I like the idea of working with whats there, rather than trying to create something that is not. We should work with existing tribes, armies, villages, or whatever local regional population structure there is.
This should be common sense. Locals understand the people, language, customs, land, that they operate in. Existing groups understand the people they operate with. They will be many times more motivated to do their job for their own region or group. The region or people will be much more receptive to having locals protect them. So overall they will be much more effective as soldiers or police than say a national army. Furthermore once local groups form, then local groups can form alliances, and so on. All common sense, that we should embrace.
Certainly if the United States of America looked at its own history, it did not create a national army from the start, but states and regions combined their armies into a national army that fought the British.
The problem is the US and NATO are trying to force a great many unnatural things to happen. This has created a mess of goals and motivations. The Afghans should be fighting for themselves, not the US fighting to protect Afghans.
Bottom line is that the US and NATO badly need to back off.
Lets go back to our original strategy that seemed to work very well at the beginning of this conflict.
Use extreme force against those that harbor Al Queda or are causing large problems for our Afghan friends.
Keep our force small, and our engagement with Afghans limited. Use CIA and special force types to work with Afghans.
Leave the rest to our Afghan friends. Give them aid in form of weapons, food, etc, but let them deal with our common enemy in their own way. As they are the ones that are going to have to live with the results, not us.
Then we can go back to hunting Al Queda, and those that harbor them. In doing so we can drastically draw down the size of our force. We can stop making ourselves targets. We can get rid of goals of democracy. We stop making promises of billions of dollars, infrastructure, and years of help.
We can tell the Afghans that it is up to you to create a good future, we will help you, but we won't do it for you.
Found this over on the stevenpressfield.com site and it seems to fit here:
MIDN R. Davis
Posted February 5, 2010 at 6:30 AM | Permalink
It seems that these Mental Models are exactly what is preventing the mid-level military leaders from effectively engaging the tribes in Afghanistan. This failure to engage was a problem Major Gant brought up recently during a lecture at the U.S. Naval Academy. Unfortunately this is unlikely to change in the near future since a large part of our military strategy in Afghanistan relies on conventional forces with battalion and brigade leaders who have a hard time developing a 'hands off approach to engaging the tribes. As Major Gant discussed at the U.S. Naval Academy, these leaders cannot easily relinquish their control over the battle space to allow Captains and Lieutenants the necessary freedom to act.
These MMs can be attributed to some officers continuing inability to overall adapt to a different environment that requires different tactical goals, operations and strategies than a necessarily conventional war. Furthermore, with the advent of a military designed to be 'network oriented, these preventive commanders have a greater ability to micromanage and restrict their subordinates from making the necessary tactical-strategic decisions. (See P. Singers book Wired for War for more detail on this 'techno over control)
Dan---a number of items jump out of the article;
1. top down approaches never really work and are time consuming and time is of the essence when you look at 2011 and this is simply a top down approach
2. the Iraqi experience cannot be carried into
Afghtanistan as it was not our successes that caused the Awakening--it was the impact of AQI on the tribes that caused the Awakening--some smart BCT Cmdrs in 2005 understood the AQI impact on the tribes and made constant suggestions to DOS but got shot down all the time-ie in 2005 the 3/3ID was already doing major heavy HTT lifting in Diyala as the DOS rep never read a single IR---he felt it was not part of his job description
3. the HTTs are not combat arms types willing to go native and die if need be to drive forward in clearing insurgents from a key terrain area-heck they do not like to even
be actually tasked on the intelligence gathering side
4. big Army BCT Cmdrs are risk adverse--do you think they will scatter their units into 4-6 man teams, go native, learn the culture, fight without body armor/kelvar helmuts---the first BCT soldier killed without body armor will create a max BCT review of policy and hit his OER and he has to explain to the families why they were killed wearing no armor and he has to explain his policy to CNN as well
5. using history to explain things on the current ground level will never work-why?--the insurgency is morphing constantly as they adapt to our TTPs and they adapt at a far faster rate than we do-why? because we have to discuss it to death before we make decisions--SF is faster at this than big Army simply because their lives depend on being faster and smarter
6. so while it is an interesting article it will not lead to driving the Taliban out of critical areas nor securing the population by 2011
Just my opinion as a former SF VN vet and a HUMINT SME who did his time in Diyala/Abu Ghraib in 2005/2006 who was preaching HT to anyone that would listen but no one was listening---why?-- because HT was hammered into our heads as a UW fighting unit in the 60s thus the SF crest "To free the oppressed".
Going tribal sounds like a viable solution at first glance. But the reality is that this system is currently in disarray; much of the tribal leadership has been usurped by local strongmen and their militias. The loyalty to money vs tribal lines is a very strong incentive. I some place, it has not just created a parallel structure to the GoA, but has made sub-national governance a token position.
When people speak about "tribal security solutions" what they really mean is turning to the Arbakai/Lashkar for a local COIN solution. It is generally thought (by Westerners) that this system is universal throughout AFG or throughout the Pashtun areas. It might have been but no longer. Only a small area in the South-East of the country now maintains the Arbakai in support of the traditional governing body; the Jirga. If an Arbakai operates outside the Jirga, then it is no longer an Arbakai but just another militia.
The Arbakai is a double-edged sword. It can assist with COIN but it can also be won over by insurgents. And seeing how poorly we've done with the "hearts & minds" in this country, I'd suggest leaving the Arbakai out of the equation for now.
In other areas (examples: Baghlan, Konduz, Kapisa) the Govt has tried to create an Arbakai but these attempts have backfired. The "Arbakai" (without the traditional links to the tribes/jirgas) exploited their new found authority and began to prey on the communities. These people, who were previously COIN neutral at worst, now side with the INS. Another job not well done. The Arbakai have traditionally implemented the decisions of the Jirga and stand between two conflicting sides. Asking them to join a side is a major departure from their role. If they are forced to pick sides, a Jirga may decide that the presence of the Govt, ANSF or the IMF are a destabilizing factor for their area. Case in point; the Mangal tribe. They were once very anti-INS/TB/AQ but within the last year they abruptly changed sides. There are many possible causes for this and I don't claim to know the exact reason.
As for the Pashtunwali code of conduct, having been in Afg for 48 mths, I have never met a Pashtun that believes in it today. It worked once, they are fond of the idea, they say that's how things SHOULD be but its gone.
Dan,
As an MA in International Relations, and working as a mentor to the Afghan National Army since 2006 (with previous, numerous deployments since 2002), I applaud this piece and assert that your advice is SPOT ON. I couldn't agree more and I have 3 years DIRECT experience here in Helmand Province to support your advice.
In a nutshell, we must develop relationships, but in order to develop those relationships, one must first understand how (and that means learning and understanding the tribes). There is no cookie cutter approach other than the a sound understanding of associative/collective cultures, Pashtunwali, and three cups of chai.
Dan Green has touched on an important subject looking at potential benefits and pitfalls of engaging tribes. He is correct in his assertion that tribal factor is being considered not because it is inherently better but due to the fact that U.S. is either unable or unwilling to provide adequate troops for the tough task at hand. Tribal factor is an important element in the conflict, however it is crucuail not to generalize tribal element. It is a very complex drama in which tribesmen have been playing this game of survival for centuries outlasting empires and nation states. In view of U.S. objectives and limitations, tribal factor will be a small piece in the big puzzle. It can surely bring some benefits, but it also has the potential of reversing the modest gains made so far and setting the stage for a different conflict.
In Afghanistan, Washington has been entangled in many tribal, clan and even extended family rivalries. Washingtons money and military muscle has been used by Afghans to settle scores with tribal rivals. One example of Haji Bashir Noorzai will suffice. He claims leadership of Noorzais; a powerful tribe of southern Afghanistan. Bashir helped Washington in Stinger buy back program in mid 1990s. It is alleged that he inherited his fathers opium business. When Taliban emerged on the scene, he threw his lot with them. In October 2001, when U.S. arrived on the scene, he switched sides and delivered several trucks of arms hidden by Taliban in his tribes villages. He also helped to bring in some Taliban leaders (the most famous was former foreign minister Mullah Abdul Wakil Muttawakil). In the local power struggle, he was opposing his fellow tribesman Arif Noorzai who was then Karzais minister for tribal affairs. During all this time, his paycheck was coming from Washington. The wind started to blow in the other way and Washington now saw him a big drug lord. He was enticed to come to U.S. where he was indicted and in May 2009 sentenced to life imprisonment on drug charges. U.S. taxpayers first paid Bashirs salary, then spent millions on his trial and now will be spending about $30000 per year to keep him in a comfortable U.S. prison. Bashir is 43 year old and with a good balanced diet and decent health care provided by our prison system is likely to live a long life.
There needs to be a clear understanding about the mission. The end game is reasonable stabilization in the security realm and then departure of U.S. troops or social re-engineering of the region. Resources and more importantly the mindset requirement about these two projects are totally different. Unfortunately, patience has never been an American virtue. Few examples will give a glimpse of the task at hand. Dan advises the readers to read about the marvelous work of Robert Groves Sandeman. A little knowledge about Robert is as important as his work. Robert came to India at the tender age of sixteen to join the regiment which his father has been commanding for long time. He ended up spending twenty six years among the Baluch tribes earning their genuine love and respect. On his death bed, several tough Baluchi chiefs were seen crying and he is buried in Baluchistan. Robert Warburton spent eighteen long years dealing only with one Afridi tribe of Khyber. General Abraham Roberts spent his entire military career of fifty years in India. His son Field Marshal Frederick Roberts spent forty years in India. Between father and son that comes out to ninety two years.
British were successful in social re-engineering in view of enormous resources put into the effort. Men of that bygone era spent their whole lives among their subjects and in the end desired a knighthood and adding C.B., O.B.E. etc. after their names. Young Americans are doing ninety and one hundred and eighty days furloughs in these far off lands and want CEO and CFO after their names. A lot of good work is being done about various day to day issues but there is no serious debate about the endgame. Consensus about the end game should be the first step to work towards a reasonable operational set up. One senior U.S. official in Baghdad very accurately described the tribal dilemma in 2003 stating that 'the significance of the bigger tribes doesnt escape me. But if it was easy as talking to five or six sheiks to put a stop to violence, wed have done it. Were not that dense. Tribal factor is an important one but it needs a more serious and in depth analysis with clear comprehension about the nuances.
(These views are based on authors own research work on security issues of Afghanistan & Pakistan.)
Dr. Hamid Hussain
Coeus Consultants LLC
[email protected]
August 9, 2009
Sorry, I originally meant to respond to your last comment. The major difference between "tribal" social systems and non-tribal ones is that tribe is based on kinship. Kinship beyond the nuclear family is not the primary form of identification among Pashtuns (although it could potentially be, it almost never is). So making a whole "tribal" solution and then saying it's perfectly applicable to non-tribal areas is tantamount to a policy of tribalization of non-tribal areas. Is that what you intend?
One of the problems I have with your usage of the word "tribe" throughout your paper is that you don't indicate anywhere that in a given area, a non-tribal faction might be the operative cleavage. In many areas tribe is as important a political indicator as sports rivalries are in America--good enough of an identity to have some emotion about, but not enough to go to battle over. When you say "tribal identity is the beginning," I have to disagree--often, assuming tribal identity is the beginning is going to mislead you about which cleavages are "operational."
If we were to take our cue from the human terrain experts known as the Taliban, and especially the 1994-1996 version, then we might use our local knowledge of conflicts (and the social networks they spawn) as a way of knowing who needs to be killed and who can be treated as a civilian. Right now, the big complaint is that we can't peel apart the combatants from the noncombatants. Knowing local networks allows you to do that. That's what the Taliban did and why they had such great success in the Pashtun areas in the mid 90s.
Second, close knowledge of local conflicts allows you to figure out if those conflicts can be resolved. The way to resolve those conflicts is not to militarize (hand out more powerful guns to arbakai, say) but to offer a fair (I emphasize fair since fairness is currently in short supply in the Af govt) court system. One of the few services the insurgents are providing the few areas they have limited control: dispute resolution.
Again, I want to press the point that arming "the tribes" causes fear in the population, because the population understands that "tribe" is a conflict identity, not a stability identity.
I propose paying close attention to local conflicts between local groups--which rarely turn out to be tribes. They are almost always factions that cut across family lines. Understanding these local conflicts and how they map onto the national-level conflict is the first step (the first of many complex steps) to increasing our control of areas that are now gray. Unfortunately, we can make militias and councils all day long, but until our local knowledge improves--and locals are specifically trying to distort and influence that knowledge in their own private favor--we won't make progress. Knowing who's in a tribe and where they are doesn't predict behavior among Pashtuns.
With respect, sir, your experience in Iraq as a Tribal Engagement Officer isn't going to help you in Afghanistan--in fact it could end up leading you down the wrong path altogether. Working on the PRT in Uruzghan may have given you some exposure to the elites in the province, but "the tribes" in Afghanistan don't work like they do in Iraq. Tribal elders in RC-South and RC-East have been displaced in their communities by young guns who cut across tribal lines with devastating effectiveness. Pick any recent anthropological writing on Pashtuns--they all are unanimous that Pashtuns don't even organize tribally anymore. I can give you a good thick bibliography on the topic (it will exclude Bruce and Sandeman because I'm serious, not joking, when it comes to the fact that Americans might die because of a misunderstanding of Afghanistan's culture).
Tribal voices were disconcertingly absent from "Going Tribal." I've found their insights, concerns, and even demands to be highly relevant to policy development and decision-making. For example, North Waziristan tribal elders and religious scholars had strong opinions when I recently solicited their views about development and foreign assistance in their area. Some of their thoughts can be found in an article I wrote for the May 2009 issue of Monday Developments, "New Technology for Development." (The full issue must be downloaded to access the article.)
http://www.interaction.org/library/detail.php?id=6768
I also don't hold much hope for an informant system based on postcards and "anonymous" complaint boxes. Having worked six years in the tribal areas on both sides of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, I think this would inevitably increase "the tendency of the tribes to fight among themselves."
A recent paper, "Tribal Security System (Arbakai) in Southeast Afghanistan," provides a more realistic look at possibilities for enlisting the tribes. It also considers expansion of the system to other regions of Afghanistan. I've included the introduction below. The author, Mohammad Osman Tariq, is an Afghan religious scholar, tribal leader, and former mujahid.
http://www.crisisstates.com/download/op/OP7.pdf
*********
"Tribal Security System (Arbakai) in Southeast Afghanistan"
Introduction
Forms of community policing known as Arbakai1 have existed in Southeast Afghanistan for centuries, their survival facilitated by the particularly weak state presence in this region. Their existence initially became a matter of controversy during the Security Sector Reform (SSR) process in post-conflict Afghanistan (2001-). This was only exacerbated in 2007-08 when ideas of sponsoring similar militias surfaced within the Afghan government and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). This paper examines the Arbakai in the light of existing literature about community policing and explores their relationship with the Afghan State.
Limited literature exists on this subject. Thus the author here presents highly original research findings using data collected during interviews, focus group discussions and his own experience working with the Arbakai between 2001 and 2006, after the fall of the Taliban regime. Qualitative open-ended interviews took place with three government officials and seven people from the region - three tribal leaders, two civil society members and two retired regional government officers. The author also distributed a survey questionnaire to nine people from the south-eastern, eastern, central and southern regions.
Underpinning this study lies one question: how can the state security sector engage with the Arbakai? In order to answer this, the paper will first analyse the current situation, and then the context of the region in which the Arbakai are currently active. Following this, the specific failure of the security sector reform will be discussed. Much of the paper is dedicated to explaining how the Arbakai institution works, and how it is distinct from militias and those hired by private security companies. The potential expansion of the system to other regions of Afghanistan will be discussed with a particular focus on the difficulties of introducing a community security system from above and the possible consequences of doing so. In this light, the clash between Pashtunwali, as the legal source for Arbakai, and the civil law adopted by the state will be explored. A case study of the Mangal tribe will be used to illustrate the role of the Arbakai in the counter-insurgency effort.
I was skeptical when I read the opening blurb, but I think the framework described in the body of the essay is not only realistic, but (in my opinion) the only way that we are going to create any lasting stability in Afghanistan.
One aspect not covered in much detail is the amount of time and the number of US/Coalition troops that would be required to execute a program like this. And (again in my opinion) you can't just stick any bunch of troops into a mission like this and expect them to be successful. They would need to be mature, culturally sensitive, patient, and disciplined (though not necessarily in the "garrison" sense of the word).
Ultimately, I'm not holding my breath until this strategy is put into action on any workable scale. I understand some SF teams are mentoring local tribal-type militias, but it's going to take more than a few of these to make the kind of difference we are looking for. But the danger our commanders would have to allow their troops to be placed in and the level of logistical support needed, not to mention the massive delegation of authority and initiative for this kind of effort seems like it would find few allies in the upper echelons of our military.
I don't know. I hope I am proved wrong on this.